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Abstract 
This study entails a constructive contribution towards a contemporary reinterpretation, 
within the Akan context, of the classic Christian notion of Christ’s person and work as 
Mediator between God and humanity. Specifically, I endeavour to reinterpret aspects of 
the Christian confession of faith as formulated by the Council of Chalcedon (451) that, 
Jesus Christ is “truly God” (vere Deus) as well as “truly human” (vere homo). I build on 
the notion that the relationship between these two claims may also be understood in terms 
of the one “person” and the two “natures” of Jesus Christ. The work of Christ is 
reinterpreted from this perspective. 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part, which covers the first four 
chapters, entail reviews of some of the dominant African Christologies – with particular 
reference to divine conqueror and ancestor Christologies. In these chapters, the adequacy 
of the mentioned Christologies is assessed with reference to the Nicene/Chalcedonian 
confessional definition concerning the person of Christ. The conclusion reached is that 
these Christologies do not adequately express the person of Christ as truly divine as well 
as truly human as defined by the first four ecumenical councils. As a result, these 
Christologies also express the work of Christ, particularly his atonement in a less 
adequate way. 
In critical dialogue with the two Christological models mentioned above, the second part 
of the thesis (chapters 5-7), articulates, tests and develops a constructive proposal, for a 
Christology within the Akan context, based on the concept of “God’s unique priest” 
(Nyamesofopreko). The research problem which is investigated in this research is 
formulated as follows: 
Can a Nyamesofopreko Christology overcome the weaknesses of ancestral 
Christology and divine spirit Christology in re-appropriating, within a 
contemporary Akan context, the classic Christian affirmation that the person 
and work of Jesus Christ may be understood in terms of acting as unique 
Mediator between God and humanity? 
The following approach was employed to investigate the adequacy of a Nyamesofopreko 
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Christology:  
In this Christology the following three themes were developed: a) the need for a mediator 
between God and humanity, b) the person of Christ as Mediator between God and 
humanity and c) mediation as the work of Christ. In the case of each of these three 
themes: a) the core tenets of the Christian faith were described briefly. b) This theme was 
then related to similar aspects of the traditional Akan culture, worldview and belief 
system. c) On this basis a constructive reinterpretation of such themes within the Akan 
context is offered. The strengths and weaknesses of such a reinterpretation were assessed 
based on of the criteria used to critique the divine conqueror Christology and ancestor 
Christology.  
Before introducing the concept of “okra” and afomusuyideε, an exposition of the term 
Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique Priest) as a Christological designation was offered to 
articulate the need for a mediator between God and humankind. This is patterned along 
other Christological designations such as “Messiah”, “Son of Man”, and “Son of God”. 
This observation is followed by a constructive proposal on the need for such a mediator. 
The proposal is that the term Nyamesofopreko may be employed to portray Jesus Christ 
as God’s unique priest, i.e. as One who, for the first time, could fulfill this mediating role 
since he is professed to be a person without sin. As God’s unique priest, Jesus mediates 
between God and humankind following the alienation between God and humankind 
(interpreted in the traditional Akan context in terms of the myth of God’s withdrawal).    
On the basis of the traditional Akan myth of Onyame’s self-withdrawal and the absence 
of a priesthood for Onyame, the observation was offered that, in traditional Akan religion 
and culture, no suitable mediator has been identified that could restore the relationship 
between Onyame and humanity.  
The core of the proposal embedded in this thesis is summed up with the Akan concept of 
okra. This concept is loosely translated in English as “soul” but could be better rendered 
as Logos as its dynamic equivalent. This is a concept that implies the quality of a co-
presence of time and eternity. Jesus’ divinity is thus proposed on the basis of the notion 
of the Okra of Onyame. His humanity is described in terms of the Okra of Onyame 
becoming teasefo (human). His two natures in one person are conceptualised as 
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Nyamekrateasefo (Okra of Onyame incarnate).  
The work of Christ is also conceptualised as afomusuyideε. The term is coined from the 
two Akan terms afodeε (sin sacrifice) and musuyideε (curse bearer) to express the 
Christian notion of the death of Jesus as a sin sacrifice as well as “scapegoat”. My main 
contention is that the death of Jesus as a sacrifice may be interpreted closer as One who 
publicly “acknowledged” the sin of humankind” before God as a representative.   
In the final step, the wider ecumenical significance of such a Nyamesofopreko 
Christology within the African context and for Christianity elsewhere in the world is 
briefly explored.   
To sum up the proposal of this thesis: The person of Jesus is presented as being God’s 
unique priest (Nyamesofopreko); he is the incarnation of the Okra of Onyame. The 
purpose of this incarnation is that the Okra of Onyame through the person of God’s 
unique priest becomes the Afomusuyideε (sin sacrifice and curse bearer) for humankind.  
This proposal rests on the foundation of faith in the triune God. This was conceptualised 
as Nyamebaasafua, that is, Onyame Ntoro (God the Father) Onyame Okra (God the Son) 
and Onyame Sunsum Kronkron (God the Holy Spirit). 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This study entails a constructive contribution towards a contemporary reinterpretation of the 
classic Christian notion of Christ’s person and work as Mediator between God and humanity 
within the Akan context. I have offered a critique of two alternative forms of Christology 
which are dominant in the Akan context, namely a popular Christology in which Christ is 
portrayed as the “Divine conqueror of the African spirit world” and an elitist Christology in 
which Christ is portrayed as the “great ancestor”. In this study I have proposed a Christology 
based on the concept of “God’s unique priest” (Nyamesofopreko) in which the following three 
themes have been developed: a) the need for a mediator between God and humanity (given 
the reality of sin), b) the person of Jesus Christ as Mediator between God and humanity and c) 
mediation as the work of Christ. In each case the core tenets of the Christian faith are related 
to themes and myths in the traditional Akan culture, worldview and belief system in an 
attempt to offer a constructive reinterpretation of such themes. 
1.2 Context and relevance of the study 
1.2.1 Christianity in the context of Ghana 
The context within which this study in Christology is situated is that of the introduction and 
growth of Christianity amongst the Akan people in Ghana and the ways in which it engaged 
with African traditional religion.1 The Akan people live predominantly in the countries of 
Ghana and the lvory Coast. In Ghana they inhabit the southern and central half of this 
country. The Akan consist of several subgroups of which the Ashanti are numerically 
dominant. The Akan have a common socio-economic and cultural system and speak a 
common language. The Akan people represent over 53% of the current population of twenty 
million in Ghana.2
The first church in West Africa was planted in Ghana by the Western missionaries (Roman 
  
                                                 
1  See Williamson (1959) and Ellis (1887). 
2  For detailed discussions of Akan traditional culture see Busia (1951), Rattray (1956, 1959)), Opoku (1975) 
and Sarpong (1974). Also see Sarpong (1971, 1980, 1998), Gyekye (1998), Amponsah (1975), Amoah 
(1998) Nketia (1963), Anti (1978) and Parrinder (1961, 1969, 1970). 
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Catholics) around 1482. The Christianity transplanted in Ghana was in the form of a sterilised 
European institution, safely quarantined in “hygienic” enclaves along the coast (Sanneh 
1983:20). From there the church in Ghana occasionally started to reach out to the indigenous 
population. As sections of the Akan population lived in the coastal region of Ghana, from 
early on they came into contact with Christianity.3
The early missionary activities remained restricted. From 1820 a new wave of Protestant 
missionaries led to the growth of Christianity amongst the Akan. The Basel Missions Society 
began its work in 1828. After a brief stay in Accra, they moved to the Akwapim area to work 
among the Akan groups. In 1835 the Wesleyan Methodist society (WMS) also started their 
activities in Ghana. The Methodist missions began their activities among the Akan (Fantes) in 
the coastal areas and later extended their work to other parts of Ghana (Clarke 1986:41-42, 
Sanneh 1983:119-126). Currently, up to 70% of the people of Ghana are considered to be 
Christians, including 56% Protestants and 14% Catholics.
 
4
The phenomenal growth of the protestant missionary activities was at least partially the result 
of a general dissatisfaction amongst the Akan with the operations and perceived 
ineffectiveness of the abosom (lesser divinities) as compared to the effectiveness of Western 
forms of technology. The Akan people shifted their allegiance from the lesser divinities to the 
message of Christianity since they recognised the powerful potential of allegiance to Jesus 
Christ (who is portrayed as a miracle worker and Lord over all spirit powers). The 
missionaries did not fully comprehend the shift of power allegiance taking place. 
Nevertheless, since the missionaries heavily depended on African agents, the messages 
preached were either directed or interpreted to fit in the power encounter between the African 
traditional religion and Christianity.
 
5
As Lamin Sanneh (1983) rightly asserts, the use of African local agents in the work of 
Western missions was indispensable. This was probably the major factor behind the growth of 
Christianity in West Africa during this period. Sanneh notes that the successful establishment 
of Christianity in Sierra Leone, against the background of centuries of failure, acted as a 
powerful stimulus for the extension of Christianity to other parts of Africa, particularly 
Ghana. The lesson from this period seems to be that there is no substitute for partnership with 
Africans in missionary work (also see Grau 1968:61).  
  
                                                 
3  See the following publications for more detailed work on early Christianity in Ghana: Bartels (1965), Sanneh 
(1983) and Clarke (1986). Also see, Walker (1976), Debrunner (1967), Jenkins (1905) and Southon (1935).  
4  See the Ghana Demographic Survey of 2004. 
5     Also see Anyanwu (1985) and Okorocha (1987). 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Behind the role of local agents was the use of the mother tongue in which the Christian 
message was translated within the worldview of the Akan people. Such local agents received 
very limited theological training (which would have been within a Western orientation). 
Therefore they communicated the Christian message in a simplified form and in the 
conceptual framework provided by their own culture and worldview. 
The role of African agents and the use of the mother tongue are significant for a reflection on 
the status of African religions in Christianity. Those who adapted and promoted the Christian 
faith in Akan communities themselves remained very close to sources of traditional religious 
vitality – even though they occasionally had to condemn traditional practices in order to 
please Western missionaries. Thus the spread of Christianity took place along familiar 
religious channels, in the process acquiring a strong dose of traditional religious resources. 
This quarantined Christianity of Western missionaries subsequently tried to filter out (Sanneh 
1983:20).  
By bringing the Christian gospel into Africa, the missionaries assumed that they were 
introducing a new concept to the Akan. However, for the African agents, the God which the 
missionaries proclaimed was simply identified with the Supreme Being traditionally known 
amongst the Akan.6
1.2.2 Jesus Christ as the core message of Christianity 
  
The message of the Christian gospel brought by the missionaries to Ghana included several 
aspects which were easily recognised and assimilated within the traditional culture and 
worldview of the Akan. This entails the notions of the Supreme Being, the creation of the 
world and humanity, the alienation between humanity and the Supreme Being and the need 
for sacrifices to restore the relationship between the Supreme Being and human beings.7
However, the figure of Jesus Christ, which formed a core component of the gospel the 
missionaries preached, was not familiar to the traditional Akan. As more or less orthodox
  
8
                                                 
6   From the writings of African theologians about the Supreme Being, it is sufficient to conclude that this 
concept of deity is encountered all over Africa and that there is no debate with regard to the originality of the 
concept. More importantly, it is also clear that African theologians see the Supreme Being in Africa as none 
other than the God proclaimed by Christianity. See Adubofour (1987) and Fulljames (1994). 
 
7  Sanneh (1983:20) argues that Christianity as a universal religion has the task of introducing certain 
universal teachings about God which were lacking in traditional religions. However, he contends that 
missionary Christianity rather presented a universal God to be revered in an exclusive religion. 
8  In this research the term “orthodoxy” is used with reference only to those groups of Christians who seek to 
adhere to the decisions of the councils of Nicea (325/381) and Chalcedon (451). For the debates on 
“Orthodoxy” and “heretics”, see Dunn (1977). Also see Bauer (1972) and Bultmann (1952). 
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Christians, the understanding of the person and work of Jesus Christ amongst the Western 
missionaries was shaped by the Councils of Nicea (325/381) and of Chalcedon (451). The 
message that the missionaries proclaimed, portrayed Jesus as a being who is fully human as 
well as fully divine and it maintained that Jesus died “for us and our salvation”.9
This message created confusion in the mind of its Akan recipients. The oneness of the 
Supreme Being is assumed within the Akan worldview, while the concept of divine assembly 
is foreign to it.
  
10 It was therefore difficult for the Akan to comprehend that Jesus could be 
regarded as the Supreme Being or as being one with Supreme Being. From the very beginning 
this raised questions about the status and the identity of Jesus Christ, especially within the 
context of Akan Christianity.11
In terms of the traditional Akan worldview, it would be possible to attribute divinity to Jesus 
by regarding him as one of the “lesser divinities” (abosom). For the Akan, divinity does not 
necessarily refer to the Supreme Being only, but could also apply to the lesser divinities. The 
abosom are regarded as creatures of the Supreme Being and are not in any sense in the same 
class or in competition with this Being.
 
12
This created further confusion in the mind of Christians amongst the Akan. This confusion 
has led to many (conflicting) interpretations of the significance of the person and work of 
Jesus Christ, not only in the Ghanaian/Akan context but also in the wider African one. It is 
therefore not surprising that Christology remains one of the core themes in contemporary 
African Christian theologies. 
 However the missionaries demonised the lesser 
divinities and maintained the Nicene notion that Jesus is “of one being with the Father”. In 
light of this Akan Christians could not easily accept the notion that the person of Jesus Christ 
could be categorised amongst the lesser divinities.  
                                                 
9  For detailed discussions of the decisions of the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon, see Kasper (1976:230-
269), Wells (1984:85-125), Stevenson (1966), Peterson (1995) and Grau (1990). 
10  Danquah (1968) in Akan Doctrine of God suggests that Onyankonpon emerged to be the Supreme Being out 
of the struggle with other deities. However, such a notion of divine assembly is foreign to the Akan 
worldview, as Ryan (1980) rightly argued.  
11  See the following publications for detailed work on the Akan concept of Supreme Being, the lesser 
divinities, ancestors and other spirit beings:  Rattray (1956, 1959), Sawyerr (1986), Opoku, (1975), Sarpong 
(1974, 2001). 
12  See in this regard Sarpong (2002:96-97).  
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1.3 Demarcation: Various perspectives on Christology  
1.3.1 The person and work of Christ: Christ as Mediator  
In Christological discourse it has been customary to focus on two main themes, namely the 
person and the work of Christ. These themes are, of course, closely related. 
Discourse on the person of Christ follows from the titles attributed to Jesus Christ in the 
biblical texts (Messiah,13 Kurios,14 Son of Man,15 Son of God,16 etc). The early history of 
Christianity was characterised by fierce disputes on the person of Christ. The affirmation of 
the ecumenical Council of Nicea (325) was that Jesus Christ is both “fully human” and “fully 
divine”. This had countered a number of “heresies” in which either the divinity of Jesus (see 
subordianism, Arianism)17 or the humanity of Christ (see docetism18/Ebionism19) was under-
played or denied. This affirmation became highly influential in the subsequent Christian 
tradition but begged further questions about the relationship between the humanity and the 
divinity of Christ. This was addressed at the ecumenical Council of Chalcedon (451) which 
produced the formula that Christ has one “person” but two natures.20 This formula did not 
prevent further Christological disputes which followed from the terminology employed, as 
well as the relationship between the two “natures” of Jesus Christ which could either fuse the 
two natures (see monophysitism)21 or undermine the one or the other (see Apollinarianism)22
                                                 
13  On “Messiah” or “Christ”, see Klauser (1980), Marshall (1976:85-96), Martin (1964), Moule (1977:31-35), 
Cullmann (1963:111-136), Grundmann (493-580), Fuller (1979) Klein (1978) and Pannenberg (1977). 
 
14  On “Kurios” or “Lord” see Well (1984:74-77), Sarbourin (1984:19-20), Marshall (1976 97-110), Moule 
(1977:35-46), Cullmann (1963:195-236), and Pannenberg (1977: 365-397). 
15  On “Son of man” see Kasper (1976:197-229), Wells (1984:77-81), Moule (1977:10-22), Cullmann 
(1955:137-193), Marshall (1976:63-82), Pannenberg (1977) and Dunn (1980:65-97). 
16  On “Son of God” see Hengel (1975), Kasper (1976:163-196), O’Collins (1983:170-200), Marshall (1976) 
Wells (1984:70-71), Moule (1977:22-31) Cullmann (1955:270-290), Pannenberg (1977:334-337), Dunn 
(1980:12-64) and Brunner (1942:285-377). 
17  A central concept of Arianism is the absolute uniqueness and transcendence of God. Jesus is ultimately 
regarded as a “lesser divinity”. See Erickson (1985:695-702) William (1983) Stead (1978) and Spoerl 
(1994). 
18  Docetism takes its name from the Greek verb which means “to seem or appear”. Its central thesis is that 
Jesus only seemed to be human. God could not really have become material, since all matter is evil, and he 
is perfectly pure and holy. Like the Ebionites, the docetists had difficulty with the idea of the virgin birth. 
See Erickson (1985:712). See chapter 6 of this thesis for a detailed explanation. 
19  The Ebionites deny the deity of Jesus. They reject the virgin birth, maintaining that Jesus was born to 
Joseph and Mary in normal fashion. Jesus was, according to the Ebionites, an ordinary man possessing 
unusual (but not superhuman or supernatural) gifts of righteousness and wisdom. He was the predestined 
Messiah, although in a rather natural or human sense.  
20  For the discussions of the Chalcedon affirmation of Jesus’ two natures, see Erickson (1991, 1997) and 
Wells (1984). For alternative views, see Cupitt (1979:21-29). 
21  Monophysitism (from the Greek word monos meaning “one” and physis “nature”) maintains the 
Christological position that Christ has only one fused nature as opposed to the Chalcedonian position which 
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or create division within the one “person” of Jesus Christ (see Nestorianism).23
Historically, it has been customary to categorise the work of Christ in terms of the three 
“offices” of prophet, priest, and king.
  
24 Another way of exploring the work of Jesus Christ is 
to distinguish between the state of his humiliation and of exaltation. Each of these categories 
of Jesus are related to core Christological symbols. This pertains to the state of humiliation, 
incarnation,25 suffering, the cross and descent into hell on the one hand and, on the other hand 
the state of exaltation, resurrection, ascension, sitting at the right hand of the Father and the 
expectation of the (“second”) 
The work of Jesus Christ is captured in the Nicene Creed with the formula that Christ died 
“for us and our salvation”. The nature of such salvation and the way in which this is 
established through the incarnation,
coming of Christ (parousia).  
 cross26 and resurrection27 of Christ are traditionally 
discussed within the framework of the doctrine of atonement. The basic meaning of 
“atonement” (at-one-ment)28
                                                                                                                                                        
holds that Christ has two natures, one divine and one human. See Marshall (1982).  
 is to restore the relationship between God and humans. In the 
history of Christian doctrine a number of influential theories on the doctrine of atonement 
have emerged. Erickson (1985) identifies the following five theories in this regard: a) the 
Socinian theory: the atonement as an example of dedicated life, b) the moral influence theory 
– the atonement as a demonstration of God’s love, c) the governmental theory – the 
atonement as a demonstration of divine justice, d) the ransom theory: the atonement as a 
22  Apollinarianism, like docetism, denied the reality of Jesus’ humanity. However, Appollinarianism contends 
that Jesus took on genuine humanity, but not human nature as a whole. Therefore, Jesus although human, 
was different from other human beings, for he lacked something which all humans have (a human will). 
The Appollinarian doctrine was condemned at the Council of Constantinople in 381. For further 
discussions on this issue, see Wells (1984:105). See chapter 6 of this thesis for a detailed explanation. 
23  Nestorius a patriarch of Constantinople was accused of adoptionism (maintaining the notion that the man 
Jesus became divine at some point in his life after birth, probably at his baptism). See Wells (1984:106-
108), and Erickson (1985:726-727 )  
24  While some of the church fathers spoke of the offices of Christ, it was Calvin who gave special attention to 
this concept. However, some scholars contend that the expression “offices” with reference to Christ’s work 
sounds abstract and theoretical, see Berkouwer (1965:58-59). Berkouwer therefore deems it more 
appropriate to speak of a “threefold office” and of three aspects of one office. Erickson (1985:763) also 
refers to the work of Christ as three functions of Christ, namely revealing, ruling and reconciling.  
25  On the theme of incarnation, see Marshall (1982), Barr (1988), Brown (1974) Anderson (1978), Petersen 
(1995: 109-134) Barrett (1978), Hick (1977) and Goulder (1979). 
26  Throughout the course of Christian history this has been associated above all with the death of Jesus. 
However, Hooker (1994) contends that the saving work of Christ is just as often associated with his resur-
rection. Thus one should be wary of restricting New Testament views about the atoning work of Christ to 
discussions of the meaning of Jesus’ death alone. 
27  The resurrection of Jesus is seen as the most decisive point of Christology. See Pannenberg (1977:53-108), 
also see Jon Sobrino’s (1978) review of different interpretations of the resurrection of Jesus. 
28  On atonement see these publications for detailed discussions: Ezech (2003), Brunner (1942) and Erickson 
(1983). 
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victory over the forces of sin and evil and e) the satisfaction theory: the atonement as 
compensation to the Father.29
One Christological motif seems to bring discourse on the person and the work of Christ 
together in one formula. This is the portrayal of Christ as Mediator of the broken covenant 
between God and humanity. According to this motif, Jesus Christ is a suitable mediator 
between God and man precisely because he is “truly divine” as well as “truly human”. 
Accordingly, the work of Christ may be understood primarily in terms of mediation or 
reconciliation
 
30
In this thesis I have focused on the above mentioned core Christological motif in order to 
explore a reinterpretation of the person and work of Jesus Christ within the Akan context. 
 (see the discussion on mediation under 1.3.4 below).  
1.3.2 Christology in the African context 
John Mbiti (1967) noted in an early article that there are no ideas about Christology in African 
Christian theology. A few years later, Edward Fashole-Luke also remarked that there were no 
sign that African theologians were wrestling with Christological ideas (Fashole-Luke 
1976:159-176). In 1977, ten years after Mbiti’s statement, Kofi Appiah-Kubi of Ghana also 
observed that very little literature on African Christology was available.31
The proliferation of contributions on Christology has also led to the emergence of different 
forms of African Christology. These Christologies correspond to two of the dominant schools 
of contemporary African Christian theology, namely liberation
 However, twenty 
years after Mbiti’s statement, Charles Nyamiti (1989) could report that: “Christology is the 
subject which has been most developed in today’s African theology.” There is no doubt that 
the situation has changed drastically over the last two decades. 
32
                                                 
29  See also the influential analysis by Gustav Aulén (1931).  
 and inculturation theologies. 
Inculturation theology is perhaps the most common and extensively developed theological 
approach in Africa. Most of the current African Christologies belong to this group (Mugambi 
1989, 1997, Nyamiti 1991 and Sarpong 2002). In this thesis, while incorporating some 
aspects of liberation theology, I have largely followed such an inculturation approach to 
African Christian theology with regard to Christ as Mediator.  
30  Emil Brunner (1942) regards mediation as the central doctrine of the Christian faith. For further discussions, 
see Kasper (1976:230-274), Badcock (1992) and Torrance (1983). 
31  Aylward Shorter in 1982 could still speak of the failure to produce a convincing African Christology. 
32  African feminist Christology falls in this group. See Amoah and Oduyoye (1988:35-46) and Oduyoye 
(1986). For feminist Christology in general, see Johnson (1990, 1997) and Fiorenza (2000). 
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A careful examination of the procedures employed in African Christologies reveals two 
approaches toward the subject. Firstly, there are those who, in constructing an African 
Christology, start from the biblical witnesses concerning Jesus Christ and then identify those 
Christological themes which would be relevant within a particular cultural context. Secondly, 
there are those who take the cultural context as their point of departure for constructing an 
African Christology (Nyamti 1991). 
Several surveys on African Christologies have already been published. It has become a major 
task to keep track of such new developments. There is also an increase in survey articles on 
African Christologies; see Nyamiti (1989, 1991:3-23, 1994:62-77) and Stinton (1970). 
Amongst contemporary African theologians who have engaged in the task of doing 
Christology from within an African context one may mention the contributions by Anne 
Nasimiyu-Wasike (1991), A.T. Sanon, Bujo Benezet (1992, 1998) Cece Kolie (1991), Charles 
Nyamiti (1984, 1996), Douglas W. Waruta (1991), Enyi Ben Udoh (1988), Efoe Julien 
Penoukou (1982:374-92; 1991), Francios Kabasèlè (1991), John Mbiti (1967), Jesse 
Mugambi (1998) Jean- March Ela (1986), John M.Waliggo (1991), Zablon Nthamburi (1991) 
and many others. Within the Ghanaian context, contributions to an African Christology have 
come from Abraham Akrong (1992:119-26), John Pobee (1979), Kwame Bediako (1990), 
Kofi Appiah-Kubi (1977:51-65), Peter Kwasi Sarpong (1998) and Mercy Amba Oduyoye 
(1986). 
In the African discourse on Christology a number of images and titles for Jesus have emerged. 
These include, amongst others, descriptions of Jesus Christ as ancestor (Akrong 1992, 
Bediako 1995, Muzorewa 1988, Nyamiti 1984, Pobee 1979, Penoukou 1991, Sarpong 
1998),33 chief (Pobee 1979, Cece Kolie 1991), 
In this thesis the proposals that Jesus Christ may be described as a divine conqueror and, 
alternatively, as an ancestor, are discussed in more detail. In response to these proposals, I 
have offered a constructive contribution within the discourse on African Christology. My 
divine conqueror (Appiah-Kubi 1977, Bediako 
1995, Mbiti 1973), elder (Shorter 1978:65-71), healer (Shorter 1982, Cece Kolie 1984), 
master of initiation (Sanon 1982), elder brother (Kabasele 1991), liberator (Ela 1986, 1988), 
guest (Udoh 1988) and priest (Waruta 1991, Wairimu 1997). 
                                                 
33  Sarpong deals specifically with the Christology of the Ashanti (the dominant group of the Akan). This is 
crucial to this thesis, as I will also interpret my data from the Ashanti perspective (Sarpong 1998: 25-27; 
31-33; 43:46; 47:51; 97-102; 141-159). This does not mean that there are any significant differences 
between the Ashantis and the other Akan groups. Nevertheless, when such contentions arise, my basic 
perspective is that of the Ashanti, to which I belong. 
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proposal is that Jesus Christ may be seen to be “God’s unique priest” (Nyamesofopreko). This 
proposal will seek to retain some continuity with the Christian tradition of Christological 
reflection (with specific reference to the Christological decisions of Nicea and Chalcedon). At 
the same time, it will seek to be relevant within the Akan context, allowing for a critique and 
innovation of the Christian faith, but also a challenge to the traditional Akan culture and 
worldview. 
1.3.3 Christology in the Ghanaian context 
In light of the above brief survey of developments in the history of Christian doctrine and of 
contemporary African discourse on Christology, the wider problem which this research will 
address may be formulated as follows: 
What is the most adequate model for a contemporary re-appropriation, within the 
Akan context, of the classic Christian affirmation that Jesus Christ is Mediator 
between God and humanity? 
In response to this question, one may identify especially two Christological models which are 
dominant and influential in contemporary Christian discourse within the Akan context. 
Firstly, there is a popular form of Christology in which Christ is portrayed as the divine 
conqueror of the African spirit world. Secondly, there is, especially amongst professional 
theologians, an elitist form of Christology in which Christ is portrayed as the great ancestor.  
a) Jesus as divine conqueror in the African spirit world  
According to the Akan worldview, the dominant spirit beings are Onyame (the Supreme 
Being), abosom (the lesser divinities) and nsamanfo (ancestors). Conceivably, if Jesus is not 
readily accepted amongst the Akan as Onyame (the Supreme Being), it logically follows that 
the other possibilities are either the status of obosom34
Within the wider African scene, Jesus is seen especially as a divine spirit who reigns supreme 
 or an ancestor, if one maintains that 
Jesus is more than a human being. The concepts of Jesus as a lesser divine being who 
conquers the African spirit world and as the great ancestor, therefore appears to reflect images 
which end any possibility for an incarnational Christology.  
                                                 
34  Technically speaking, Christology pertaining to “divine conqueror in African spirit world” would put Jesus 
in the category of abosom (lesser divinities) where it is assumed that Jesus is the most powerful amongst 
them, and that he conquered them through his death and resurrection. Otherwise, where would Jesus fit in 
to be the conqueror of the spirit world? The Ancestral Christology also poses Jesus in the image of the 
African ancestors. 
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over every spiritual ruler and authority. This understanding of Christ arises from Africans’ 
keen awareness of spiritual powers which threaten the harmony and the interests of living 
beings in the world. Jesus is deemed to be victorious over forces in the spiritual realm. This 
notion responds to the need for a powerful protector against such forces and powers.
This view of Christ suggests a deep appreciation of the traditional African world, which 
exerts such a powerful influence on the ways in which Africans understand and experience 
the Christian message. Nevertheless, some African theologians consider this view of Christ as 
inadequate (Mbiti 1973:397-414, also see Bediako 2000:8). 
  
Especially two weaknesses are related to this form of Christology which one might mention 
here. Firstly, this view does not account for the humanity of Jesus. Secondly, it does not offer 
an interpretation of the atoning work of Jesus on the cross. Jesus is taken to belong essentially 
to the more powerful realm of divine beings in the spiritual realm. (See chapter 3 for a 
detailed analysis on this). 
b) Ancestral Christology 
Of the various images of Jesus Christ emerging in African Christology, the image of ancestor 
seems to be dominant. More attention has been given to ancestorhood as a way of 
“Africanising” Jesus than to almost any other image.35
African theologians have depicted or qualified Christ’s ancestorship in varied ways. For 
example, for Efoe Penoukou writing within the context of the Ewe-Mina of Togo, Christ is 
ancestre-joto (source of life). For Benezet Bujo of Congo, Jesus Christ is the proto-ancestor. 
Charles Nyamti, of Tanzania, has written more than most on the topic of Christ as ancestor. 
For him Jesus Christ is both our brother and our ancestor, or better put: our brother-ancestor. 
For Francois Kabasèlè, also of the Congo, Jesus Christ is an elder brother- ancestor. Writing 
within the context of the Akan society in Ghana, John Pobee, presents Jesus as Nana, “the 
Great and Greatest Ancestor. 
 The category of ancestor is of 
particular interest because it focuses not only on one aspect of Jesus’ work, but also on the 
person of Christ. The traditions venerating (or “worshipping”) ancestors in Africa are strong 
and widespread throughout the African continent. However, when the category of “ancestor” 
is applied to Jesus, it needs to be qualified. Jesus is not just one of our ancestors, but the 
Ancestor par excellence, humanity’s unique ancestor. 
                                                 
35  J.B. Danquah (1968), writing from the Akan context, was the first person to refer to God as an ancestor. 
Also see, Danquah (1928, 1938 and 1954). 
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Such an ancestral Christology has, both culturally and theologically, some important 
deficiencies36with regard to the status and role of ancestors amongst the Akan. For the Akan, 
ancestors remain human spirits. The Akan do not elevate their ancestors to the status of God 
or of lesser divinity. Moreover, amongst the Akan, the idea of ancestors acting as the 
intermediaries between the Supreme Being and humankind is not authentic. Theologically, 
the image of Christ as ancestor downplays the doctrine of the bodily resurrection of Jesus 
since this could not apply to any other ancestors. This image also conflicts with the doctrine of 
Trinity since the ancestors are not divine or worshipped together with the Supreme Being. The 
image of Jesus as ancestor also does not offer an account of the divinity of Jesus Christ. 
1.3.4 A Nyamesofopreko Christology 
(See 
chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis). 
In critical dialogue with the two Christological models discussed above, I am proposing in 
this thesis a Christology based on the concept of “God’s unique priest” (Nyamesofopreko). 
Such a notion would be both doctrinally orthodox and genuinely relevant within the Akan 
context, culture and worldview. In this Christology the following three themes will be 
developed: a) the need for a mediator between God and humanity, b) the person of Christ as 
Mediator between God and humanity and c) mediation as the work of Christ. 
a) The need for a mediator between God and humanity  
Mediation in its broadest sense may be defined as the act of intervening between parties at 
variance with each other for the purpose of reconciling them. It could also imply intervention 
between parties not necessarily hostile to each other for the purpose of leading them into an 
agreement, contract or covenant. Though the term mediator is very rare in the Bible, the 
theme of mediation is of great significance in the biblical texts and also in Christian theology. 
In the letters of Paul the need for a mediator arises out of the reality of sin. Sin interrupts the 
harmonious relationship between God and humankind. From it results a state of mutual 
alienation. On the one hand, humankind exists in a state of enmity with God (Romans 5:10; 
8:7; Colossians 1:21). On the other hand, God expresses righteous wrath in relation to the 
sinner (Romans 1:18; Ephesians 5: 6). Hence, there is a need for reconciliation, a removal of 
God’s displeasure against the sinner as well as of the sinner’s hostility to God. Such necessary 
reconciliation would require the work of a mediator.  
                                                 
36  Perhaps the strongest criticism against ancestor Christology so far has come from AyIward Shorter (1969, 
1982 and 1983). 
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In this thesis, I have sought to re-appropriate this Christian concept with reference to the 
somewhat similar Akan myth of the Supreme Being’s withdrawal. According to this myth, it 
is said that the Supreme Being (Onyame) used to live with human beings in a primal state of 
peace. He then withdrew, far, away from the world of humankind. Amongst the Akan of 
Ghana, it was the pestle of the old woman37 pounding fufu38
Such a need for a mediator was demonstrated in failed attempts to establish priesthood for 
Onyame (see Rattray 1923:142). Such failures resulted from the Akan concept of Onyame as 
a perfect Being since, according to the Akan, a priest must fully obey the rules and codes of 
conduct of his/her deity to the point of death. God’s priest should therefore be sinless but 
human beings do not have the ability to meet such a standard. This is expressed in the Akan 
maxim bone bata onipa ho (sin is part and parcel of human beings’ life). The myth of God’s 
withdrawal and the resulting broken relationship between Onyame and human beings 
therefore necessitates a mediator between Onyame and human beings.  
 which caused God to move 
upwards. The implications of this myth as understood by the average Akan is that from then 
on distance developed between the Supreme Being and human beings due to human sin.  
In this thesis I have coined the term Nyamesofopreko by combining three Akan terms, namely 
Nyame (Supreme Being), sofo (priest/pastor) and preko (unique).39
• The myth of God’s withdrawal and the resulting broken relationship between Onyame and 
human beings necessitate an intermediary between Onyame and human beings.  
 With regard to the coining 
my suggestion is that the message of Jesus Christ responds to this need for a mediator 
between the Supreme Being and human beings and furthermore that Jesus Christ is indeed 
unique in this regard (see below). This proposal is based on the following considerations: 
• Although there are examples of a priesthood for the (lesser) divinities, no such priesthood 
has yet been established that could fulfil such a mediating role between Onyame and 
human beings. 
• According to the Akan, the previous attempts to establish a priesthood for Onyame has 
failed since Onyame, as a perfect Being, would require from priests to be sinless and since 
no human priests are able to meet such a standard.40
• There are also no other, non-human mediators available since the abosom (the lesser 
  
                                                 
37  Virtually all discussions in terms of the matrilineal system amongst the Akan, begin with elderly women. 
They are considered as the appellate head of the family, fountain of wisdom. Yet they are also considered 
witty and crafty.   
38  Pounded cassava and plantain meal; a local dish. 
39  See chapter 5 of this thesis for a more detailed analysis on this. 
40  Rattray (1956:142) has shown (with photos) that there was a temple and priest particularly dedicated to 
Onyame.  
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divinities) and the ancestors have traditionally not acted as intermediaries between 
Onyame and human beings. 
b) The person of Christ as a Mediator between God and humanity 
In the discussion above it was noted that the mainline Christian tradition has maintained that 
Jesus Christ is a suitable mediator between God and humanity precisely because he is “truly 
divine” as well as “truly human”. The humanity of Christ is crucial in order to demonstrate the 
solidarity of Jesus with human beings, while the divinity of Jesus enables him to establish the 
required reconciliation between God and humanity. In Christian discourse both the humanity 
and the divinity of Christ are traditionally captured in the doctrine of the incarnation that 
implies the Logos who became flesh.41
Within the traditional Akan worldview, culture and religion, the role of mediators is well-
established. Various groups of human beings, including women, elders, linguists, chiefs, 
medicine persons, diviners and traditional priests are called to fulfil such a mediating role 
within the context of family and clan life. In addition, the lesser divinities play an important 
role to mediate in conflict between human beings and their ancestors. Furthermore, the 
ancestors,
 How can these classic Christian affirmations and the 
doctrine of the incarnation be re-appropriated within an Akan context? 
42 dwarfs,43 and others spirits44
The notion of Jesus Christ as Nyamesofopreko suggests that Christ can indeed play a unique 
role as Mediator in this regard. From the Christians’ point of view amongst the Akan, this is 
indeed a novel element introduced through the Christian gospel which is proclaimed amongst 
the Akan. However, this begs the question how the status of Jesus Christ should be 
understood within an Akan context. How can both Christ’s divinity and humanity be affirmed 
at the same time? 
 also help to mediate between the physical and the 
spirit world. However, as I observed above, there are no suitable mediators between the 
Supreme Being and human beings. 
In reinterpreting the doctrine of the incarnation within the Akan context, I will draw on 
                                                 
41  See Erickson 1991.  
42  The ancestors are the illustrious members of the family who have passed away previously. See chapter 4 for 
a detailed analysis.  
43  Some other spirits who are said to assume personalities are the Mmoatia or “little people”. Mmoatia are not 
wholly evil, for they contain a creative aspect (Rattray 1959:26, Opoku 1975:78, Bannerman-Richter 
1987). 
44  Akan traditional religion recognises and accepts the existence of spirits who may use material objects as 
temporary residence and manifest their presence and action through natural objects and phenomena. Some 
of these spirits imply witchcraft, and spirits which reside in tress (Idowu 1973:173; also see Sarpong 
2002:96-97, Bannerman-Richter 1982 and Gehman 1987). 
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traditional Akan anthropology in which human beings are regarded as a composition of okra 
(soul/bearer of destiny), sunsum (spirit/personality), ntoro (fatherhood-deity) and mogya 
(blood) (Sarpong 2002:90-93, Gyekye 1978, Opoku 1975 and Rattray 1959:153-155). 
According to Akan anthropology all human beings receive okra and sunsum from the 
Supreme Being, while the ntoro is derived from the biological father and the mogya from the 
biological mother. If this anthropology is taken as a point of departure, how should the 
Christian message of the conception of Jesus Christ through Holy Spirit in Mary be 
understood? In this thesis I have investigated and offered a reinterpretation of the incarnation 
which suggests that Jesus received his okra and sunsum from God the Father, his mogya from 
Mary45 and his ntoro from God the Father through the Holy Spirit. On this basis the divine as 
well as human nature of Jesus Christ may be affirmed, while the one person of Jesus Christ 
may be understood in terms of the way in which these four elements are combined in each 
person. 
c) Mediation as the work of Christ 
In terms of this anthropology the sinlessness of Jesus may be understood on the basis 
of his divine ntoro. The miracles and the resurrection of Jesus Christ may be understood in 
terms of his “heavy” sunsum (strong spirit) which enables him to overcome evil forces, 
including death.  
Mediation is a prominent soteriological concept in the biblical roots and the subsequent 
history of the Christian tradition. As noted above, in the Christian tradition Jesus Christ is 
portrayed as Mediator of the broken covenant between God and humanity. Accordingly, the 
work of Christ may be understood primarily in terms of mediation or reconciliation. In 
discourse on the doctrine of atonement, various soteriological images are employed to explain 
the way in which Jesus Christ’s life, death and resurrection have established the possibility of 
reconciliation between God and humanity. The images include the following: offering a 
sacrifice for irreparable harm that was done, as well as a go-between within the context of 
interpersonal conflict (e.g. between marriage partners, parents and children, family feuds, 
employers and employees).46
                                                 
45  Perhaps, it is logically incoherent to assert the reality of the bodily resurrection of Jesus and at same time 
reject the doctrine of his virgin birth. The underlying presupposition is the same. Logically, the two stand 
together and fall together. However, whereas Pannenberg (1977:141-149) accepts the resurrection as 
factual, he dismisses the virgin birth as a legend. Nonetheless, the Akan anthropology offers a possibility to 
re-appropriate the orthodox doctrine of full humanity, full divinity, virgin birth, sinlessness and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ.  
 This also entails the focus on the intercessory role of an 
advocate acting on behalf of others, a vicarious representation and suffering or exorcising evil 
46     See Der (1980), Awolalu (1977), Morris (1965, 1983), Stevenson (2004) and DeGruchy (2002). 
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from within society (e.g. “the goat for Azazel”). It is not possible to explore the significance 
of each of these soteriological metaphors here in any further detail. 
Traditional Akan culture and religion contain rough equivalents for many of these 
soteriological images. For example: In the Akan history, four Akan Chiefs intentionally gave 
themselves up, at different occasions, to be killed on behalf of Ashanti nation (the dominant 
group of the Akan people). They offered themselves for ritual purposes to gain victory in the 
war against their enemies. One of these chiefs, Nana Dikopim I chief of Edwoso, offered 
himself to be butchered to death and his body distributed to the vultures. In the true spirit of 
sacrifice, none of the four chiefs pleaded for any personal benefits. However, each one 
requested that after his death, nobody from his home- town should be killed as a sacrifice in 
any form. This may serve as an example of vicarious representation within the Akan history 
(Sarpong 1998:149).
Although, the vicarious sacrifices in Akan history have some similarities with the vicarious 
death of Jesus, there are some differences. Most notably, the four chiefs died for their nation, 
the people they loved, and not for their enemies. In fact their death was aimed at saving their 
own people from their enemies. In the case of Jesus, he died not only for those he loved but 
also for those who treated him as an enemy.  
  
In this constructive contribution towards a Nyamesofopreko Christology, I have explored this 
image of vicarious representation further. I will seek to show that the examples of vicarious 
sacrifice in Akan history present a mere shadow of better things to come, which has been 
fulfilled in Jesus, God’s unique priest. 
1.3.5 Statement of the research problem  
On the basis of this discussion, the research problem which will be addressed in this thesis 
may be formulated as follows: 
Can a Nyamesofopreko Christology overcome the weaknesses of ancestral 
Christology and divine conqueror Christology in re-appropriating, within a 
contemporary Akan context, the classic Christian affirmation that the person and 
work of Jesus Christ may be understood in terms of acting as unique Mediator 
between God and humanity?  
The concepts employed in this statement of the research problem have been introduced in the 
discussion above and will be explored in further detail in the various chapters of this thesis. 
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One further aspect of this research problem needs to be discussed here though, namely the 
relative adequacy of such Christologies. On what basis can the adequacy of one form of 
Christology be compared to that of others? 
The notion of relative adequacy indicates that adequacy is an elusive concept in theological 
reflection. There is a need to guard against claims to full adequacy, final truth claims, 
fundamental positions, fixed formulas and exposition of the “right doctrine” (orthodoxy). 
Theological reflection will always remain an ongoing and necessarily incomplete attempt to 
articulate, describe and explain the content and the significance of the Christian faith. On the 
other hand, there is a need to guard against relativism in the selfsame theological reflection. It 
is possible to identify relatively more and relatively less adequate interpretations of the 
Christian faith. This begs the question as to what criteria may be identified in assessing such 
relative adequacy. Although such criteria remain subject to further debate, they at least 
indicate some items on the agenda for theological discourse on this matter. 
Three such criteria will guide this research. In the first place, contemporary theological 
reflection needs to demonstrate its continuity with the biblical witnesses and the subsequent 
Christian tradition. No single expression of the Christian faith may be regarded as normative 
for all subsequent theological reflections. Nevertheless there is at least a need to demonstrate 
in what ways new reinterpretations may be regarded as appropriate innovations of the 
Christian tradition. For the purposes of this thesis, the classic Christological affirmations of 
the ecumenical councils of Nicea (325) and Chalcedon (451) will serve as continuous 
reference points. The question is therefore whether a Nyamesofopreko Christology can do 
justice to both the humanity as well as the divinity of Jesus Christ and can explain the 
relationship between these coherently. 
In the second place, contemporary theological discourse needs to demonstrate its contextual 
relevance in the local but ever-changing context within which it is situated. This does not 
imply that theological reflection cannot and should not engage critically with contextual 
consideration. One may argue that the introduction or (adoption) of concepts (in this case 
Christological ones) into a new context (Akan culture) will inevitably lead to the adaptation of 
both concepts and context. Nevertheless, the leitmotif of African Christian theologies has 
been the need to express the content and significance of the Christian faith in indigenous 
rather than in foreign (colonial) categories. It has to engage with a particular culture, its 
thought forms and contextual needs. The articulation of such a local theology (see Schreiter 
1985, Sarpong 2002, Mugambi 1998, Nyamiti 1991, Bediako 1992, Ukpong 1884) does not 
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preclude its catholicity and ecumenicity, that is, the need for others to recognize it as an 
authentic expression of the Christian faith. 
In the third place all theological discourse needs to be assessed in terms of its internal 
coherence, clarity, intelligibility and plausibility. The task of this research will therefore be to 
articulate and assess the relative adequacy of a Nyamesofopreko Christology within the Akan 
context on the basis of these three criteria. 
1.4 Strengths and weaknesses of a Nyamesofopreko Christology 
It would be premature to give an account of the strengths and weaknesses of a 
Nyamesofopreko Christology here. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to identify some of these 
possible strengths and weaknesses provisionally. This may serve as a preliminary “working 
hypothesis” to guide the discussion in the rest of this thesis. 
One of the obvious strengths of a Nyamesofopreko Christology is that it draws on various 
aspects of the Akan mythology, history, culture and worldview. It adheres for example to the 
myth of God’s withdrawal, the need for a mediator between the Supreme Being and human 
beings, the unavailability of a suitable mediator in this regard, and Akan views on 
anthropology. It could therefore be readily understood within an Akan context, not only by 
Christians but also by traditionalists, Muslims and others. Another strength is that the Akan 
anthropology and the conception of God may offer a way of affirming both the divinity and 
the humanity of Jesus Christ. The focus on the concept of a mediator is both appropriate 
within Akan history and in the Christian tradition, with specific reference to the doctrine of 
atonement and the themes of reconciliation, the ministry of intercession and the vicarious 
representation of Jesus Christ. 
There are a number of theological questions which may be raised with reference to a 
Nyamesofopreko Christology though. While this form of Christology may be able to offer an 
account of the incarnation, sinlessness and resurrection of Jesus Christ, it is less evident that it 
may do justice to the traditional Christological themes of the parousia, the final judgment of 
Jesus Christ and the Christian notion of hell. There is no analogy to such themes in the Akan 
worldview. 
The task of this research will therefore be to articulate a Nyamesofopreko Christology and to 
test and develop its relative adequacy on the basis of these considerations. 
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1.5 Research procedures 
In this study, the adequacy of the constructive proposal of a Nyamesofopreko Christology was 
tested and developed.  
The thesis is divided into two main sections. The first section which covers the first four 
chapters, entails reviews of some of the dominant African Christologies – with particular 
reference to divine conqueror and ancestor Christologies. In these chapters, I assessed the 
adequacy of the Christologies mentioned with reference to the Nicene/Chalcedon definition 
concerning the person of Christ. The conclusion of my critique was that these Christologies 
do not express the person of Christ adequately as truly divine and truly human as defined by 
the first four ecumenical councils. As a result, these Christologies also express the work of 
Christ, particularly his atonement, less adequately. 
The first step taken to analyse these Christologies was to offer a survey of the emergence of 
African Christologies, starting from an early article by Mbiti in 1967 and including a number 
of more recent contributions. My main focus was on the Christological images in terms of 
which Jesus Christ is described as ancestor, chief, divine conqueror, elder, healer, master of 
initiation, elder brother, liberator and priest. 
In the second step of the thesis I described, analysed and critiqued the two dominant 
Christological theories in the Ghanaian context, namely where Jesus is portrayed as a divine 
conqueror in the African spirit world and as an ancestor. The strengths and weaknesses of 
these two Christologies were highlighted.  
In critical dialogue with the two Christological models discussed above, the following 
approach was employed to investigate the adequacy of Nyamesofopreko Christology: a) In the 
case of each of these three themes, the core tenets of the Christian faith were described 
briefly. b) This theme was then related to similar aspects of the traditional Akan culture, 
worldview and belief system. c) On this basis a constructive reinterpretation of such themes 
was offered. d) The strengths and weaknesses of such a reinterpretation were assessed on the 
basis of the criteria used to critique the divine conqueror Christology and ancestor 
Christology.  
In the final step, I briefly explored the wider ecumenical significance of such a 
Nyamesofopreko Christology within the African context and for Christianity elsewhere in the 
world.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A brief survey of African Christologies  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers a review of the dominant Christological images which have emerged 
within the context of recent African Christian theologies. The purpose of such a review is not 
to provide a comprehensive discussion of the complex discourse on an African Christology. It 
is rather to offer a brief description of some of the dominant images with reference to which 
Christological debates in the Akan context have to be understood. My focus is on the 
Christological images whereby Jesus Christ is described as healer, master of initiation, 
linguist, chief and priest.1
This chapter has four sections. The emergence of African Christologies as the result of an 
ongoing process of contextualization is briefly discussed in section 2.2. Liberation 
Christology is discussed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 deals with African inculturation 
Christology. Section 2.5 offers some conclusions with regard to the argument of the chapter. 
 The strengths and the weaknesses of these Christologies are 
assessed in terms of their continuity with the Christological decisions of the ecumenical 
councils of Nicea and Chalcedon on the person and work of Christ.  
2.2 African Christologies and the process of contextualization  
Every Christological inquirer has a particular concern and poses questions which are largely 
informed by the inquirer’s context. For the African, these concerns and questions must be 
informed and shaped by African worldviews and thought forms based on Africa’s religious-
cultural, socio-political and economic realities. In the African context Christology must not 
only be able to respond to general human concerns over alienation and reconciliation. 
In response to Jesus’ question: “Who do you say I am” in Matthew 16:15, Africans cannot 
simply imitate Peter, but have to say who Christ Jesus is from the African perspective. 
Certainly, this question cannot be answered adequately without knowledge of African culture 
and accompanying religious experiences. Usually various elements of African traditional 
religion and culture, such as the ancestors, chieftaincy, sacrifices, healing, views on humanity, 
It 
should also respond to each particular African context. 
                                                 
 1  Two forms of African Christology, namely where Christ is seen as either a “Divine conqueror” or a “proto-
ancestor” will receive special attention in chapters three and four respectively. 
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the concept of the family and so forth, are employed to construct an African Christology 
(Martey 1993:79).  
The emphasis on contextualisation in African Christological discourse has led to the 
emergence of different forms of African Christology. One may identify especially two main 
types of African Christology, namely liberation Christology and inculturation Christology. 
African women’s Christology may be regarded as a distinct type of Christology, but is often 
included under the rubric of liberation Christologies.2
The variety of African Christologies may be regarded as the legitimate result of the process of 
contextualisation since African theologians have at particular times addressed pertinent issues 
in different African contexts. Nevertheless, it has been rightly pointed out that the future task 
of theologians in Africa will be to develop a synthesis between liberation and inculturation 
approaches to Christology.
  
3
2.3 Liberation Christology 
 The reason is that theologians have to respond to political and 
socio-economic realities as well as to religious and cultural ones (Martey 1993:81). It is 
within such discourse on African Christologies that this contribution towards a 
Nyamesofopreko Christology is situated.  
This section entails African liberation Christologies and African Women’s Liberation 
Christology. 
2.3.1 African liberation Christologies 
The liberation approach to Christology, as seen in the writings of Jean-Marc Ela, Engelbert 
Mveng, Laurenti Magesa and others, approach African economic and political struggles from 
a theological perspective. Within this approach Jesus is portrayed not only as the oppressed 
one whose life reflects the life of the oppressed and marginalized black Africans, but also the 
One who would liberate them from their suffering and oppression (Ela 1986, Mveng 1974, 
Magesa 1976:79-92). 
There are three forms of such an African liberation Christology. The first is generally known 
                                                 
2  One may find that inculturationists reside mainly in Anglophone Africa and that liberationists originate 
mainly from Francophone Africa. Inculturation theology is perhaps the most common and most developed 
theological approach in the African context. Most contributions to African Christology belong to this 
group.  
3  Martey (1993:81), citing the works of liberationist Jean-Marc Ela and of inculturationist Gabriel Setiloane, 
points out that although there are indications that the conflict between these two approaches to African 
Christology has reduced remarkably, the tension between the two approaches is not yet settled. 
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as South African black theology and historically responded mainly to issues of race within the 
context of apartheid 4
The second form is simply called African liberation Christology, found especially in 
independent sub-Saharan Africa and is closer to Latin American liberation theology. This 
theological approach is broader than the one of South African black theology, for the theme of 
liberation here is integrated within the wider African cultural background (Nyamiti 1991:13). 
 (Boesak 2004). 
The third form is African women’s Christology which focus on the emancipation of women. 
Central to the Christological reflection of African women theologians is the experience of 
women in a patriarchal society and male-dominated churches (Martey 1994:82). 
(a) The image of Christ as Liberator 
Stress is 
placed on structures in African societies that oppress women and that marginalise the role that 
Jesus Christ plays in liberating African women.  
The earliest African theologians writing about liberation theology were Jean-Marc Ela and 
Eboussi Boulaga. The Tanzanian theologian Laurenti Magesa wrote on liberation and the 
church and published Christ as Liberator as early as 1976. Apart from the obvious 
Africanisation of their message, the emphasis on liberation from poverty and the role of the 
poor is very much akin to Latin American liberation theology. A stronger emphasis is placed 
on the importance of critical thinking in Latin American liberation theology – an element not 
always emphasised by other African theologians. There is, however, in addition to the 
emphasis on economic liberation, an increasing tendency on the part of African theologians to 
speak of liberation from all oppressive forces, including cultural ones. This is particularly 
seen in the work of Ela (1986:39-53). 
In his 1985 survey article “Current state of biblical studies in Africa” Onwu cites the article 
by Mpolo (1983) on “Jesus Christ – Word of life”. In this article Mpolo argues that the 
ministry of Jesus clearly indicates his commitment to liberate the oppressed from every form 
of oppression.  
Onwu also points out that in several studies an increasing number of African theologians are 
speaking of Jesus as Liberator from all oppressive forces, bringing deliverance from sin, 
sickness, poverty, and evil forces. He cites the work of Mbiti (1975), Sawyerr (1972) and 
Enang (1979). One may also add the contribution of Appiah-Kubi (1979). His reference to 
                                                 
4  African liberation Christologies typically draw on the contributions from North American black theology 
and Latin American liberation theology. 
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Mbiti is interesting because it is Mbiti who has been most explicitly critical of liberation 
theology, citing it for insufficient biblical grounding (Mbiti 1978). 
The strengths of the image of Jesus as Liberator lies in the notion of God’s “preferential 
option” for the poor – which the Gospel of Luke, for example, clearly demonstrates. Added to 
that, the need within the African context for a liberator as an antidote for the feared spiritual 
forces and all forms of oppression cannot be over-emphasised. However, the image of Jesus 
as typically portrayed in African liberation Christology is merely that of a charismatic leader 
or lesser divinity. The advocates of this image have not in any way shown how such a 
liberator can be fully human and fully divine – as the Nicene definition confesses. 
(b) The image of Christ as healer  
In the African context the image of Jesus as healer seems to have been proposed first by the 
Congolese writer Buana Kibongi. In English literature it has recently been taken up by 
Aylward Shorter and in French Literature by Cece Kolie 
Shorter (1988) points to healing as a central feature of the life and ministry of Jesus Christ. 
Therefore he believes that the African traditional interest in healing requires a Christology 
based on Christ’s healing function. Shorter then compares the Galilean healers (whose 
techniques Jesus adopted) with the African traditional medicine men and women.  
(Moloney 2004:505-515). In 
describing Christ as healer, Shorter uses the West African word Nganga – which might be 
translated as “witch doctor”, “medicine man” or “medium”.  
Shorter discovers similarities between these traditions in that both practised a holistic form of 
healing in which physical, psycho-emotional, moral-spiritual, social and environmental 
dimensions of health come into play. According to Shorter, both traditions also tend to 
confuse the dimensions of wholeness or sickness. For example, there was a common belief 
that sickness is a direct punishment for personal sin.  
He also notes that belief in sorcery was common in the Mediterranean world of Christ’s time, 
as it is in the African world today. Jesus employed traditional techniques of healing, but 
warns his followers against dappling in magic. Jesus followed an integral approach to healing, 
but also taught that suffering has a salvific power, as manifested through his death on the 
cross.  
In another development, the Guinean Roman Catholic Priest, Cece Kolie, offers critical 
comments of the image of a healer. Kolie (1992:128-150) begins his reflections on the 
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possibility of conferring on Jesus the title of healer with the polemical statement “that it might 
be easier for African theologians to present Jesus as the great Master of initiation, or as the 
Ancestor par excellence, or the Chief of chiefs, and so on.” He notes that to proclaim Jesus as 
the great Healer calls for a great deal of “explaining to the millions who starve in Sub-Sahara 
Africa, to victims of injustice and corruption and the polyparasitic afflicted of the tropical and 
equatorial forest” (Kolie 1992:128).  
Kolie (1992:128-132) cites the socio-economic and political realities in Africa and at the 
same time looks towards the Crucified One. Kolie bases his contention on two points: Firstly, 
Jesus Christ is the healer because the healings contained a central element in his ministry 
(Kolie 1992:129). Secondly, Jesus Christ is a healer because through his own suffering he is 
present in human suffering. Kolie (1992:128-132) also points out that healing looms large in 
some African Indigenous Churches, Pentecostal churches and Charismatic churches 
(Kolie1992:128-132). He maintains that, amongst Africans, health is the predominant concern 
over employment or family life (Kolie 1992:132).  
Assessing the proposals of Shorter and Kolie, it is clear that the title “healer” has considerable 
support in the Bible and in the African context. However, the image of Jesus as healer is by 
itself inadequate to construct a contextually applicable doctrine of the person and the work of 
Christ. The reason is that both Shorter and Kolie did not show how healers in the African 
context could be taken to be fully human as well as fully divine.  
2.3.2 African Women’s Liberation Christology 
In African theological discourse, men have dominated the field of written theology and they 
hardly take women’s life experience into account (Nasimiyi-Wasike 1998:128). In her article 
“An African Woman’s Christ”, Mercy Oduyoye asks whether there is such an issue as 
“women’s Christology,” since “Christology is the church’s word about Christ” and the church 
is dominated by men. As a way of showing her concern, she indicates that her contribution to 
African Christological discourse is not in terms of what the African church says about Christ 
but, instead, what one African woman wishes the church could say about Christ (Oduyoye 
1988:35, see also Martey 1994:69). 
However, with women’s voices being heard in theology, Christological discourse in Africa 
has taken on a new a dimension. African Christological construction no longer merely entails 
the use of African titles to fit New Testament concepts or the juxtaposition of African 
traditional symbols with biblical images. Now the following issues come under scrutiny: 
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structures in African societies that oppress women and marginalise people and Christ’s part in 
liberating not only African men but also women. 
Most African women theologians now posed Christ in opposition to all cultural systems that 
dehumanise and oppress them. It is not surprising, therefore, that some African female 
theologians make women’s experience per se the point of departure for Christology. For 
example, Therese Souga (1988:25) writes: “We need a Christology that takes into account the 
situation of women in the African world. Christology cannot be formulated without taking 
into account women and their place in church and society in Africa.” Souga (1988) contends 
that Jesus bears “a message of liberation for every human being”, especially for those who are 
socially the most disadvantaged. She contends a basic solidarity between Jesus and African 
women who are the most marginalised people within society. Souga however laments that the 
church in Africa maintains “certain negative kinds of behaviour” towards women. According 
to her, the theological question about the role of women and the Christological question posed 
in Mark 8:29 cannot be separated.  
Tappa (1988:31-33) also challenges male supremacy in the African churches. She reminds 
African male theologians that the sexist is not so different from the racist, for the same 
principle makes it possible for someone to profess Christianity while keeping women in a 
lower position than men. She notes that as long as African male Christians discriminate 
against women in the churches, they have no moral obligation to demand liberation for blacks 
in South Africa. In the same sense the principle of apartheid is preached when women are told 
they are not worthy to be ordained into the ministry of the church of Christ. 
Oduyoye (1984:4) also contends that Jesus is the One who liberates women from the burden 
of disease and ostracism from a society. For Bonita Bennet of South Africa, Jesus did not only 
refrain from belittling women; He actually stood up amongst his contemporaries to defend 
women actively (Bennet 1987:172). Nasimiyi-Wasike (1998:126) also reminds male 
counterparts that in the Bible we do not find Christ distinguishing between women and men 
as children of God. 
Drawing from the writings of African women theologians, one may note that African women 
theologians by and large see Jesus as the Liberator who offers total liberation, embracing 
every aspect of life. Central to their Christological reflection is the experience of women in 
the patriarchal society and male-dominated churches (Martey 1994:82). To these theologians, 
one cannot separate physical liberation from the spiritual kind, for the spiritual encompasses 
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the physical. For African women theologians, Jesus stands with African women today, as he 
did with the Jewish women of his time.  
The emergence of African women’s Christology “from the underside”, to use the term of 
Ekeya (1988:17), has indeed questioned the authenticity and relevance of the Christologies of 
male theologians. Nonetheless, one area where African women do affirm the Christologies of 
their male counterparts is in the use of titles that are conferred on Jesus – titles such as 
“Healer”, “Saviour”, “Lord”, “Christus Victor”, and above all, “Liberator”.  
It is interesting to note that, while accepting a liberation approach to Christology, most 
women reject a cultural approach because they hold African traditional culture partly 
responsible for the contemporary structures of oppression (Nasimiyi-Wasike 1998:124). 
The interpretations African women render to some of these titles go beyond those of men. For 
instance, the “Christus Victor” type plays a crucial role in the Christologies of male 
theologians such as Emmanuel Milingo and John Mbiti, portraying the work of Christ in 
terms of a victory over Satan and evil spiritual forces in the world. To African women, 
Christ’s victory in this regard also extends to the evils of male-dominated society.  
Moreover, the title of okyeame (linguist) that Pobee ascribes to Jesus is reinterpreted by 
Amoah and Oduyoye to include women – whereas for Pobee, okyeame can be nothing else 
but male. Nevertheless, within the Akan system of rule, the okyeame can be either man or 
woman (Martey 1994:78-88).  
According to Martey (1994:83), the title given prominence in all African women’s 
Christology is that of Jesus as “Liberator” – the one who liberates women from dehumanising 
customs, taboos and traditions. Yet, some feminists are of the mind that all these attempts are 
not enough.
Assessing African women’s liberation Christologies, one may notice some discontinuities, yet 
they share some continuities with the mainline liberation Christologies. The African women’s 
Christology focus on the emancipation of women. Central to the Christological reflection of 
African women theologians is the experience of women in patriarchal society and male-
dominated churches.
  
 The focus is placed on structures in African societies that oppress 
women and that tend to marginalise the role that Jesus Christ plays in liberating African 
women. While accepting the liberation approach to Christology, most women reject the 
cultural approach because they see African traditional culture as partly responsible for 
contemporary structures of oppression (Oduyoye 1988, Tappa 1988, Souga 1988, Nasimiyi-
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Wasike 1998). 
Nevertheless, both African women’s Christology and the mainline liberation Christological 
methods focus primarily on the role or functions of Christ as Liberator and healer. Indeed 
such images have a basis in the Scriptures and are relevant within the African context. 
However, these images only present the role and activities of Jesus without showing how 
Christ can be said to share the same nature with God. In this respect, such an approach seems 
inadequate to construct the doctrine of Christ as a whole in light of Christianity Nicene and 
Chalcedon confessed. 
2.4 Inculturation Christology 
The inculturation approach to Christology takes Africa’s pre-Christian and pre-Muslim 
religious experience seriously. In this model, the traditional African worldview and culture 
serves as a point of departure. Jesus’ presence in Africa today, the proponents of inculturation 
Christology argue, cannot be acknowledged without Africa’s past religious knowledge and 
experience (Idowu 1965:75).5
The responses that both the Jewish public and Jesus’ disciples gave to the Christological 
question Jesus posed in Mark 8:29 indicate a certain tendency. People’s previous religious 
experience and knowledge in confessing the reality of Jesus Christ are inevitable – all 
originated from their Jewish heritage.  
 
In this regard, Ukpong (1984:30) contends that the theologian’s task in the inculturation 
process consists of re-thinking and re-expressing the original Christian message in an African 
cultural context. The inculturation model therefore seeks to integrate the Christian faith with 
African cultural life and thought forms, as shown in the works of Mbiti, Sawyerr (1996), 
Idowu (1965), Dickson (1984) Fashole-Luke (1974) and others. Inculturation occurs when 
Christians express their faith in the symbols and images of their respective cultures.  
                                                 
5  The term “inculturation” emerged from Roman Catholic debate in the 1970’s. This was a means of 
expressing some of the insights of the Second Vatican Council, notably that evangelisation is to be 
understood in terms of change in communities as well as in individuals and that an ongoing interaction 
between the Christian message and particular cultures is needed. Shorter contends that inculturation has to 
begin with acculturation, the already embedded, and then to be followed by a separation which allows 
appropriate development within the new culture (Shorter 1988). Schineller (1990) also defines inculturation 
as “the incarnation of Christian life and of the Christian message in a particular context, in such a way that 
this experience not only finds expression through elements proper to the culture in question, but becomes 
principles that animate, direct and unify the culture, transforming and remaking it so as to bring about a new 
creation.” This is the preferred definition that Sarpong (2002:32) put forward in his African theological 
reflections.  Also see Mugambi (2004), Parratt (1995) and Conradie & Fredericks (2004). 
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A careful examination of the procedures employed in African inculturation Christologies 
reveals two ways of approaching the subject. Firstly, there are those who, in constructing 
Christology, start from the biblical witnesses of Jesus Christ and then identify those 
Christological themes which would be relevant within a particular cultural context. Secondly 
some researchers take the cultural context as point of departure for constructing an African 
Christology (Nyamti 1991). Below are five examples of such Christologies.  
2.4.1 The image of Christ as the “Master of initiation”  
In traditional African communities, initiation is held whenever a member of society 
undergoes an important change in status within the life of the group. Initiation dramatises 
through symbolical practises how important status changes are in the eyes of society. The 
acquisition of a new status calls for the successful adoption of a new set of roles by the one 
who is moving into the new phase of life. At the same time the society adjusts to culturally 
significant changes in people’s lives. The formal dramatisation of these changes in the “ritual 
of status change” may be psychologically beneficial to those who are accepting roles that they 
have not practised before. It could be of help to other members of society as well who must 
also adopt new ways of relating to these people. Initiation helps to maintain stability and order 
within such a society. 
Four public symbolic rituals are commonly celebrated in Africa, perhaps throughout the 
world. These initiation rituals are: a) naming ceremonies, which confer human status 
In addition to these commonly known initiation rituals, numerous other initiation rituals are 
performed in Africa and also around the world. These rituals serve as criteria to admit people 
into secret societies. It may be noted here that many of these initiation rituals – both the 
conventional ones and the non-conventional ones – may or may not be compatible with 
Christian beliefs and values.  
on the 
new members of society and proclaim the parenthood as their caretakers; b) puberty 
celebrations, which confer adult status; c) marriage, which legitimises new sexual, economic, 
and child raising obligations; and d) funerals, which proclaim the loss of human status and 
opens a new door into the spirit world for the deceased. 
One such example is the initiation relating to male same-sex intercourse as found among the 
Etoro in New Guinea. The Etoro community is a group of 400 people who subsist by hunting 
and horticulture in the Trans-Fly region. The Etoro believe that boys cannot produce semen 
on their own. To grow into men and eventually give “life force” to their children, boys must 
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acquire semen orally from older men. From the age of 10 years until adulthood, boys are thus 
inseminated by older men (Kottak 2004:558).6
Indeed, in this diverse cultural context of “initiation rituals” some African theologians 
propose that Jesus is the leader, the master of the team who sees to the performances of such 
rites. Here we will discuss the well known and the most developed proposal by Anselm 
Sanon.
 Such a ritual is classified under the type of 
initiation rituals of which Jesus is said to be “master” of the group. 
7
Jesus as “Master of initiation” is the theme of the Christology developed by Sanon. His 
Christology begins with a detailed explanation of African initiation rituals. Sanon notes that 
initiation accompanies various stages of life: birth, growth, puberty and marriage. Initiation 
involves two main elements: passage from a lower condition to a higher status with new 
rights and, with that, responsibilities and introduction into community membership (Sanon 
1992:94-96). 
  
Sanon also points out that initiation involves various rites and other conditions such as 
separation from one’s own community to a separate locality, various instructions (usually 
accompanied by initiation secrecy), ordeals, prayers, and rituals (of purification, sacrifice), 
imposition of a new name, use of symbols, death and resurrection being symbolically 
manifested. 
He reinterprets African initiation rituals in relation to the mystery of Christ. With regard to the 
New Testament teaching, he interprets the various stages in Christ’s life in light of the African 
sense of initiation (Sanon 1992:92-99). He notes that Christ’s life followed a gradual 
movement towards the goal of perfection (Hebrews 2:10; 7:28; 5:9). Sanon also points out 
that Jesus was initiated according to Jewish tradition at birth, when he was circumcised, when 
he received his name, and when he was presented in the temple – so as to enter ritually into 
his Jewish family and community (Sanon 1992:94). 
Jesus’ act of remaining in the temple when he was twelve years old is interpreted in terms of 
initiation. These activities involved separation from his family, receiving instructions from 
Jewish rabbis, and instructing his father and mother (as initiates are to instruct others). 
                                                 
6  Once every third year, a group of Etoro boys around the age of 20 are formally initiated into manhood. 
They go to a secluded mountain lodge, where they are visited and inseminated – homosexually – by several 
older men. 
7  Anselm Sanon is the Catholic bishop in Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta). See his article: Jesus, Master 
of Initiation (1991:85-102).  
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Likewise, the washing of feet by the Jesus at the Last Supper is seen as an initiation gesture: 
Jesus, the Master of initiation initiates his disciples, instructs them ritually to follow in his 
footsteps. 
Sanon (1992:96) indicates other initiation rituals linked with the life of Jesus: his messianic 
secret (Mark 1:44; 3:12), his use of symbols and signs (parables), his solidarity (Christ’s 
initiation involved us), a cross (initiation tree), the church (place of initiation), time of grace 
(sacraments) initiation. 
Sanon 1992:94) remarks that Christ was himself initiated into the tradition of his people by 
being named, circumcised, and presented in the Temple. Christ was initiated into the fullness 
of God’s plan by being brought to the perfection spoken of in Hebrew 2:10, 5:9 and 7:28. 
This happened to him especially through his death and resurrection. These acts can be 
understood as a kind of initiation ordeal through which one is transported into a higher mode 
of existence. Sanon contends that Christ’s initiation process has more than an exemplary 
significance: Christ’s initiation is truly the cause of our being initiated into a whole new mode 
of existence. Christ is the one who leads us into the fullness of life.  
For Sanon, just as in the initiation process symbols are used as vehicles of the highest values 
of the community, so does Christ lead us on through symbols – especially the sacraments 
(Sanon 1992:96-97). In this regard, Sanon contends that the master of initiation occupies a 
mediating role within the human community. 
The value of Sanon’s proposal is that it helps to reinterpret Christ’s mediating role between 
God and humankind. The weakness of the model lies in the reality that, for many Africans 
today, initiation is no longer a practised ritual. Another weakness is that the master of 
ceremony sometimes excludes the sick and the weak from society. It happens in certain 
societies that the master of initiation even kills the weak members of that community. This is 
what Kolie (1992:132) terms as the “cult of life”. Nonetheless, Jesus is known to be more 
inclined to the poor and the weak, and even today he is present in their suffering. In addition 
He is the provider of life (John 10:10).  
He acts as an intermediary between the human 
and the spirit powers.  
The image of a master of initiation is based on human being identity. Sanon has not in any 
way though shown how such a cult leader can be fully human and fully divine – as Nicene 
Christianity would maintain it to be.  
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2.4.2 The image of Christ as the linguist (okyeame)  
In most African societies the idea and work of a mediator or intermediary implies routine. 
Among the Akan of Ghana, the king or the chief does not generally speak directly to the 
people, neither do the people normally approach the king or chief directly except through the 
linguist. The linguist receives and transmits the message from the king to the people and vice 
versa. 
In the Akan court the linguist (okyeame)8 is a highly important personality. He remains close 
to the chief, relaying his requests and pronouncements to others and even sometimes acting 
for him in his absence. This institution has become part of the social order. Thus, amongst the 
Akan, the okyeame is not just a speech intermediary. He is envoy, counsellor, consultant, 
protocol officer, as well as ritual officiant responsible for libation prayers. Whether Akan or 
not, it is clear that the royal spokesperson, wherever he has been found in Ghana, is the 
chief’s close confidant and the most reliable among the chief’s council of elders. Amongst the 
Ashanti (the dominant group in the Akan), the okyeame is the royal spokesperson and 
prosecutor in court. In the Akan system of rule, the okyeame can be either male or female. 
Drawing from such a background, Pobee (1979:92-98) suggests that Jesus could be seen as 
okyeame amongst the Akan. However, it has been argued that considering Jesus as okyeame 
sends the wrong signals about who Jesus is. The argument is that the okyeame rules on behalf 
of the chief. Therefore if Jesus is to be named as okyeame, the misunderstanding could easily 
arise that the chiefs are higher than Jesus, because okyeame directly falls under a chief. 
Besides, the impression could also be created that Jesus derives his authority from the chiefs 
and that they have provided Jesus’ authority. Certainly, that would also raise the chiefs above 
Jesus and make him subject to them within the Akan social context.  
Certainly, such a rich background makes the image of a linguist as mediator meaningful as a 
Christological image applicable to the Akan context (Yankah 1995:25). 
However, whereas the argument is valid in some sense, it may not be conclusive to render the 
                                                 
8  The term “linguist” may not be adequate to translate the Akan word okyeame. However, its connection may 
be due to the need and usage of a bilingual interpreter between colonial representatives and the local states. 
The interpreter and okyeame, both master over language and both agents of verbal mediation, could be 
mistaken for one another, as indeed they have been in the literature on okyeame. The mistaken application 
of the word “linguist” to the royal spokesperson in West Africa could be traced to this crisis of identity. In 
this respect Yankah (1995) analysed the lexical meaning of linguist and compared it to the role of okyeame 
in Akan. He contends that the term okyeame simply resists a precise translation of the English term linguist. 
In order to avoid being entangled within a detailed discussion of this issue, which lies outside the scope of 
this thesis, I will follow the general translation of okyeame as “linguist”. For an excellent and detailed 
discussion of this issue, see Yankah (1995:25-26).  
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image of okyeame “useless”. One can rightly refer to Jesus as Onyamekyeame (God’s linguist) 
without creating any impression that God’s linguist is lower than a chief. Nonetheless, if one 
is to use the Christological title Okyeame consistently as a Christological image, one cannot, 
in addition, promote the idea of Jesus as chief, except if this is inferred through analogy. In 
this sense the relationship between Jesus and God is thus analogous to the relationship 
between the linguist and the chief.  
Remarkably, the image of okyeame in the Akan context does not go beyond human beings. 
Those who advocate such an image have therefore not in any way shown how okyeame could 
be seen as fully divine.  
2.4.4 The image of Christ as a chief  
Amongst the Akan, the chiefs occupy a mediating role within the human community as role 
models and leading figures. As supreme political heads, the chiefs at the same time have 
religious functions; they mediate between the living and the ancestors, as seen in libation 
rituals (Asante 2006). Although the chiefs are not first-hand recipients of divine instruction 
from the spirit beings, they are partly executors of it, by pouring libation and offer sacrifices 
to the ancestors. Thus, the chiefs’ functions are partly priestly in nature; they therefore double 
up as priests. Nevertheless, the Akan do not regard their chiefs as deities; they are not even 
deified after death. 
For Sarpong (1978), a chief is expected to be the judge, legislator, religious leader, as well as 
head of the community. The chief should be the one who does not break his oath and who 
saves his people in battle. The chief should be humble, be above blame, and should, amongst 
other qualities, be ready to offer sacrificial services for the common good of the community. 
Sarpong contends that these are the qualities that Jesus puts forward in a “superhuman” way 
in his personality. 
Pobee (1979) believes that Christ possessed all the qualities of a good chief. According to 
Pobee, Christ is the greatest chief or the Nana.9
However, Pobee notes the differences between Christ’s functions as a chief which include not 
only sharing in the struggle for liberation but also suffering with the weak. Pobee therefore 
 As such, Christ has power and authority to 
judge, reward, and punish. But as God-man, he is superior to all chiefs and all spiritual 
beings. 
                                                 
9  The Akan word for chief and king is Nana, literally translated as grandfather or grandmother. Ancestors are 
also addressed as nananom. 
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warns that the chief analogy can be dangerous as it leads to a theologia gloriae – which lacks 
a theologia crucis10
Pobee further notes that the office of an African chief is bound up with worldly power, the 
claim of wealth and prestige. A distance is built between the chief and the community. And 
this distance is difficult to overcome. Sometimes, the members of the community find a 
hearing only through mediators. . By contrast, Jesus calls for a radical change of position as 
relayed in Mark 10:43 (Pobee 1979:78). 
 (1979:97). 
For some other African theologians such as Bediako (1984:19), the image of chief sends the 
wrong signals about who Jesus is. Bediako contends that Jesus cannot be reckoned as a chief, 
because the chief rules on behalf of the ancestors. If Jesus is thus to be named as chief, the 
misunderstanding could easily arise that the ancestors have given Jesus this authority.
Bediako (1984:19) argues that considering Jesus as chief would raise the ancestors above 
Jesus and make him subject to them. Bediako maintains that, if one is to use the 
Christological title “‘ancestor” consistently, one cannot, in addition, promote the idea of Jesus 
as chief.  
  
Harry Sawyerr also rejects the image of chief for a number of reasons. To Sawyerr, chiefs 
have lost their positive power and influence. Chiefship per se does not imply unquestioned 
supreme rule. Chiefs have never been readily accessible to the ordinary clan member. They 
had to be approached through various middle-persons. Chiefs generally live in walled 
settlements and are therefore not exposed to the ordinary contacts of their subjects (Sawyerr 
1968:72). 
In relating the image of Chief to the person of Christ, the problem that one encounters is 
Christ’s divinity. According to Nicene Christology, Christ is truly human as well as truly 
God. However, as stated earlier, the Akan do not regard their chiefs as divine beings, not even 
after death. Granted that there is a possibility of elevating chiefs to the status of divine beings, 
we will in that case encounter the heresy of adoptionism; there was a time when the chiefs 
were merely human and became divine later. Moreover, since the concept of “divine 
assembly” is foreign to the Akan worldview, the presumed “divine chiefs” will inevitably 
have the status of lesser divinities. 
                                                 
10  Pobee notes that the chief analogy denotes authority and power derived from other ways than the way of 
suffering and humanity (Luke 24:46 ff). 
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2.4.5 The image of Christ as a priest  
The institution of the priesthood 
The training
is a highly respected office in traditional West African 
societies. This institution is open to both men and women. Each candidate usually receives “a 
call” to the priesthood before embarking on a period of training. In certain societies the office 
of priesthood is hereditary. Nevertheless, the vocation must be authenticated. This takes place 
when the candidate is possessed by the particular deity whom he or she as priest or priestess 
will serve. Possession indicates a call as well as confirmation of the candidacy. The priest’s 
authority therefore does not emanate from either herself/himself or from any other human 
being. It is derived from the metaphysical world (Opoku 1978:74).  
 of the priests and priestesses is elaborate. During that period each trainee must 
make a complete break with their family relations. The training includes instructions in the 
laws, taboos, dances, songs and idiosyncrasies of the lesser divinities as well as about general 
priestly duties. In addition, the trainee has to acquire knowledge of medicine: herbs, roots and 
traditional African methods of psychiatry. 
The primary function of priests amongst the Akan is mediation. Priests mediate not only 
between the devotees and the lesser divinity and the ancestors, but also between human 
beings. This image of priest therefore makes the mediator role of Christ meaningful within the 
Akan context. 
The trainees also learn as part of their preparation 
for their vocation, the customs, traditions and history of their society. Priests/priestesses are 
therefore popular repositories of communal knowledge and traditions (Opoku 1978:75). 
The priests are believed to have power over evil spirits and to set human beings free from the 
yoke of evil. They appear to act as prophets or visionaries. It is generally believed that these 
priests have the ability to unfold a secret or, when they go into ecstasy, to foretell the future 
accurately.  
In addition to the religious role, the priests also play a part in the political, social and 
economic spheres. In some places, priests may double as chiefs. Their blessings are also 
solicited in almost all socio-economic undertakings. They are undoubtedly the most powerful, 
influential and complex figures in Akan society.
As spiritual leaders of the entire community, a certain standard of moral and social behaviour 
is expected of priests. Although some priests may fall short of this standard, many others 
maintain the high traditions of their office and are honest, trustworthy and devoted to their 
calling.  
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With respect to this background, some African theologians suggest that Jesus could be 
referred to as a priest. Amongst those who have made such suggestions are: Pobee (1979), 
Bediako (2000), Waruta, (1989) and Wairimu (1997). In this section, I will present only the 
proposals of Waruta and Bediako.  
Waruta (1989:43) notes two main sources from the New Testament as the basis of viewing 
Jesus as a priest. Waruta contends that the use of sacrificial language in Paul’s writings and 
the presentation of Christ as the High Priest in Hebrews conform to one of the most basic 
aspects of the early Church’s understanding of Jesus. Accordingly, as a priest, Jesus 
intermediates between human beings and God to provide the essential link between 
humankind and God. 
Comparing the role of Jesus as priest to the roles of the traditional African priests, Waruta 
(1989:48-49) observes some similarities. He argues that the priests in African traditional 
religions are seen as the mediums through which the life-giving power of God is conveyed to 
human beings. He notes that in the African communities, the priests preside over religious 
rituals, lead the people in worship, and solemnise ceremonies pertaining to the rites of 
passage. The priests are considered masters of traditional wisdom, rituals and ceremonies. 
More than anything, they are deemed the living symbols of religious life of the African 
community. People go to them with the hope that their fears and sufferings will be alleviated. 
They take the lead in the communal sacrifice when the intervention of spirit meets the needs 
of the community.  
Waruta (1989:52) also contends that through the priest divine power is employed for the 
purpose of bettering the human condition, thus providing liberation to the people. The 
traditional priests serve as officiating ministers of these rituals. They mediate in order to 
establish the bond between the people and the spirit beings: the Supreme Being, the lesser 
divinities and the ancestors, and between the people themselves.  
Waruta (1989: 50-52) links the functions of priests to the role of prophet and the king. He 
then remarks that the priests in African religion also play the roles of prophet and king. A 
priest may also at times be a chief, or act as a chief since some priests double as chiefs. 
Likewise, a chief or ruler in Africa plays a priestly part on behalf of his people. He does it on 
the basis of his position as the intermediary between the people and the ancestors and the 
lesser divinities.11
                                                 
11     Amongst the Swazi in Southern Africa, the king is both ritual and political head of his people. 
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Waruta (1989:41) points out that the need for Jesus to be understood in the threefold office of 
prophet, priest and king is not uniquely African. Such a recognition may be traced back to the 
church Father Eusebius of Caesarea. Waruta notes that in the Scriptures, as well as in the 
writings of the Fathers, sometimes the office of prophet is combined with that of priest, 
especially when emphasis was placed on understanding Jesus as the “Revealer of God”.  
In another development, Bediako (2000:27) confers the image of priest on Jesus. With the 
image of Jesus as High Priest, Bediako elaborates on the reason why Jesus is a perfect 
mediator. Bediako notes that the Jews could not possibly accept Jesus as High Priest, because 
he did not belong to the right tribe. In the same sense the Akan find it difficult to accept 
someone outside the tribe as an ancestor (Bediako 2000:27). 
However, Bediako notes that the writer of the book of Hebrews elaborates a line of argument 
that opens up the possibility for someone outside the tribe of Levi to exercise a priestly 
function. Building on the analogy of Melchizedek from Hebrews, Bediako concludes that the 
functions of Jesus as universal priest and his nature as true God and true human being, has 
placed Jesus’ priesthood in a different category – universal as against particular priest. That 
makes Jesus’ accomplishment significant for each human being in every human context and 
in all human cultures.  
Assessing the image of priest, one can discern the possibility of combining inculturation 
Christology with liberation Christology. The image of priest serves as a traditional symbol 
that embodies the African traditional religion and culture. Certainly, the institution of 
priesthood and the chieftaincy are the two main custodians of African traditional religion and 
culture. In addition to this vital role, these two institutions also serve as symbols of liberation 
of the oppressed from oppression by both spiritual and material forces. This is particularly the 
case when the chief and the priest join hands and engage in war to liberate their community 
from the external aggressors and oppressors. Added to this, the priest also stands as the 
liberator of the oppressed from the “evil spiritual forces” that many Africans fear so much.  
Moreover, the advocates of a priestly image have also rightly pointed to the mediatory part 
priests played in the African traditional religion and Christianity. All these functions 
relatively enhance the image of the priest.  
However, there is a pertinent question we still need to pose: On what grounds can mortal 
priests in Africa be said to be fully human and fully divine? The writer of the book of 
Hebrews ingeniously drew an analogy from the personhood of Melchizedek.  
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2.5 Assessment and conclusion 
I do not intend here to offer a detailed study of African Christologies or a detailed exposition 
of any particular Christology. Rather, it is a discussion of whether African Christologies have 
been able to remain true to the Nicene confession concerning the person and work of Christ. 
In order to offer a fair assessment, I have selected some key Christologies, but have made no 
attempt to survey all the available African Christologies.  
In keeping with this, my focus has been on the Christological images in terms of which Jesus 
Christ is described as “Liberator”, “Healer”, “Master of initiation”, “Linguist”, “Chief”, and 
“Priest”. I noted that there are two main Christological directions in the African Christological 
discourses, namely liberation and inculturation Christology. The first two of the images 
discussed in this chapter resort under liberation Christologies which place the emphasis on 
African political and socio-economic problems. The other five images resort under 
inculturation Christologies which stress a traditional African religion, culture and worldview. 
Observably, there are at least three ways in which African theologians usually construct a 
Christology.  
These Christological images are assessed from a Nicene/Chalcedonian perspective.  
2.5.1 Jesus as functional Liberator 
Firstly, there is an approach where Jesus is seen in functional terms as a liberator without any 
reference to his divinity, though divinity is not necessarily excluded.  
This approach is primarily based on the role or functions that Christ fulfills. In this sense, 
Christ is an ideal person whose life should be imitated, or is taken to be a liberator who 
liberates human beings from all kinds of oppression. The oppression could pertain to 
structural evils that dehumanise people, or culture and traditions that enslave underlings or 
even to perceive evil spirits that deceive and torment people. Such an approach to Christology 
responds to the need felt by Africans for a powerful protector against all forms of oppression 
and what they perceive as evil spirits that oppose human beings. 
Obviously, such images are derived from Scripture and were prominent in the ministry of 
Jesus. It is also important to note that such images are very appropriate within the African 
context, given the state of oppression and suffering on the African continent. However, such 
an approach seems badly inadequate to express the person of Christ as truly human as well as 
truly God as affirmed by the Councils of Nicea and Chalcedon.  
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Indeed, the work of Christ may be seen as liberating humankind from all forms of 
oppressions, yet Christ’s person and practice amount to more than that. One hardly constructs 
an adequate Christology just on some aspect of the role or functions that Jesus played. For 
example, if one should follow Christ because he is healer, liberator or a mere moral example, 
such an approach also serves as basis for people to follow other spiritual leaders with similar 
“charisma”. The intention here is not to say that the approach focusing on the function or role 
model is “wrong”. Rather, it cannot account for the “being” of Christ which is essential for 
the right picture of Christ’s person and salvific work.  
One may argue that African Christianity, at least in theory, represents largely a pro-Nicene 
form of piety. However, if the images that portray Jesus as merely a human being are to 
become dominant, African Christianity will eventually run the risk of undermining the 
distinctiveness of Nicene Christianity which has its core foundation on the divinity of Christ.   
To those who adhere to the Nicene definition of the person of Christ, Christianity is unique 
basically because of the Christian claim that Jesus is not merely human but also truly God. 
Thus, if the dominant images that claim to re-interpret Jesus on behalf of the African, depict 
the Lord as merely human, what doctrinal impression will that create for a later doctrinal 
development of African Christianity? If this trend is not reversed, here obviously lies an 
impending Christological problem for African Christianity.   
2.5.2 Jesus as human mediator 
The second approach poses Jesus as human mediator between God and humankind. The 
images of master of initiation, linguist, chief, and priest, are usually used in this regard. 
However, these images are known to represent only human beings. 
However, the problem with the approach focusing on functional divinity is that it tends to 
depict Jesus as the highest embodiment of God ever found in any human being. This 
essentially reduces Christ’s existence to the status of merely a human being. There are several 
forms of functional Christology, but basic to all these forms is that they contrast the functional 
divinity of Jesus against his essential divinity. Nevertheless, the Nicene-Chalcedon 
confessional definition of the person of Christ entails that Jesus is “of the same nature with 
God”. 
Nonetheless, this approach 
shows some developments along the line of the functional divinity of Christ as found in the 
work of Pobee (1979:81-98).  
It is very important to note the following insight. To reduce Jesus to merely a human being or 
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to reduce Christ’s divinity to only the function of God is to deprive Christ’s sacrifice of its 
infinite merit. For a mere human being cannot atone for the sins of humankind. Moreover, a 
mere human being does not deserve worship. It is in this respect that Pelikan (1971:173) 
noted that, amid all the varieties of Christian response to the Gnostic systems, the Fathers 
were sure that the Redeemer did not belong to some lower order of divine reality, but was 
himself God.  
Remarkably, the Father Athanasius in his argument against bishop Arius also noted that 
viewing Jesus as lesser than God undermined the Christian idea of redemption in Christ. He 
explained that, only if the Mediator was Himself divine, could humankind hope to re-establish 
fellowship with God (see Kelly 1978:233). In the same vein, he argues that if Jesus is not 
God, it is then inappropriate to practice the established liturgical customs of baptising others 
in the name of the Son as well as that of the Father, and to address prayers to the Son. Thus, 
from the perspective of Nicene Christianity, one must follow Christ because he is unique; 
fully divine and fully human and is the only mediator between God and humankind.  
2.5.3 Jesus as reconfigurated ancestor 
The third approach implies an attempt to reconfigure a human being into a divine one in order 
to express both Jesus’ humanity and divinity. Here we become aware of some sensitivity to 
the doctrinal importance as a complement to appropriating the proposal to the African 
context. Examples are found in some approaches in ancestor Christology. In such proposals, 
the humanity of Jesus is accepted as axiomatic – it is the divinity which must be 
demonstrated. There is no African Christological development along these lines which has 
done justice to the divinity of Christ in accordance with the Nicene confessional definition. 
Such attempts either run the risk of adoptionism or Arianism. If one starts from a finite being 
and elevates the image to the status of divinity, one inevitably runs the risk of adoptionism. 
Alternatively, if one poses an already existing divine being, one may also either import the 
image of a lesser divinity – Arainism or run the risk of modalism, by viewing the Supreme 
Being in terms of a Christological image. (I will return to this later in more detail in chapters 
3, 4 and 6 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Divine conqueror Christology: A critique  
3.1 Introduction  
The concept of Jesus as “divine conqueror” of the African spirit world reflects the most 
popular and dominant type of Christology in Africa. This view of Christ responds to the need 
felt by Africans for a powerful protector against what they perceive as evil spirits that oppose 
human beings. This chapter entails a description, analysis and critique of divine conqueror 
Christology in the Ghanaian context, namely where Jesus is portrayed as a divine conqueror 
in the African spirit world. In this chapter I argue that this type of Christology does not 
express the true humanity, true divinity and the atoning work of Christ adequately (see also 
Mbiti 1973:397-414, Bediako 2000: 8).  
An analysis of this form of Christology will be placed within the context of the debates in 
African theology on the relationship between the Supreme Being of African traditional 
theology and the God proclaimed by Christianity, as well as the status and role of the lesser 
divinities as intermediaries between God and human beings. In section 3.2  
I discuss the notion of “Jesus as divine conqueror” in African Christian theology. In sections 
3.3 and 3.4 I discuss the image of divine conqueror within the context of Akan traditional 
religion on the one hand and the Nicene confessional affirmation of the person and the work 
of Christ on the other. Section 3.5 focuses on the strengths and the weaknesses of the divine 
conqueror Christology. A conclusion on this is presented in section 3.6.  
3.2 Jesus as “Divine conqueror” in African Christian theology 
In this section I do not intend to present a detailed study of African Christologies. Still less, it 
is not an exposition of any particular African Christology that deals with the notion of divine 
conqueror. Instead, I will discuss briefly some of the key components of divine conqueror 
Christology and assess its strengths and weaknesses in light of the Nicene and Chalcedonian 
affirmation of the person and work of Christ. The issues discussed here include Jesus as 
“Christus Victor” over the African spirit world, Jesus as mighty Saviour of humankind, Jesus 
the conqueror of territorial spirits over Africa, and Jesus as the great orisha (lesser divinity) – 
who has overcome all the other spirit beings.  
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3.2.1 The notion and the form of divine conqueror Christology 
What I term as “divine conqueror Christology” is not any particular well defined theory where 
one can readily point to exponents who propagate it. Like African traditional religion, divine 
conqueror Christology is a functional form of African Christology. This view of Christ 
responds to the need felt by Africans for a powerful protector against what they perceive as 
evil spirits that work against human beings. It is an attempt from the traditional African per-
spective to give meaning to Christianity within the African context. This view of Christ 
operates throughout sub-Saharan Africa where African traditional religion and Christianity 
interact.  
This notion of Christ as the divine conqueror implies an African Christian understanding in 
which Jesus is often portrayed as a divine spirit who stands supreme over every spiritual ruler 
and authority. Such an understanding of Christ arises from the African perception that there 
are spiritual powers at work in the world which threaten the harmony and the interests of 
human beings. According to this type of Christology, Jesus is seen to be victorious over such 
forces in the spiritual realm.  
Divine conqueror Christology shares the ethos of liberation Christology. But unlike other 
liberation Christologies – which usually approach Christology “from below” – the divine 
conqueror Christology starts “from above”. The reason being that in this view, Jesus as divine 
conqueror is not identified with his earthly ministry. Jesus is merely viewed as a divine being 
acting in the transcendent realm. As I will argue below, this form of Christology raises 
important questions with regard to where Jesus fits in as the “divine conqueror” amongst the 
African divinities. 
3.2.2 John Mbiti: Jesus as “Christus Victor” within the African spirit world 
John Mbiti was the first African theologian to observe that the dominant and the most popular 
form of Christology prevailing amongst African Christians is the view of Jesus as the divine 
conqueror of the African spirit world. In keeping with this observation, he draws from the 
traditional Christological image of “Christus Victor” and applies it to the African context. 
Mbiti notes that within the African Independent Churches African Christian faith is better 
seen than in the mainline denominations1
                                                 
1  The distinctions between “independent” and “historical” churches are now less meaningful than they once 
were when Mbiti posed his questions. Presently, with the advent of African church leaders occupying 
leadership positions once held by Western missionaries, the mission churches to a large extent have also 
succumbed to the influence of the traditional worldview (Bediako 1983:96). 
 (Mbiti 1972: 51).  
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The major point Mbiti makes in his study is that Jesus is seen above all else as the Christus 
Victor (Christ supreme over every spiritual rule and authority). Mbiti points out that this 
understanding of Christ arises from the keen perception by Africans that there are forces and 
powers at work in the world which threaten the interests of people and their social harmony. 
Such a perception creates the need for a saviour. In this respect, viewing Jesus as victorious 
over the spiritual realm and particularly over evil forces, answers the need for a powerful 
protector against these forces and powers. 
Another important point that Mbiti makes is that, for African Christians, the term “our 
saviour” is readily interchangeable for God and Jesus, and sometimes even the Holy Spirit. In 
a saving capacity, Jesus mediates and is able to do all things, to save in all situations, to 
protect against all enemies, and is ready to intervene whenever those who believe may call 
upon him. Mbiti particularly notes that in the African context Jesus is our Saviour because He 
is almighty.2
However, Mbiti criticises Christology regarding the divine spirit as having serious defects. He 
particularly points to the fact that the humanity of Jesus and his atoning work on the cross are 
considerably less emphasised.  
 Jesus is thus seen and approached as saviour in all spheres of African life. 
3.2.3 Larbi and Asamoah-Gyadu: Christ the agyenkwa (saviour)  
The Akan (Twi) Bible translates “saviour” as agyenkwa. Amongst the Akan, agyenkwa is the 
one who saves and preserves one’s life. Whether used with reference to a deity or a human 
being, the term saviour conveys the same meaning – deliverance. For example, where 
someone’s timely intervention prevented a catastrophe or something unfavourable from 
happening, that person could be said to have become agyenkwa in that particular instance.  
In the Akan context, Asamoah-Gyadu and Larbi respectively have made an analysis of Akan 
Christian identification of Jesus as the agenkwa. In Larbi’s analysis of the cognate term 
nkwagye (salvation), he notes that the term is made up of two words: nkwa and gye. Nkwa 
means life, vitality, health and happiness. Gye has several meanings, but when used in the 
salvific sense it denotes “rescue, retake, recapture, redeem, ransom, buy out of servitude; to 
release, to free, to deliver, to liberate, and to save” (Larbi 2006: 6).  
                                                 
2  Mbiti advises that the church in Africa needs to re-examine its methods of evangelisation, taking into 
consideration the traditional African worldview. As Mbiti rightly noted, the grip that such perceived 
spiritual powers wield is so strong that it exercises a powerful influence on the ways in which Africans 
understand and experience the Christian message.  
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The agyenkwa is a powerful being; otherwise he cannot rescue and protect one from the 
powerful malevolent spirit beings: the abayifo (witches) and adutofo (sorcerers). The 
agyenkwa saves from danger and all perilous conditions also (see Onyina 1995). He does not 
only save but also offers banbo (security). The term agyenkwa and its cognates convey 
concrete realities. 
Larbi (2006:5) also points out that the concept of agyenkwa (saviour) becomes more 
important in the Akan context because of its dualistic worldview. The Akan worldview is 
divided into “two inter-penetrating and inseparable, yet distinguishable, parts” namely, the 
world of spirits and that of humans. 
Within the world of human beings there are men and women who manipulate the spirit forces 
for evil purposes. These are the akaberekyerefo and adutofo (charmers, enchanters and 
sorcerers), and abayifo (witches). The activities of these forces are directed against human 
beings in order to prevent them from enjoying abundant life.  
Amongst the Akan, there is a belief in the multiplicity of 
spirits within the universe. The idea of the cosmic struggle is strongly imbedded in the Akan 
understanding of the nature of the universe.  
Amongst the Akan, the central focus of the religious exercises of every member is to harness 
power inherent in the spirit force for his or her own advantage. To be able to fulfil his or her 
aspirations in life, each member requires the “balance of power” in favour of the supplicant. 
This “tilting of cosmic power” for one’s own benefit or for the benefit of one’s community 
Larbi dubs as “maintaining the cosmological balance”. The survival of human beings and 
their communities is in this way dependent upon the help given by superior powers. Therefore 
the way in which a human being relates to spirit forces is crucial to his or her ultimate well-
being (Larbi 2006:3).  
Abundant life can only become available to human beings through the various forms of 
mediation. The saviour who acts as mediator, both rescues from danger and continues to 
protect the “rescued one” from danger. Thereby he makes it possible for that one to 
experience nkwa, that is, life in all its fullness, which embodies prosperity (ahonyade) and 
peace (asomdwei).  
In this instance the notion of Jesus as divine conqueror and saviour (agyenkwa) becomes 
meaningful to Akan Christians. Jesus as a divine conqueror answers the need for a saviour 
who rescues human beings from the threat of these malevolent spirits. Jesus therefore, 
provides a proper sanctuary for those seeking to resist the evil spirits. The dramatic nature of 
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some of the conversion testimonies of those who “convert” to Christianity explains not only 
why such old ways of life are seen as driven by supernatural powers, but also why believers 
are keen to invite potential converts to taste the superior might of Christ (Asamoah-Gyadu 
2005:135).  
Observably, African Christians’ understanding of Jesus as divine conqueror correlates with an 
African cosmology. Jesus as divine conqueror becomes relevant in the Ghanaian context 
where salvation connotes deliverance from evil and all misfortunes. As one becomes a 
Christian, it is believed that Satan is defeated by the divine conqueror; otherwise one could 
not have left the former master to Christ who is now the new master. This means that Christ 
has conquered the evil forces that dominate the believer’s life (Asamoah-Gyadu 2005:137).  
3.2.4 The “blood of Jesus” as symbol of him being a divine conqueror 
In another development, particularly amongst Christians in Ghana and Nigeria, much 
emphasis is placed on the “blood of Jesus” as symbolising victory over Satan and evil spirits. 
Here the blood is deemed to be powerful because Jesus is a powerful divine spirit.  
The blood of Jesus is implied both in a passive and an active sense. It is used in a passive way 
to denote something which cleans sins and acts as protection. In Ghanaian Christianity, 
particularly amongst Pentecostals and charismatics, the blood of Jesus is used like a magic 
incantation to ward off evil spirits. It is common to hear someone praying at the dining table: 
“I put the blood of Jesus in this food,” or someone embarking on a journey saying: “I cover 
myself with the blood of Jesus.”  
It is also used in the active sense as that which “emits fire” to consume the evil spirits. Others 
also usually say: “Yesu Mogya nka wo anim” (literally, “Jesus’ blood be on your face”); in 
other words: “I suppress you by the blood of Jesus.” The idea behind such usage is that, 
because Jesus is a more powerful divine being, he is seen to conquer all evil spirits. Ghanaian 
Christians by and large use the blood of Jesus more as an offensive force than in the sense of 
cleansing of sin. Here the blood is deemed to be powerful because Jesus is confessed as 
powerful. There is no strong link between the usage of the blood of Jesus and Jesus’ 
redemptive atonement.  
One may therefore argue that Christ the Victor stands at the centre of African theology. Jesus 
is our Saviour because He is almighty. Where the cross does come into focus, it appears as a 
place of glorification. As Mbiti (1968:78) has rightly noted, Africans do not explain the 
significance of the cross primarily as the sacrificial action of Christ. There is no direct link 
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with the mention of the blood of Jesus and atonement as the work of Christ. For many African 
Christians, the cross, in so far as it relates to the human life of Jesus, is not a sign of shame 
and humiliation, but a symbol of might and power.  
3.2.5 Githii and Emeka: Jesus the conqueror of territorial spirits across Africa  
In another scene of engagement between Christianity and African culture, the perceived 
threats of demonic oppression and Jesus’ victory over demons are not restricted to individuals 
and families. Satanic forces are also believed to wield power over specific geographical areas. 
These perceived demonic forces are believed to be responsible for the underdevelopment of 
Africa and also for restraining people from becoming Christians. Indeed it is of particular 
interest to note that such perceived oppressive influence is believed to be observable in the 
national economies of various African countries. The socio-economic, moral and political 
problems in Africa are explained in terms of demonic activities.  
The books by Peter Wagner, a former professor from Fuller Theological Seminary, have 
contributed immensely to the idea of “territorial spirit” in African Christianity. Some African 
theologians, particularly Githii (2007) of Kenya and Oshun (1998) of Nigeria, have drawn 
from this view. The principal biblical reference to the existence of such spirits is Daniel 10, 
where one may be left with the impression that demonic spirits influence the affairs of nations 
(Wagner 1991, 1992).  
The suggestion is that countries stay poor not because of structural injustice or bad 
governance but because of a “spirit of poverty” visited upon that nation by demons. 
Many Christians, particularly Pentecostal and charismatic Christians, have subsequently 
called on the government of Ghana to abolish the traditional practice of pouring libation 
during state functions. Their argument is that such practices invite demons which in turn work 
against the economic system of the country. According to this view, Ghana’s socio-economic 
difficulties could be reversed through some sort of national deliverance by using the name of 
Jesus who has overcome these territorial spirits (see Asamoah-Gyadu 2005:181).  
African 
countries are considered particularly vulnerable to the influence of demons and curses 
because of the performance of rites and rituals that are associated with traditional religion.  
This view is held not only at the popular level, but also by some academics who identify with 
certain strands of Pentecostal or charismatic belief. Thus, Nigerian theologian Chris Oshun 
argues that Nigeria’s present difficulties, and those of African nations generally, could be 
explained in terms of the activities of evil powers. He thus strongly advocates what he calls a 
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“power approach” to resolve his country’s socio-economic problems.  
Oshun maintains that it is only by engaging “the powers and principalities” through the 
powers of the gospel, fasting and prayer that Nigeria may receive the needed healing (Oshun 
1998:32-52). Such a view is not restricted to African Indigenous Churches, Pentecostal 
churches and charismatic churches whose mode of operation predisposes them to this view. 
Rather, the belief cuts across the fabric of African Christianity. Such an assertion gains weight 
when one considers the position of David Githii, the current moderator of the 18th General 
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa.3
This book seeks to reveal to Kenyans how some of these satanic powers have held 
our nation captive. What is more, the book seeks to expose, in depth, the various 
areas that the devil has held captive; areas which, I believe are connected to satanic 
altars and practices that have long been upheld in the nation.  
 Githii’s recently published book, 
Exposing and Conquering Satanic Forces over Kenya (2007) contains his treatise on how 
territorial spirits control the socio-economic and political arena of Kenya. In the preface, 
Githii states that:  
He also cautions: “Remember, whether you believe it or not, there is an ongoing war between 
the Kingdom of God (Light) and Satan (Darkness).” Githii particularly links such wars with 
symbols and images which he believes are tools for evil spirits. His supposition is that these 
symbols and images allow evil spirits access to control the area where they roam, thereby 
negatively affecting the economy of Kenya. He particularly points to some of these symbols 
and images in Kenya’s Parliament House, which, he believes, do not only anger God but also 
prompt God to withhold His economic blessings. Githii contends that such symbols give 
access to territorial spirits to control Kenya and negatively affect its socio-economic and 
political situation. To Githii this is not merely an academic exercise; there are important 
practical issues to be dealt with. To show his commitment, he attacked some of these symbols 
and images in Kenya’s Parliament House when he had the opportunity to offer a prayer at that 
site. He noted that:  
Twice in the past, while leading prayer within Parliament, I castigated these 
satanic symbols that have been erected within Parliament. This prayer stirred rest-
lessness in a majority of the members of Parliament. Tension, apprehension and 
outright disgust [were] was apparent throughout my prayer. I soldiered on though 
the tension was near-tangible (Githii 2007:31-32). 
Another leading exponent of this view in West Africa is the Nigerian charismatic lawyer 
Emeka Nwankpa who expounds such a view in his book Redeeming the Land. Nwankpa 
                                                 
3  Githii holds a Doctorate in Missions from Fuller Theological Seminary. 
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interprets 1 John 5:19, “the whole world is under the control of the evil one,” to mean that 
Satan has expanded his hold over the earth by deploying his principalities and powers in the 
world.4
Nwankpa maintains that demons could have a tight grip on the affairs of nations as a result of 
defilement through idolatry and moral perversion. He contends that Africans have become 
economic migrants in other countries because of idolatry and moral perversion (Nwankpa 
1994:9). Apparently such a view is not only in line with the Old Testament thought forms but 
also correlates with an African traditional understanding. According to this view the 
custodians of morality – God, the lesser divinities and the ancestors – would punish a society 
for breaching moral laws. Whether or not such a view is plausible in economic terms, falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
 In so doing, Satan is supposed to have strengthened his hold over families, 
communities, cities and certain African Nations.  
3.2.6 Onaiyekan: Christ as the great orisha (lesser divinity)  
African theological discourse conducts many discussions on the person and the work of 
Christ. However, the nature of the person of Jesus as understood in terms of an African 
worldview has not been clarified as yet. In his contribution to the debate, Onaiyekan has 
suggested that Jesus could be presented as the great and unique orisha (lesser divinity).  
The cult of the lesser divinities represents a deeply rooted tradition in Africa; it has persisted 
up to modern times. Yoruba traditional religion is almost exclusively concerned with the cult 
of the lesser divinities named orisha (Onaiyekan 1991:22). On this basis Onaiyekan suggests 
that Jesus could be presented as the great and unique orisha, (lesser divinity) superior to all 
the others.  
Onaiyekan notes that some of the orisha were once human beings and may therefore also be 
considered to be ancestors. But he insists that the cult of the orisha is basically regarded as 
that of lesser divinities. Thus, the cult of orisha should not be confused with a somewhat 
limited cult of paternal ancestors who are called oriisun (source), or, more generally, babanla 
(grandfathers).  
The suggestion of Jesus as the greatest orisha rests on the idea of replacing the allegiance to 
the lesser divinities with an allegiance to Jesus. The argument behind such a proposal is that, 
when one accepts Jesus as orisha (the greatest of the lesser divinities), the attention paid to 
                                                 
4  Here I partly draw on Asamoah-Gyadu’s (2000:180) discussion concerning territorial spirits. 
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the lesser divinities becomes redundant and useless (Onaiyekan 1991:22-23). Such a proposal 
also allows Africans to maintain the concept of lesser divinities which matters most to them; 
yet no attention would be given to the individual lesser divinity. Onaiyekan admits that seeing 
Jesus as a lesser divinity has grave limitations. He nevertheless insists that since each image 
of Jesus paints only part of the picture, there are limits to all the various images of Christ 
which have been presented.  
However, the problem is not whether an image is perfect or not. Instead, what is important is 
the relative adequacy of any suggested image. Undoubtedly, the image of orisha (lesser 
divinity) shows stark contrast with the Nicene definition of the person of Christ. I will return 
to this issue later in this thesis. 
3.3 An analysis of the person and the work of Christ 
3.3.1Conceptual analysis of the person of Jesus as “Divine conqueror”in the Akan 
context  
The Akan worldview recognises only two categories of spirit beings as divinities, namely 
Onyame and abosom. A distinction is made between Onyame who is regarded as the unique 
one, and the abosom who are also regarded as lesser divinities. It is believed that whereas the 
abosom share the divinity with Onyame, they are not in the same class or category. The 
abosom are believed to be created by Onyame, thus there is only one Onyame (Supreme 
Being) recognised by the Akan. Since divinity or deity does not necessarily denote God or 
gods in Akan thought-form, an examination of the cults of Onyame and the abosom will help 
to assess the nature of the person of “divine conqueror” as attributed to Jesus in the Akan 
context.5
 In what follows, I will discuss whether or not Jesus could be categorised as being amongst 
the lesser divinities the Akan perceive of. I will also engage in a conceptual analysis on 
whether or not one can say that Jesus is Onyame (God). 
  
                                                 
5  I explored this theme in more detail in my M.Phil thesis, particularly chapters 2, 3 and 9. See Agyarko 
(2006). 
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 a) Can Jesus be categorised as being amongst the abosom?6
In African Christianity, the Supreme Being is identified with the God that Christians 
proclaim, but how should African Christians view the lesser divinities? They are sometimes 
understood in terms of gods, other times even in terms of demons (fallen angels) and enemies 
of God. They are also sometimes interpreted as angels and ministers of God. In this section, 
we will first briefly consider the Akan divinity cult of the abosom (lesser divinities), assess 
their nature and explore whether Jesus being “truly God and truly divine” would fit into this 
category.  
  
In the Akan society the abosom may be classified in two categories. There are the ancient 
tutelar divinities called tete abosom. They belong to the community and have been 
worshipped from time immemorial. These divinities are believed to be friendly towards the 
community. With reference to tete abosom, Sarpong suggests that the term abosom denotes 
that their habitat was formerly stones. This suggestion is based on the etymological meanings 
of the two words abo and som.7 Similarly, Pobee gives the etymology and the breakdown of 
the term abosom as: “a”, a prefix which makes a root plural; bo, a stone or rock; and som, to 
serve or worship. He therefore draws the conclusion that the term “abosom”, quite literally, 
implies the worship of stones or rock.8 Pobee however admits that lesser divinities do not 
always use stones or rocks as their abode; they also inhabit rivers and trees.9
The Akan distinguish between the habitat of the spirit and the spirit itself (Pobee 1979:46). 
The abosom require a temporary abode and a priest. The temporary abode may be a tree or 
 Moreover, such a 
meaning appears to be misleading as the Akan do not regard the shrines of abosom as being 
made entirely of stone.  
                                                 
6  There is a whole pantheon of these abosom, for their number increases continually. Some acquire country-
wide fame for a season and then pass into oblivion; while others, like the Ntoa lesser divinities of 
Nkoranza, Wenchi, and Techiman, or the Tano, have become lesser divinities within tribal bounds. 
Elaborate annual festivals are held in their honour. Of these lesser divinities, the most powerful are spirits 
of rivers. 
7  Some Christians entertain another suggestion that abro (useless) and som (worship) connote the meaning of 
abosom. Such a suggestion is just a negative expression by which Christians show their contempt and 
disregard for the abosom.  
8  The habitat of the abosom, according to traditional Akan culture, is not always stones or rocks. Particularly 
amongst the Ashantis (on whom Sarpong’s and Pobee’s studies are based) almost all the ancient and 
original abosom are water deities (lesser divinities). On that basis, Sarpong’s and Pobee’s suggestion does 
not bring the true meaning of abosom to the fore. Sarpong (1974:15) however admits that it is not easy to 
determine the precise nature of abosom (lesser divinities).  
9  Pobee (1979:46) advances another view, namely that the etymological association of the lesser divinities 
with a rock gives a hint of a stone that is usually put as security to support the shrine of the lesser divinities. 
Phil Bartle (2005:1), a Western sociologist and a former lecturer at the University of Cape Coast, supports 
this view.  
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river, or a rock; or a priest might prepare for the spirit a wooden image or mound of mud 
daubed with blood placed in a basin and kept in a temple.  
Amongst the Akan the tete abosom mainly reside in water, that is, in rivers, lakes, or streams. 
The various forms of water are more or less perceived to contain power based on the spirit of 
the water that Onyame created directly (Rattray 1959:11-12, Opoku 1978:55).10
It is generally believed that abosom have not originated as human beings.
 The abosom 
(lesser divinities) will not always be present in this temporary abode which they enter at will 
when summoned by a priest.  
11
Sarpong (1974) and Pobee (1979) maintain that, traditionally, the lesser divinities were called 
Nyame mma (“children of the Supreme Being”). With this, these theologians propose an inter-
mediary role of the abosom between Onyame and human beings. However, according to the 
Akan traditional thought form, it may mean nothing more than the idea that they were created 
by Onyame.  
 They are distinct 
from the spirits of the dead though they may reside also in human beings. It is in addition 
generally believed that abosom (lesser divinities) were directly or indirectly created by 
Onyame, since nothing exists outside Onyame in terms of Akan life and thought (Rattray 
1959:26). Thus, abosom are creatures of Onyame and are subordinate to Him, although they 
may use their enormous powers independently of Him. They may be male or female, but their 
influence is independent of their gender (also see Field 1940, 1961). 
Another category of lesser divinities is relatively more recent in origin and was introduced 
from the outside into the Akan context. It is perhaps better to refer to them as “elevated 
fetish”. These are physical objects or instruments used in the practice of magic and have been 
elevated to the status of lesser divinity. They are called suman bosom by the Akan. The suman 
may be in the form of beads, or medicine balls carried on strings or in a sheep’s horn or a 
gourd. Some of them are no more than charms or talisman that could be regarded as 
impersonal forces acting in obedience to secret formulae and operations. A suman is believed 
                                                 
10  Not every lesser divinity is benevolent to human beings. Some indeed are, but others are mischievous. They 
punish those who do not offer them the due worship and obedience. Sacrifices are made to them either to 
repay the benignity of the good ones or to avoid the malignity of the ill-disposed ones (Sarpong 1974: 17). 
This explains the two categories of abosom. 
11  In some African societies such as amongst the Yoruba of Nigeria, some lesser divinities were originally 
ancestors. Likewise, in Greek and Mesopotamian societies some of the gods were demoted to become 
lesser divinities – as one of them emerges as Supreme Being and others were subsequently demoted. Some 
scholars have suggested that the same occurred in Judaism: when Yahweh became Supreme and other gods 
within the divine assembly ultimately became what we know today as angels. 
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to protect the wearer and guards him or her against harm, or assists him or her to gain 
personal ends, and functions effectively or not, according to the care rendered to it (Busia 
1976:195).  
This category of abosom, unlike the tete abosom, belongs to the individuals and operates in 
the interest of the owners who, for personal ends, may put these to beneficial or harmful use. 
The abosom are believed to hate and to kill witches (Rattray1959:9-12).  
Amongst the Akan, it is believed that the power of suman bosom comes from the mmoatia 
(dwarfs), sasabonsam (evil spirits), saman bofou (fetish spirits) and abayifo (witches) and 
sometimes from plants and trees. Although suman may be part of abosom, suman and abosom 
are in themselves distinct. Suman (fetish) do not have traditional priests who serve them, 
although a traditional priest may usually have suman of his own. Suman are personal charms. 
They help the osofo (traditional priest) or the owner personally for protection. It is believed 
that suman also make the tete bosom more powerful (Rattray 1959:14, also see Agyarko 
2006:17-19).  
On the basis of the above analysis, it will be an over-generalisation to speak of all abosom as 
evil forces or spirits. The Akan actually do not see the tete abosom as evil forces as such. 
Instead, the Akan see them as community guides who may receive their powers from God 
(see Busia 1976:193, also Mbiti 1969:87). Rattray (1959: 23) rightly comments: “The main 
power, or the most important spirit in abosom, comes directly or indirectly from Nyame, the 
Supreme Being.”
Nevertheless, the suman bosom can be justifiably identified with evil forces or spirits because 
the Akan themselves regard them as such. On this basis Sarpong suggests that we should 
identify the good abosom with the good angels and the evil abosom with evil angels (Sarpong 
1996:43).
  
Notwithstanding such a traditional view, many Christians in Ghana do in fact regard the 
abosom (lesser divinities) as gods. Maintaining a cult for such abosom would therefore be at 
variance with the first commandment. However, strictly speaking, the abosom are not gods, 
neither do they rival God. The first commandment reads: I am Yahweh your God who 
brought you out of Egypt, where you lived as slaves. You shall have no other gods, to rival 
me (Exodus 20:1-2). Contextually, the first commandment presupposes “spirit beings” that 
are perceived to be “gods” and thereby rival Yahweh. The sin against this commandment 
which we run the greatest risk of committing, is giving the glory and honour which are due to 
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God to any other god or creature.12
When the Bible mentions the gods of Babylon, Persia, and Greece, it is talking of beings 
whose worshippers thought and believed they were at least equal to the Jewish Yahweh. 
Hence God could say: Thou shall not serve any other god apart from me (Exodus 20:3). 
“Baal” and “Zeus” were competing with Yahweh. This is simply unthinkable in African 
Traditional Religion. Onyame has no competitors and the worshippers of abosom know and 
acknowledge this (Sarpong 2002:97). 
  
 The abosom are neither the “gods” the author of the first commandment had in mind, nor 
spirit beings who in any way rival Yahweh, as already explained above. In this respect, it 
would be possible to attribute divinity to “lesser divinities” (abosom) yet not regard them as 
gods – in the sense of Ancient Near East and Middle-East. For the Akan, divinity does not 
necessarily refer to the Supreme Being only; it could also denote the lesser divinities.  
Nonetheless, another related question needs to be asked here: are the abosom idols? Of course 
verse 3 of the same passage enjoins Yahweh’s followers not to worship idols. Also in the 
New Testament, I Corinthians 11:8-11, Paul contends that making an offering to the idols is 
the same as making it to demons, and that comprises idolatry. This stand is explained by 
Paul’s contention that all the gods of the Gentiles are demons.  
According to Barrett (1973:237), Paul was convinced that the image used to represent 
idolatrous worship was a block of wood or stone and nothing more; it neither contains power 
to bless nor curse. He also points out that Paul at the same time believed in the reality of an 
unseen world, and that to him idolatry was not merely meaningless but positively evil.  
Sifting through Barrett’s analysis of the passage, one could still see that Barrett has evil spirits 
in mind. But as already explained, Akan tete abosom are not evil as such, at least in the 
conception of the traditional Akan. In keeping with this, one may still ask: How should the 
Akan Christian relate to abosom? Since we are still confronting the problem of abosom who 
are not evil yet constitute idols. Would the Akan Christian who dabbles in the cults of abosom 
run the risk of idolatry? 
Taking the verses of Exodus 20:1-3 together, idolatry could be defined as the worship of idols 
(or images); the worship of the polytheistic gods by the use of idols (or images) and even as 
                                                 
12  These commandments were written as rejoinders to the beliefs and practices of the polytheistic religions of 
the Ancient Near East. The Bible is clearly responding to the religions of Akkad, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. 
The spirit beings who are gods according to the understanding of people of the Ancient Near East were 
seen as rivals of Yahweh. 
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the use of idols in the worship of the Bible’s monotheistic God. The word “idolatry” (from 
‘idol’) comes from the Greek word eidololatria, which is a compound of eidolon, “image” or 
“figure”, and latria, “worship”. Eidololatria appears to be borrowed translation of the Hebrew 
phrase avodat elilim meaning worship of idols (Buchsel 1974:375-380). 
Various terms, expressing scorn and disdain, are sometimes applied to the idols. Thus, idols 
are stigmatised as “non-God” (Deuteronomy 32:17, 21 Jeremiah 2:11), things of naught 
(Leviticus 41:29), “a lie” (Isaiah 44:20), and similar epithets. Idols are said to be made of 
gold, silver, wood, and stone, and are graven images. Being the products of human hand, idols 
are unable to speak, see, hear, smell, eat or feel. They are also powerless, either to injure or to 
be of some benefit. Idols were named according to their material or manner in which they 
were made. At first, the gods and their images were conceived of as identical; but in later 
times a distinction was drawn between the god and its image. 
Temples, altars, and statues were erected to the gods. Prayers were offered to these gods 
(Exodus 20:5). They were invoked by name (1 Kings 18-19, 21), their names were praised 
(Joshua 23: 7), incense was burned in their honour (1 Kings 11:8), they were invoked by the 
taking of oaths, and sacrifices were immolated to them (Jeremiah 7:18). The victims even 
included human beings, such as the offering made to Moloch (Buchsel 1974:375-380). 
From the above analysis, an Akan Christian may argue that the abosom are not the gods that 
the first commandment had in mind. However, looking at the biblical description of what 
constitutes an idol, it is obvious that the Akan abosom are idols. In this respect, one may agree 
with Barrett as he rightly argues that idol worship is evil primarily because it robbed the true 
God of the glory due to him alone. This type of worship is also evil because it meant that 
subjects are engaged in a spiritual act and are directing their worship towards something other 
than the one true God. Thus, to Barrett, the harmful effect of idol worship is related to the 
way in which worshippers commit themselves to evil through subordinate power. Therefore 
the argument, which is very strong amongst African theologians, that the abosom receive the 
worship on behalf of Onyame (God), would not suffice here. The reason is that, the first 
commandment categorically condemned the use of idols as means to worship God.  
The question that now besets us is this: Can we categorise Jesus as being amongst the abosom 
(lesser divinities) as Onaiyekan for example suggested? In my opinion, the response to this 
question is an unequivocal denial. Such a view of Christ is sorely inadequate since it fails to 
do justice to the Nicene notion of Christ as truly God and “of one being” with the Father. The 
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abosom or orisha are at best lesser divinities. Such images do not adequately express the true 
divinity of Jesus. 
In another discussion of the lesser divinities and angels, Sarpong (a Roman Catholic 
Archbishop in Kumasi), suggests that a belief in angels can replace belief in abosom (lesser 
divinities). Ezeanya (1969:425) concurs with this view. Indeed, of the so-called intermediary 
figures in pre-Christian Judaism, angels were also regarded as intermediaries. There was a 
clear enough concept of angelic leadership functioning as mediators between God and 
humankind. However, there was certainly no thought of angels becoming human in order to 
redeem humankind. Moreover, the consideration of Jesus as an angel was discouraged in the 
early church. The image of Jesus as an angel would also starkly contradict the Nicene 
understanding of the person of Christ as angels are neither in the class of God nor of human 
beings. Nevertheless, it may be interesting to view the abosom as angels in their own right. 
An exploration of this theme falls outside the scope of this thesis though.
Besides, the cult of abosom clearly fits into the category of idols which the 
first commandment condemns. 
13
From this contextual analysis, I conclude that the status of Jesus as fully human and fully God 
would put Jesus beyond the status of abosom. However, if it is indeed inappropriate to 
categorise Jesus as being amongst the abosom (lesser divinities), would that necessarily imply 
that Jesus is on par with Onyame – since the Akan have only these two categories of 
divinities? This question is explored in the next section.  
 
 b) Can one say that Jesus is Onyame (God)? 
In a symposium published in 1979, Don Cupitt (1979:31) set out to analyse the expression 
“Jesus is God”, on the ground that Christians were often considered as people who believed 
that Jesus is God. He nevertheless adds that few theologians would accept that formula 
without qualification. 
Sturch (1982:326), an evangelical scholar, readily affirmed that Cupitt is correct on this point. 
More importantly, while he agrees with Cupitt, he also disagrees with the implication that 
Cupitt had drawn from such statements – that Jesus is not in the class of God. Sturch also 
makes some valuable suggestions with regard to how one could view Jesus as truly human as 
well as truly God. This question is important to this study seeing that the Akan Bible 
translators have identified Onyame – the Akan notion of Supreme Being with the God 
Christians proclaimed. 
                                                 
13  See Agyarko (2006:139-146).  
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Thus, in this section, my focus is to establish whether and in what form one can say, within 
the Akan context, that Jesus is Onyame. Amongst the Akan, Onyame is not just an abstract 
Supreme Being. It is clear that Onyame is not a compound name or a term used in any generic 
sense. It entails a personal name. It is a singular, and does not in any way denote a sense of a 
divine assembly. In the current usage, Onyame is identified with the God Christians proclaim, 
as seen in the Akan Bible translation. In this respect, a similar inquiry would help to assess 
the divinity of Jesus in the Akan context.14
These analyses will take three phases. Firstly, I will analyse the Akan traditional connotations 
attached to the name Onyame. This is to find out whether the concept of Onyame can readily 
be identified with the God Christians proclaim. Secondly, I will analyse the expression “Jesus 
is God” within the context of Christian (Nicene) affirmation of the person of Christ. Thirdly, I 
will assess how the analysis of the second phase – “Jesus is God” affects a similar statement: 
Jesus is Onyame – granted that Onyame is the God proclaimed by Christians.  
  
Firstly, the concept of Onyame (God) as the creator of the world and human beings and the 
final authority in all matters, is original to the Akan traditional culture and religion. This idea 
is firmly entrenched in the religious beliefs of the Akan people and is fundamental to their 
religious systems (Opoku 1978:14, Sarpong 1974:13, Gyekye 1996:7). 
The Akan have names for Onyame which are different from the names given to other spiritual 
beings they recognise. These special names 
The name Onyame or Onyankopon is exclusively used for the Supreme Being. It is singular 
and does not in any sense express a divine assembly (Ryan 1980:162, Sarpong 1974:10).
express the idea of the uniqueness of Onyame 
(God) and reflect the attributes given to him (Opoku 1978:14, 1975). The concept which the 
Akan have of the Supreme Being may be gathered from the titles ascribed to him. He is, the 
Akan say, older than all the things that live on the wide, wide earth (Asase tere, na Onyame 
ne Panin). He is Onyankopon, alone, the great one; Bore-bore, the first, the Creator of all 
things; Otumfo, the powerful One; Odomankoma, the eternal one. God is also personalised as 
one who acts amongst human beings. Thus, when evil befalls one who had acted in an evil 
way, it is said that God has punished him or her.  
 He is 
never represented in the form of images nor worshipped through them.15
                                                 
14  Here I draw on Sturch’s analysis (Sturch 1986).  
 Onyame is also 
considered unique and different from all the other spirits or divinities. Thus the obosom 
15  The Akan also rarely dedicate temples and shrines to Onyame.  
 
 
 
 
 55 
(lesser divinity) or abosom (lesser divinities) are never referred to as Onyame or anyame; 
neither has Onyame ever been placed in the category of the abosom (Sarpong 2002:97). On 
this basis Ryan rightly argues that it is wrong to place Onyame and abosom in the same class 
and refer to them as God and gods as if both have the same personality. Ryan rightly observes 
that there is no authentic dialect of the Akan language that yields an adequate equivalent of 
the Semitic and Greco-Roman pair called God and gods (Ryan 1980:164).16
To the Akan, Onyame is essentially a spirit, a being who is invisible to humankind but who is 
omnipresent. The invisible nature of God is usually expressed in concrete terms. Amongst the 
Akan, Onyame has never manifested himself physically in any form. There is no myth, story, 
or song that suggests this manifestation.
 
 The Akan only liken Onyame to the sky but do not 
identify God with it. The sky is seen as the abode of Onyame. The Akan also liken Onyame to 
the wind. As the Akan maxim says: “if you want to speak to God, talk to the wind.” But they 
do not identify Onyame with this phenomenon.17
In this analysis, it is clear that Onyame consists of one indivisible essence in His essential 
being or constitutional nature. Thus, it can be concretely affirmed that according to the Akan 
concept, the unity of the person of Onyame is strongly affirmed.  
  
Secondly, one has to view the Akan concept of God against the background of Old Testament 
ideas of God. That is in order to conclude that it may be justifiable to consider the Akan 
concept of Onyame and the Old Testament idea of God as similar. Nevertheless, as much as 
the concept of Onyame may correlate with the Old Testament idea of God, this monotheistic 
stance alone is not adequate to reinterpret the person of Christ according to the Nicene 
confessional formula.  
As Hurtado has noted, the exclusive monotheism of ancient Judaism is the crucial religious 
context in which to view exponents’ devotion to Christ in early Christianity. But, he cautions 
that one should not assume that this stance on monotheism was transferred into early 
                                                 
16  Ryan further rightly argues that the recent translation of the Bible into Asante Twi, which translates the 
plural “elohim” of Psalm 82:6 as anyame, a neologism foisted on the traditional unique Onyame in the 
nineteenth century, is not correct. He contends that by so doing, the translators have over-dignified the 
divine antagonist of Yahweh in Israel and they have thereby underrated the Supreme Being in West Africa 
(Ryan 1980:164).  
17  The idea of the original closeness of God is illustrated by the myth of Onyame’s withdrawal. According to 
the belief, originally everyone had direct access to the Supreme Being. However, it is believed that such 
direct access was marred due to humankind’s sin (represented by the old woman) against God. 
Nevertheless, there is another saying: “Obi nkyere abofra Onyame”, which may mean either, “No-one 
shows a child the Supreme Being” (he knows it by instinct) or, “No-one shows the child the sky” (which is 
the abode of the Supreme Being).  
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Christian circles (Hurtado 2003:48). Notably, the Christian (Nicene) notion of God can better 
be described in terms of the confession of the “triune God”. Therefore, the Christian notion of 
the triune God calls for a new perspective on the idea of God. It is very important for the 
Akan Christians to view Onyame (God) as the triune God, if one will identify the Akan 
concept of God with the God Christians proclaim. Otherwise, any Christological proposal 
from within the Akan context will degenerate into the heresy of modalism.  
Secondly, based on this trinitarian Christian understanding of God, can one argue that Jesus is 
God? Sturch (1986:326) has rightly pointed out that the statement “Jesus is God” is nowhere 
to be found in the Bible itself, nor in any of the church’s historic creeds, nor even in the 
confession of the Council of Chalcedon. Sturch further points out that even the most 
celebrated of all assertions of our Lord’s divinity, the prologue to John’s Gospel, does not 
make any statement of which “Jesus” is the direct subject; indeed, it does not use that name. 
This indirect approach to the assertion of Jesus’ divinity is in fact typical of the New 
Testament testimony.
Jesus is Lord, yes, but that is perhaps more an acclamation than a theological statement with 
distinct theological implications. The blunt statement “Jesus is God” is avoided in the 
Scriptures. As noted above, even the great Christological definition of Chalcedon – perhaps 
one should say especially the definition of Chalcedon, with its careful accuracy – avoids this 
assertion. It is stated: “We teach men to acknowledge . . . our Lord Jesus Christ, at once 
complete in Godhead and complete also in manhood, truly God and truly man.”
  
In this regard a distinct question arises: Does the reason for this strange linguistic habit lie in a 
logical difficulty, or impossibility rooted in the details of the case? Is it as untrue to say “Jesus 
is God,” as it would be to say that “Robert is God”? One may argue, if the doctrine is 
essential to the Christian faith, why is it that none of the biblical authors ever inserts the 
expression, and why so many later authors have avoided it.
  
 We therefore need to look 
carefully into the possibility that there may lie some sort of difficulty in the unqualified 
assertion that Jesus is God. The most obvious possibility is that there is some catch in the 
implementation of the word “is”. 
In this respect, if someone willingly says “Jesus is God” we might well balk at the saying 
“God is Jesus”. The confessional expression “God is Jesus” by itself suggests that there is no 
There are, irritatingly, certain difficulties in claiming either 
that the “is” in “Jesus is God” pertains to one of identity or one of predication. If it is one of 
identity, the statement should be reversible. 
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more to God over and above the man Jesus, which is not the case.18 Going by this, we may 
run the risk of the “heresy” of modalistic monarchianism.19
However, perhaps “God” is not a proper name after all.
 
20 Does not this make “God” a mere 
descriptive phrase, equivalent to (say) “the supreme being” or “the only proper object of 
worship”? This seems fair enough. Unfortunately, it turns out to raise the selfsame difficulty 
as approaching “God” as a proper name.21
That will enable us to use the word “God” as a predicate, undoubtedly, but only at the cost of 
saying “Jesus is a God”. Then a polytheist might also accept this affirmation. For such a 
notion would fit well in the confessional construct of a divine assembly. However, that is not 
an option for those who adhere to Nicene Christianity, even those who subscribe to the 
monotheism.
  
22
It seems, then, that the New Testament and the widespread tradition of later Christianity were 
right not to use the unqualified statement “Jesus is God”. To do so lands one in serious logical 
and theological difficulties. In this respect, the statement that “Jesus is God”, cannot be 
sustained. Yet such a linguistic barrier does not necessarily mean that one cannot see Jesus as 
God.  
 
One cannot technically say that “Jesus is God”. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean 
that one cannot say that Jesus is fully God as well as fully human, at least within the 
conceptual framework of the confession of faith in the triune God. The former statement 
restricts one from identifying the person of Jesus with that of God. The contention here is that 
God is seen as a single entity – monotheistic. However, it may be argued that the Christian 
concept of God, strictly speaking, is rather trinitarian or communitarian.  
Thirdly, applying this insight to the Akan context, how do we then answer the question: Can 
one say that Jesus is Onyame? Obviously, if one grants that the Akan word Onyame refers to 
the same God as the One proclaimed by Christians, then it would be logically inconsistent for 
Akan Christians also to say that “Jesus is Onyame”. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
mean that one cannot affirm that Jesus is truly Onyame (God) as well as truly human, in the 
                                                 
18  This is the natural way to approach the “is” in the affirmation “Jesus is God”. 
19  Or patripassionism – one God parading in different “masks”. 
20  Elijah’s challenge on Mount Carmel: “If the Lord is God, then follow him; but if Baal, then follow him.” 
21  The definite article picks out a single being or object; and a being or object, like a proper name, cannot be 
predicated of anything, it can only be identical with it. Nor will it help to omit the definite article. 
22  A debate exists in Christian theology as to whether monotheism describes the Christian faith accurately. We 
can however not enter that debate seeing that it is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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Akan traditional context. That is, provided it can be proved that the idea of the triune God can 
be sustained within the Akan concept of Onyame. This leads us to another phase of the 
problem to assess whether the affirmation that Jesus is truly God as well as truly human can 
be sustained in terms of Akan concepts.  
How then do Akan Christians approach the problem of the identity of the person of Jesus in 
the Akan context – seeing that Jesus could not be considered to be obosom (a lesser divinity) 
nor can one say that “Jesus is Onyame”? 
c) Can the image of Divine conqueror adequately express the Nicene notion that Jesus 
Christ is “truly God”? 
This problem becomes especially complex as the 
Akan recognise only two categories of divinities: the unique divinity of Onyame and the cult 
of abosom (the lesser divinities). Admittedly, this may not be an easy task. I will nevertheless 
offer some suggestions in this regard in chapter 6 of this thesis by making use of the Akan 
anthropology and conception of God. 
The emphasis of Christology adhering to the notion of the divine conqueror is on Jesus’ 
divinity. He has overcome the spiritual realm because he is a powerful divine being. He is the 
Saviour because he is more powerful than all the evil spirits. In keeping with this, one may 
think that as it stands, the divinity of Jesus is adequately expressed in the divine conqueror 
Christology. However, that is not exactly the case. For the Akan, divinity does not necessarily 
refer to the Supreme Being (Onyame); it could also refer to the lesser divinities.
This calls for some clarification on the nature of Jesus’ divinity as understood in the context 
of a divine conqueror Christology. The subtle difference here is that the Akan use the term 
Onyame which is identified with the God which Christians proclaimed only in singular sense, 
whereas the usage of divinity might apply to Onyame and abosom (the lesser divinities) and 
many others.  
  
However, amongst the Akan (as already stated) the oneness of the Supreme Being is assumed, 
while the concept of divine assembly is foreign within the Akan worldview. It therefore 
requires that one establishes how Jesus could not only be regarded as “divine” but as “truly 
God”. That is to say, Jesus could not be simply regarded as Onyame (the Supreme Being) or 
as being one with Onyame unless one shows that the form of Jesus could be described as “of 
one being with the Father”. The divine conqueror Christology has not yet established this 
belief; thus it differs starkly from the Nicene definition of the person of Christ.  
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d) Can the Divine conqueror image adequately express the true humanity of Christ? 
The humanity of Jesus is an aspect of New Testament Christology which is vital to any 
construct of Christology (Torrance 1981). However, as Jesus is taken to belong essentially to 
the more powerful context of divine beings in the spiritual realm, his humanity is not 
adequately expressed in the divine conqueror Christology. The general perception of Jesus as 
divine conqueror has no essential link with his historic humanity.  
Amongst the Akan, it is believed that the abosom (lesser divinities) sometimes assume human 
form temporarily to carry out needed tasks. Likewise, some trees and certain animals also take 
on human form temporarily to participate in human affairs. Beyond merely assuming 
temporary human form, it is also believed that the abosom sometimes take on human form 
and live amongst human beings. In such instances they have passed through a normal human 
birth process but develop and die in an unusual manner; they never reach adulthood. Amongst 
the Akan, those who are labelled in such a category are not regarded as truly human beings. 
Moreover, the Akan do not accord the status of human being to all who undergo the human 
birth process. A new born baby is not regarded as fully human until the eighth day of its 
existence.  
Ghanaian Christians usually place emphasis on the blood of Jesus which logically has a link 
with Jesus as a historical person. Yet, the focus is not on the humanity of Christ but on his 
divinity instead. It is not so much that Jesus becomes human in order to redeem humankind. 
But, as a powerful divine being, Jesus’ blood is regarded as inherently powerful.23
3.3.2 Comparative analysis on the work of Christ as divine conqueror in the Akan 
context 
 In the 
Ghanaian context, if one mentions the “blood of Jesus”, it may relate to Jesus’ divinity rather 
than his humanity. In this respect, there may be some uncertainty with respect to the status of 
Jesus’ true humanity with regard to his work as divine Conqueror.  
In this section, I will analyse the above topic under two headings: (a) does any spirit being 
(divinity) serve as mediator between God and humankind? And (b) can the divine conqueror 
image adequately express Christ’s atoning work?  
                                                 
23  One can comprehend the Akan Christian usage of the “blood of Jesus” as a weapon against an evil spirit 
better if one understands the practices of collecting bath water from a religious cult leader. It is believed 
that, if someone is powerful, anything or anyone that comes into contact with that person becomes partly 
contaminated with the power he or she possesses. This is particularly observed amongst the members of the 
African Indigenous Churches. 
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a) Does any spirit being (divinity) serve as mediator between God and humankind?  
Basic to all the theories of atonement lies the idea that Christ is the only trustworthy mediator 
between God and humankind. African theological discourse entertains an on-going debate on 
whether the lesser divinities (and also the ancestors) serve as the intermediaries between God 
and humankind. In this respect, the question we will explore here is whether the spirit beings 
are regarded as intermediaries between God and humankind – that may fit the role of Jesus as 
Mediator in this regard. 
Some African theologians, including Sarpong (1974:19), Pobee (1979:65) Bediako (2000) 
and Mbiti, contend that the lesser divinities serve as intermediaries between God and human-
kind.24
According to this intermediary theory, the Supreme Being is such a great king that most of the 
time he may not be approached directly. He has delegated authority to the lesser divinities to 
deal with the relatively trivial affairs of human beings. Thus, the lesser divinities are assumed, 
in theory to operate as representatives of God. Moreover, God is also conceived of as retiring 
into heaven after creation, leaving the governing of the world in the hands of the lesser 
divinities (Pobee 1979:65, 188, Parrinder 1983, McVeigh 1974).  
 However, such a claim has not gone unchallenged by some other African theologians 
(Dickson 1984:52-53, Ukpong 1983:188).  
However, it could be argued that the intermediary theory is not an original concept of the 
Akan but a created one with a very weak basis in Akan thought and life (Dickson 1984:52-53, 
also see Ukpong 1983). In what follows, I will offer a discussion on the basis of this theory 
and the response to it. 
                                                 
24  Some African theologians, including Mbiti, Idowu and Pobee, hold that the lesser divinities serve as 
intermediaries between God and humankind. But these theologians believe that such intermediaries have no 
part to play in the Christian faith, because Christians shun them. It is assumed here that the traditional role 
of lesser divinities as intermediaries has been fulfilled by Jesus Christ. In contrast to this view, Sarpong 
holds that, although Jesus is the only mediator between God and human beings, the functions of the lesser 
divinities are more likened to that of the angels. On that basis, the mediating role of Jesus Christ does not 
affect the intermediary role of the lesser divinities. In analysing the different positions regarding the 
intermediary role of the lesser divinities, one is likely to pose this question: If the lesser divinities are 
regarded as ministers in Onyame’s government, when was their appointment terminated since Onyame 
(God) has been identified as the Christian God? There is no myth, story or proverb of the Akan to suggest 
the fall of the lesser divinities. In this respect, there may be a logical inconsistency here. That is if one is to 
maintain that the lesser divinities serve as intermediaries between Onyame and humankind but ceased to 
function as such within the context of Christianity. Obviously, the traditional Akan will get the impression 
that God is an enemy of his former minister in the Western society but a co-worker with the same ministers 
elsewhere. Based on this analysis, it seems that Sarpong’s approach carries yet further internal consistency. 
However, the problem remains whether there are adequate theological grounds to reconfigure the lesser 
divinities as good and evil angels as Sarpong has proposed (see my MPhil thesis [Agyarko 2006, chapter 3] 
for a discussion in this regard). Also see Pobee (1979:65, 188), Idowu (1973) Mbiti (1970) and Turaki 
(1999). 
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(i) Arguments in support of the theory 
Firstly, the concept of God in Akan traditional religion is associated with the myth of God 
withdrawing from human beings. According to this myth, it was the pestle of the woman 
pounding fufu (a local Akan dish), which finally drove God upward. The myth is quite 
explicit about God being remote from the world of human beings (Dickson 1984:52). This 
may support the view that Onyame (God) after the creation has retired into heaven, leaving 
the governing of the world in the hands of the lesser divinities. 
Secondly, it is assumed that certain spirits, particularly the water spirits, are God’s sons and 
the relationship between God and these lesser divinities is considered to be that of the 
sovereign and His/Her delegated ministers (Sarpong 1974:19, Pobee 1979). In this regard, 
Pobee maintains that the Supreme Being and the ancestors provide the sanction for wellbeing 
and punishment for evil. 
Thirdly, there is also an assumption that the abosom (lesser divinities) and the ancestors are 
akyeame, (“linguists” or spokespersons) between God and human beings (Idowu 1962:116, 
Gaba 1968, see Dickson 1984). According to Pobee, the Supreme Being is conceived of as a 
great paramount chief who is so important that he has to be approached through sub-chiefs 
and his official spokesperson called okyeame, who in public matters acts like the chief. He 
exercises royal authority, even if it is subordinate to that of the paramount chief.  
In the Akan court, the linguist is a highly ranked personality. Being close to the chief, 
requests and pronouncements are passed through him to the chief. He sometimes even acts for 
the chief in the latter’s absence. This could be applied to the relationship of God with the 
lesser divinities. Therefore the use of the expression “intermediary” may very well reflect the 
belief that God is the ultimate, and the lesser divinities serve as the intermediaries between 
God and human beings.  
Fourthly, polytheism has been defined as a qualitative and not a quantitative concept. It is 
argued that polytheism is not “a belief in a plurality of gods but rather the lack of a unifying 
and transcending ultimate which determines its character”. Applying such a definition within 
the context of African traditional religion would exonerate the African traditional religion 
from the charge of polytheism. For Idowu, since the lesser divinities are regarded as creatures 
of God, it can at least be said that some good works are credited to them, and that they are 
ministers of good works for human beings on behalf of God. For that matter, they are 
ministers of God, since, in African thought and life, all good works come from God (Idowu 
1962: 62). 
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(ii) Arguments against the theory 
In reaction to the intermediary theory, it could be argued that the story of God’s self- 
withdrawal from human beings and the need to demonstrate His power, overstates the 
meaning of the myth. I argue that the myth of the closeness and the subsequent withdrawal of 
Onyame (Supreme Being) seeks to explain the gap between the earth as the dwelling place of 
humans, and the sky as God’s abode. 
It is common amongst the Akan to explain a valley as the abode or deserted dwelling of a 
certain river obosom (lesser divinity) who withdrew due to the misbehaviour of the people in 
the area towards “him” or “her”. It is generally believed that such lesser divinities disguised 
themselves in some shape, usually that of a wretched person, to ask for water, but were 
subsequently denied. Thus, almost all of the valleys and dried up river beds relate a story of a 
departed river spirit who was defied by the people. With regard to such common stories about 
the withdrawal of the river spirits, can we not also argue that the withdrawal of “the God who 
has the sky as His abode” is based on something similar to the plight of the river spirits?  
Nevertheless, from this myth, one may infer the existence of a broken relationship between 
God and humankind due to evil done to God. Indeed, such a marred relationship demands 
intermediaries between God and humankind. But for one to refer to the lesser divinities as 
such intermediaries would demand evidence from ritual practices or myth or extracts from 
any of the traditional sayings. However, such a theory has not yet been proved in ritual 
practice. Thus, the view that the lesser divinities serve as the intermediaries between God and 
humankind does not express the experiences and cultures of Africans.  
Yet another issue undermines the theory. In ritual practice amongst the Akan, the lesser 
divinities do not function as the intermediaries between God and human beings but rather 
between the ancestors and human beings. Busia (1953:25-26) notes that the wishes of the 
ancestors are believed to be made known to the human community more often through the 
abosom. Sarpong (2002:96) also affirms that the lesser divinities are the spokespeople for the 
ancestors. Whereas the lesser divinities usually relay messages from the ancestors to human 
beings, they rarely, if ever, carry a message from Onyame (Supreme Being) to human beings.  
Also, whereas the lesser divinities at times receive sacrifices on behalf of the ancestors, they 
rarely, if ever, receive sacrifices on behalf of Onyame (God). Amongst the Akan, as well as 
the Ibibio in Nigeria, the intermediary theory is not borne out by any aspect of their sacrificial 
system. For neither the sacrificial structure nor the sacrificial rituals and prayers imply that 
every sacrifice is aimed ultimately toward God. This can be said of most West African 
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peoples. What is evident is that sacrifices are always addressed to specific spiritual beings. If 
such intermediary function were always implied in every sacrifice to the lesser divinities, it 
would of course be unnecessary to address specific spiritual beings if sacrifices are ultimately 
offered to God (Ukpong 1983:180).  
If all the sacrifices offered to the lesser divinities are ultimately meant for God, which 
sacrifices are then offered to evil spirits? Amongst the Akan and also Ibibio for example, such 
sacrifices are always treated with contempt and are intended to keep these spirits as bay. 
Amongst the Ibibio of Nigeria, items for such sacrifices are generally not fit for human 
consumption and there is generally no accompanying sacrificial meal. Thus, to infer that such 
sacrifices are ultimately intended for God is simply repugnant to the spirit of these people 
who would not want to offer contemptuous sacrifices to God. It must be accepted then that 
these sacrifices are meant for these spirits. And if evil spirits can demand and enjoy sacrifices 
meant for themselves, good spirits must likewise be considered capable of demanding and 
receiving sacrifices themselves (Ukpong 1982). 
Moreover, amongst most West African peoples, God is regarded as supremely good and 
cannot be thought of as the author of evil. Amongst many African societies, calamities such 
as epidemics or famine are attributed to the lesser divinities. Therefore sacrifices are offered 
to these divinities to placate them. To say that such sacrifices are ultimately intended for God, 
would mean that God is considered the cause of that specific epidemic or calamity, and this is 
repugnant to these peoples’ conception of God (Ukpong 1983:180).  
Furthermore, in African (particularly Akan) thought and life, the lesser divinities are simply 
regarded as God’s creatures. To advance a concept that the lesser divinities are “sons of God” 
as done in “Hellenism”, is an idea totally foreign to African traditional religion.  
Nevertheless, in some areas the Akan use the concept of “sonship”. Firstly, there are those 
whose parents in a special situation (e.g. where they experience barrenness’) solicit the 
service of certain abosom to help bear them a child. When the woman gives birth, the child 
will be considered to be the “son” or a child of the abosom. Secondly, all the seriously 
mentally and bodily deformed children are also seen as “sons” or children of the (river) 
“abosom” (nnsuoba). Thirdly, a popular story runs that river Bia and river Tano are first and 
second sons of God respectively.  
However, in all three cases mentioned, there is amongst the Akan no authentic myth, proverb, 
or saying that denotes a sense of representation or intermediary role of the lesser divinities on 
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behalf of God. According to tradition Onyame is approached concurrently with the other 
lesser divinities without any sense of jealousy on the part of Onyame. As Elizabeth Amoah 
rightly points out, there is very little room for religious exclusivism amongst the Akan 
(Amoah 1998:3). 
Remarkably, the idea that the lesser divinities serve as the intermediary between the Supreme 
Being and humankind was actually employed to exonerate African traditional religion from 
the charge of polytheism and idolatry. The charge of idolatry matters, and it is indeed 
considered a serious sin in Judaism and Christianity. However, such a problem does not exist 
in terms of Akan religious experience. Amongst the Akan, Onyame (unlike in the Judeo-
Christian concept of Yahweh) is not a jealous God in any practical sense when it comes to 
relating to the lesser divinities. Onyame seems to rule concurrently with the lesser divinities, 
other spirits and the ancestors (without any sense of agency or representativeness, at least in 
practice). Therefore Onyame does not need to reduce the abosom to intermediaries to be the 
sole recipient of human worship. 
Based on this analysis, some scholars point out that the idea of the lesser divinities acting as 
intermediaries does not originally form part of the Akan belief system. The most important 
concern was raised by p’Bitek (1970) in his book African Religions in Western Scholarship. 
He criticised Danquah, Mbiti and Idowu amongst others, on African religions in general and 
what he called the “Hellenisation” of African lesser divinities. He notes that these theologians 
are introducing Greek metaphysical constructs into African traditional religion. He rightly 
pointed out that such views were put forward by students of African religion and cannot be 
associated with traditional Africans (p’Bitek 1970).  
In light of this analysis, I suggest that the concept of the intermediary role of the lesser 
divinities (and even that of the ancestors) is not based on a solid foundation in Akan thought 
and life. On that basis, there is no adequate theological ground to reconfigure the lesser 
divinities (even the ancestors) as intermediaries between God and humankind.25
b) Can the image of a divine conqueror express the atoning work of Christ adequately?  
  
On the one hand, the understanding of the person of Jesus Christ shaped by the Council of 
Nicea (325/381) and Chalcedon (451) portrayed Jesus as being fully human as well as fully 
                                                 
25  Nevertheless, the fact still remains that the lesser divinities were created by God but are not in the same 
category as God. They are also not regarded as enemies of God in Akan traditional belief.  
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divine. With respect to the work of Christ, the Council of Nicea maintained that Jesus died 
“for us and our salvation”. Combining the two facets, the person of Christ and the work of 
Christ strongly suggest that the work of Christ can only be meaningfully interpreted in 
reference to the person of Christ – truly God and truly human. 
It is necessary that Christ should be truly human to die on behalf of humankind; otherwise his 
example becomes meaningless. It is also necessary that Christ has to be fully God to redeem 
humankind; otherwise salvation becomes merely human enterprise (Malone 1983 also see 
Hultgren 1987). However, divine conqueror Christology does not adequately portray Christ as 
a truly human being. Neither does it portray Christ as truly God either. As such, it does not 
adequately express the atoning work of Christ. I will return to this in more detail in 3.4.2 
below. 
3.4 The strengths and weaknesses of divine conqueror Christology 
3.4.1 The strengths of divine conqueror Christology 
Firstly, the credibility of the divine conqueror view is that, it is closer to the African and 
biblical worldviews. The divine spirit Christology is akin to the Christus Victor Christology 
the early church proclaimed. As Aulén argues, its credibility lies therein that it is closer to the 
early Christian understanding of the atoning work of Christ. This does apply to the divine 
conqueror Christology as well (Aulén 1931). 
Secondly, the notion of Jesus as divine conqueror has been a vital tool against idolatry in 
African Christianity. Many Africans have an excessive fear for perceived spirit beings. Due to 
that, the relationship between Africans and such beings has been moulded into contractual 
obligations. In such a relationship, many Africans are not only depending on these spirit 
beings but worship them as well. Thus the traditional Africans invoke and ask for direct 
assistance from the lesser divinities, ancestors and other spirit beings and offer returns of 
veneration and worship.26
                                                 
26  The general perception amongst African Christians, particularly Akan Christians is that, all the traditional 
spirit beings – lesser divinities, ancestors and the others – are evil spirits or demonic forces that Jesus had 
overcome through his death and resurrection. The logic here remains, if Jesus is the conqueror of all other 
spirits, then in some sense it becomes baseless to invoke other spirits to solicit their assistance. Such an 
understanding might account for the decline of some key practices of African traditional religion amongst 
African Christians. 
 In the perspective of the divine conqueror Christology, Jesus is 
portrayed as one who has overcome these spirit beings – particularly the lesser divinities. 
Thus, for many African Christians, the attention to the lesser divinities becomes redundant 
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and useless. This is not to say that all African Christians no longer contact these lesser 
divinities and the ancestors. The fact is rather that these spirits are not so much feared as it 
used to be.27
Thirdly, this view of Christ (divine conqueror Christology) has also helped to accelerate the 
growth of Christianity in Africa. Without doubt, the most common way through which many 
people have joined the church in Africa is through what one may call a “problem-solving 
approach”. On the one hand, the perceived evil spirits are presented as the sources of all ills – 
religious, socio-economic or political. On the other hand, Jesus is presented as the divine 
conqueror who has power over all such perceived evil spirits. For the African Christians the 
slogan “Jesus is the answer” is meaningful without the sequel question: “What then is the 
problem?” The reason being that the problem is obvious, for, according to that view, the spirit 
beings are the source of all problems. Divine conqueror Christology therefore equips African 
Christians with a functional Christology that aids and protects followers from perceived anti-
life forces. Interestingly, even non-Christian Akan in times of trouble usually invoke the name 
of Jesus as weapon against evil forces.  
 Obviously, such relief came through the notion of the perceived divine 
conqueror in the person of Jesus. 
Fourthly, this view of Christ has served as a message of hope for the African in their struggles 
against socio-economic hardships. In their engagements with Christ, African Christians see 
Jesus as Liberator fighting for their “holistic” welfare – religious, socio-political and 
economic.  
Based on the above points, the divine conqueror Christology can be considered much closer 
to the traditional African worldview and culture. This view of Christ therefore has an 
advantage of relaying a relevant Christianity to Africa. 
3.4.2 The weaknesses of divine spirit Christology 
Notwithstanding these advantages, divine conqueror Christology has many weaknesses. 
Summarising the three main ones will suffice. Firstly, divine conqueror Christology does not 
express the humanity of Jesus adequately. Within the context of divine conqueror Christo-
logy, Jesus is basically seen as a divine being with no relation to humans. However, unless 
                                                 
27  The classic example is the evangelistic activities of William Harris, a Liberian evangelist who worked in 
Liberia, Ivory Coast and Ghana in the early part of 19th century. It was typical of Harris to present Jesus as 
a divine conqueror who is not only more powerful than the lesser divinities but has actually conquered all 
the lesser divinities. In Harris’ evangelistic activities, one of the distinctive marks of conversion is that the 
people not only abandoned their idols, but sent them to Harris to incinarate them (see Walker 1976 andSha 
Shank 1980).    
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Jesus is truly human, his sharing of our condition becomes a mere abstraction (Gunton 
1996:10-55). This conceptual defect obstructs a Christian understanding of Christ’s 
resurrection. The problem is that if Christ was not a material being, his death cannot be 
understood in the sense of a human one. Thus, Christ’s resurrection may also not be 
understood as unique in terms of a human understanding of death and resurrection. 
Secondly, in the context of divine conqueror Christology, Jesus could at best be presented as 
one of the lesser divinities. As the above analysis of Jesus’ divinity according to the Akan 
shows, the general perception of Jesus as divine conqueror has no essential link with Onyame 
(God). Thus, the Nicene notion that Jesus is “truly God” is not expressed adequately in divine 
conqueror Christology. This defect obviously affects Christian worship because if Jesus is not 
truly God, worshipping him as a person in his own right would become idolatry.  
Thirdly, Christ’s atoning work on the cross is not expressed adequately within the construct of 
divine conqueror Christology (Mbiti 1973:397-414, also see Bediako 2000:8). The divine 
spirit Christology cannot express the true divinity and true humanity of Christ adequately. 
Therefore this has also affected the view of atonement logically constructed from divine 
conqueror Christology. According to the Nicene perspective, the primary framework within 
which to understand the salvation of humankind, is the notion that Christ is truly God as well 
as truly human. In the Nicene Creed, the statement of “he died for our sins” is tagged along 
with the statement of “truly God and truly human”. The two statements are so intrinsically 
linked that the former cannot be interpreted contextually without implying the latter as the 
larger context. Otherwise, the Nicene understanding of humankind’s salvation could not be 
expressed adequately. Logically it follows that the divine conqueror Christology does not 
adequately express the salvific work of Christ because it fails to express the person of Christ 
as truly human as well as truly God adequately.  
3.5 Conclusion  
Methodologically, divine conqueror Christology may be regarded as a form of liberation 
Christology. Usually, liberation Christologies start from the function of the historical Jesus or 
some liberative activities performed by Jesus. In this respect, Jesus becomes a liberator or the 
one who suffers with the oppressed. 
On the one hand, liberation Christologies in many cases present Jesus as charismatic leader. 
However, unlike the other liberation Christologies which 
usually approach Christology “from below”, divine conqueror Christology takes its point of 
departure “from above”.  
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This view of Christ of course does not express the divinity of Jesus adequately, which is 
essential for the doctrine of the trinity and of the atoning work of Christ. 
On the other hand, divine conqueror Christology primarily presents Jesus as a divine being. 
This view neither adequately does justice to the person and the work of Christ. The reason is 
that it fails to account for the humanity of Christ, thus generating a docetic Christology. 
Moreover, it is not adequate to point to Jesus as divine being; one should also indicate how 
such a divine being is “of one being” with Onyame (God). This indication – Jesus as truly 
God becomes necessary as the abosom (lesser divinities) are also regarded as divine, 
however, not in the same class as God.  
The methodological problem of finding the middle way between the Christology “from 
below” and “from above” is directly associated with the affirmation of “truly God and truly 
human”28
 
 In this respect, the Christological method that might be able to address this two-fold 
problem, must be couched not only within the dynamic relations of time and eternity (Gunton 
1997:158) but also within the contexts of finite beings and the triune God (Shults 1999:169). 
However, the divine conqueror Christology does not adhere to such criteria. The question is: 
Does ancestor Christology, which we will discuss in the next chapter, offer an adequate 
solution to this double dilemma?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 There are ongoing debates in respect to the meaning of the terms Christology “from above” and “from 
below”. It is not our intention to enter into these debates. For further readings see Gunton 1997: 10 -55.  
 
 
 
 
 69 
CHAPTER 4 
Ancestral Christology in the Akan context: A critique 
4.1 Introduction  
Observably, the most dominant aspect of African traditional religion is the ancestral cult. The 
notion of ancestors is so deeply embedded in African religious consciousness that the idea of 
Christ as ancestor seems to have arisen independently in the minds of different theologians in 
diverse sectors of the continent. Amongst the various images that have emerged in African 
Christological discourse, that of Christ as an ancestor seems to be the most distinctive and the 
most profound image. 
An analysis of this form of Christology will operate within the framework of debates in 
African theology. This comprises the relationship between the Supreme Being of African 
traditional theology and the God proclaimed by Christianity, as well as the status and role of 
the ancestors as intermediaries between God and human beings. Thus, section 4.2 begins with 
a description, analysis and critique of some notable ancestor Christologies in African 
Christian theology. Section 4.3 focuses on an analysis of the person of Jesus as an ancestor. 
As a sequel, section 4.4 focuses on an analysis of the work of Christ as an ancestor. Section 
4.5 draws the argument together by highlighting the strengths and the weaknesses of such an 
ancestor Christology. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter by briefly elucidating the challenge of 
designing an appropriate Christological method in order to do justice to the actual content of 
any Christology, particularly as it applies to ancestor Christology.  
However, I argue here that the ancestor image within the Akan context 
(and also within the general African context) does not adequately express the Nicene 
affirmation of the person of Christ as “truly God” as well as “truly human”. As a result, the 
ancestor image does not express the atoning work of Christ adequately either. To elucidate 
my contention, I will use descriptive, analytical and comparative approaches. Thus, this 
chapter entails a critique of the ancestor Christology in an African, particularly in the Akan, 
context.  
4.2 Ancestor Christology in African Christian theology 
In this section, I will discuss some of the notable ancestral Christologies in African Christian 
theologies. However, the section does not intend to present a detailed study of such 
Christologies, still less to be an exposition of any particular ancestor Christology. Instead, I 
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will briefly discuss some of the key components of African ancestor Christologies and assess 
their strengths and weaknesses in light of the Nicene and Chalcedonian confessional 
affirmations of the person and work of Christ. The major contributions discussed here include 
those by Bénézet Bujo, Charles Nyamiti, Francois Kabasèlè, John Pobee and Kwame 
Bediako.  
4.2.1 Background of ancestral Christology 
Joseph Boakye Danquah (1968), writing from within the Akan context, was the first person to 
refer to God as “the great ancestor”. This suggestion was later affirmed by Harry Sawyerr 
(1986), a Sierra Leonian Anglican canon, theologian and educationist. Sawyerr discusses God 
as an ancestor from the context of the Akan of Ghana, the Yoruba of Nigeria and the Mende 
of Sierra Leone. He contends that each of the three contexts supports the notion of God as the 
parent-ancestor of the human race. Approximately a year after Danquah’s assertion, another 
suggestion came from a Nigerian Roman Catholic scholar, S.N. Ezeanya (1969:45), who 
proposed that African ancestors should be considered as Christian saints. This suggestion also 
has the ardent support from Peter Sarpong, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kumasi, 
Ghana.1
Kabasèlè (1991:125), a Roman Catholic parish priest and lecturer, does also object to the idea 
of reconfiguring the ancestors as saints.
 Nonetheless there are some African theologians, who object to these proposals. 
Kwesi Dickson, a former presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Ghana, objects in the 
introduction of the second edition of Danquah’s book to the idea of God as a parent-ancestor.  
2 He condemns the attempt to reconfigure the African 
ancestors in terms of the category of the saints. He argues that this seems to be too superficial 
an attempt to rehabilitate the African ancestors. 
Considering the background of the personalities involved in these debates, it is obvious that 
He contends that the Bantu ancestors have no 
need to be painted over as saints to deserve our veneration. Just as they are, they may be 
regarded as the founders of our societies and reconcilers of human beings and should remain 
as such. Kabasèlè maintains that African Christians can reconcile the two without forcing the 
issue. 
                                                 
1  Also see E. Fasholé-Luke’s article: “Ancestor veneration and the communion of Saints”. 
2  Roman Catholics maintain that the saints serve in some sense as mediators between God and humankind. 
Correspondingly, African Catholics who also hold true to the notion that ancestors are intermediaries 
between God and humankind, show better internal coherency in their views. Both the ancestors and the 
saints have human origins. Unlike ancestral Christology, the reconfiguration of ancestors into saints, does 
not impose a sense of divinity on the ancestral image. Thus, if compared to ancestral Christology, the 
suggestion of ancestors as saints has more internal coherence.  
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this is not merely an academic exercise. Rather, these are issues which permeate the very fibre 
of African Christianity. Consequently, the outcome of these debates may ultimately have an 
impact on the direction of African Christianity, for better or for worse. Nonetheless, such 
proposals, particularly the notion of God as the “great ancestor”, have prompted a new phase 
of theological discussion amongst African theologians. The notion of God as an ancestor has 
direct influence on the development of the idea of Christ as an ancestor. This is especially 
evident in Nyamiti’s Christology.  
The assumption behind Danquah’s suggestion is that God may be seen as a revered departed 
human being who once lived on the earth and died – later to become a deity owing to his 
newly acquired status as “ancestor”. Indeed, on this basis Danquah equated the worship of 
Onyame (God) to that of the ancestors. He also suggests that a “good” living chief, a 
representative of the ancestors, should be worshipped in place of God.3
In keeping with Danquah’s suggestion of God as great ancestor, some African theologians 
suggest that Christ may be seen as an ancestor. However, in most proposals, Jesus does not 
only feature as one of the ancestors. Instead, he has been depicted or qualified as an ancestor 
in varied ways – he is the ancestor par excellence or a unique ancestor.  
 
4.2.2 Bénézet Bujo:4
Bénézet Bujo focuses his Christological reflection on African ancestral beliefs and practices. 
He explores different perspectives on African ancestor worship and on that basis refers to 
Christ as an ancestor.
 Jesus Christ the proto-ancestor  
5
Bujo (1992:297) designates Jesus Christ as the proto-ancestor. This is meant to emphasise 
Christ’s uniqueness in distinction from the African ancestors.
 From this background Bujo reflects on the mystery of Christ with the 
aim of grounding his African ethics firmly in an ancestor Christology (Bujo 1992, 1995). 
6
                                                 
3  Danquah’s proposal might have primarily a political rather than a religious motif.  
 He views Christ as a proto-
ancestor – the unique ancestor, the source of life and the highest model of an ancestor. 
4  Bénézet Bujo was born in 1940 in Drodro, Bunia in Zaire. For several years (1978-1989) Bujo held a chair 
in Moral Theology in the Theological Faculty in Kinshasa, Zaire. In 1989 he accepted a call to be Professor 
of Moral Theology at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He is an ordained priest in the Roman 
Catholic Church. 
5  Bujo believes that the idea of Christ as ancestor is more meaningful to the African than the terms Logos or 
Kyrios. It enables the African culture to be the source for incarnating Christianity. This, according to Bujo, 
demands a Christology “from below”. 
6  He also speaks of the need for a “cleansing” of culture. He is well aware of the “negative sides of pre-
Christian religion – views, customs and usages – which are incompatible with the Christian message” Bujo 
(1992:297).  
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Through his incarnation Christ assumed human history in its entirety, including the legitimate 
aspirations of African ancestors. Bujo argues that Jesus did not only realise the authentic ideal 
of the God-fearing African ancestors. He also infinitely transcended that ideal and brought it 
to a new completion. 
Bujo maintains that the incarnation enables Christ to be unique and privileged amongst the 
other ancestors. Christ’s encounter with African ancestors allows the ancestors to be the locus 
where human beings encounter the God of salvation. Thus, the future which the ancestors 
sought to guarantee is assured by Christ. This is the case seeing that our ancestors’ 
experiences have been made efficacious in Jesus who was crucified and is risen.  
Moreover, the notion of Christ as proto-ancestor provides, for Bujo, the foundation of a 
narrative ethic. Christ is the proto-source of life and model of human conduct. Bujo also 
contends that, in traditional religion, the good ancestors have already served as ethical 
examples or models; thus they continue to serve as models for Christians (Bujo 1992:301). 
Bujo believes that this Christocentric ethic confirms the positive elements in African culture 
such as hospitality, the family spirit and solicitude for parents. At the same time it corrects 
and completes African traditional and modern customs7
According to Bujo, life flows from God through the ancestors to the living and this life is 
handed on by the living to the coming generations. To Bujo, if Jesus Christ is a proto-
ancestor, a source of life and happiness, our task is to realise in our lives the memory of his 
passion, death and resurrection, making that saving event the criterion for judging all human 
conduct. He also contends that Christ as the proto-ancestor is the criterion for the church and 
for the African society (Bujo1998).  
 (Bujo 1990). 
Sifting through Bujo’s work, it is already evident that the neologism “proto-ancestor” signals 
discontinuity from the traditional ancestors. Bujo shows awareness to the problem of negating 
the traditional content pertaining to ancestors. Notably, he attempts to construct the features 
needed to transfer the title “ancestor” to Jesus Christ.  
However, the pertinent question that remains to be asked is: On what grounds can Christ 
according to Nicene, who is said to be not only truly human but also truly God, be identified 
with the ancestors who are merely human spirits? It could be observed from Bujo’s 
                                                 
7  Bujo claims that there are good and bad ancestors. He argues that only the good ancestors can be considered 
for Christian veneration. Whereas these good ancestors are incorporated into the body of Christ, the evil 
ancestors are conquered through the death and the resurrection of Christ and are bound in chains. No one 
needs to fear them any longer.  
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Christology that his major concern is the ancestors’ exemplary lives – which Christ has 
fulfilled in a more excellent way. As a moral theologian, Bujo’s pressing interest lies in the 
formulation of a Negro African Christocentric morality. From such a perspective, Bujo’s 
Christology is predisposed towards Jesus as an ideal human being who through his moral life 
has set a good example for all to follow.  
Such a view is similar to the “moral influence” theory of atonement – one of the three main 
atonement theories (to be discussed in chapter 7 below). The strength of this Christology is 
that it serves as an important aspect of the saving work of Christ. However, it reduces the 
person of Christ to a mere human being, or at best a divinised person. Consequently, the work 
of Christ loses its objective value, and more importantly, salvation becomes the work of 
human beings. In this regard, Bujo’s presentation of Christ as an ancestor cannot express the 
Nicene affirmation of Christ’s person and work adequately.  
4.2.3 Charles Nyamiti:8 Jesus Christ, the brother-ancestor9
Nyamiti bases his Christological reflections mainly on an African understanding of ancestors. 
He takes his starting point in the beliefs and practices of the ancestral cult as found in many 
(though not all) African traditional societies. According to Nyamiti, ancestral relationships 
between the living and the dead, and sometimes between the Supreme Being and humanity on 
earth, comprise of the following elements: (a) kinship between the dead and the living; (b) 
superhuman status (usually acquired through death) comprising nearness to God, sacred 
powers, and other superhuman qualities; c) mediation between God and the earthly kin; d) 
exemplary behaviour in the community; e) the right or title to frequent sacred communication 
with the living kin through prayers and ritual offerings (Nyamiti 1984:16).  
  
Nyamiti rightly observes that there is no uniform ancestor religion amongst African societies. 
Yet, he contends that “there are enough beliefs shared by most of these societies to enable one 
to affirm the presence of common ancestral beliefs in black Africa.” On this basis, Nyamiti 
points out two elements which are characteristic of the African conception of an ancestor: 
                                                 
8  Nyamiti was born in 1931 at Ndala-Tabora, Tanzania to Catholic parents. After his ordination in 1962 he 
furthered his education in Louvain, Belgium. In 1968 he presented his doctorate thesis on “A comparison 
between Christian Initiation and the Initiation Rites of the African Masai, Kikuyu and Bemba peoples, with 
reference to Liturgical Adaptation”. Nyamiti moved to Vienna to study ethnology and composition. He 
became Professor of Systematic Theology at the seminary in Kipalapala (1976-1981). In 1978 he was 
appointed as professor and later became head of the department of Dogmatic Theology at the Catholic 
Higher Institute of Eastern Africa (CHIEA) in Nairobi, Kenya. He also worked part-time as a community 
pastor.  
9  In this section I will rely especially on Nyamiti’s book Christ Our Ancestor as it contains his main theory 
on ancestral Christology. For a review of Nyamiti’s ancestral Christology see Muzorewa (1988:255-264). 
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first, the natural relationship between the ancestor and his/her earthly relatives; second, a 
supernatural or sacred status acquired by the ancestor through death (Nyamiti 1984:19-23). 
He notes that natural relationships of kinship can be based on the following: a blood 
relationship with parents, and – more rarely – with brothers and sisters, or on the common 
membership of a clan, tribe, secret society, etc. In order to attain the supernatural or holy 
status of an “ancestor”, the deceased must have led a morally unobjectionable life, so that one 
can do justice to this person’s future role as a role model. As an ancestor he or she is a source 
and a store of the tribal tradition. If the people do not pay sufficient attention to the ancestors, 
unpleasant consequences may result. In keeping with this, Nyamiti contends that the ancestors 
function as the mediators between God and their earthly kinsfolk (Nyamiti 1984:21). 
In his reinterpretation of ancestor veneration, Nyamiti distinguishes four types: (a) the 
traditional ancestors who take part in the Christian veneration of ancestors through 
incorporation into the body of Christ; (b) the saints in heaven and in purgatory who in light of 
their incorporation into the body of Christ, are brother-ancestors of the African Christians; (c) 
Jesus Christ, the brother-ancestor and (d) God himself, as the parent-ancestor of the human 
race (Nyamiti 1984:20-23). 
Nyamiti notes that, as a rule, the natural relationship between the African ancestors and their 
earthly relatives is based on parenthood. However, as basis for his ancestor Christology he 
focuses on the sibling relationship. Although he concedes this relationship to be rare, he 
nevertheless considers Jesus Christ as brother-ancestor of human beings.  
He contends that “a brother-ancestor is a relative of a person with whom he has a common 
parent, and of whom he is a mediator to God, an archetype of behaviour, and with whom – 
thanks to his supernatural status acquired through death – he is entitled to have regular sacred 
communication.” Nyamiti presumes a structural affinity in this relationship between the 
African brother-ancestor and his earthly relatives to that between Jesus Christ and the 
members of his earthly body.  
Nyamiti further contends that Christ’s brotherhood is revealed as the divine example of its 
African counterpart. The resulting difference is grounded in the unity of God and human 
beings in Jesus Christ and his mediation in salvation. Nyamiti also explains that the natural 
affinity through a common descent from Adam is transcended by Jesus Christ (Nyamiti 
1984). Thus, the natural kinship characteristic of the African conception of ancestors is de 
facto transcended and disposed of at a higher level.  
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Nyamiti notes that the ancestors acquired a supernatural or sacred status through death. He 
therefore claims that Christ’s divinity corresponds with the attainment of the “supernatural” 
status of ancestors through death. Thus, the title “ancestor” to some degree becomes a 
synonym for divine sonship. In keeping with this belief, Nyamiti draws the conclusion that 
the ancestors are divine beings also. However, such conclusion does not necessarily follow 
from his premise.  
The premise of the argument is that the ancestors are sacred. The conclusion is then drawn 
that the ancestors are divine beings. In between the premise and conclusion lies the 
assumption that all sacred entities are necessarily divine. However, this implies a strained 
argument and a logical fallacy. The reason being that, whereas Africans believe the ancestors 
to be sacred, these Africans rarely ascribe divine status to their ancestors. Amongst the Akan, 
ancestors are regarded as mere human spirits. 
I do concede that in some rare instances, for example as found amongst the Yoruba of 
Nigeria, some ancestors are believed to become divinities, but they are then considered in the 
category of lesser divinities. Accordingly, if Christ obtained divine status along this path of 
ancestorhood, this would lead to a heresy comparable to Arianism. 
In conclusion, Nyamiti wishes to avoid the pitfall of presenting Jesus as a mere human being. 
However, despite all his careful safeguards and his concern to maintain the Chalcedonian 
affirmation of Christ as truly human as well as truly God, it is difficult to see how Nyamiti’s 
Christology avoids an outcome similar to that of “degree Christology” (in other words, the 
divinity of Jesus would not tend to be derived from the greatness of his life, character and 
teaching).  
4.2.4 Francois Kabasèlè: Christ as ancestor and elder brother 
Kabasèlè (1991:116-127) develops his Christology on the basis of the image of the Bantu 
ancestors. Amongst the Bantus, the ancestors constitute the highest link, after God, in the 
chain of beings. According to Kabasèlè, it was to the ancestors that God first communicated 
the divine “vital force.” In their transition, the ancestors have become more powerful than 
human beings in their capacity to exert influence, to increase or to diminish the vital force of 
earthly beings. Thus, in their present state, the ancestors serve as the intermediaries between 
God and humankind (Kabasèlè 1991:117). 
Kabasèlè (1991:118) notes that amongst the Bantus, not just anyone accedes to the rank of 
ancestor. To become an ancestor, it is not enough to become a deceased; one must have lived 
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well and must have led a virtuous life. Those who will be ancestors must have observed the 
laws; they must have incurred neither the guilt of theft nor of a dissolute life. They must not 
have been wrathful or quarrelsome persons, or have dabbled in sorcery. In this respect, to 
Kabasèlè, an ancestor is by a definition a good person – there is no bad ancestor to be found 
amongst the Bantus.  
However, Kabasèlè concedes that the appellation “ancestor” can be extended to the deceased 
who have not fulfilled all the necessary conditions mentioned above. Nevertheless, such a 
category of “ancestors” is not regarded as mediators in the true sense of the term. The role of 
mediation between God and human beings is played out only by those who have fulfilled the 
necessary traditional and moral conditions.10
Amongst the Bantus, the primary datum concerning the ancestors is found in the role they 
play in the “transmission and safeguarding” of life.
  
 
Kabasèlè also postulates that Christ is an ancestor in the sense of an elder brother. The Bantu 
notion of eldest child or eldest sibling focuses on the notion of anteriority. The eldest brother 
makes the offerings to the ancestors and to the Supreme Being on behalf of all the rest of his 
brothers. The eldest brother represents an example to be followed by the other siblings. In 
virtue of his exemplary function, the eldest child is charged with the responsibility for the acts 
of the younger ones. Kabasèlè notes that, as the case is in any other situation, some eldest 
brothers do not live up to the expectation; thus they disappoint the family (Kabasèlè 
1991:122).  
Kabasèlè notes that Christ came to provide 
life and thus meets the requirements of being an ancestor. In the same sense that the ancestors 
watch over the lives of their descendants and continuously strengthen it, does Christ 
continuously nourish the life of believers (Kabasèlè 1991:120). 
Kabasèlè (1991:120-21) then suggests that Christ, God’s only Son, likewise receives the 
attribute of “Eldest”. Christ has shown himself to be the eldest brother, by taking 
responsibility for the wrongs, by performing expiation for his people. As a true “eldest one”, 
Christ has disappointed neither our expectations nor those of his Father. Thus for Bantu 
Christians, Christ performs the role of ancestor through the mediation he provides. 
Kabasèlè notes that Jesus Christ is exalted above all spirits. He distinguishes Christ from 
                                                 
10  Kabasèlè notes that for the more devoted amongst the Bantu, all acts of daily life must be steeped in the 
presence of the ancestors. Before taking a drink or tasting food, a devout Bantu will pour some of it on the 
ground, in token of deference to and participating in the life of the ancestors. If someone happens to sneeze, 
he or she will mention the name of an ancestor, as if asking for a blessing.  
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other ancestors. Christ is labelled as the ancestor par excellence. Thus, there are two lines of 
ancestors: the Great Spirit (ancestor) who is Christ and the founding ancestors who are the 
relative ancestors (Kabasèlè 1991:17).  
4.2.5 Ancestor Christology in the Akan context: John Pobee and Kwame Bediako 
Within the Ghanaian-Akan context, contributions to an ancestral Christology were provided 
by the design of Kofi Appiah- Kubi (1977: 51-65), John Pobee (1979), Mercy Amba Oduyoye 
(1986), Kwame Bediako (1990), Abraham Akrong (1992:119-26), Kwasi Sarpong (1998), 
and many others. Here I will focus on the ancestor Christologies of John Pobee and Kwame 
Bediako.  
a) John Pobee’s ancestor Christology11
Pobee (1997:85) starts his ancestor Christology with a credo: Christ is truly human as well as 
truly God. Pobee then attempts to express this credo within an Akan framework in various 
forms by interpreting Christ’s divinity and humanity according to an Akan understanding. He 
notes that the Akan and biblical ways of expressing humanity are very similar. However, he 
contends that “functional Christology” better fits the mentality of the Akan (Pobee 1979:83-
84). 
 
Discussing Christ’s humanity, Pobee notes that, within the Akan context, a human being must 
fully realise himself/herself within society. He suggests that any construction of Akan 
Christology must stress Christ’s kinship, circumcision, and baptism. He notes that these are 
rites that incorporate initiates into a group. From this idea, Pobee emphasises Christ’s 
humanity within the Akan context. 
Christ’s humanity is further accentuated by the dread of death and finite knowledge. He parti-
cularly points to Christ’s attitude in Gethsemane – the fear of his approaching death. Pobee 
also notes that the synoptic gospels clearly inform us of the limits of Christ’s knowledge in 
this regard. Another human characteristic, according to the Akan, is dependence on a superior 
power. Pobee sees this characteristic in Jesus with reference to the frequent prayers offered to 
his Father.  
On Christ’s divinity, Pobee (1979:85) points to sinlessness as one of the divine qualities. 
Amongst the Akan, sin is regarded as anti-social. He sees Christ’s sinlessness as a true sign of 
his divinity in the Akan context. He notes that Christ committed no sin but fought against sin 
                                                 
11  For the details on this, see Pobee (1979: 81-98). 
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by his conduct of love towards others. He showed his concern for those oppressed in any way 
possible and made all the necessary efforts to relieve their pain and suffering. 
Pobee further observes that, within Akan society, divinity is also demonstrated in authority 
and power, in the capacity to heal and to create. Pobee contends that, by performing miracles 
and curing people, Christ manifested his divine status. He also stresses that Christ is the pre-
existent agent of creation. According to Pobee, this is the distinctive Christian claim, which 
has no parallel in Akan religion.12
Of the images that give expression to the person and the work of Jesus, Pobee’s suggestions 
include okyeame
  
13
The title Nana, in practical terms, embraces all the respect accorded to the highest authorities 
amongst the Akan. Pobee thus argues that the image of ancestor in the sense of nana will 
portray the supremacy of Jesus with reference to personal orientation, the structures of 
society, economic processes, and political forces amongst the Akan.  
 and ancestor. To Pobee (1979:94), the practical relevance of ancestral 
Christology is that Jesus is Nana. Amongst the Akan, the term Nana is used in two senses. 
Basically, it refers to one’s grandmother or grandfather. However, it is also generally used as 
a title to refer to the Supreme Being, the ancestors, the lesser divinities, chiefs, and any 
elderly person (senior citizen). It implies a title of respect which could be accorded to anyone 
to whom such respect is due. According to Pobee, Christ is Nana in the sense of an ancestor. 
As such, Christ has power and authority to judge, reward, and punish. But as God-man, Jesus 
is superior to all ancestors and all spiritual beings.  
While analysing Pobee’s ancestral Christology, it is important to note that he leans to an 
approach of functional Christology (Pobee 1979:85). Thus, he views Christ’s divinity in the 
sense of Jesus’ functions as God, while Nicene Christology also affirms that Jesus is “of one 
essence with the father”. Pobee contends that African Christian theologians need not follow 
the Nicene Creed or the formulas of Chalcedon. His reason is that the Nicene-Chalcedonian 
Christology was constructed in a particular context which is quite foreign to African culture 
and even the contemporary Western world. He buttresses his contention with the argument 
that the New Testament does not speculate about the ontological nature of Jesus. Rather, it 
depicts Jesus as the unique representative of God. He further contends that “functional 
                                                 
12  Yet, Pobee neglects the fact that pre-existence is not something new to the Akan; the okra (soul) pre-existed 
with God before becoming a person. Nevertheless, there is no claim that the okra is an agent of creation. I 
will discuss this in more detail in chapter 6.  
13  For the title of okyeame, see chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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Christology” suits the mentality of the Akan better. 
Pobee may be partly right in the sense that the Akan do not only see “good works” as 
Nyamedwuma (God’s works) but usually also allude to anyone who does good work as “me-
Nyame” (my God). That Jesus is viewed to be without sin, implies that he is God in a sense 
similar to the idea of functional Christology. Therefore every Akan may affectionately call 
him “me-Nyame” (my God) in one way or the other. Nevertheless, the status of Jesus as “me-
Nyame” (my God) over and above any other person may be considered in the sense of (what 
one may term as) “degree Christology”.
Besides, one may suggest that the Nicene affirmation equally fits an Akan mentality. The 
Akan believe that an entity called okra forms part of a human being. This entity is also 
believed to be the God’s nature within each human being. Based on this belief, the Akan refer 
to every human being as Nyameba (God’s child). In this regard, the Akan believe that a 
human being is not only capable of functioning as God in some ways but is also capable of 
bearing the nature of God. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 6.3-4.  
  
b) Kwame Bediako’s ancestor Christology 
Bediako focuses his Christology primarily on the Akan ancestors. For Bediako, the term 
“ancestor”14 is the most significant African title to be used for Jesus Christ. The reason being 
that the ancestors comprise the most visible and prominent aspect of the Akan religious 
world. Amongst the Akan, the image of ancestors (apart from God) reigns supreme in the 
structures of society, in economic processes and amongst political forces.15
He maintains that there is a need for African Christians to relate to Jesus as an ancestor. One 
reason is that the identity of Africans is linked to their ancestors. Thus, in order to be a true 
African, one has to be connected to the reality of the ancestors. Bediako contends that if one 
can relate to Jesus as an ancestor, one may be fully integrated as an African as well as a 
Christian.  
 By naming Jesus 
as an ancestor, Bediako (1990:10) places Jesus amongst the outstanding persons of the 
community. 
Another reason is that, in order to make Jesus relevant to the people in Africa, it is crucial to 
come to terms with the way in which Jesus relates to the importance and function of “spirit 
                                                 
14  Bediako uses the title “ancestor”  in three ways. He uses it for Christ, for non-Christian traditional Africans 
and for Christian ancestors.  
15  This is the case seeing that the power underpinning the institution of chieftaincy is the ancestors’ cult. 
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fathers” or “the ancestors”. For Bediako, the solution is to identify Jesus as Nana Yesu 
(ancestor).  
The Akan believe that the ancestors take care of individuals and the community. They protect 
people on a journey and on the farm. They guarantee the continuance of a family by securing 
pregnancy and enough food and clothing. The ancestors lay out the communal ethic and serve 
as custodians of public morality. They punish those who violate the law and safeguard the 
power base of the ruler and the sustainability of society. Bediako holds the view that Jesus 
replaces the ancestors as the benefactor of society and as a source of protection (Bediako 
1984:99).  
He contends that Christ has come to fulfil all the aspirations that are traditionally assigned to 
the ancestors. Therefore, the role of the ancestors has to be transferred to Christ. Such an idea 
was first proposed by Bujo (1992:297) and was later echoed by Nyamiti.  
Bediako also contends that the ancestors serve as the mediators between God and humankind. 
He claims that, in Akan thinking, the ancestors mediate between God and human beings, 
acting on “authority delegated by God”. Such mediation includes various aspects of what may 
be called “salvation”: rescuing in times of trouble, securing the continuation of society, 
restoring when sin destroys the social order, and receiving prayers for help. Bediako suggests 
that Christ has taken over the mediatorial function of the ancestors.  
He notes that as one with God, Jesus is automatically elevated above the ancestors, and as 
Lord and Saviour, he replaces them and for humankind becomes the only mediator between 
God and humankind. Bediako also contends that by becoming a human being and sharing our 
condition, Jesus can also be seen as an Elder Brother who lives in the presence of God. As 
such he displaces the mediator function of our natural spirit father. 
To Bediako the ancestors are worthy of respect, but he also alleges that they have an 
ambivalent nature. He contends that some ancestral spirits are “malevolent”, thus some 
ancestors may terrorise people. He therefore desires to see an end to this negative influence of 
ancestors on society, and he sees Jesus as the one to achieve this. By fulfilling the role of the 
ancestors, he claims that Christ has rid society of the terror pertaining to the ancestors. He 
poses that when Jesus takes his place as the sole divine ancestor, the terror of the ancestors is 
eliminated (Bediako 1984:114). 
He further postulates that, by becoming Lord of the ancestors, Jesus empties them of their 
powers, and claims that power for himself. In this way, according to Bediako (1984:114), 
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Jesus “neutralises” the ancestors; being replaced by Jesus, the ancestors have no power to 
save nor harm. Nevertheless, Bediako’s assumption and approach is debatable. Contrary to 
Bediako’s view, Sarpong (1974:36) also speaking from within an Akan framework, rightly 
contends that an ancestor is by definition a good human spirit; no bad ancestor exists. 
Inferring from Sarpong’s definition of an ancestor and their position as custodians of public 
morality, one may argue that the ancestors only exercise their “executive powers”. 
Thus, to consider the exercising of such “executive powers” as “terror”, negates the idea of 
the ancestors as custodians of public morality – unless one would want to charge the ancestors 
with abusing such “executive powers”. Nonetheless, such a charge would be inconsistent with 
the traditional understanding of the nature and role the term “ancestor” summons. 
Linguistically within the Akan context, a “malevolent ancestor” would be a contradiction in 
terms.  
Furthermore, the Akan differentiate between ordinary ghosts and the ancestors. Not all the 
deceased qualify to be ancestors; only those who meet certain conditions. Those who do not 
obtain the status of an ancestor become samantwentwen (roaming ghost). They roam about 
terrorising people until they are reborn as human beings. Thus, there are bad ghosts in the 
Akan context. But for Bediako to talk about “evil ancestors” means that his definition of 
ancestor may differ considerably from the traditional Akan concept of ancestor. Notwith-
standing this, Bediako (1975:23-24) maintains that ancestors are custodians of public 
morality. 
Again, Bediako contends that Jesus has emptied the ancestors’ power and has claimed that 
power for himself. Such an assertion creates the impression that Jesus had somehow engaged 
in warfare with the ancestors. Yet, there is no Akan or Christian notion on the warfare 
between Jesus and the ancestors in which Jesus triumphed over them. Of course within the 
context of Christian theology, particularly in line with the view of atonement incurring 
Christus Victor, one may hold that Jesus has conquered all the evil spirits and powers. 
However, could one go as far as presuming that the ancestors are amongst the evil spirits or 
powers that are presumed to have opposed Jesus? Certainly, this is not the case in terms of the 
traditional Akan understanding of the ancestors. 
On a different note, Bediako believes it important to desacralise ancestors and view them as 
ordinary members of the community. He notes that, the coming of Christ inaugurates a new 
humanity and creates a regenarated history for Christians.  
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In this way, Christ is seen as the only Lord, and the ancestors are reduced to participants in 
the community. 
By implication, Bediako assumes that the ancestors are or have become divinities. Thus it is 
necessary to strip them of their divinity so that Christ alone could become a “divine ancestor”. 
The term that Bediako uses for stripping the ancestors of their divine status is 
“desacralisation”. He says: “other ancestors should be desacralised” to become “non-divine”. 
However, the Akan do not see the ancestors as divine. Besides, Bediako (2000:22-23) 
maintains that ancestors are human spirits, thus they are not worshipped but receive 
veneration. However, if one supposes that the ancestors are not worshipped because they are 
not seen to be divine, one cannot use the image of the ancestor to account for Christ’s 
divinity. 
For Bediako, desacralising the ancestors occurs at two levels. The first level is 
to withdraw divinity from the ancestors and restore their humanity. The second is to 
desacralise the king who rules on their behalf so that he becomes a human being amongst 
other human beings. By desacralising the traditional ancestors, Christ will, in the end, stand 
alone as divine ancestor.  
Having enumerated all these differences between Jesus and the traditional ancestors, one is 
tempted to enquire whether “ancestor” is a viable Christological title after all. If Christ 
exceeds the original ancestors to that extent, why does Bediako insist on using this term for 
Christ? Because of the differences between God, Jesus and the traditional ancestors, Dankwa, 
an Akan traditional paramount Chief of Akropong Akuapem, rejects the idea of using the title 
“ancestor” either for God or for Jesus Christ. His reason is that the traditional African 
ancestors are merely human and are 
c) Some other Akan ancestor Christologies 
not worshipped (Dankwa 1987). 
In his contributions on Christology, Sarpong is reluctant to consider Jesus as an ancestor. He 
notes that Jesus Christ is indeed a great personality whose life conforms to what the Ashanti 
(the largest and the dominant group amongst the Akan) expect of a great leader or ancestor. 
The greatest of these ancestors are obviously the kings who fought to protect the Asante 
nation and who led the Asante to enjoy security and peace (Sarpong 1998:155).  
According to Sarpong, the Asante may see the person, the role and the mission of Jesus as 
reflected in the various achievements of the various ancestors of the Asante people. In this 
sense, Jesus is considered much higher than an Akan ancestor.  
Sarpong cautions that the ancestral image fails to account for the divinity of Jesus and as such 
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conflicts with the doctrine of the trinity (Sarpong 1998:137). Sarpong therefore argues as 
follows. The concept of an ancestor makes it possible for us to appreciate what Jesus means 
or meant for us. Nevertheless we realise that Jesus is far above any ancestor and all the 
ancestors put together.  
However, Sarpong notes that much can be gained by following in the footsteps of the 
ancestors, although one cannot imitate all the traits of any given ancestor. His reason is that, 
the basis of the ancestor’s exemplary life is in many ways defective. This is especially evident 
in the criteria for becoming an ancestor. In the case of Jesus, we can and should imitate every 
aspect of his life. Jesus exhibits more perfect qualities against that which the ancestors have 
practiced (Sarpong 1998:143).  
Appiah-Kubi (1977:51-65), a Ghanaian sociologist, approaches African Christology through 
the African Independent Churches. He maintains that the African understanding of Christ is 
threefold: Firstly, Christ is seen as the mediator between the living and the dead – which he 
claims is based on the ancestral conceptions and practices in traditional thought. Secondly, 
Christ is designated as saviour and Liberator from all the oppressive forces – physical, social, 
and political evils that wage war against humankind. Thirdly, he is seen as a healer of 
physical sicknesses. Akrong (1992:119-26) also postulates that the ancestors serve as the 
intermediaries between God and humankind.  
d) Conclusion 
In searching for an adequate image to give expression to the person and the work of Christ, 
there seems to be some stages of development in African Christological discourses. This is 
particularly true for those who follow the line of Nicene Christology. Tentatively, one may 
see three such stages.  
In the first stage Jesus is seen as a functional liberator without any reference to his divinity, 
though his divinity is not necessarily excluded. Some positions on liberation Christology 
illustrate this stage. The second stage is where Jesus is seen as a mere human (with the 
functions of God) mediator between God and humankind. The approach of Pobee (1979) may 
serve as an example in this regard.  
In the third stage theologians such as Nyamiti and Bediako reconfigure the person of an 
ancestor to be a divine being in order to express Jesus’ ‘humanity and divinity. Nyamiti’s 
approach (following Danquah’s assumption) constitutes an example of this third stage. 
However, the claim that God once had a human nature is yet to be established in any society 
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in Africa. The Akan may see some form of God’s nature in human beings, namely okra (akin 
to soul). But, there is no myth, story or maxim that depicts God as a deified human being 
amongst the Akan as Danquah proposes. The Akan maintain strict distinctions between the 
ancestors, the lesser divinities and the Supreme Being.  
In another development, Bediako suggests that the ancestors should be “desacralised” and that 
Jesus should become the only “divine ancestor”. His suggestion is based on the assumption 
that the ancestors are divine and that there is a need to divulge them of their divine status. 
Here the words “sacred” and “divine” are used synonymously. However, this does not 
necessarily pertain to their use in the Akan context.  
To Bediako, the ancestors are divine because they are sacred. Indeed, the ancestors and even 
chiefs are regarded as sacred amongst the Akan. Yet the Akan do not equate sacredness with 
divinity. Whereas all that are divine may be sacred, not all that is sacred is divine, particularly 
within the Akan context. Amongst the Akan, the ancestors are viewed as human spirits; they 
are never elevated to the status of divinity or take on any divine form.  
Nonetheless, in some African societies, particularly Yoruba culture, the ancestors are elevated 
to divinities (Idowu 1973:172). Obviously, this development might have had some influence 
on the third phase of Christological discourse to which Nyamiti and Bediako subscribe.  
However, in the context of the Nicene affirmation of the person of Christ, these ancestors who 
have been elevated may become lesser divinities. The reason is that, if it is granted that the 
ancestors were once merely human beings and were later elevated or became divinities, then 
this image runs the risk of adoptionism: there was a time when they were not divine although 
they later became that way.  
Analysing these Christologies, it becomes obvious that their weakness lies in their expression 
of the person of Christ as a truly divine being. Nonetheless, the strength of ancestor 
Christologies may lie in the area of Christ’s work. However, the image of an ancestor in the 
Akan context (and also in the general African context) does not express adequately the Nicene 
affirmation of the person of Christ as “truly God” as well as “truly human”. Therefore it 
cannot also express the atoning work of Christ adequately either. What follows, is a further 
analysis of Akan concept of ancestor and the Christian (Nicene) understanding of the person 
of Christ.  
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4.3 The person of Jesus as an “ancestor” within Akan context:  
A conceptual analysis 
In determining whether, and to what extent, the image of ancestorhood is relevant or can 
express the Nicene affirmation of the person of Christ adequately, one needs to examine the 
Akan notion of ancestorhood and the Christian (Nicene) notion of the person of Christ. To 
what extent could the ancestor image be stretched to express the person of Christ as truly 
human as well as truly God? A brief comparative analysis of the person of Christ and the 
Akan concept of ancesterhood will help in this assessment.  
4.3.1 Who are the Akan ancestors?  
The most important aspect of the Akan traditional religion is the ancestral cult. Rattray (1959) 
argues that the predominant influence in the Akan religion is neither Onyame (Supreme 
Being) nor the hundreds of abosom (lesser divinities), but the nsamanfo (the ancestors). 
a) Qualifications for becoming an ancestor 
To 
find out who these ancestors are, I will in this section describe and analyse the identity of the 
ancestors.  
Amongst the Akan, not every deceased can become an ancestor; one must fulfil certain 
conditions. The person must be an adult and must have attained a senior age and must have 
had children. Thus, those who have died as children cannot become ancestors.16
Akan ancestors include both men and women.
  
17 Ancestors must have led a life worthy of 
emulation, that is an exemplary life while on earth. A “natural” death is also an important 
condition for ancestorship. One cannot be an ancestor if one dies by way of an accident or 
suicide,18 or through an “unclean” disease such as lunacy, dropsy, leprosy/epilepsy or HIV-
AIDS (Sarpong 1974:34).19
                                                 
16  As Sarpong (1974:34) notes, amongst the Akan, an adult is by definition a married person. A teenager that 
is 15 years old who is married is considered an adult. An old man of 60 years who has remained a bachelor 
all through his life is not viewed as such. This raises the question as to whether Jesus would qualify as an 
ancestor amongst the Akan. Actually, his age of 33 years when he died is too young to have him considered 
as an ancestor. Had he married, his status would not have been debatable in this regard. At 33 and 
presumably unmarried, it would be strange for the Akan to consider Jesus as an ancestor.  
 
17  The Akan ancestral cult does not exclude women from being ancestors: There are women ancestors 
amongst the Akan. By contrast, Tlhagale (2004:48) notes that women are excluded from ancestorship in 
some South African societies.  
18 The Akan frown on suicide. It is believed that those who commit suicide have some hidden sins which they 
refuse to face. However, the Akan also believe that: animoguase ne wuo dei fanyam wuo (“it is better to die 
than to live in disgrace”).  
19  Such criteria raise a serious question regarding the possibility of the disabled attaining ancestor status. 
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b) The person of an ancestor: “living” dead or “risen” from death? 
According to Akan beliefs, death does not immediately annihilate life. The departed continue 
to live in the spirit world; the ancestors live in asamando (place of rest)20
The Akan believe that from the dwelling of bliss, some ancestors can come back to be reborn 
in order to finish an assignment which he or she started, but could not complete.
 while those who do 
not qualify as ancestors roam about.   
21 It is also 
believed that some of the deceased can decide to come back to be reborn for another lease of 
life. Thus, the Akan name Ababio (return from the dead).22
However, the Akan do not attach any strong connection between the deceased and the human 
being as the same person. The Akan only draw some bodily and behavioural similarities 
between the dead and living human beings  
  
Moreover, the Akan also believe that some people, on an individual basis, can appear to living 
human beings from “beyond death”. Amongst the Akan, it is generally believed that the dead 
are supposed to return within forty days and reveal themselves in one way or another to their 
relatives. The deceased are usually believed to reveal themselves to a known person who does 
not yet know about the death of that person. The one experiencing the appearance would later 
be informed that the one he/she encountered had already died. According to the Akan belief, 
after forty days, the deceased will disappear to join the ancestors (or not).  
Remarkably, to the Akan, such persons – who make appearances beyond death, are not 
regarded as being raised from the dead. Thus, Komfo Anokye, the co-founder of the Asante 
Kingdom and a renowned traditional priest is said to have made some appearance after his 
death. Yet it is said of him that “Anokye went for death antidote but he could not return from 
death”, i.e. he could not rise from the dead. 
Moreover, amongst the Akan, all ancestors are regarded as awufo (dead people), thus the 
saying in reference to the ancestors: nsamanfo mpo se wope dodo na ateasefo (if the dead or 
ancestors want a multitude, how much more the living?). Though not all of the deceased are 
regarded as ancestors, every ancestor is a dead person. Of course, they are seen as the living 
                                                 
20  The Akan believe that those who could not get entry into bliss (the place of rest), roam about as ghosts 
terrorising people until certain rituals are performed or until they are reborn. Sarpong (2002:99) suggests 
that this type of return into the world imlplies a kind of re-incarnation. He also maintains that the Christian 
concept of hell has no analogy within the Akan worldview and is therefore foreign to the Akan traditional 
thinking. 
21  The Akan believe that no one is eternally doomed, those who cannot make it as ancestors, have an 
opportunity to be reborn.  
22  The Yoruba of Nigeria has a similar belief. See Opoku (1978) for a detailed discussion on this. 
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dead. However, this does not change their status as dead persons. This is clearly less than 
what Nicene Christianity would affirm about Jesus Christ. 
Interestingly, there is another Akan belief about life beyond death; which may permit one, 
somehow, to talk about one “rising” from the dead. Amongst the Akan, there is the belief that 
those who die before their hyebre can come back by means of “rising from the dead” in order 
to finish a job they started, but could not complete. (Hyebre denotes the time they told 
Onyame they would spend on earth – particularly a young man or woman.) Such people23 
would usually live outside of their hometown; they could get married and raise children. They 
live their lives like any other normal human being except that they would not eat pepper. 
In the late 1980s something happened in one of the Akan villages that became a point of 
discussion for both adults and children around that area.
An 
example from an incident in an Akan village will illustrate this belief.  
 A middle aged woman one day called 
in at a certain house and introduced herself as the daughter of a woman whom the people in 
the house knew to have died without children some years ago.24
She explained that before her death, her mother (who had not visited her hometown during all 
her stay as a “risen one”) gave her children directions to her home town as well as her 
family’s contact details. According to the young lady, their mother further encouraged the 
children to visit her family in her hometown some day. 
 The middle aged lady 
informed her host that the woman in question had died recently and not long ago as the 
villagers seemed to have recalled. 
The young lady was able to narrate the whole life story of her (risen) mother – of course 
without any mention of her “first” death – in order to convince her host about the genuineness 
of her mission. The host and the other family members were finally convinced. It would 
certainly require someone closely acquainted with the family to be able to provide such vital 
information about the supposed “mother”, as the middle aged lady has narrated. Moreover, 
the family of the deceased woman was poor. There would therefore be no obvious benefit for 
                                                 
23  There are a myriad of stories about such people. It is believed that some could send their children to their 
families while others also send money and other goods to the family members. There are also stories about 
family members who tried to coerce such people back into their homes. However, in most cases they are 
outwitted. The “risen ones” vacate their dwelling place before the family member reaches it. It is generally 
believed that if one meets such a person and is able to give her/him a pepper, the “risen one” would not 
scuttle away again; she or he could then be integrated into the community as a human being.  
24  The Akan believe that only an individual can make an appearance after death or can be raised from the 
dead. There is neither a question of “corporate resurrection” nor any notion of a set day that all or some of 
the dead will be raised from death.  
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a family member who was not genuine concerning his or her mission. This event was indeed 
surprising but not something unheard of amongst the Akan. Similar examples of such an 
event took place in the past and are expected to occur in future as well. Such an experience is 
indeed common amongst traditional Akan communities. 
After conferring amongst themselves, the family broke the news to the middle aged woman 
that the woman (her mother) she was talking about was their relative but that she had already 
lived, died and was buried in her hometown. They added that they had her tomb to prove their 
report. Nevertheless, since their “sister” had risen from the death, lived somewhere and raised 
a family, they cannot reject her children as family members. Thus, the middle aged woman 
and her family were then welcomed into the family. On the basis of an assurance from the 
family, the young woman went back and later came along with other members of her family.
Usually, someone who was reportedly raised from the dead does not qualify to be an ancestor. 
The reasons are related to the age of their death or their means of death, especially in cases of 
death by accidents. As indicated above, either one of these can disqualify one from becoming 
an ancestor. Moreover, when there are enough grounds to suspect that a relative is living 
somewhere as a “risen human being”, that person will never be regarded as an ancestor.
  
25
One may therefore conclude that an ancestor dwells amongst the living-dead and does not 
imply one who has reportedly been “risen from the dead”. Most likely, the Akan will not 
consider someone to be an ancestor if it is believed that that person has risen and has resettled 
in another vicinity.  
 
c) The person of an ancestor: Human spirit, lesser divinity or divinity? 
Danquah was the first African theologian to refer to Onyame as ancestor. He portrays Onyame 
as an old human being who lived on earth, died and was subsequently deified to be worship-
ped as an ancestor. Danquah therefore equates the worship and veneration of the ancestors 
with the worship of Onyame. If one accepts Danquah’s suggestion, then an ancestor could be 
seen as deity. 
Another argument professes some lesser divinities to be deified heroes. This would imply no 
clear line between the ancestors and the lesser divinities. The Yoruba solar and thunder 
However, as previously argued, such a suggestion does not have a basis in the 
Akan culture and worldview. 
                                                 
25  In referring to such stories, the Akan do not apply the term “risen from the dead” explicitly. The emphasis is 
usually placed on the claim that (supposedly) the dead person had resettled in another vicinity. For the 
Akan, the question whether the tomb of such a person who has supposedly resettled elsewhere is empty or 
not is not even raised.  
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divinity, Sango, was reportedly originally a human king and later became deified as a lesser 
divinity. Idowu (1973:186) concedes this point, but contends that the case of Sango is a rare 
example. He therefore insists that Africans by and large draw a distinction between the 
Supreme Being, the lesser divinities and the ancestors (Idowu 1973:171-173). 
When one analyses the status of the ancestors within the traditional African context, the 
person of an ancestor may be regarded as a human spirit or a lesser divinity. However, no 
African myth, story or maxim, at least not in the available literature, depicts the Supreme 
Being as a deified ancestor. Thus, the proposal that the Supreme Being may be regarded 
within the traditional African context as an ancestor is questionable. Amongst the traditional 
Akan, the ancestors remain mere human spirits; none of them becomes a lesser divinity or 
deified hero. 
4.3.2 Who is Jesus Christ: “living” dead or “resurrected” person? 
My focus here is to ascertain whether it will be appropriate to categorise Jesus as being 
amongst the Akan ancestors – whether explicitly or implicitly. I do not intend to enter here 
into any debates on the search for a historical Jesus or on the interpretation of the (physical) 
resurrection of Jesus. Instead, I want to test the hypothesis that the Akan concept of 
ancestorhood stands in conflict with the Christian understanding of Jesus’ resurrection. The 
statement “Jesus is our ancestor” would therefore be inappropriate. In this section, I will test 
and develop this hypothesis through a critical examination of the Akan concept of 
ancestorhood and the Christian understanding of Jesus’ resurrection, with particular reference 
to the biblical accounts of the “empty tomb”.  
In the New Testament, the name Jesus Christ refers to a historical figure. Jesus the son of 
Joseph might have been the common name by which he was known to his contemporaries. 
But later on, and more frequently after his death and acclaimed resurrection, he was referred 
to as Jesus Christ. The term “Christ” (Christos in the Greek and its Hebrew equivalent 
Messiah) is associated, more than anything else, with the belief that Jesus was resurrected 
from the dead.  
According to the Nicene Creed, Jesus Christ is “truly God” as well as “truly human”. The 
Council of Chalcedon added that he has two natures in one person. Nicene Christianity 
affirms that Jesus Christ became “incarnated from the virgin Mary, suffered and died under 
Pontius Pilate, but was risen from the dead. Christians have often affirmed the “bodily” 
resurrection of Jesus Christ to indicate that it was not just his influence or the movement Jesus 
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instigated that continued after his death but that he is indeed still present in a (omnipresent) 
bodily form. However, the biblical narratives, the creeds or the ecumenical councils do not 
provide clarity with regard to the nature of the body of the risen Christ. In fact, speculation in 
this regard is widely discouraged.  
Nonetheless, the biblical narratives concerning the empty tomb at least suggest the Christian 
conviction that some change befell the physical body of Jesus during his resurrection. This 
does not imply that the resurrected body of Jesus Christ was simply the same as his pre-
resurrection one. He died and his corpse was buried. If his corpse could not be located, it was 
either stolen or misplaced, or otherwise. The biblical testimonies suggest that he was “risen” 
through the power of the Holy Spirit. How that happened and how this should be understood 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Before Jesus’ death, it was simply assumed by those who were closest to Jesus that he was as 
much a human being as they were. After his resurrection, according to the biblical 
testimonies, there was some doubt as to whether Jesus was indeed a human being or a 
spiritual one. In response, Jesus invited his followers to establish for themselves that he was 
indeed a being of flesh and blood: “See my hands and my feet … handle me, and see; for a 
spirit has not flesh and bones” (Luke 24:39). Obviously, this invitation served to counter the 
possible view that he appeared to them as a ghost. 
4.3.3 Can one categorise the being of the resurrected Christ amongst the Akan 
ancestors?  
An answer to this question demands two focal points. The first is one’s understanding of 
Christ’s resurrection – as this subject has several interpretations. The second is how far one 
can draw out metaphoric language to express one’s understanding of Jesus’ resurrection 
within the Akan context. The problem largely lies with the failure of the advocates of the 
ancestor Christology to align their view of Jesus’ resurrection with the Akan concept of 
ancestorhood which is relatively clear cut. Unless, one clarifies one’s view of Christ’s 
resurrection, an answer to this question becomes bizarre. Nonetheless, the doctrinal question 
that besets the Akan Christian is: In what way does the notion of Jesus’ resurrection become 
unique amongst the Akan Christians?  
Notably, according to Akan belief, all the ancestors are regarded as awufo (dead people), 
which leads to the saying about the ancestors: nsamanfo mpo se wope dodo na ateasefo (if the 
dead or ancestors want a multitude, how much more the living?). Though not all deceased are 
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regarded as ancestors, every ancestor is regarded as deceased. Of course they are seen as the 
living dead. Nevertheless, this does not change their status as dead persons.  
Here the question confronts us, if Jesus could not be regarded as owufo (a dead person) can he 
be regarded as oteasefo (a human being)? Notably, the Akan use the term oteasefo only in 
reference to human beings, but can Jesus be regarded fully as such a being? 
The Akan Twi translators in Luke 24:5 referred to Jesus as oteasefo – “Why do you look for 
the living (teasefe) amongst the dead (awufo)?” Of course one does not have to agree with the 
Twi translators. But in case one does, it becomes clear that tagging Jesus as an ancestor is a 
way of looking for oteaseni amongst the awufo. Of course some conceptual problems are 
associated with the Twi translation in this regard.  
Nonetheless, this poses a question as to whether Jesus as ancestor is still a dead person – and 
“ancestor” – or a “risen one”. Logically, the two cannot be held concurrently – if one agrees 
with the Akan Twi translators, for these views are in opposition.  
On the other hand, if Jesus could neither be regarded as owufo (a dead person) nor oteasefo (a 
human being), what then is the status of Jesus’ person amongst the Akan? Here the burden of 
proof lies with the advocates of ancestor Christology. Indeed, by inference, they contend that 
Jesus’ experience is similar to that of the ancestors – or what justification would there be to 
profess Jesus as an ancestor? Nonetheless, I will now analyse briefly the possible positions of 
the advocates of an ancestor Christology.  
To commence the analysis, let me pose this question: What does it entail when one asserts 
that “Jesus is an ancestor”? By using this expression, does one mean to say that “Jesus is an 
ancestor” in a sense that one would refer to the past Akan historical figure like Komfo 
Anokye in that regard? My contention here is that, logically, to assert that “Jesus is an 
ancestor” is tantamount to denying the uniqueness of Jesus’ resurrection, unless the advocates 
of an ancestor Christology can prove the contrary. I also contend here that one may rarely 
avoid such denial by implicitly categorising the being of Jesus “as” ancestor.  
I will begin with the statement “Jesus is an ancestor”. Is this an expression of factual assertion 
according to the Akan tradition? Granted that Jesus qualifies as an ancestor within the Akan 
context, certainly, the statement may be regarded as factual. This is so because, to the 
traditional Akan, Jesus was a historical person who lived an exemplary life and died.
Another question emerges: If Jesus is an ancestor, could he still be proclaimed as resurrected 
Christ? The answer will depend on one’s view of Christ’s resurrection. If not, the 
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identification of the risen Christ with the concept of ancestorhood would commit us to a 
statement that is theologically confused. If there are such similarities what do they entail? 
Would such similarities include room for the uniqueness of Jesus as “risen one” amongst the 
ancestors? Probably not! An example of such a theological distortion of Jesus’ resurrection 
may be taken from an incident reported by Sarpong. He captions the story: “A true story, the 
resurrection”. 
There is a true story of a missionary who went to one of the villages of Ghana to preach. 
In his explanation about what Christianity was, he tried to convince his hearers that Jesus 
was an extraordinary person and the prominent fact in the life of Jesus that he used was 
Jesus’ resurrection. For over 30 minutes, he hammered on the fact that Jesus rose from the 
dead and that this is true, that this is not a story, that we must all believe it and that if we 
did, we could all be saved. The villagers looked at him with amazement, not because of 
what he was saying but because of the enthusiastic way he was saying it. They wondered 
what point he was trying to make. They were perplexed as to what was so remarkable 
about it. It was clear that nobody was impressed. The chief of the village, in his role of 
leadership, simply replied: “Did you come all the way from Europe to tell us that 
somebody died and came back to life? What is so special about this? We have exactly the 
same experience, multiplied dozens of times here. Our forefathers have all died but they 
do come back into the world; so what is so peculiar or so wonderful about this particular 
return of this Jesus into this world? Probably what is unusual about it is the speed with 
which he returned. You say he came back a day or two after his death; our ancestors take a 
little more time to come back. This is an ancestor and ancestors are supposed to come 
back and reveal themselves in one way or another to their relatives and so if your Jesus 
did that, then he did a natural thing. What is so mysterious about it?” 
By way of conclusion, Sarpong (1978:45) says: “The story of the death and resurrection of 
our Lord Jesus Christ, therefore, only convinced the Asante that Jesus is an ancestor, a great 
and good leader who was willing to do anything for his people, including dying, and would 
not abandon them after he had returned to the place of the dead.”  
Indeed much can be gained by identifying Jesus with the ancestors – who are prominent and 
respected above everyone apart from God. The question remains, however, whether this 
would do justice to the Christian confession that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead – upon 
which the divine status of Jesus the Christ is especially built.  
Notably, the biblical narratives on the empty tomb suggest what transpired with regard to the 
corpse of Jesus of Nazareth and that there is a vestige of recognisable continuity between the 
body of Jesus of Nazareth and the bodily appearance of Jesus as risen Christ. Of course the 
notion of the “bodily” resurrection of Christ is highly contested (and therefore cannot be 
discussed here).  
Admittedly, asserting the resurrection of Jesus amongst the Akan already creates 
complications – particularly if one interprets it within the framework of ancestorhood. Yet 
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proponents of an ancestor Christology claim that the status of Jesus may be likened to that of 
the ancestors. They would claim that this image does justice to Jesus Christ’s resurrection 
with reference to reports in Akan traditional culture on the appearances of deceased persons to 
living relatives. In this respect, the burden of proof lies on the proponents of ancestor 
Christology. They have to clarify whether their views would do justice to the Christian 
confession that Jesus Christ is risen. As they have not clarified this crucial question, one may 
therefore conclude that an ancestor Christology is not (yet) plausible.  
4.3.4 Can the ancestor image adequately express the Nicene notion that Christ is “truly 
human” and “truly God”?  
As argued above, the notion of Jesus as an ancestor does not do justice to the Christian 
(Nicene) understanding of Jesus’ resurrection. In this section, I submit the further argument 
that the ancestral imagery does not adequately express the Nicene affirmation pertaining to 
the person of Christ, namely that he is “truly human and truly God”. Here one needs to 
consider a) the doctrine of Trinity and b) the worship of Jesus as the Christ. 
Firstly, the notion of “Jesus as ancestor” does not capture adequately what is at stake in the 
doctrine of Trinity. This is so because the ancestor image portrays Jesus as merely a human 
spirit, at best a lesser divinity. The crux is that the advocates of the ancestor Christology have 
not shown how the image of ancestor could indicate that Jesus is of one substance with God 
the Father. Notably, ancestors are creatures while Jesus is the creator of the ancestors 
(“through whom all things were made”). Hence, Jesus cannot even be called an ancestor par 
excellence. The best that could emerge from the notion of Jesus as ancestor is that Jesus is not 
divine but an agent or representative of God. Certainly, such a view of Jesus cannot do justice 
to the Christian doctrine of Trinity. While Christology serves as the main focus of theological 
reflection, one must recognise that Christology traditionally also served as preamble for 
reflection on the Trinity. This is most true when Christ’s divinity is not denied – as is the case 
in many of the African Christologies (Vähäkangas 2000:34).  
Secondly, if Jesus is not deemed truly God, it then follows that it is inappropriate to worship 
him, because Christian faith accords worship only to God. As already argued above, amongst 
the Akan, the ancestors are not regarded as God or gods; they are not even deemed divine. 
They are human spirits. Sarpong thus argues that the ancestors are not worshipped. Also, 
African theologians such as Mbiti argue that the ancestors are not divine, neither are they 
worshipped. On this basis, one may rightly infer that the ancestors cannot be worshipped 
alongside God – for they are merely human spirits while Jesus is God. If one would grant that 
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Jesus is an ancestor in the Akan context, will Jesus then be regarded as God? Will he be 
worshipped? Obviously not!  
One may argue that Jesus represents believers in heaven, yet he is an object of worship. 
Certainly he is truly human, but even more, he is also truly God. Thus, Jesus does not only 
represent believers in heaven, but figures also as a creator – truly God. Therefore, even 
though he condescended to dwell within a human body, Jesus is still our Lord, our creator, 
our maker. Hence, the claim that Jesus may be regarded as an ancestor, may ultimately distort 
not only the Akan culture but the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as well.  
Nonetheless, more that anything, it is the roles that the ancestors are supposedly playing that 
the advocates of an ancestor Christology find compelling. The question that has to be 
addressed here is: Can the ancestral imagery express the work of Christ adequately if it cannot 
do justice to the unique person of Christ? 
4.3.5 Can the ancestral imagery adequately express the atoning work of Christ?  
The idea of viewing Jesus as an ancestor, seems to stem primarily from the obvious 
similarities between the work of Christ and that of the ancestors. Undoubtedly, such 
similarities have been demonstrated by the various theologians whose works we have 
discussed above. On the basis of such a comparative analysis some African theologians have 
proposed that Jesus may be regarded as an ancestor. For the benefit of African Christians it 
has been suggested that Jesus should replace the ancestors as benefactor of society and their 
source of protection. The question remains though: Can the ancestral image express the 
atoning works of Christ adequately? My line of argument here is that the ancestral imagery 
establishes no more than a functional association with God. That is to say, there is no 
ontological relation between the person of an ancestor and God. In this respect, since the 
ancestral image does not adequately express the unique person of Christ, it cannot adequately 
express the redeeming work of Christ either.  
From a Nicene perspective, the divinity of Jesus Christ forms a prerequisite for his atoning 
work. As Aulén (1948:221) rightly puts it: “No other power than the divine could accomplish 
this [the work of atonement]”. He further contends that the confession of divine incarnation in 
Jesus Christ is thereby a statement essential to the Christian conception of God. Inferring 
from Aulén’s assertion, the Nicene confession of faith in Christ is essentially a confession that 
God became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth.  
Of course, it could be argued, contrary to the affirmations of Nicea and Chalcedon, that the 
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work of atonement may be possible without claiming such divine status for Jesus Christ. This 
is especially the case in Abelard’s “moral influence” theory of the atonement – whereby 
Jesus’ death is seen only as an example of the willingness to die for a good cause. Thereby 
Jesus leaves a remarkable example to follow. This position does not regard Christ’s 
incarnation as a necessary prerequisite for his atoning work. Nonetheless, it is debatable 
whether this position could do justice to the divinity of Jesus Christ. I will return to this matter 
in more detail in chapter 7. 
4.3.6 Can one separate the work of Christ as Mediator from the person of Christ as truly 
human and truly God? 
There are two ways in answering this question. Firstly, it must be noted that Christology 
intrinsically belongs to soteriology, thus any image which fails to account for the person of 
Christ as truly human and truly God also inevitably fails to express the salvific work of Christ 
adequately. If the person of Christ is merely interpreted within a soteriological framework, 
then it becomes an appendix to the work of Christ. However, unless assertions of Christ’s 
significance are based upon beliefs or statements about his being, Christ then becomes no 
more than his benefits – in the sense that the individual believer happens to conceive of them. 
In such a case, it may happen that truth is made subordinate to meaning and Christology 
thereby deprived of its foundation. In this respect, as the ancestral image cannot adequately 
account for the Christ’s unique person, it follows that it cannot account for the work of Christ 
either.  
Secondly, although Christ’s person and his work are inseparable, it must be noted that a 
distinction is nevertheless necessary here. Unless one makes room for a distinction between 
Christology and soteriology, between what Jesus is in himself and what he holds for us, one 
fails to ground the significance of Jesus for our salvation. 
Nonetheless, in African Christological discourse, there is a strong tendency to reduce 
Christology to soteriology. Support for this allegation may be found in the Christological 
image of chief, linguist, master of initiation and even in the ancestral imagery. The 
Christological proposal based on such images reveals obvious similarities of the roles 
attributed to such images and that of Jesus. However, as argued above, these images cannot 
express the divinity of Christ adequately. What one observes here is that the unique person of 
Christ is typically reduced to the benefits derived from him.  
This trend is not only typical of African theologians. The dictum of Melanchthon “[t]o know 
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Christ is to know his benefits, not to contemplate his natures and his modes of incarnation, as 
the scholastics teach”, may be the background of this trend. This dictum served, whether 
appropriately or not, as a significant source of that very reduction of Christology to 
soteriology. Christology on this account thus becomes subordinate to soteriology.  
Nevertheless, as Gunton (1977:27) rightly points out, in this passage Melanchthon “was 
protesting against the excessive objectivism of the scholastics in order to connect a Christ 
who is not simply an object of knowledge, but is what he is in the meaning he has for 
believers.”  
Notwithstanding this trend, it must be noted that Christology concerns Jesus himself as person 
– about his identity. Thus, the person and status of Christ must remain prior to the benefits 
that may be derived from knowing him. In order for faith in God’s salvation to keep true to its 
very foundation, soteriology must follow from Christology, not vice versa (Pannenberg 
1968:48). 
For this reason a more careful examination is needed to find out whether the person of Christ, 
as truly human as well as truly divine (the ontological), and his work (the soteriological 
aspect) are intrinsically related in any proposed Christology. 
4.4 The strengths and weaknesses of ancestral Christology  
In this an ancestor Christology is 
found wanting. The ancestral imagery accounts only for Christ’s one nature, namely that he is 
“truly human”. Nevertheless, an adequate mediator between God and humankind must also be 
truly God.  
4.4.1 The strengths  
Advocates of the ancestor Christology advance several reasons why Jesus could be regarded 
as an ancestor. These explanations reflect the interplay between the roles that are traditionally 
attributed to the ancestors and to Jesus in Christian theological discourse. Here I will 
enumerate six of these advantages. 
In the first place, a parallel role between Jesus and the ancestors is presumed – both the 
ancestors and Jesus are community founders. It is proposed that Jesus fits exactly the role of 
the supreme ancestor, seeing that he founded a new and universal community.  
The second major role of the African ancestors, which is parallel to Jesus’ role, is that of 
ongoing participation in the life of the human community, specifically as family guardian. It 
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is argued that the role of the ancestors is to protect and care for the totality of life. If Africans 
therefore are to experience Jesus as a protector and one who truly cares about their daily lives, 
Jesus also has to be understood as an ancestor.  
Thirdly, both the ancestors and Jesus share a common role as custodians of public morality. 
For many African societies, the ancestors serve as sanctioners of such morality. Such a role 
correlates with the similar role attributed to Jesus as the custodian of Christian morality. If 
Jesus is to be regarded as an ancestor, he may then be regarded as the custodian of public 
morality in the African societies. Sarpong (2002:9) argues that viewing Jesus as the custodian 
of African societal norms and values, will give a purified meaning to the African cultural 
practices. This will conform with Christian truths. To Tlhagale (2004:43), this should be the 
goal of the concept of inculturation.  
Fourthly, another role which is attributed both to the ancestors and to Jesus is that of “role 
model”. In African societies, the ancestors are regarded as societal role models, insofar as 
their exemplary life is deemed worthy of emulation. For the traditional African, the ideal life 
implies to grow up, undergo the rites of passage, to die and to become an ancestor. It is 
therefore argued that the ideal nature of the ancestors would be a framework within which one 
could also articulate the ideal nature of Jesus Christ. This role correlates with the Christian 
concept of following in the Christ’s footsteps (Sarpong 2002). In a way it implies a 
meaningful category, because the ancestors, like Jesus stand for what one may call the 
fullness of life. 
The fifth major advantage of an ancestral Christology is that the revering of ancestors lies at 
the heart of African spirituality. If Jesus is to be considered more than a guest and a stranger 
from the outside world to Africans, he has to be amongst those to whom they can relate at the 
level of their heart (Bediako 1995:219). For this reason, ancestral Christology promotes 
Christian spirituality within the African context. 
Sixth, Christianity will gain much credibility and respect amongst the Africans if Jesus would 
be regarded as an ancestor. In the African societies, the ancestors are prominent and respected 
above everyone apart from God. In this regard, there would be much gain in terms of 
reverence and the high sense of devotion to the Christian faith. That is, if Jesus could be 
identified with the ancestors.  
Remarkably, with the exception of the intermediary role between God and humankind which 
the ancestors are said to play, I have no problem with any of the proposed functions of the 
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ancestors.  
4.4.2 The weaknesses  
Having enumerated the advantages of ancestor Christology, the question needs to be posed: 
Do such advantages outweigh weaknesses of the ancestor Christologies? To this question, 
only brief answers will be given here. The reason being that in this chapter the whole of the 
argument has been structured to refute the claim that the ancestral image expresses the Nicene 
affirmation of the person of Christ adequately. To highlight my contentions, I will only 
summarise my major points. 
My objections to the ancestral image stem primarily from the contention that this image does 
not adequately express the Nicene affirmation of the person of Christ, namely as “truly human 
as well as truly God”. As a result, the ancestral imagery does not do justice to the atoning 
work of Christ either. Here my major points are as follows:  
Firstly, the notion of “Jesus as ancestor” does not capture adequately what is at stake in the 
doctrine of Trinity. Secondly, if Jesus is not truly God, it then follows that it is inappropriate 
to worship him, because the Christian faith accords worship only to God. Thirdly, and on a 
more serious note, categorising Jesus as being amongst the ancestors leads to some serious 
confusion between the (Nicene) Christian understanding of Jesus’ resurrection as one “risen 
from the dead” or as one who merely made “appearances beyond death”.  
4.5 Conclusion 
With rare exceptions, the advocates of ancestral Christology approach Christology from the 
perspective of what has been tagged as “Christology from below”. The concept of ancestors 
as human spirits shapes their understanding of Christ. The Divine conqueror Christology as 
already indicated in the Chapter 3 takes its point of departure “from above”. It is indeed 
remarkable to see how the two Christologies reviewed in this and the previous chapters are in 
parallel with the two approaches to Christology in Western Christianity, namely “from above” 
and “from below”.26
It must be noted that without any kind of synthesis between the Christology “from above” and 
“from below”, reinterpreting the person of Christ as truly human and truly God remains a 
  
                                                 
26  Demarcating the Christological methods as “from below” and “from above” may give the impression that 
these are mutually exclusive methods. Yet, what constitutes Christology “from below” and “from above” 
are not without conceptual difficulties. However, this topic lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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pipedream. As has been indicated in chapter 3, if a method of Christology cannot harness the 
Christology “from above” 
Nonetheless, the riddle is that if one starts “from below”, one can rarely avoid a heresy similar 
to degree Christology – professing a divinised man. Likewise, the method of Christology 
“from above” may also run the risk of docetism. In this respect, the divine conqueror image, 
as shown in chapter 3, becomes prone to docetism. As also indicated in this chapter, the 
ancestral image which usually has its starting point “from below” also runs the risk of falling 
into the heresy of adoptionism.  
and “from below”, it is doubtful whether such a Christology can 
express the Nicene affirmation of the person of Christ adequately.  
Methodologically speaking, Christology “from below” and “from above” are Christological 
approaches which are likely to absolutise either “time” or “eternity”. While “from below” is 
likely to render time absolute, “from above” is also likely to consider eternity in the same 
vein. When any of the methods is trapped in this way, the content of the proposed Christology 
will be inevitably influenced by such methodology.27
This points to the necessity of harnessing both Christological methods from above and from 
below, to achieve a synthesis rather than assessing one to be the only solution of expressing 
the notion of “truly God” and “truly human”. In this respect, the question has to be addressed 
whether and in what form the Christology “from above” and “from below” can be harnessed 
to achieve such a synthesis. 
  
Without the said synthesis, one may be rarely able to express the Nicene affirmation of the 
person of Christ adequately as truly God as well as truly human. The rest of this thesis 
(chapters 5-8) will grapple with this question. It may be helpful to give a brief account of the 
argument that is to follow: 
Overall, the core of my proposal is summed up within the Akan concept of okra. This concept 
is loosely translated in English as “soul” but could be better rendered as Logos in its dynamic 
equivalency. This concept carries/contains the quality of a co-presence of time and eternity – 
a concept that holds together time and eternity, immanence and transcendence. That is to say, 
the Akan idea of okra may embody the synthesis of the notion of time and eternity. Thus, the 
Akan poses/mentions okrateasefo as the point where sparks of God’s nature and human flesh 
meet. Before introducing this concept, I will in chapter 5 suggest and develop a coined term 
                                                 
27  Nonetheless, some theologians like Pannenberg who starts his Chirstology “from below”, appeared to 
express the person of Christ as truly human and truly God concurrently. However, it is debatable whether 
his approach is not “an unaided ascend from below” as Gunton contends (Gunton 1997:31).  
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Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique Priest) as a Christological designation which suggests the 
need for a mediator between God and humankind. This idea is patterned along with the 
designations of Messiah, Son of Man, and Son of God.28
In chapter 6 I will then employ this Akan concept of okra, which is similar to the concept of 
Logos and carries both the properties of that which is divine and human. Through this 
conceptualisation I will suggest that Okra is incarnated in the person of the Nyamesofopreko. 
This may be similar to Logos (okra) incarnated in the person of Jesus the Messiah.  
  
In the chapter 7, the designation Afomusuyideε (sin and curse bearer) will be developed to 
account for the unique atoning work of Jesus. The concluding chapter 8 will be devoted to the 
ecumenical significance of this thesis.  
 
                                                 
28  In chapter 5, I will suggest how Jesus who is not Akan may be accepted amongst the Akan.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 A Nyamesofopreko Christology: The need for a mediator  
5.1 Introduction   
In critical dialogue with the Christologies based on the divine conqueror and ancestor 
Christologies discussed in the previous two chapters, in this second part of the thesis (chapters 
5-8) I will propose a Christology based on the concept of “God’s unique priest” (Nyamesofo-
preko). In this Christology, three themes will be developed. The need for a mediator between 
God and humanity will be discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will then focus on the person of 
Christ as a mediator between God and humanity. This will be followed by a discussion on 
mediation as the work of Christ in Chapter 7. Finally, Chapter 8 will explore the ecumenical 
significance of the proposal.  
In each case, the core tenets of the Christian faith will be related to themes in the traditional 
Akan culture, worldview, and belief system in an attempt to offer a constructive 
reinterpretation of such themes based on the notion of Nyamesofopreko. This neologism 
expresses the person and the work of Jesus Christ as “God’s unique priest”. As God’s unique 
priest, Jesus mediates between God and humankind following the alienation between them 
(interpreted in the traditional Akan context in terms of the myth of God’s self-withdrawal).  
The argument of this chapter will be structured in three main parts. In section 5.2 I will offer a 
very brief survey of traditional Christian discourse on the need for a mediator between the 
triune God and humanity – specifically with reference to the Christian understanding of sin in 
terms of a broken relationship between God and humanity (alienation). In section 5.3 this will 
be placed in juxtaposition with traditional Akan views on mediation in ordinary human affairs 
(with reference to the roles of the priest and the linguist) but also the need for a mediator 
between the Supreme Being (Onyame) and humankind. I will refer back to the traditional 
Akan myth of Onyame’s self-withdrawal and the absence of a priesthood for Onyame. On this 
basis I will offer the observation that, in traditional Akan religion and culture, no suitable 
mediator has been identified that could restore the relationship between the Supreme Being 
and humanity. In section 5.4 I will then develop a constructive proposal on the need for such a 
mediator. My proposal is as follows: The term Nyamesofopreko may be employed to portray 
Jesus Christ as God’s unique priest, i.e. as one who, for the first time, could fulfil this 
mediating role since he is professed to be a person who is without sin. This is the basis for the 
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proclamation of the Christian gospel that salvation may be found in the mediating work of 
Jesus Christ. In section 5.4 I will also consider various objections which may be raised in 
response to this proposal. This will be followed by a brief conclusion in section 5.5. 
5.2 The need for a mediator between God and humankind in  
Christian discourse  
Mediation is a prominent soteriological concept pertaining to the biblical roots and the 
subsequent history of the Christian tradition. The term “mediator” occurs infrequently in the 
Scriptures but the idea of mediation and of persons acting in the capacity of mediator 
permeates the Bible as a whole. The situation requiring a mediator is often one of 
estrangement and alienation, while the mediator then effects reconciliation (Oepke 1974:598-
624).  
5.2.1 The concept of mediation in the Old Testament and in Judaism 
The Hebrew word mesites may be translated as mediator. The term mediation does not have 
an exclusive religious usage; it could be given a theological as well as a legal content. 
Rabbinic Judaism introduced the term “mediator” in its theological sense. The basis is the 
concept of the negotiator, broker or interpreter. The term is used especially with regard to 
Moses as God’s commissioned agent. Moses acts as go-between who brings God and his 
people together. In apocalyptic literature, the Messiah serves as such an intermediary.  
Hellenistic Judaism saw considerable development with regard to the notion of mediatorship. 
In the work of Philo, angels are regarded as heavenly mediators (logoi) connecting heaven 
and earth. For Philo, Moses is also a mediator either at the human or the cosmological level. 
Under Hellenistic influence, there is a tendency to exalt the mediator of the covenant (e.g. the 
high priest) almost to a semi-divine status.  
In later Hebrew thought, the word mesites was most commonly applied to Moses. It was 
through Moses that God gave the covenant and the law to Israel. Moses was therefore the 
mediator between God and his people (Stahlin 1974:289-93). There is another particular 
Hebrew use of the concept of mediation pertaining to angels. The angel who had this 
particular charge was Michael. Sometimes in Jewish thought, Michael was called the mesites, 
the mediator between God and humankind. 
Moreover, in the Old Testament, the prophet and the priest fulfilled, most characteristically, 
the office of mediator in the institution which God established in terms of covenant relations 
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with his people. The prophet acted as God’s spokesperson (Deuteronomy 18:18-22). The 
priest also acted on behalf of human beings in the presence of God. These offices 
complemented each other in terms of mediation between God and humankind. In the Old 
Testament, however, Moses, of all human instruments, was the mediator par excellence.  
It is with Moses (as prophet) that Jesus as Mediator of the new covenant is compared and 
contrasted. There is a tendency for the offices of the priest and the king to flow into one 
another as far as the role of mediation is concerned. When the office of prophet is added, the 
stage is set for the threefold New Testament mediator (Oepke 1974:598-624).  
5.2.2 The concept of mediation in the New Testament  
In the New Testament, Jesus is portrayed as the mesites, the mediator, “middle-person” 
between humankind and God. It is his supreme function to bring together humanity and God. 
The idea of Jesus as mediator is deeply embedded in Christian thought. It is also interwoven 
into Christian language, especially the language of devotion to Christ. 
The word mediator is applied to Jesus four times. In the Pastoral Epistles, it is said that “there 
is one mediator between God and men: the man Christ Jesus’ (1Timothy 2:5). In the Letter to 
the Hebrews, Jesus is thrice professed as the mediator of a better covenant between God and 
humankind (Hebrews 6; 9:5; 12:24). 
Jesus did not appropriate the term mediator for himself. Nevertheless the connotations are 
present in his demands (Matthew 10:37 ff), claims (Matthew 11:27), remission of sins (Mark 
2:1 ff) and in the idea of relating human destiny to himself (Matthew 11:27) (Oepke 1974: 
598-624). The main form of Jesus’ mediation is set in a unique combination of majesty and 
humility that is strongly oriented to the servant of Isaiah 53 (cf. Mark 10:45).  
For Paul, Adam the first human, mediates ruin, but Christ, the last Adam, mediates salvation 
as the incarnate Son. In St John’s Gospel and the Epistles, the term mediation is not directly 
applied to Jesus, yet these books are full of indications that Jesus serves as Mediator between 
God and humankind. In contrast to all other means (John 10:8), Christ is the only way, truth, 
and life (John 14:6). Jesus’ role as Mediator culminates in his death (John 10:11). The atoning 
significance of his death is emphasised in 1 John (1:7; 2:2). In the other New Testament 
books, one may not find the term mediator directly applied to Jesus but they tacitly 
presuppose the notion of mediation (Oepke 1974:598-624, De Bary 1986).  
In both the Old and New Testaments, the need for a mediator arises out of the stark reality of 
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sin. Sin interrupts the harmonious relationship between God and humankind. It results in a 
state of alienation from God upon which Jesus serves as mediator between God and 
humankind. To understand the need of a mediator well, one has to comprehend the nature of 
sin which calls for mediation.  
5.2.3 The need for a mediator between God and humankind: The impact of sin 
I shall not be concerned in this section with any form of exegesis on the theme of sin per se. I 
also do not intend to offer an exhaustive account of the theology of sin in the Old and New 
Testaments. An exegetical work or any such thorough account of sin in the Old and New 
Testament, would need investigation on a vastly larger scale than what can be offered here. 
All that I shall attempt in this section is to capture briefly the concept of sin in the Old and 
New Testament. This will serve as background for the proposal that Jesus may fill the need 
for a mediator in the Akan context. My major sources for this discussion include the 
Theological Dictionary of New Testament, the New Bible Dictionary and the International 
Standard Bible Encyclopedia.  
a) Sin according to the Old Testament and in Judaism 
The complexity of sin is illustrated by the great number of Hebrew words used to describe it. 
There is no uniform concept of sin within the Old Testament testimony. The Hebrew term 
hatta’t with its derivatives conveys the idea of missing the mark, or deviating from the goal. 
The term hatta’t is translated as hamartia in the LXX. Hatta’t has religious as well as legal 
connotations. The religious use is prominent but not exclusive. In the Old Testament, sin is 
regarded as an act against the norm: transgression of custom, law, treaty or obligation. In each 
case such an act implies a sense of guilt.  
Amongst the more important ones are hatta’t (missing the mark), pesa’ (rebellion, 
transgression), awon (perversion), ra‘(an evil disposition) and resa’ (impiety). In the LXX 
(Greek translation of the Old Testament) and in the New Testament common words that are 
used to denote sin include hamartia (missing the mark), parabasis (transgression), adikia 
(unrighteousness), asebeia (impiety), anomia, (lawlessness), poneria (depravity) and 
epithymia (evil desire).  
In Judaism, the law as a whole, legal as well as cultic and moral, reveals God’s will. Hence 
every transgression of the law is regarded as sin. Both the Old Testament and Judaism 
proclaim sin to be universal. It is held that whereas Israelites sin by breaking the law, the 
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Gentiles sin by breaking the Adamic and Noachic covenants, or even by refusing the law 
when it is offered to them.  
The emergence of sin is usually traced to Adam and Eve or at times to the fallen angels 
(Genesis 6:1 ff.). It is believed that sin can be overcome by observing the law. However, if 
one fails to observe the law, this has serious consequences. It entails continual sinning, 
separation from God, and disruption of God’s gracious purpose as well as the punishments of 
sickness, death, and eternal damnation. Nonetheless, human beings are offered the 
opportunity to repent and return to God (Stahlin and Grundmann 1974:289-93).  
b) Sin according to the New Testament 
By far the most common word for sin used in the New Testament is hamartia (Hebrew, 
chatt’ath, pasha, and asham). The word hamartia contains a metaphor derived from the 
practice of shooting an arrow. Hamartia means missing the target, whether mistakenly or on 
purpose. 
For Paul, sin at its root pertains hostility to God. Sin entered the world through Adam 
(Romans chapter 5) and brought death as its wage (Romans 6: 23). Paul thus connects sin 
with universal destiny, but does not depict it as a necessity related to creatureliness. For Paul, 
the act of Adam, death and the general state of sin are interconnected.  
For St James sin is derived from human desire. It relates to human will, and finds its end in 
death (James 1:14-15). However, confession and prayer bring forgiveness (5:15-16). To 
rescue others from sin is a Christian ministry (5:19-20). The first letter of St Peter proclaims 
Christ as the victor over sin by his voluntary submission and atoning death as the servant of 
the Lord (2:22, 24; 3:18). 
In the New Testament as a whole, the decisive message concerning sin is that Christ has died 
as the offering for humankind. The victory consists of the saving action by which sin is 
forgiven and life is constituted anew (Grundmann 1974:302-316). 
c) The understanding of sin in the history of Christian Theology 
My intention here is not to engage in any comprehensive review. An exhaustive account of 
sin in Christian theology would need an exposition on a more comprehensive scale than what 
can be offered here. In this section I will only attempt to describe briefly the major views on 
the Christian doctrine of sin. This will be followed by an account of the positions of some 
individual theologians, selected either for their representative character or the particular 
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interest in their theories. My major selections for this discussion are the works of Kelly 
(1977), Lohse (1966), Berkhof (1937), Brunner (1952) and Pannenberg (1985). 
The history of the doctrine of sin within Western Christian theology may be divided into four 
periods: the patristic period, the medieval period, that of the Protestant Reformation and the 
modern period – since the time of the European Enlightenment.  
In the Patristic period, it was during the time of the Apologists when interest in the idea of sin 
began to emerge. In this period, one may think of well-known apologists such as Justin (100-
165), Tatian, Irenaeus (130-200) and Theophilus. Justin believed that sin consists of 
erroneous belief and ignorance of what is good and the resultant rebellion against God’s 
commandments. He also blamed the “malign demons” which he believed were the product of 
fallen angels’ union of with the daughters of men [sic] (Kelly 1977:167).  
Tatian believed that human beings fell into sin by attaching themselves to one of the angels – 
who was more subtle than the others – as well as through venerating this angel as God. As a 
result, human beings became the prey of demonic assaults. 
Irenaeus argued that Adam became an easy prey to the serpent’s wiles and disobeyed God. 
Consequently, Adam lost the divine image and likeness of God in each human being. For 
Irenaeus, the essence of sin consisted of disobedience, which the serpent instigated. Most of 
the Apologists, including Irenaeus, held a belief that a human being is endowed with “free 
will”. Theophilus argued that a human being is neither mortal nor immortal, but is capable of 
both. The destiny of a human being depends on how he or she acts on his or her own free will 
(Kelly 1977:168).  
Moreover, some of the Apologists, including Theophilus believed that Adam’s sin had 
negative consequences for his descendants. Nonetheless, this line of thinking should not be 
confused with the doctrine of original sin, which developed in the fourth century (Kelly 
1977:171-174). 
In the period of the Church Fathers, the subject of sin came under scrutiny, particularly, 
amongst the Greek fathers. The Greek fathers believed that before the fall (Adam’s sin), 
human beings were in a state of perfection and blessedness. This is the view of, particularly, 
the Cappadocian fathers, including, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa (330-395) 
(Kelly 1977:348-352, McGrath 1994:270). Nonetheless, for the Greek Fathers, even though 
the fall corrupted the human nature, the human “free will” was not affected. As far as the 
Greek fathers were concerned, any act of sin was the result of an individual’s own free choice 
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(Kelly 1977:348-352). 
The debates on the subject of sin amongst the Greek fathers serve as the starting point for the 
discussions of the Latin fathers. As a result, the thoughts of the Greek fathers – with regard to 
sin had a significant influence on the way the Latin Fathers in Western Europe approached the 
reality of sin (Berkhof 1937:128-130). Like the Greek Fathers, the Latin Fathers maintained 
that a person’s original state was that of supernatural blessedness.  
Concerning the debates on “free will”, Tertullian (160-225) followed in the footsteps of his 
Greek counterparts, as he strongly believed that free will plays a major role in human 
behaviour with respect to sin. He defended the existence of man’s “free will” against Marcion 
and Hermogenes (Kelly 1977:174). 
However, the Latin Fathers increasingly emphasised the idea of “original sin”, especially 
during the third and the fourth century. Unlike the Greek Fathers, the Latin Fathers began to 
accentuate the solidarity of the human race with Adam including all that this incorporation 
entails (Berkhof 1937:129). For example, statements such as “all sinned in Adam”’ and “all 
are guilty in Adam” became more popular and common in the writings of the Latin fathers 
such as Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, and Cyril of Jerusalem (315-387).  
Later on, the role of “free will” received less attention in the writings of the Latin Fathers, as 
the focus shifted towards the part grace plays. This trend reached its zenith in the fourth 
century through the contributions by St Augustine (Berkhof 1937:127-130). Augustine took 
the discussions on sin to a new level. He contends that human beings are inherently sinful 
because of the fall. This condition causes the human “will” to be generally biased towards 
evil. However, it is worth noting that, in spite of the influence of Augustine’s doctrine of sin, 
his views were strongly opposed by a learned scholar (however not a cleric) Pelagius (cf. 
Lohse 1966:114). Pelagius totally rejected the idea that “human will” has an intrinsic bias in 
favour of wrongdoing because of the fall. He taught that human beings have a unique 
privilege to accomplish the divine will out of their own choice.  
In the medieval period, Augustine’s theory of sin became so prominent that it served as the 
basis for discussions on sin. A particular emphasis was placed on Augustine’s doctrine of 
original sin and the bondage of the will. The Roman Catholic priest Thomas Aquinas (1224-
1274) contributed significantly to the advancement of these ideas in his Summa Theologiae 
(also see Brunner 1952:115, Hick 1968:100). For Aquinas, sin implies an unintended by-
product of a good creation (Berkhof 1986:204). 
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During the period of the Protestant reformation, Augustine’s views on the doctrine of sin were 
revived (Brunner 1952:114). Both Luther and Calvin based their doctrines of sin mostly on 
the views of Augustine; they believed that Augustine represented the best wisdom of the 
ancient church, uncontaminated by the subsequent aberrations of Medieval Scholasticism 
(Hick 1968:121). Both Luther and Calvin believed in the reality of original sin. As in the case 
of Augustine, they held that the human will is enslaved through sin, and that God’s grace 
provides the only hope for such a situation (Brunner 1952:115).  
However, the doctrine of sin as formulated by Augustine and advanced by the Reformers 
came under attack in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries. Firstly, Augustine is accused of 
being self-contradictory. One of the areas in which such contradiction is observed is in 
Augustine’s affirmation of the universal inevitability of sin – which is reflected in his doctrine 
of original sin, as well as a personal responsibility for sin – which he maintains through his 
emphasis on the “free will.” The attack on the Augustinian’s theory of sin had a major impact 
on the theological discourse with regard to the doctrine of sin up to the 20th century. 
Nonetheless, around this period a number of books were published on the doctrine of sin. The 
major contributors included Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth. Other leading figures from 
this period who contributed to the doctrine of sin include Reinhold Niebuhr,1 Paul Tillich,2
The doctrine of sin also elicited the attention of quite a number of theologians towards the 
middle and the end of the twentieth century. Major contributions available in English came 
from prominent European and American authors such as G.C. Berkouwer (1971), Hendrikus 
Berkhof (1986), Wolfhart Pannenberg (1985), and Cornelius Plantinga Jr. (1995).  
 
F.R. Tennant and Emil Brunner. 
Other developments regarding the doctrine of sin took place within the context of theological 
movements such as liberation theology,3
                                                 
1  Reinhold Niebuhr views the problem of sin in terms of anxiety owing to human finiteness. He contends that 
sin arises from the predicament of human’s finitude on the one hand, and his/her freedom to aspire to 
higher heights on the other. In his assessments of the human predicament, Niebuhr saw the removal of this 
contradiction as the aim of every religion. For Niebuhr, this contradiction does not constitute sin, but serves 
as an occasion for sin, although not its cause. This is what Niebuhr calls “natural contingency” (Niebuhr 
1941, also see Erickson 1985:581- 585). 
 black theology, feminist theology, and African 
2  Paul Tillich’s view of sin is built on the theory of existentialism. According to this view, human being’s 
state of existence comprises of a state of constant estrangement – from the ground of his being, from other 
beings, and from him- or herself. In many ways this estrangement is an equivalent of what Christianity has 
traditionally called sin. Yet, to Tillich, estrangement is not identical with sin, for sin refers to a reality not 
included in the concept of estrangement (Tillich 1957). 
3  In most cases, the advocates of liberation theology understand sin as arising from economic struggles. This 
is quite different from the conventional or orthodox view. A first step in understanding the position of 
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theology.4
Theologians within this context tended to focus their attention increasingly on the impact of 
sin on society – in the form of structural sin and violence. Major contributions in the 
development of this new way of viewing sin came from authors such as Gustavo Gutièrrez 
(1978), James Cone (1969) and Judith Plaskow (1980). African theologians who have also 
written on sin include Harry Sawyer (1972:1964) and John Pobee (1979).  
 Within these contexts, sin came to be understood progressively in terms of “being 
sinned against” through colonialism, discrimination, oppression, patriarchy, and in terms of 
anything that hinders the well being of a society.  
5.2.4 Conclusion 
Christian theology suggests and develops an idea that sin breaks the human relationship with 
God and thus leads to death. 
5.3 The need for a mediator between God and humankind in the traditional 
Akan context 
Sin has marred the relationship not only with God, but also with 
one’s neighbor, and with nature. This has resulted in a state of mutual alienation between 
humanity and God on the one hand, and humanity and nature on the other. Hence, there is the 
need for reconciliation: a removal of God’s displeasure against the sinner as well as of the 
sinner’s hostility towards God. Such reconciliation would require the work of a mediator. The 
New Testament makes it explicitly clear that Christ is the only Mediator between God and 
humankind in this regard (Berkhof 1986:194, Erickson 1985 and Plantinga 1995). 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In the traditional African context, both human and spirit beings serve as intermediaries.5
                                                                                                                                                        
liberation theology is to note its rejection of the privatisation of sin (Gonzalez 1980:23). In terms of the 
more traditional understanding, sin is seen as a matter of the individual’s broken relationship with God. 
Thus sin is basically understood as unbelief and rebellion. For liberation theologians, however, sin is much 
more concerned with the social dimension, oppression, and exploitation. 
 
Some of these human intermediaries are priests, kings, linguists, medicine-persons, seers, 
diviners, rain-makers and ritual elders. The lesser divinities and the ancestors also serve as 
intermediaries. Amongst the Akan, any person who mediates between human beings may be 
referred to as okyeame (a linguist). Likewise, any person who mediates between human 
beings and spirit beings may be referred to as osofo (a priest).  
4  For review of African Christian theology on sin, see Sakuba (2005). 
5  For further discussions see Mbiti (1988:75-90).  
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However, in the traditional Akan context, there is no human institution or priest or spirit being 
who mediates between God and humankind. In the relationship between God and humankind, 
the Akan believe that God uses any ordinary person – as long as that candidate makes 
himself/herself available to perform what is called Nyamedwuma (God’s work).6
5.3.2 Mediation in the traditional Akan context 
 
Nevertheless, as I will argue below, evidence suggests that there is in the Akan context the 
need for a mediator; a priest between God and humankind. 
a) The okyeame (linguist) as intermediary 
In most African societies the roles played by mediators or intermediaries form part and parcel 
of everyday life. Amongst the Akan of Ghana, the traditional chief does not generally speak 
directly to the people, and the people also normally do not approach the chief directly except 
through the linguist. The linguist receives and transmits the message from the chief to the 
people and vice versa. In this regard, the linguist (okyeame) 
Usually, at family meetings, special agents act as linguists. Alternatively, anyone can be 
randomly chosen to act as linguist, and the one involved would be addressed as okyeame 
(linguist) at that particular occasion.
is a very important personality in 
the Akan court. He is close to the chief, relaying the chief’s requests and pronouncements to 
others. This has become part of the social order of the Akan people (Pobee 1979 and Yankah 
1995).  
 
Nonetheless, there are especially informally trained people whose main occupation is that of 
being a linguist. Such people may engage in other work for a living to supplement their 
income, but they are known as linguists in the technical sense. Those who serve in such 
capacities are usually called nana in the sense of a sub-chief.  
Moreover, at every shrine, there is an okyeame who 
mediates between the priest and the worshippers or the visitors. In most cases, someone 
special is designated to serve in that capacity. However, one may also be randomly chosen to 
serve in such capacity. Thus, in the generic sense of the term, anyone who mediates between 
individuals or group of people acts as linguist at that particular time. The term okyeame 
embodies all that it takes to act as intermediary in relationships between human beings. 
Amongst the Asante (of the Akan), every chief has his own special linguist and every shrine 
                                                 
6  Any acts which the Akan may term as “good deeds” are tagged as God’s work, irrespective of the one who 
fullfilled them. 
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also has its own special linguist. The Asantehene (Asante-king) has several linguists and has a 
chief (leader) amongst them called akyeame-hene (chief linguist).  
Linguists mediate in all human situations either for good or otherwise. However, acting as 
mediator between people, the ultimate intention of a linguist is to bring peace, harmony and 
stability to all and, more so, to the community.  
b) The osofo (priest) as intermediary 
On the relationship between spirit beings and human beings, the traditional priests serve as 
intermediaries. Amongst the Akan, it is believed that there are men and women who are able 
to manipulate spirit forces for evil purposes. These are the akaberekyerefo and adutofo 
(charmers, enchanters and sorcerers), and abayifo (witches). The activities of these forces are 
directed against human beings to prevent them from enjoying abundant life. Thus to the Akan, 
the survival of human beings and their communities is dependent upon the help rendered by 
superior powers. How one relates to spirit forces is therefore crucial to one’s well-being 
(Larbi 2006:3).  
In this regard, the central focus of the religious exercises amongst the Akan is on the 
harnessing of power inherent in the spirit force for his or her own advantage or for the benefit 
of his or her community. The work of the traditional priest as mediator between the spirit 
world and physical world is to “balance the power” in favour of the supplicant. 
The traditional priests mediate not only between the lesser divinities and the devotees but also 
between the human beings and the ancestors. 
c) The role of ordinary human beings as “situational” intermediaries 
In a general sense, they are also believed to 
mediate between the physical world and the spirit world. Thus, any issue that relates to spirit 
beings falls under their jurisdiction. Amongst the Akan, every priest has one or many lesser 
divinities which he /she is particularly attached to. But no priest is particularly devoted to 
Onyame (God). According to Rattray (1923:142), there was once a temple and priest for 
Onyame amongst the Akan but the institution ceased. This will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
To the Akan, any ordinary human being can act as a “situational” intermediary, with regard to 
the relationship between God and humankind. The Akan concept of “Nyame adwuma” 
(God’s work) connotes that all “good works” done for one, irrespective of the source, 
ultimately originate from Onyame. It is the belief of the Akan that Onyame can use anyone to 
 
 
 
 
 112 
effect salvation: rescue, retake, recapture, redeem, ransom, buy out of servitude; to release, to 
free, to deliver, to liberate, and to save.  
Moreover, in a more interesting sense, one can become another’s “God” (God here in a 
functional sense) when one renders the needed beneficial assistance to that person. In such a 
situation one may make the point that Kofi, or Yaa (the doer) – “ye me Nyame” (is my God). 
In other words, Kofi or Yaa is my saviour. Notably, the statement “my God” here only applies 
to human beings. 
Furthermore, the Akan maxim: Onyame bofo sene bofo pa (God’s messenger is preferred to 
any other good messenger) illustrates that the ultimate end of salvation lies with Onyame; yet 
Onyame can use any ordinary human beings to effect salvation. In this maxim, there is a play 
on words between “good messenger” and “God’s messenger”. The “good messenger” here 
refers to one’s own arrangement through someone else to solve a problem. God’s messenger 
refers to an unexpected intervention, the value of which far outweighs the original plan.
The idea is not to discourage human effort to solve problems, but to stress the point that in 
spite of all that one can do, there are sometimes some unexpected interventions that are far 
better than those one could have imagined. Such interventions are attributed to Onyame 
through the mediation of a human being, who at a particular moment turns into God’s 
messenger.
  
7
For the Akan, Onyame is Spirit and a perfect being. Thus, one may infer that anyone who will 
represent Onyame as his or her intermediary must exhibit a high sense of devotion to him and 
live a life worthy to be called a representative of Onyame. The Akan may otherwise not 
recognise that person as such. Such an assertion could be affirmed in the context of the 
relationship between abosom and their representatives, the priests. The traditional priests are 
expected to live lives which reflect the code of conduct of the abosom (lesser divinities) that 
priest represents. Amongst the traditional Akan, every traditional priest is expected to obey 
his deity to the point of death. Many stories abound whereby priests have been killed by the 
deities they serve, for failing to obey their rules and regulations.  
  
However, recognising the reality of human nature, the Akan declares, bone bata onipa ho (sin 
                                                 
7  The Akan Bible translation transposes the English term “Angel” with soro abofo (heavenly messenger). 
Meanwhile, the Akan call anyone who renders “beneficial assistance” as Onyame bofo (God’s messenger). 
Thus, the traditional Akan have (God’s messenger) as a means of salvation and the Akan Christians, 
particularly Roman Catholics maintain that heavenly messengers provide a means of salvation. Both 
approaches confess God as the ultimate end of salvation. Nonetheless, Akan Christians regard Jesus as the 
only means of ultimate salvation.  
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lies very close to the human being). This clearly illustrates the human inadequacy to act as the 
priest or intermediary for Onyame. Thus, it occurs only occasionally that a human being is 
qualified to be Onyamebofo (God’s messenger), that is, when he/she does something good.  
Curiously, the issue that arises here can be posed as follows: Why are there only “situational” 
intermediaries between the Supreme Being and humankind? Although one cannot give any 
concrete answer to this question, it is undisputable that the Akan may expect a representative 
(priest) of Onyame to be sinless. 
Recognising that this is not possible for any ordinary human being, the Akan settled with a 
“situational messenger or priest” as God’s agent. This may account for the reason why 
Onyame does not have any special priest. Nonetheless, there is room for anybody to approach 
God as best as one can.  
A related question that arises can be posed in this way: Why is it that human beings cannot 
enjoy an adequate fellowship with Onyame who is duly regarded as the Creator of human 
beings? An analysis of the Akan myth of God’s withdrawal, which is also well known in 
many African societies, may provide a clue to answer this question. 
5.3.3 Traditional Akan terms and ideas for sin 
The need within the Akan context for a mediator between God and humankind arises out of 
sin. Remarkably, the only instance that human beings are said to have sinned against God 
directly is noted in the myth of God’s withdrawal. In all other cases, sin against God is 
regarded as indirect, i.e. resulting from sin against fellow human beings or nature.8
In discussing the concept of sin, the question of language is extremely important. The English 
term “sin” does not always translate adequately into the African language. Amongst the Akan, 
four major terms; mfomsoo, mmrato, musuo and bone may capture the English term “sin”. It 
is necessary to analyse these terms in order to penetrate their cultural and social connotations. 
 Inferring 
from the myth of God’s withdrawal, it is indeed obvious that the broken relation between God 
and humankind is due to humans sinning directly against God. Correspondingly, the need for 
a mediator between God and humankind arises from this direct human sin.  
                                                 
8  In the traditional African context, what is called sin basically pertains to relationships within the 
community. The community consists of the departed and the living. Any breach which punctures this 
communal relationship amounts to sin, or whatever word may be used to explain this concept.  
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a) Mfomso (error or wrongdoing) 
The stem of the word mfomso is the verb fom, meaning to offend. Mfomso is the noun form of 
fom which means “an error or wrong action without a malicious intention”. Amongst the 
Akan, one is said to have committed mfomso when one offends an individual or a group or the 
whole community without an evil intention. Mfomso therefore is tantamount to a sin, but it is 
applied to denote an error or an unintentional wrong action. Usually, mfomso emerges within 
issues of interpersonal relations. The problem involved is usually settled with or without a 
third party. The state does not normally interfere. However, at times, mfomso can lead to a 
breach of societal laws and norms. In this sense, an individual as well as group or the whole 
community can commit mfomso against another individual or community.  
Usually mfomso does not call for a sacrifice as it is not taken as a serious sin. However, one 
can be said to have committed mfomso kese (severe error). With the qualification of the 
adjective “severe” the mfomso may be unintentional but would be tantamount to a huge 
aberration problem which may necessitate a sacrifice to the ancestors and the lesser divinities. 
For example, one may unknowingly have sex with a matrilineal blood sister which is 
forbidden in the customs of the Akan. Though the act was committed unintentionally, it is 
mfomso kese, and as such, sacrifice is needed to remove musuo (abomination) from both the 
man and the woman. The Akan term musou has an extremely interesting background. I will 
return to it in more detail in section 5.3.3(c). 
b) Mmrato (breach of the laws and norms of the state) 
Mmrato is composed of two words: mmra (laws) and to (breach). It carries the sense of 
mfomso but implies more than mfomso. While mfomso usually denotes an unintentional act, 
mmrato can be either intentional or unintentional. When a stranger or foreigner breaches the 
law (mmrato), it is not taken as sin, as the Akan would say: Ohohuo nnto mmra (a stranger “to 
the law” does not breach the law). This is contrary to the English common law (as used in 
Ghana), namely that ignorance of a law is not an excuse. 
However, when a stranger breaches the law and the case is classified as musuo, the case may 
call for a sacrifice. Amongst the Akan, mmrato is usually a breach of laws and norms against 
the community (the corporate community) rather than an individual.  
(c) Musuo (taboo or abomination)  
The term musuo is made up of two words mmoa which means (animals or beasts) and su 
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(behaviour). Thus, musuo literally means “the behaviour of animals or beasts”. The 
etymological meaning of musuo denotes “behaviour of a beast”. 
In its technical and current usage, the term musuo denotes taboo, abomination or curse. In 
some cases, the etymology of a word may have nothing to do with the current usage of that 
word: however, this is not always the case. 
In the technical and current usage of the term musuo, an Akan will say: wo bo musuo (he/she 
has committed an abomination). The abomination here refers to behaviour contrary to what 
society deems as befitting human dignity. Thus, one can say that the said individual behaved 
like an animal or a beast.  
Such an exception applies to the term musuo.  
The prefix bo and suffix yi usually accompany the term musuo. An Akan will say that ye koyi 
musuo, which literally means that “we are going to remove (yi) something that is an 
abomination to the society, i.e. an animal behaviour”. Musuoyi (yi musou) therefore means a 
ritual to remove behaviour which society deems unfit for human beings. Such behaviour is 
regarded as a taboo, abomination or curse in that it offends the ancestors, the lesser divinities, 
Mother Earth and even God, who are affected by any disgrace of human beings too. These 
spirit beings serve as the custodians of public morality. 
Behind the taboo, abomination or curse, lies the idea that someone has involved himself or 
herself in an act which human society despises. Indeed it is so brutish and uncouth that it can 
only be likened to the behaviour of an animal or beast. There is a need to purge society from 
this abominable act before it spreads to other members; lest it even comes to be considered as 
normal human behaviour. 
It becomes a curse when such behaviour is allowed to permeate the cultured society. Then it 
will ultimately disorganise the whole of society. The ritual of removing such behaviour 
(musuo yi) involves not only the pouring of libation (an invocation of the spirit beings) but 
also a blood sacrifice to illustrate the seriousness of this aberration to society. Amongst the 
traditional Akan, the ritual of musuyi is usually preceded by a sacrifice termed afodeε (sin 
sacrifice). 9 I will return to this topic in more detail in 
                                                 
9  In such situations, sacrifices would be needed as an expression to acknowledge one’s sin against the spirit 
beings concerned. Such sacrifice in the Akan context is called afodie (which literally means guilt 
something). This is similar to what the Old Testament terms as sin/guilt sacrifice. Since sin and curse run 
concurrently within the Akan context, it may be necessary for one also to offer another animal as musuyidei 
(a curse bearer). This may be similar to what the Old Testament terms as “scapegoat”. Sometimes the two 
rituals are carried out simultaneously in such a way that one would not be able to separate afodeε from 
musuyideε. However, the distinctive mark between the two is that, whereas the carcass of the afodeε is 
Chapter 7.3-4. 
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d) Bone (evil acts) 
The term bone is derived from the stem bon (stink). It is a general term used to translate the 
English term sin. All the other terms, namely mfomso, mmrato, and musuo may be regarded 
as bone (evil). Yet bone also carries a distinctive meaning which may exclude other errors or 
forms of wrongdoing. For example, amongst the Akan, it is against the custom to go out to 
farm on a certain day. If one disobeys the rule, it is indeed a mmrato (breach of law or norm) 
to the Akan but not bone. To the traditional Akan, if two unmarried adults willingly engage in 
sexual activities it is not considered as bone. Smoking and usage of “hard” drugs is also not 
classified as bone. 
Bone in its technical sense and current usage is “an evil thought and action against a fellow 
human being”. Technically, evil thought by itself cannot constitute bone; however, it is 
regarded as adween bone (evil thought). An evil action by itself cannot constitute bone either. 
One could only be said to have committed bone when there is an evil intention that preceeds 
the evil action.  
Bone (evil) may primarily be defined as anything that dehumanises a person. It implies a 
thought and act that “kills” (dehumanises) one’s sunsum (spirit/personality), as the Akan 
would say: wakum no sunsum (he/she has killed one’s spirit).  
To the Akan, sunsum denotes a spiritual component of a human being which does not die. 
Thus to use the term kum (kill) to describe one’s action against another fellow human being 
tells us how far one has oppressed that person. Nonetheless, bone can also be committed 
against a group or the whole community thereby slaying the sunsum (spirit/personality) of the 
group or the community. A classical example is the 18th
5.3.5 The Akan conception of sin and human nature  
 century slave trade in which the 
Westerners and some Africans engaged in Africa. One may also cite the unfair trade system 
that has reduced huge masses of people to naked poverty and servitude whilst a few enjoy a 
“sea of riches”. In this respect, bone may be regarded as a structural evil.  
a) Do the Akan believe that human beings are sinners by nature? 
The Akan maxim relating to sin and human nature says: bone bata onipa ho (sin is very close 
                                                                                                                                                        
eaten by the traditional priest and others, it is taboo to eat the carcass of musuyideε. Thus, although the two 
rituals can be carried out at the same time, there is a clear distinction. I will discuss this in detail in chapter 
7.3-4. 
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to human beings). The key term is bata, which I have interpreted as “very close to”. 
Nevertheless, one may also render bata as “part of” or “a component of” which then creates 
an alternate view to my position. However, such a translation may not be sustained in the 
daily usage of the term bata. An example of another Akan proverb which uses the term bata 
will assist here. There is a proverb that goes: dua “bata” buo a no twa ye twa na (if a tree is 
too close to a stone, it becomes difficult to cut the tree). Here the term bata is used to combine 
a tree and a stone. In this context, it is obvious that the idea is “extremely close” but not “part 
of” – as stones are usually not parts of trees. Thus to use the term bata in the sense of “part 
of” or “component of” is to stress the term beyond its accepted meaning.  
Having said that, I maintain that in the Akan myths of God’s withdrawal, the separation 
between God and humankind did not render human beings as sinners by nature. Within the 
context of Akan traditional religion, there is no original sin, nor is a human being believed to 
be born a sinner. A human being becomes a sinner by deed in the context of the community of 
which that person is a member.  
b) Do the Akan know a sense of guilt? 
The Akan sense of sin clearly also goes against the theories of “shame culture” that hold that 
Africans do not have a sense of guilt (guilt culture), but they are only concerned about the 
opinion of the public (shame culture).  
Some scholars have suggested that primal societies such as traditional African ones have a 
“shame culture” in contradistinction to a “guilt culture” – as the case is in Judaism and 
Christianity. It is argued that, what concerns primal societies is public esteem and not a 
troubled conscience. In other words, the strongest moral force in African society – tagged as a 
shame culture – is respect for the public opinion rather than fear of God. However, this does 
not apply to the Akan. There are at least five examples that negate such an assumption (Pobee 
1979:102). 
Firstly, the Akan concept of tiboa (which refers to the conscience) denotes that sin has a basis 
of guilt as well as shame. The common saying in this regard is ne tiboa bu ne fo (his/her 
conscience has condemned him/her). Secondly, the Akan saying Onyame mmpe bone (God 
hates evil) also makes it clear that the Akan are not only concerned with people’s opinion, but 
also what God has to say about their sin. Thirdly, the Akan phrase Nyame ntua woka also 
implies that it is not only what people see in one’s evil deed, but that God is the final judge of 
all humankind. Fourth, the Akan believe that the okra (soul) returns to God to render an 
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account of him-/herself. Fifthly, the ancestors, the lesser divinities and God serve as 
custodians of public morality and provide sanctions to ensure general wellbeing. 
Thus, sin within an Akan religious framework, extends beyond public opinion. One has to 
reckon with the idea that the ancestors and the lesser divinities are also monitoring the 
thought and action of human beings. These ideas illustrate that the issue of sin is not only 
about people’s opinions but also a matter of conscience relating to God.  
5.3.6 The Akan conception of sin in relation to Onyame (God)  
The myth of God’s withdrawal indicates in the first place that the Akan have a conception of 
sin which relates to God. According to this well-known myth, Onyame long, long ago dwelled 
truly close to humankind. His abode was the sky. There was a certain old woman who used to 
pound her fufu (a meal of mashed yam or plantain) and, whenever she did so, the long pestle 
she used knocked against Onyame’s abode – the sky. In reaction to the human misdeed, 
Onyame said: “Because of what you have been doing to me, I am taking myself away far up 
into the sky where humankind cannot reach me.” So Onyame went higher and higher up into 
the sky, and human beings could no longer approach him. 
Upon that, the old woman instructed her children to collect all the mortars (used to pound 
fufu) they could find, and pile them one on top of the other. They complied and piled the 
mortars, until they required only one more to add to the pile so that it could reach Onyame. As 
they could not find another mortar, the old woman advised her children to take one mortar 
from the bottom, and place it on top. The children accordingly removed one mortar from the 
bottom, and when they did, all the other mortars rolled and fell to the ground killing many 
people (also see Pobee 1979). 
The implication of this myth, as understood by the Akan is that there developed a distance 
between the Supreme Being and human beings due to human misdeed (sin). 
In what follows, I will discuss some ways which the Akan believe make it possible to sin 
against God, though not directly. Some Akan phrases help us to understand such a 
relationship.  
As already noted, 
the only direct sin against Onyame is regarded within the context of the myth of God’s 
withdrawal. Besides that, one does not directly sin against God, since Onyame, according to 
the myth, has geographically removed himself from the reach of human beings. However, the 
Akan believe that human beings still sin against God in the sense that one sins against other 
human beings.  
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This leads us to a second point, captured in the saying wo abra Nyame (you have sinned 
against God). This comprises an archaic Akan phrase. The key word is abra. To help us to 
understand this term better we will compare its usage to another Akan saying: wobono no 
abra no su (he beats him/her and yet stopped him/her from crying). In this context, the term 
bra does not yield to one word. Nevertheless, its meaning is clear. It denotes “extreme 
suppression”. In its daily usage, one would say woa bo me abra me su (what you are doing 
against me is evil; yet you also block the way by which I can solve the problem).  
In the modern context, the phrase woabo me abra me su may be equivalent to a structural or 
an institutionalised evil. When evil is an instrument of policy, it discloses two faces of 
oppression. The classic example is the old discriminatory law in the USA that demanded that 
a black person may not sit on a seat in a bus whilst a white person is standing. Firstly, what 
the law demands from the black person is submission and humiliation; it demeans a person. 
Secondly, the law does not only stop (bra) one from addressing the problem but rendered 
every means of resistance a criminal offence.  
When such a treatment is meted out to a human being, it is then said that: woabo no abra no 
su (he/she beat one, yet stopped one from crying). This brings the true meaning of bone (evil). 
In other words, he/she has dehumanised someone and has turned every means of resistance 
into a criminal offence. This implies a thought and act that “kills” (dehumanised) one’s 
sunsum (spirit/personality) as the Akan would express it wakum no sunsum (he/she has killed 
his/her spirit).  
In relating this concept of evil to sin and God, the Akan say woa bra Nyame (you have acted 
evil against God). To the Akan, such an extreme oppression constitutes a dehumanisation of 
the creature which God has created in his own image. The Akan believe that the okra (soul) in 
the human being is a spark of God’s nature. Thus, to hurt someone is to hurt God. Within 
such a context the Akan will retort: wo ye nipa bone yefoo (you are an evil person). 
Interestingly, the Akan concept of okra links individuals to God, to one another and God for 
all – in a triangular manner.10
A third point relates to the Akan phrase: Onyame ntua wo ka (God should “reward” you 
according to your deeds). It is normally in the context of woabo me abra me su that woabra 
  
                                                 
10  Such a notion conflicts with the saying each one for himself and God for all of us– which may be said to be 
the factor underpinning the economic ideology of capitalism. I will discuss this in somewhat more detail 
under Nyamesofopreko Christology as synthesis of inculturation and liberation Christologies in chapter 
8.3.7  
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Nyame is added by those who witness the scene. What follows is Onyame nntua wo ka (God 
should “reward” you according to your deeds). In this respect, Onyame nntua wo ka is an 
appeal by the victim to God as the great judge.  
This leads to a related question – as the fourth point: Are human beings responsible to God 
for their sins? Amongst the Akan, when one commits a sin against a fellow human being, one 
needs to resolve the problem with the offended one. When the problem is settled with that 
person, it is automatically settled with God.  
Thus, David’s assertion (after he committed adultery with Uriah’s wife and had him killed) 
“God, you alone I have offended” does not fit well within the Akan context. The Akan will 
regard such an assertion as perhaps shunning one’s responsibility. This is not to say that the 
Akan do not accept an individual’s responsibility towards God. However, the Akan insist that, 
first and foremost, one should settle the problem with the premier offended party. If that is 
settled, then it automatically follows that one has settled the issue with God. 
It is firmly established in the Akan culture that Onyame is the ultimate and final judge of 
humankind. Thus, when an Akan member finds him- or herself in the midst of injustice 
without the means of redress, he or she would sigh with the statement, made masem ama 
Onyame (I have committed my case into God’s hands). 
This leads to another related question – as the fifth point: Is Onyame a custodian of societal 
norms and laws? Some societal norms, rules and regulations specify one’s relationship with 
the State, with an individual human being and the spirit beings. In addition, some rules and 
norms are attached to the shrine of an individual lesser divinity and to family ancestor black 
Stools. For example, a particular lesser divinity may hate goat or palm wine. Thus, for one to 
approach such a shrine of a lesser divinity with one of those items, entails a breach of the rule 
of that lesser divinity. On the one hand, such a case may cause a problem between the 
offender and the particular lesser divinity. Thus the offence may be regarded as “civil case”.  
Nonetheless, on the other hand, when the offended lesser divinity belongs to a community or 
State, the offence may then be regarded as a “criminal offence”: the offended individual 
versus the community/State. Such a case might be based on the “random taste” of an 
individual lesser divinity (as not all of the lesser divinities within the State dislike goat or 
palm wine). It may nevertheless be reported within the context of the Akan that wato Oman 
mmra (he/she breached the norms of the State). Generally, God, the ancestors and lesser 
divinities are believed to be the custodians of the societal norms and laws.  
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Obviously, a problem arises when God is said to be the custodian of the societal laws and 
norms. It is problematic that some of the laws and norms are set not as much to protect human 
rights but to appease certain lesser divinities or ancestors. Some of these laws however serve 
to oppress the masses. Thus can one claim that God sanctions such oppressive norms? 
Notwithstanding this obvious contradiction, some African theologians have inferred that God 
acts as the ultimate giver of the societal laws without drawing any distinctions. For such 
advocates, the lesser divinities and ancestors act as the ministers who enforce the laws on 
behalf of God.11
Besides, to claim that God is the ultimate source of societal laws would cause problems, in 
that, God then becomes responsible also for the obnoxious laws and norms in the society. In 
this respect, it will be more appropriate to attribute only laws that relate to human rights and 
ethical issues to God. Thereby the ritualistic laws and the norms in Akan society are attributed 
to human beings, the lesser divinities and the ancestors. Such a suggestion may not be without 
pitfalls either, as the ancestors, by definition, are good persons. However, as one within the 
Akan context can only attribute perfection to Onyame, all other persons may have their 
limitation. 
 However, the premises of such an inference could be contested. While the 
fact is acknowledged that God is the creator and therefore the source of all, one cannot 
overstress it, as it may also logically follow that God could become the source of evil and sin, 
being the creator of everything.  
By way of concluding this discussion, one may say that the implied sin related in the myth of 
God’s withdrawal concerns a combination of the three above mentioned aspects: bone, 
mmusuo and mmrato. The myth of God’s withdrawal suggests the need for an intermediary. 
5.3.7 The need for an intermediary between God and humankind 
Firstly, amongst the Akan of Ghana, it is generally believed that the myth of God’s 
withdrawal expresses the fact that human action has grossly marred the relationship between 
God and humankind. In the myth as previously narrated, the old lady was rude to God. The 
latter moved Himself/Herself further away, hence the recession of the firmament away from 
humankind. In symbolic language, this denotes the broken fellowship between human beings 
and God. Within the Akan context, such a state of affairs calls for reconciliation through an 
                                                 
11  May one ask if Onyame cares about “goat and palm wine laws”? Of course one may also pose the question 
if God also cares about “eating of pork and rabbit laws”.  
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intermediary. Thus, the myth of God’s self-withdrawal provides a clue to comprehed the 
impact of sin in respect to human relationships with God. Similarly, the need for a mediator 
between God and humankind could be inferred from the Akan myth of God’s withdrawal. 
Secondly, the attempt to establish a priesthood institution for Onyame amongst the Akan 
suggests the need for an intermediary. Rattray (1923:142) has illustrated (with photos) that 
there was a temple and priest particularly dedicated to Onyame (Supreme Being). Although 
all of that became extinct/obsolete, it gives an indication that at least an attempt was made to 
establish a priesthood for Onyame (also see Sawyerr 1970: 6). Such failures, as I may suggest, 
are a result of the Akan view of Onyame as a perfect Being and the human inability to 
represent God as this would require a perfect agent, that is, a sinless priest. 
Nonetheless, there are firm indications that, to the Akan, it requires betterment to an ordinary 
human being to be sinless. A human being’s inability to overcome sin points to the 
inadequacy of a human intermediary between God and humankind. No other, non-human 
mediators are available either, since the abosom (the lesser divinities) and the ancestors have 
traditionally not fulfilled the role of intermediaries between Onyame and human beings.12
5.3.8 The need for an intermediary between Onyame and humankind: Some objections 
and responses  
  
Amongst the Akan of Ghana, it is generally believed that the myth of God’s withdrawal 
carries implications for a broken relationship between God and humankind. 
a) Does the omnipresence of Onyame negate the need for an intermediary?  
However, some 
objections may be raised in the context of this myth of “God’s withdrawal” against a 
suggestion of the need for an intermediary between God and humankind.Two such objections 
are: (a) the omnipresence of Onyame negates the need for an intermediary; (b) the concept of 
okra also negates the need for such an intermediary.  
Amongst the Akan, God is compared to the wind, which is to be found everywhere around. 
The contention here is that since God is everywhere, and is thus able to hear our supplications 
at any given time, there is no need for an intermediary between God and human beings. It is 
argued that for this reason God is not identified with anything in particular or restricted to any 
place either. Therefore there exist amongst the Akan no shrines, temples and feast days 
                                                 
12  Indeed, socio-religious etiquette suggests the need for an intermediary between God and humankind. But to 
turn such a suggestion into a conclusive argument for the lesser divinities as intermediaries oversteps the 
boundaries of West African religious experiences.  
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specifically devoted to God (Opoku 1978:29). 
Moreover, there is a saying: Obi nkyere abofra Onyame, which may mean either, “No-one 
shows a child the Supreme Being” (he knows it by instinct) or, “No-one shows the child the 
sky” – which is regarded as the abode of the Supreme Being (Gyekye 1996:7). It may be 
argued from this saying that since God is known to everyone through instinct, there is no need 
for any special agent to mediate between God and human beings.  
In response to this objection, I admit that, to the Akan, God is compared to the wind or a spirit 
that is everywhere. However, the Akan at the same time deem it appropriate to have 
Onyamedua to represent God. Thus, it may be argued that if God can have a shrine, may it not 
also be inappropriate for God to have a priest to manage such a shrine? The fact that there is 
no priest for God at present, does not necessarily imply that God does not need a priest to 
serve as intermediary between Him/Her and humankind. 
Again, the argument that God is spirit and therefore does not need a priest is contestable. The 
Akan do not only regard Onyame as a spirit being. They also view the lesser divinities as 
such. Yet the lesser divinities have intermediaries between them and their worshippers. When 
the abosom (the lesser divinities) are invoked for arbitration or vengeance, such an invocation 
can be practised anywhere – with the understanding that the abosom, as spirit beings, can hear 
and act accordingly.13
Besides, there is some evidence that an attempt had been made to erect a shrine for God, 
though no such shrines exist at present. The question as to why such shrines do not exist is 
debatable. Nevertheless the examples cited lead us to conclude: There is more to answer to 
the question why God is not worshiped like the other divinities. It is not a sufficient reaction 
to state the fact that God is spirit and exists everywhere and therefore, does not need a priest.  
 Yet, the Akan deem it necessary to have shrines and priests for the 
abosom. If God is Spirit and is everywhere, does this then imply that God does need a priest? 
Therefore, although it is admitted that the Akan presently do not have a priest or priesthood 
institution for God, we argue that such an absence does not warrant a conclusion that God 
does not need a priest to serve as an intermediary. In this regard the contentions mentioned 
above only partly answer the question as to why God, unlike the lesser divinities, does not 
have a priest to serve as intermediary agent.  
                                                 
13  This raises the issue whether abosom are regarded as omniscient or not. This is an interesting issue but it 
has to be pursued elsewhere. 
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b) Does the okra in human beings negate the need for intermediary?  
Amongst the Akan there is a contention that every person has direct access to Onyame by 
virtue of possessing okra (soul). This is expressed in an old Ashanti maxim: Obi kwan nsi obi 
kwan mu (no man’s path crosses another’s), meaning that everyone enjoys a direct path to the 
Supreme Being. Thus, there is no priest or priestess who has sole access to Onyame as is the 
case with the lesser divinities (Opoku 1978:30).  
Admittedly, the Akan believe that individuals have okra that enables them to contact God 
directly. As is obvious in libation rituals, the Akan do invoke Onyame and fellowship with 
Him/Her. Nevertheless, as suggested by the myth of God’s withdrawal, the guilt of human sin 
has marred the relationship between God and human beings. Thus, it can be said that human 
beings do certainly not enjoy adequate fellowship with God on the basis of their okra due to 
the sins of humankind that caused God’s withdrawal from humankind.  
5.3.9 Conclusion  
Just as the Akan assert that everyone enjoys this direct path to the Supreme Being, the Akan 
recognise that Onyame nnpe bone (God hates sin) and, at the same time, that bone bata nipa 
ho (sin is very close to humankind). To the Akan, sin has negative implications for a healthy 
relationship with God. Sin therefore demands afodie (sin sacrifice). These observations 
continue to beg the question why the Akan do not offer such sacrifices to Onyame. This 
question leads us back to the requirement that God should have a priest to offer such sacrifice. 
And such a person who may serve as a priest for Onyame has to be sinless in accordance with 
the institutional rule of priesthood. No human priests have been able to meet such a 
requirement within the context of traditional Akan religious experience. 
5.4 Jesus as Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique Priest)  
This would account 
for the absence of such a priesthood and sacrifice, at least in practice.  
5.4.1 Introduction 
To begin with I focus again briefly on the traditional Akan myth of Onyame’s self-withdrawal 
and the absence of a priesthood for Onyame. In light thereof I contend that, in traditional 
Akan religion and culture, no suitable mediator has been identified that could restore the 
relationship between God and humanity. On this basis, my constructive proposal is that the 
term Nyamesofopreko may be employed to portray Jesus Christ as God’s unique priest, i.e. as 
one who, for the first time, could fulfil this mediating role since he is professed to be a person 
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without sin. The concept of Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique priest) entails two main ideas, 
namely a) the need for such a mediator between God and humankind and b) the uniqueness of 
Jesus Christ to play such a role.  
In section 5.4.2 I will explain and justify the use of the term Nyamesofopreko. In section 5.4.3 
I will then develop a constructive proposal on the need for Jesus as Mediator between God 
and humankind. I will also offer an explanation as to why Jesus Christ may be seen as a 
unique Priest amongst Akan Christians. In section 5.4.4 I will also consider various objections 
which may be raised in response to this proposal. This will be followed by a brief conclusion 
in section 5.5.  
5.4.2 Explaining the term “Nyamesofopreko” 
In constructing this Christology, I have coined the term Nyamesofopreko by combining three 
Akan terms, namely Nyame (Supreme Being), sofo (priest/pastor) and preko (unique), in order 
to suggest that the message of Jesus Christ responds to the need for a mediator between the 
Supreme Being and human beings, and to suggest that Jesus Christ is indeed unique in this 
regard. 
a) Nyame 
The Akan term Nyame denotes the Supreme Being or God. This is the shorter form of the 
terms Onyame or Onyankopon. There is no cultural or linguistic difference between the three 
terms Nyame, Onyame and Onyankopon. 
The name Nyame or Onyame or Onyankopon is exclusively used for the Supreme Being. It is 
singular and does not in any sense express a divine assembly (Ryan 1980:162 and Sarpong 
1974:10).
Danquah’s suggestion that these three terms apply to 
three different persons is widely rejected by Akan scholars as speculation. The Akan section 
of the Jehovah Witnesses has also suggested that there are differences between Nyame and 
Onyankopon, alleging that the former is a lesser divinity and the latter is God. However, such 
an assumed difference is influenced by the biblical concept of God and gods, and it is 
unfounded within the Akan context.  
 
On this basis Ryan rightly argues that it is wrong to place Onyame (Supreme Being) and 
Onyame is also thought to be unique and different from all the other spirits or 
divinities. Thus, the abosom (lesser divinities) are never referred to as Nyame or Onyame or 
anyame; neither has Nyame or Onyame or Onyankopon ever been placed in the category of 
the abosom (Sarpong 2002:97).  
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abosom (the lesser divinities) in the same class and refer to them in terms of God and the gods 
as if they have the same nature. Ryan rightly observes that no authentic dialect of the Akan 
language exists that yields an adequate equivalent of the Semitic and Greco-Roman pair 
named God and gods (Ryan 1980:164). 
b) Sofo 
In this respect, it can be concluded that the name 
Nyame as “implanted” in the coined term Nyamesofopreko solely refers to the Supreme Being 
that the Akan duly recognise as the ultimate Being. 
The term sofo is the old name for a custodian or representative of the tete abosom (lesser 
divinities). Christaller (1933:467) defines an osofo as a “priest, one who officiates in the 
service of a fetish, or who performs religious ceremonies …” The term is distinctively 
different from the term okomfo,14
The term obosomfo is a combination of two terms: obosom (lesser divinity) and fo (a suffix 
connoting belonging). Combining the two terms, obosomfo means one who is an adherent to a 
cult of a lesser divinity. If the term is applied in the singular sense as in the present context, 
then the fo refers to the one involved as the head of the group; chief priest. If the applied 
context is plural as in the case of asorefo (those who belong to a church), then it simply 
denotes members of a lesser divinity cult. Another term which may be used interchangeably 
with obosomfo is okomfo-hene or okomfo-panin. The term (o)hene means chief and (o)panin 
is an elder. In this respect, the two terms have the same meaning: the head or chief priest. 
 popularly translated as fetish priest. However, the nature of 
the work of osofo is somehow akin to that of okomfo (“fetish” priest). More precisely, it is 
akin to that of obosomfo (chief custodian of a shrine) who normally serves as the chief priest 
in the shrines.  
The three persons: osofo, obosomfo and okomfo are all active servants of deities at Akan 
shrines. Traditionally, the term osofo is employed for officiating (lay) people or active 
servants of deities at an Akan shrine who act on the instruction of the chief priest (obosomfo) 
or of the possessed akomfo ( traditional priests and priestesses). 
The Akan distinguish between obosomfo and osofo. In a given shrine, whereas there may be 
many asofo (priests) there should be only one obosomfo. The obosomfo is the chief priest, and 
the asofo are the servers of the shrine. Nevertheless, in a case of an obosomfo dying, one of 
                                                 
14  The word okomfo is derived from the term akom meaning a prophecy or a revelation. Akom is popularly 
associated with possession, and the possession dance performed by the akomfo.  
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the asofo can replace that obosomfo as the chief priest. Thus, in some sense, asofo serve as 
juniors or priests under apprenticeship.  
There are also differences between the obosomfo and okomfo. The obosomfo (chief priest) 
undertakes religious transactions and as such acts as a priest. Obosomfo’s main function is to 
offer sacrifices, libations and oversee the management of the entire shrine.  
The akomfo (plural of okomfo) are the possessed and dancing prophets and prophetesses (or 
priests and priestesses) who perform publicly. The okomfo’s main task is to interpret the 
oracles of the fetish and to prophesy as well as perform magical acts under the influence of a 
lesser divinity or dwarfs. 
Indeed all the three terms obosomfo, okomfo and osofo can be rightly translated as priest. 
Whereas there may be many asofo and akomfo in a given shrine, there is only one obosomfo 
in such a shrine. Usually, there would be a number of asofo and akomfo who work under the 
obosomfo the chief priest of the shrine.
On the current usage, Ghanaians normally identify religious heads (God’s ministers: Roman 
Catholic priests, Protestant bishops, pastors and even Moslem imams) with the term sofo. The 
full form of the term sofo is osofo. Indeed, the first denomination to apply the term osofo to 
religious leaders was the Presbyterian Church of Ghana (Ekem 1994).  
  
Notably, the title sofo, is used in the Akan translation of the Bible for a priest of the Judeo- 
Christian faith. However, Ekem (2005:117)15 disagrees with such a translation. According to 
Ekem, the term asofo is traditionally employed for lay people who officiate, or for active 
servants of deities at the Akan shrine who are Akan traditional priests and priestesses. Ekem 
admits that the functions of asofo are, undoubtedly, priestly in nature. He insists that asofo are 
not first-hand recipients of divine instruction, but executors of it. Hence, technically speaking, 
the asofo are not priests.
Ekem (2005:119) contends that if the author of the Letter to the Hebrews is to be understood 
correctly, Jesus exercises his high priesthood not so much in the physical as in the 
metaphysical realm (Hebrew 9:11). Ekem argues that the Akan spiritual universe is mediated 
metaphysically through the akomfo. Thus, from the standpoint of traditional Akan 
understanding, the function of okomfo rather than osofo, seems to approximate the type of 
  
                                                 
15  John David Kwamena Ekem, holds a Doctorate in Theology from the University of Hamburg, Germany. He 
serves as a translation consultant for the Bible Society of Ghana, and is currently a lecturer at the Trinity 
Theological Seminary, Legon-Accra. He is an ordained minister of the Methodist Church of Ghana.  
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priestly Christology that is advanced by the author of Hebrews. He poses the question: if 
Jesus exercises his high priesthood in the metaphysical realm, how is this related to the asofo 
acting as earthly executors of divine instructions? To Ekem, the role of asofo in traditional 
Akan understanding cannot be compared in any way to what is being proclaimed about Jesus 
Christ in the Letter to the Hebrews.  
Ekem maintains that the term okomfo is more appropriate to translate the Judeo-Christian 
concept of priest than the term osofo as seen in the Akan-Twi translation. Thus, by opting for 
osofo, the Bible translators have not done justice to the ministry of Jesus as the high priest of 
God. Ekem further argues that it will be theologically inappropriate to describe Jesus as Sofo 
panin (high priest)16
Discussing the possible reasons why the Akan Bible translators opted for osofo instead of 
okomfo, Ekem points to “fetish associations” of the term okomfo. To buttress his claim, Ekem 
cites Damuah
 in the Akan religious world-view as He is portrayed in the biblical 
translation (Ekem 2005:120). 
17
Having turned down the title osofo as an appropriate one, Ekem suggests another title: 
Ntamugyinafopanin (Ntamugyinafo means mediator/intercessor; panin means most 
senior/highest) which could be literally translated as “Highest Mediator”. He contends that it 
is a neutral title, and that, it also sufficiently embraces both roles – osofo and okomfo. He 
 who took the combined title osofo-okomfo as a description of his new 
leadership role. Ekem sees Damuah’s new title as an appropriate description of Damuah’s 
new leadership role. He contends that one is inclined to view Damuah’s interesting title as an 
effort to resolve the ambiguity characterising the use of priestly titles in traditional Akan 
spirituality. To Ekem, the title combination, osofo-komfo, is probably meant to underscore the 
fact that the okomfo’s role cannot be ignored in any serious endeavour with the traditional 
Akan reality (Ekem 2005:119). 
                                                 
16  The question that one may ask regarding the title Sofopanin is: Who are the junior priests that justify the 
title “high priests”? The Akan do not have a priest for Onyame. Thus, to make Jesus a high priest would 
presuppose the existence of junior priests for Onyame. But such priests do not exist within the Akan 
context. One may explore the possibility of appropriating/considering the priests of the lesser divinities as 
junior priests for Onyame. The assumption for such an exploration will be the theory of intermediary. The 
intermediary theory maintains that the lesser divinities are the “mouth pieces” or ministers of the Supreme 
Being in the African traditional religious experience. If we are to accept this theory, the priests of the lesser 
divinities then become the priests of the Supreme Being. This will lead one to accept the existence of the 
junior priests for Onyame – which would pave the way for the acceptance of Jesus as the high priest within 
the Akan context.  
17  Rev. Fr. Vincent Kwabena Damuah was an ex-Roman Catholic priest from Wassa Amanfi traditional area 
in the Western Region of Ghana. He founded the Afrikania Religion as an attempt to demonstrate the 
authenticity of traditional African religious values.  
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argues that the main advantage with this title is that it focuses on the element of mediation 
which is essential for understanding the function of a “hiereus” or “archiereus” (chief priest) 
in Hellenistic thought (Ekem 2005:120).  
Ekem (2005:120) concedes that Ntamugyinafo does not specify the type of mediation unless 
clarified in context. Nonetheless, he insists that the term portrays a self-sacrificing high-priest 
as sketched by the author of Hebrews in his Priestly Christology.18
Analysing Ekem’s proposals, it must be noted that one needs to exercise caution when 
categorising the okomfo as priests and asofo as non-priests, as Ekem contends. As Ekem has 
rightly noted, strictly speaking, some of these asofo, particularly the junior ones, are not first 
recipients of the divine instructions. Rather, it is their duty to ensure that all the divine 
directions relayed by the akomfo are carried out meticulously. However, in most cases the 
osofo, particularly, the chief-osofo who is the obosomfo has direct contact with the deity. 
Some also double as okomfo or obosomfo-komfo.  
  
In the late thirties and forties, Field (1960:88) observed and clarified the distinction between 
the obosomfo and okomfo when she noted that the abosomfo as a rule were not practicing 
spirit-possession dancing. Instead they offered dignified prayer and other rites, not only on 
behalf of the individual but also with regard to the entire community who sought help when 
sick or in trouble. The abosomfo’s style of worship never took on the form of drama as did the 
services of the akomfo; however, they are also equally first recipients of divine instructions.19
Nevertheless, one may want to differentiate between obosomfo and osofo; but the differences 
are not always clearcut. This is the case because there may be some obosomfo who is a not 
okomfo, yet he /she may be a firsthand recipient of divine instruction. In such a case, that 
obosomfo may be part of the category of osofo yet he/she is firsthand recipient of divine 
instruction. 
 
Thus, in this sense the term obosomfo adequately translates the term “priest”.  
Besides, the categorisation of the akomfo as priests and the asofo as non-priests may be 
questionable as well. Viewing critically the functions of the okomfo and the asafo, it may be 
                                                 
18  Ekem notes that the crux of the matter should lie rather in investigating whether it is possible for Jesus, the 
Christ, to dwell in the Akan spiritual universe as Sofopanyin par excellence through whom spiritual 
blessings are mediated to the community of faith. He admits that it would, nonetheless, require a 
painstaking theological-linguistic investigation to determine the extent to which this Christianised title can 
assume authenticity within non-Christian Akan circles. Ekem however declines to deal with the issue 
further for he indicates that it ranges beyond the scope of his present discussion. He recommended future 
research do be be devoted to it. 
19  The abosomfo only entered the state of spirit-possession within the temple or the confines of its courtyard.  
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more appropriate to refer to the akomfo as prophets and the asofo as priests. Such groupings 
may reflect the Old Testament notion of priests and prophets. With respect to this, one may 
distinguish between an osofo/obosomfo, as one who undertakes religious transactions and in 
this, acts as a priest, and okomfo, whose main task is to interpret the oracles of the fetish and 
to prophesy as well as perform magical acts under its influence, thus a prophet. The prophets 
are seers, whilst the priest’s (osofo) function is to offer sacrifices and oversee the entire fetish 
establishment.  
Nevertheless, the term obosomfo may also be unappropriate. It has specific connections to the 
lesser divinities as the name abosom denotes. As Ekem concedes, the “fetish associations”, of 
the term in the present understanding amongst the Akan make it an inappropriate term to 
associate with Jesus. The term has been demonised beyond Christian application; in fact, it 
stands in antithesis with the name of Jesus in the current Ghanaian understanding. 
Another concern may deter us from using okomfo as a title for Jesus. The combination of 
Nyame and komfo (that is Nyame-komfo-(prekope) seems to have another meaning which 
creates a negative impression for the person of Jesus. The Akan refer to someone suffering 
from epileptics as Nyamekomfo. 
One may also look critically at the situation of Damuah as Ekem seeks to use it as a basis to 
negate the usage of osofo as priest. Here, would it not be more correct to say that Damuah just 
wanted to identify himself with the traditional priest and thus employed the term okomfo as a 
way of receiving more adherents from the traditionalists. Perhaps Ekem might have read more 
into Damuah’s intention when he wants us to believe that Damuah took the title okomfo in 
addition to the osofo to settle for a theological inadequacy of the term osofo.  
On the basis of the negative implication that the 
combinations of Nyame and komfo have, to refer to Jesus as Nyamekomfo may lead to a 
conclusion that Jesus was an epileptic.  
Moreover, Ekem’s suggestion of Ntamugyinafopanin (Ntamugyinafo) also gives a wrong 
impression. The term panin (senior, most/highest) suggests the existence of some junior 
Ntamugyinafo (mediators) between God and humankind according to Akan belief. However, 
as Ekem himself duly admits, the traditional Akan do not have any priest for God. Yet it takes 
the presence of junior priests to render a term “senior priest” meaningful. With regard to the 
term Ntamugyinafo (mediator), it may also not be as appropriate as Ekem himself points out, 
because it is (too) abstract and does not specify the type of mediation, unless clarified in 
context.  
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c) Preko 
The Akan term preko, the shorter form of prekope, could mean “at once” or “unique”. An 
Akan member can say: Prekope na obe pie ho (he/she suddenly came to the scene). In this 
context, prekope means “at once”. An Akan can also say: Woye me wofase prekope (he/she is 
my real or unique nephew/niece). Whether the reference is to “real” or “unique”, depends on 
the context. If the emphasis lies on differentiating the speaker’s own sister’s (same mother) 
son or daughter from another relative’s children, then the prekope would mean “real”. The 
term used to make one’s intention clear is nimpon, though one is equally right to say prekope.  
Equally, an Akan could say: woye me wofase prekope, referring to one of his/her real 
nephews/nieces. Although, the rest of the speaker’s nephews and nieces are from his /her 
“real” sister (same mother), using prekope in this sense makes the referent a unique nephew 
or niece. One uses such an emphasis when one wants to show in a metaphoric sense how the 
referent is “the one and only” reliable nephew or niece. Another term for such an emphasis is 
soronko. For example an Akan may say: wo ye me wofase soronko (he/she is different 
amongst other nephews and nieces). This begs the question why prekope is used instead of 
soronko. Accordingly, one may refer to Nyamesofosoronko rather than Nyamesofopreko. 
Nyamesofosoronko, while connoting that Jesus is unique, also suggests that there may be 
many existing priests for Onyame and that Jesus is one (unique) amongst them. Accordingly, 
the notion is that Jesus is the high priest for Onyame. However, within the Akan context it 
would be inappropriate, to refer to Jesus as the high priest of Onyame. Amongst the Akan, 
Onyame does not have a priest. Although there is a hint that an attempt was made to institute 
priesthood for Onyame, for some reason it failed. Thus, to name Jesus the high priest of 
Onyame is to make a statement which is likely to create the wrong impression: There has to 
be another valid lower priest to justify the presence of a high priest. Nonetheless, the idea of a 
high priest is foreign to the Akan culture and worldview. In this respect, Nyamesofosoronko 
may not be appropriate for our context. 
Nyamesofopreko is preferred here because the term prekope interpreted as unique, eliminates 
the presence of other “valid lower priests”, thus making the referent – Jesus – the only 
qualified priest of God. A popular TV advert sounds: Ariel yi fi prekope (Ariel removes dirt at 
once). In this context, the term prekope recognises other powdered soap but the presence of 
Ariel powdered soap makes the rest “not up to the job”, thus inferior or, more so, fake. 
Prekope in this sense creates a strong impression of “one and only one”. 
Observably, in the system containing lower priests and a high priest, the lower priests are duly 
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recognised. They are recognised as valid priests who serve under the high priest. However, 
when one uses the term prekope in such a context, it usually downplays the other priests by 
contrasting their position to that of the high priest. Unlike, soronko, it serves not only to 
demonstrate the positive side of the one upon whom the emphasis is placed. By implication it 
downplays the functions of the others. In respect to this subtle difference, Nyamesofopreko is 
preferred to Nyamesofosoronko to translate the concept of God’s unique Priest. 
d) Conclusion 
In light of the above mentioned problems associated with the other terms, I deem the term 
Nyamesofopreko as a relatively more adequate one to express the notion, of Jesus as Mediator 
between God and humankind. 
The other common terms close to the term Nyamesofopreko may be Nyamesofo and 
Nyameprekope. The former usually refers to Christian ministers. The latter is an Akan 
Christian theological term that any preacher may allude to in reference to Jesus’ uniqueness.  
Indeed, Jesus Christ may be seen in this way as a unique priest because, a) there have not 
been any such priests before, at least not in the Akan religious experience; b) he is unlike any 
of the other priests or other lesser divinities – because he is fully human as well as fully 
divine; c) his work as Mediator differs in scope and approach.  
 5.4.3 The concept of Nyamesofopreko: The uniqueness of Jesus’ priesthood  
Based on the discussion thus far, I may suggest here that the role of Jesus as Mediator 
between God and humankind may be better interpreted in Akan context in terms of that of a 
priest. Nonetheless, there is no priest or priesthood institution for God in the Akan context. 
This may suggest the need for Jesus as Mediator and explain why Jesus Christ may be seen as 
a unique priest within the Akan context. 
a) The myth of God’s withdrawal and the need for Jesus as priest (Mediator) 
Within the Akan context, the myth of God’s self-withdrawal gives us the clue to understand 
the impact of sin with respect to human relationships with God. The myth shows similarities 
to the biblical account of the fall of humankind as narrated in Genesis chapters 1-3. With the 
assumption that the passage in the Genesis account serves as a revelation of human alienation 
from God, the myth may help Akan Christians to infer some continuity between their African 
heritage and their Christian faith.  
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It is clear from both the myth and the biblical accounts that every person had direct access to 
Onyame but the broken relationship through the disobedience of human beings has marred 
such access. In the case of Adam and Eve (representatives of the first humans on earth), it was 
wilful disobedience to God’s commandment not to eat a specific fruit. Similarly, in the case 
of the Akan old lady, it was deliberate disobedience to use a long pestle (as against the normal 
short ones) with malice aforethought to nag Onyame. 
It may therefore be inferred here that, like Adam and Eve before the fall, the old lady had 
direct access to God before the incident of God’s self-withdrawal. Thus it can be deduced 
both from the biblical account and the Akan tradition that God did not originally create 
human beings as sinners but human beings became sinners by their own choice. 
Moreover, in the biblical narratives, Adam and Eve were condemned to die after eating the 
fruit. Similar to the biblical accounts, the consequence of sin according to the myth is not only 
human alienation from God (spiritual death) but also entails death (physical death). In the 
myth, the children of the old lady could not obtain the one mortar required to reach God 
anywhere. Their grandmother, that is the old lady, told her children “Take one from the 
bottom, and put it on the top to make them reach.” Thus her children removed a single mortar 
and all spilled down and fell to the ground, causing the death of many people. It may also be 
deduced from the myth that evil cannot escape punishment; death was the consequence of 
their sin (Pobee 1979). Of course, the myth raises an issue whether the sin of the old woman 
might have had repercussions for all human beings or not.  
This leads us to the question whether one’s sin affects others in society. In the myth, the old 
lady started alone, but later invited others in her attempt to be on equal footing with God. This 
made the helpers partake in the sin of the old lady. Amongst the Akan, it is also believed that 
one’s sin can anger the lesser divinities and the ancestors and thereby can cause misfortune to 
the entire community. Nonetheless, the Akan also believe in an individual’s responsibility for 
his/her own wrongdoing – i.e. sin. 
In the biblical account of the fall as well as the myth of God’s self-withdrawal there is a 
further notion that sin without reconciliation has fatal consequences. Such an idea is very clear 
to any traditional Akan as exemplified by the relationship between the lesser divinities and 
human beings. It is believed strongly that no one can offend any lesser divinity and walk free 
– unless that person seeks reconciliation. However, as may be deduced from the myth, the old 
woman and her people pretended that nothing had happened. Similarly, in Genesis, Adam 
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only shifted the blame back to God: “the woman you gave me …” Nevertheless, Adam was 
eventually punished.  
The need for a mediator between God and humankind could be derived from the myth of 
God’s withdrawal. Nevertheless, without the biblical revelation of the person and the work of 
Christ, the Akan people could not adequately have seen the consequences of sin and thus the 
need for a mediator in this regard. Thus, within the context of the myth of self-withdrawal, 
Akan Christians may see Jesus as Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique priest) through the 
knowledge of Christ’s person and works. In this respect, the myth may help Akan Christians 
to infer some continuity between their African heritage and their Christian faith.  
b) Jesus is unique because he alone serves as Mediator between God and humankind 
Firstly, the uniqueness of the mediatorship of Jesus pivots around the belief that he alone 
serves as God’s priest; also there have not been any such priests before, at least not within 
Akan context. Thus, Jesus is proclaimed unique because he alone serves as Mediator between 
God and humankind.  
In the previous discussion, I have noted that God can use anybody as His intermediary. Thus 
we have those intermediaries that God employs for Nyamedwuma (God’s work) and also 
those that serve as Nyamebofo (God’s messenger). Moreover, there are those who become 
“God” to others, in some situations – in other words they become a saviour to others in a 
given situation. Yet, there is no institution of priesthood or priest who serves as a mediator 
between God and humankind. Notably, there is no such institution or priest in any of the 
African societies.  
Of course the traditional Akan religious experience, as the notions of Nyamedwuma and 
Nyamebofo illustrate, have a sense of occasional (limited) “priesthood of all believers” in 
varied degrees. Nevertheless, no Akan has claimed the office of God’s priest due to the 
presumed requirement of a sinless life. And this is exactly what Jesus, though implicit, stakes 
his claim. This is also explicitly affirmed by the biblical writers and the church fathers. In this 
respect, I may suggest here that, in the first place, Jesus alone serves as Mediator between 
God and humankind because of his sinless life.  
Jesus’ sinlessness qualifies him as not only a situational or an occasional intermediary. It 
makes Jesus a regular and a permanent and even an eternal (according to Christian belief) 
Mediator between God and humankind. Thus, whereas all people may qualify in degrees to 
act as occasional mediators between God and humankind, it is only Jesus who could be 
 
 
 
 
 135 
regarded as Nyamesofopreko; holding the office of God’s Mediator not only occasionally but 
truly eternally, seeing that he lives forever.20
c) Jesus is unlike any other priest; he is truly human and truly God 
  
The second connotation ascribed to Jesus as God’s unique priest is that he is unlike any other 
priest, particularly the priests of lesser divinities. He is both fully human as well as fully 
divine.21 The author of the Letter to the Hebrews, in what must have been a profound shock to 
non-Christian Jews, applies the title “high priest” to Jesus when Jesus does not even form part 
of the priesthood family.22
In order to project Jesus as a priest, the author of Hebrews did not appeal to a Greco-Roman 
precedent. Rather, he found within the biblical tradition a precedence of one person, 
Melchizedek, who held both positions as king and priest. The author differentiates the 
priesthood of Melchizedek, which is labelled as universal, from the Aaronic priesthood, 
which was regarded as particular. Psalm 110 is the scriptural key to what the author of 
Hebrews professes with regard to Melchizedek’s position. To the author, Melchizedek 
represents the Son of God, and the Son remains a priest for all time (7:3c) because he lives 
forever (1:8-9).
 Nonetheless, the author of Hebrews indicates that it is not 
sufficient only to prove the priesthood of Jesus as a justification for his role as Mediator 
between God and humankind. He also points out how, in such a proposal, Jesus’ divinity 
would not be compromised (cf. Hebrews 7:3).  
Since the Bible makes no mention of Melchizedek’s parentage, the author contends that 
Melchizedek has no mother, no father, nor genealogy (7:3a). The author constructs an 
argument from silence, yet accords Melchizedek a status of humanity and divinity 
concurrently. With this contention, the writer of Hebrew avoids what was to be known later as 
the “heresy” of adoptionism.
  
23
                                                 
20  For all the attack on Christianity by non-Christians in Ghana, particularly the Akan traditionalist and the 
Moslems, there is no dispute on the sinless life of Jesus. 
  
21  I will return to this in more detail in chapter 6.2. 
22  Two points are important in light of the approach adopted by the author of the letter to the Hebrews. First is 
the “nature” of the comparison. Second is the “direction” of that comparison. First, in Hebrews chapter 7, 
Melchizedek is said to “resemble” the Son of God, which means that the two are similar, but not identical. 
The second point is that, the author of Hebrews does not allege that the Son of God is like Melchizedek, but 
that Melchizedek is like the Son of God (7:3c). The author spots the traits of Christ in Melchizedek in the 
way that one can discern the shape of a person in his shadow or in his reflection in the mirror. The book of 
Hebrews considers Melchizedek to be an earthly shadow that the risen Christ casts back on Old Testament 
Scripture.  
23  Nonetheless, it may be anachronistic to argue that the author’s aim then was to avoid the heresy of 
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d) Jesus’ priesthood is unique because his work as a mediator is different in approach 
and scope 
Thirdly, the work of Jesus is different in its approach and broader in scope compared to the 
work of a traditional African priest. One way of exploring the work of Jesus Christ is to 
distinguish between his state of humiliation and the state of exaltation. With reference to the 
state of humiliation, one may mention his incarnation, suffering, cross and descent into hell. 
With reference to his state of exaltation, one may also mention his resurrection, ascension, 
sitting at the right hand of the Father and the expectation of the (“second”) 
Moreover, if the author of Hebrews is to be understood correctly, Jesus exercises his high 
priesthood not so much in the physical as in the metaphysical realm (Hebrew 9:11).
coming of Christ 
(parousia). These concepts are different from the traditional Akan understanding of 
mediation. In this sense the mediation of Christ is different in approach from mediation in 
traditional Akan context. 
 
As I have already argued, the role of the lesser divinities and the ancestors should not be 
understood as that of mediating between human beings and God. In this regard, the roles 
fulfilled by the intermediaries within Akan society has a limited scope of operation as 
compared to that of Jesus. In respect to the relationship between God and humankind, Jesus 
may be regarded as sole Mediator. Indeed, in this sense Jesus may truly be regarded as 
Nyamesofopreko amongst the Akan Christians.  
The 
implication of this ministry with regard to the earth is his unceasing intercession for the 
Christians before God.  
 5.4.4 Some possible objections and responses to the notion of Jesus as Nyamesofopreko 
a) Is the image of Nyamesofopreko not substantially independent of the title sofo? 
The purpose of this section is to justify the usage of the title “priest” as accorded to Jesus in 
the sense of Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique priest). Such a justification has become 
necessary seeing that I have criticised positions that view Jesus as proto-ancestor and as 
greatest ancestor. My contention against an ancestor Christology is that, the title “ancestor” as 
accorded to Jesus in terms of “Christ our ancestor” is substantially independent of the title 
“ancestor” as understood within the traditional African context. 
                                                                                                                                                        
adoptionism which was formally denounced much later on.  
Such a problem emerges, 
particularly, when one attempts to project Jesus into a different class of ancestorhood, thereby 
modifying the term ancestor far beyond its traditional meaning. 
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On the basis of my criticism against an ancestor Christology, one may raise the question: Can 
the same objection can be used as retort against the image of Nyamesofopreko? For it may be 
conceivable that the image of Nyamesofopreko would be somewhat unlike those of the 
traditional priests – seeing that Jesus’ uniqueness distances him substantially from the 
traditional Akan priesthood.  
Obviously, such a position raises the following question: Who would this Nyamesofopreko 
then be, and how does such a person relate to the traditional Akan priests? Indeed, presenting 
Jesus as a priest and at the same time disassociating him from a traditional priest, creates the 
dilemma of rendering the Christological title independent of the traditional image.  
But I argue here as follows: One may not regard Jesus as proto-ancestor substantially 
independent from him being traditional ancestor. However the same cannot be said of the 
image of Nyamesofopreko and the priests of the lesser divinities. 
Within the traditional African context, the term “priest”, unlike “ancestor”, is somehow 
generic. Thus, one may be referred to as priest, when one mediates between human beings 
and the lesser divinities or between human beings and God. Generally, the term “priest” refers 
to any human being who mediates between human and spirit beings.
Thus, Jesus, who is truly human as well as truly God according to the Chalcedon formula, is 
in a position to mediate between God and humankind and may therefore be described as the 
priest of God. Thus, Jesus may indeed be regarded as a priest within the traditional Akan 
context, but then not as priest unto the lesser divinities, but unto Onyame – the Supreme 
Being – instead.  
  
Seeing Jesus as a priest in this way distinguishes him from the priests of the lesser divinities, 
not only in terms of a priest’s functions but also in terms of status. Of course, this would 
indicate that Jesus cannot be regarded as similar to the priests of the lesser divinities. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that he cannot be regarded as a “priest” within the 
traditional Akan context. Moreover, by modifying the term sofo (priest) with Nyame and 
preko (Nyame-sofo-preko), I have drawn a distinction between the term Nyamesofopreko and 
the phrase “priests of the lesser divinities”. Although the term Nyamesofopreko and the 
phrase “priests of lesser divinities” represent two categories, the concept of priesthood could 
nonetheless apply to both cases.  
One may retort that it is also possible to distinguish between two categories of ancestors; 
namely ordinary ancestors and ancestors accorded with black stools. However, the distinction 
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between these two groups of ancestors is based on the positions those persons occupied in 
their lives. Such a distinction therefore does not necessarily invite a generic use of the term 
“ancestor”, whereas the term “priest” could be used in such a generic sense.  
b) Can mamfrani (a foreigner) represent the Akan before God?  
In an attempt to present Jesus amongst the Akan as Mediator between God and humankind, 
another important question has to be addressed: Can mamfrani (a foreigner) represent the 
Akan before God? In light of this question Pobee (1979) also asks: “Why should an Akan 
relate to Jesus of Nazareth who does not belong to his clan, family, tribe and nation?” On the 
same issue, Bediako also commented as follows: “Up to now, our churches have tended to 
avoid the question and have presented the Gospel as though it was concerned with an entirely 
different compartment of life, unrelated to traditional religious piety”. He continues: “As a 
result, many people are uncertain about how the Jesus proclaimed by the Church saves them 
from the terrors and fears that they experience in their traditional worldview.”  
Bediako also rightly points out that, if the Akan Christians fail to interpret the person and the 
work of Christ within the context of their worldview and culture, many Akan Christians will 
continue to operate at two levels; half African and half European, but never belonging 
properly to either.  
Remarkably, both Pobee and Bediako are Akan, thus addressing the question is not merely an 
academic exercise. It is also of real practical concern for Akan Christians. This question is 
also hugely important for the purposes of this thesis, in that, if Jesus cannot be accepted 
amongst the Akan, how then can he represent the Akan before God as priest?  
Notably, both Pobee and Bediako are of the view that the solution of this problem lies with 
the idea of viewing Jesus as an Akan ancestor. Nonetheless, Bediako contends that Pobee 
approaches the problem largely through Akan wisdom, sayings and proverbs, and thereby 
does not deal sufficiently with the religious nature of the question. Bediako argues that Pobee 
has thus underestimated the cross-cultural conflict that the issue entails.  
In his own response, Bediako attempts to illustrate how Jesus could be an Akan ancestor – 
and could therefore be accepted amongst the Akan. Bediako contends that the early Jewish 
Christians had a similar problem and that the Letter to the Hebrews was written to answer 
such a question. He suggests that Akan Christians may turn to the author of this Letter to the 
Hebrews for guidance in this regard.  
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The author of the Letter to the Hebrews contends that Jesus serves as the high Priest, though 
Jesus did not emerge from a priesthood family. The author appeals to the person of 
Melchizedek, who served as a Jewish priest before the establishment of the formal (Levitical) 
priesthood institution amongst the Jews. Thus the author appeals to a notion that is referred to 
as a universal priesthood – as opposed to the local priesthood for which Jesus is evidently not 
qualified. As Bediako views it, the author of the Letter to the Hebrews confers high 
priesthood onto Jesus on the basis of his universal significance, not his particular significance. 
Bediako notes that, Aaron was the first high priest and his successors had to come from his 
particular family line. However, according to the author of Hebrews, Jesus is a high priest 
following the order of Melchizedek, who was a priestly king at the time of Abraham, the 
original and greatest ancestor of the Jews. The author buttresses his/her point by noting that, 
Abraham gave tribute to Melchizedek by paying his tithe to him. Therefore, in the Jewish 
tradition, there is also, beyond the tribal lineage of Aaron, a high priest who functions on an 
universal level.  
Building on the analogy of Melchizedek from the Letter to the Hebrews, Bediako (2000:31) 
concludes that the nature of Jesus as true God and true human places the priesthood of Jesus 
in a different category compared to the Levitical priests or the traditional Akan priests of the 
lesser divinities. 
For Bediako, if Jesus is to be considered a universal high priest, as the author of Hebrews 
argues, then Jesus can carry out the duties of a high priest – perform the sacrifices and 
function as a mediator – for all of humankind.  
Following the exposition in Hebrews, Bediako believes that Jesus did not only perform the 
ritual of a regular animal sacrifice, but that he, out of free will, sacrificed himself. For 
Bediako, Jesus is the universal Lord and Saviour, and as such, he also belongs to the Akan. 
This makes Jesus’ accomplishment significant for each human person and every human 
context and all human cultures. 
Analysing Bediako’s approach, necessary questions need to be posed: On what grounds does 
Bediako relate the Letter to the Hebrews to Akan culture? Will the Akan be able to accept 
Jesus as a universal ancestor or priest on this basis? Can one simply claim that Jesus is a 
universal priest and that the Akan should therefore accept him? To the author of Hebrews, 
Jesus was a universal priest in the order of Melchizedek but in which order recognised by the 
Akan could Jesus be regarded as a universal ancestor or priest?  
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The author of the Letter to the Hebrews provides some grounds for the Jewish Christians to 
accept another recognised priest beyond the formal priesthood institution. Thus, one would 
expect that Bediako should do in the Akan context what the writer of the Hebrews has done in 
the Jewish context with regard to Melchizedek and Jesus. However, Bediako has not 
demonstrated clearly why Jesus could be regarded as the universal ancestor in the Akan 
context. His analysis appears to say: Jesus has been proven to be a universal priest to the 
Jews; thus the Akan should accept him as their priest as well.  
However, to the Akan, Jesus is not Akan. Thus the question still remains: Can mamfrani (a 
foreigner) represent the Akan before God? The inadequacy of Bediako’s proposal regarding 
this question, necessitates another approach to the issue.  
Amongst the Akan, as already indicated, apart from the primary way, namely by being born 
from an Akan woman, one can also become an Akan by receiving a call to serve as priest to a 
lesser divinity amongst the Akan community. To the Akan, one does not need to be an Akan 
member to become a priest amongst the Akan. In fact, it is the prerogative of the “deity” to 
choose its own priest. From the evidence of traditional priesthood and present experience of 
traditional priesthood ministry, the lesser divinities chose their priests from amongst the Akan 
or from the non-Akan in an arbitrary manner. Some people even became priests amongst the 
Akan before they had mastered the Akan language – and acted as priests through an Akan 
interpreter.  
Remarkably, as soon as a lesser divinity had chosen a non-Akan for its priest, this person 
would be “naturalised” in status as an Akan. There are some instances where some non-Akan 
traditional priests became chiefs in several towns and villages, although it is strictly forbidden 
to allow any non-Akan to become a chief over the Akan. 24
Nonetheless, apart from a “call” from a deity to become its priest amongst the Akan, one has 
to be born from an Akan woman before one qualifies to be an Akan.  
 
On this basis, we may infer that Jesus received a call from Onyame (duly recognised as the 
deity amongst the Akan) to become His priest. Therefore Jesus has acquired the legitimacy to 
be seen as an Akan.25
                                                 
24  Okomfo Anokye a traditional priest was not an Ashanti but he is one of the most respected personalities 
amongst the Ashantis. Notably, the Ashantis would not even allow an Akan who is not true Ashanti to 
become a chief amongst the Ashantis. Yet, even though Anokye was not an Ashanti, he became a 
paramount chief because of his priestly status – a position the Ashantis would not grant a non-Ashanti 
under any other situation.  
 In this respect, the question of why the Akan should follow Jesus who 
25  This is the case because a priest for a lesser divinity in Akan does not need to be an Akan. It is the 
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is not an Akan (as Pobee poses it), need not be regarded as a serious problem in the way of 
constructing a Nyamesofopreko Christology.  
5.5 Conclusion 
From the descriptions and analyses of the Judeo-Christian and Akan traditions, it is evident 
that both human and spirit beings serve as mediators between God and humankind in different 
capacities. Nonetheless, in the Christian tradition, as interpreted by the first seven ecumenical 
councils, the mediator between God and humankind is the person of Jesus Christ – who is 
truly human as well as truly God. 
In the traditional Akan context, the mediators between God and humankind are human beings 
themselves – through okra. In this respect, if one presents Jesus as Nyamesofopreko – the 
Mediator between God and humankind, there must be an explanation as to how such a term 
adequately expresses the Nicene/Chalcedon confessional formula of the person of Christ as 
“truly God” (vere Deus) as well as “truly human” (vere homo).  
In as much as respect is accorded to the traditional priests within the Akan community, there 
is no suggestion that divine status is attributed to a priest or any human being. This appears to 
be a problem for the image of Nyamesofopreko as it seeks to express the Nicene affirmation 
of the person of Christ who is truly human as well as truly divine.  
As already noted, the author of Hebrews demonstrated that it is not an adequate assertion to 
prove only the priesthood of Jesus to justify his role as Mediator between God and 
humankind. The author of Hebrews also points out how in such a proposal, Jesus’ divinity 
would not be compromised. On this basis, the question that now has to be addressed may be 
posed as follows: On what grounds could one account for the Chalcedon affirmation of the 
person of Christ as truly human and truly God within the context of traditional Akan belief? 
Pursuing an answer to this question will be the focus of the next chapter.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
prerogative of the particular divinity to appoint his/her priest from anywhere it suits the divinity.  
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CHAPTER 6 
The person of Christ as Mediator in the Akan context 
 6.1 Introduction 
One of the fundamental aspects of the Christian confession of faith as formulated by the 
Council of Chalcedon (451) is that, Jesus Christ is “truly God” (vere Deus) as well as “truly 
human” (vere homo) and that the relationship between these two claims may be understood in 
terms of the one “person” and the two “natures” of Jesus Christ. These are the core Christian 
confessions that a Nyamesofopreko Christology would seek to reinterpret within the Akan 
context. The proposal of a Nyamesofopreko Christology is an attempt to contribute from 
within the Akan context to the understanding of the person and work of Jesus Christ. It is also 
an attempt to make a contribution to a wider ecumenical Christianity, for example in terms of 
the notion of the catholicity of the church, taking root in different contexts but remaining 
recognisably Christian.
The chapter is divided into three major sections, following the pattern of chapter 5. In the first 
main section (6.2), I have offered a brief description of the most important Christological 
decisions of the seven ecumenical councils of the patristic period, with specific reference to 
the decisions of Nicea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451). 
These decisions led to considerable controversy in the subsequent history of Christianity. 
However, a detailed discussion of post-Enlightenment debates on Christology would go well 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It would have to suffice here to merely note famous 
distinctions such as those between an ontological and a functional Christology,
  
1 Christology 
“from below” and “from above”,2 the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith,3 and so forth.
                                                 
1  For the proponents of functional Christology, Christ’s divinity is explained as functions of his humanity 
while Nicene Christology also affirms that Jesus is “of one essence with the father”. A fully-fledged 
functional Christology made its appearance in the early and mid-seventies, particularly in the publications 
of Cullmann (1975), Küng (1976) and Robertson (1973). Remarkably, functional Christologies hardly 
escape the “heresy” of degree Christology. The proponents of degree Christology usually define certain 
characteristics to be human qualities and then argue that the significance of Jesus consists in his possessing 
a large, even unique degree of these qualities. The major publications in this area came from the Roman 
Catholic theologians such as Schoonenberg (1977), Schillebeeckx (1982) and Küng (1980). Major 
publications from Protestant theologians who also abandoned Chalcedon include those by Flesseman (1972) 
and Robinson (1973). 
 
2  One of the features of Christology “from above” is that the Kerygma – the proclamation of Christ by the 
church – forms the basis for comprehending Christ’s eternal person and work. By contrast, Christology 
“from below” aims to ground what it has to say about Jesus primarily in the anthropological or, more 
generally, in that which has to do with time rather than with eternity. A Christology from below is strongly 
influenced by a Kantian view of time. The eternal features of Jesus’ reality are thus explained as functions, 
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These debates clearly indicate that the decisions of Nicea and Chalcedon are open to 
diverging interpretations. In fact, the divine status of Jesus Christ is widely contested in 
Western Christological discourse in the post-Enlightenment period, for example in the context 
of inter-faith dialogue4 and in the highly publicised proceedings of the Jesus-seminar.5 
Moreover, the way in which these decisions are formulated with the help of categories 
derived from Greek metaphysics has often been noted and criticised in African discourse on 
Christology.6
In the second main section (6.3) I will explore the position and status of mediators in the 
 Nevertheless, the Nyamesofopreko Christology which I am developing in this 
thesis seeks to remain true to the core intuitions of Nicea and Chalcedon. A brief description 
of these decisions within their own historical context will therefore have to suffice here. 
                                                                                                                                                        
epiphenomena or projections of his humanity. In the twentieth century, this approach to Christology has 
been associated especially with Rudolf Bultmann, and Emil Brunner in his early book The Mediator (1942). 
Perhaps the most instructive example of a contemporary “Christology from below” is that of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg Jesus – God and man (1968). For further discussions on Christology “from above” and “from 
below”, see Gunton (1983), Johnson (1981), Pannenberg (1968, 1964), Peters (1975), Placher (1975), 
Shults (1999) and Tupper (1973). 
3  The quest to discover the historical identity of Jesus came to be known as the “search for the historical 
Jesus.” Underlying this search was the expectation that the real Jesus would prove to be different even from 
the Christ who appears within the Scriptures, and who is in some sense the product of the theologising of 
Paul and others. Amongst the more famous renditions of “early lives of Jesus” were those produced by 
David Strauss and Ernst Renan. Increasingly, the early Jesus was depicted as basically a good man, a 
teacher of great spiritual truths, but not the miracle-working and pre-existent Second Person of the Trinity. 
Perhaps the best known and the most influential picture of Jesus is that of Adolf von Harnack. In many 
ways, von Harnack’s work represents the pinnacle and the end of the search for Jesus. He notes that the four 
Gospels do not provide us the means to construct a full-fledged biography of Jesus, for they mention very 
little about Jesus’ early life. However, the issue of theological legitimacy sparked off another, so-called 
“second quest” for the historical Jesus. Firstly, its proponents contend that there is a danger in posing too 
sharp a discontinuity between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith. Secondly, they argue that history 
reappears as a potential threat to faith: it may not be able to prove faith, but it may once again cause 
embarrassment to the believer who takes its findings seriously. The so-called “third quest” for the historical 
Jesus also commenced in the closing decades of the twentieth century. What distinguishes this “third quest” 
from the first and the second, is the conviction that any attempt to build up a historical picture of Jesus of 
Nazareth should start from the fact that he was a first-century Jew operating in a first-century milieu. For 
detailed discussions, see: Dunn 2003:78-79, Strauss (1879), Renan (1856), Harnack (1957), Tyrrell (1910), 
Schweitzer (1964), Kähler (1964) and Käsemann (1964). 
4  For the debates on incarnation and religious pluralism, see the following publications: Hick (1973, 1982, 
1985), Goulder (1979), Green (1977) Cupitt (1979), Knitter (1985), Pinnock (1988) Mackey (1979) and 
Hillman (1989).  
5  Some scholars who have subjected Jesus to scrutiny in their private studies and disclosed their conclusion 
in closed academic circles are now waging their battle through the public media. One group that has been 
forefront of this endeavour names itself “The Jesus Seminar.” It was formed in 1985 to examine all the 
sayings attributed to Jesus in the New Testament and other early Christian documents. The Jesus Seminar 
has on the surface a simple academic purpose: “to assess the degree of scholarly consensus about the 
historical authenticity of each of the sayings of Jesus.” However, the Jesus Seminar has an agenda other 
than the academic one. They contend that the Jesus whom people know is the mythic figure. They want to 
liberate the people of the church from the dark ages of theological tyranny by liberating Jesus. John 
Dominic Crossan and Robert Funk are the co-founders of Jesus Seminar. For further discussions, see Funk 
(1988, 1993) and Kloppenborg (1990). For an Evangelical critique of “Jesus Seminar”, see Wilkins (1995).  
6  See Pobee (1979). 
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traditional Akan context. However, there is no human institution or priest or spirit being who 
mediates between God and humankind. From within such a context I argue that the role of the 
lesser divinities and the ancestors should not be understood as one of mediating between 
human beings and the Supreme Being. In section 6.3 I will nevertheless argue that there are 
resources available in the traditional Akan view of humanity that may be employed to 
reinterpret the status of God’s unique priest (Jesus Christ) as one who is truly human as well 
as truly God.  
In the constructive part of the chapter (section 6.4) I will then employ this analysis of the four 
constituent entities of being human to offer a proposal on how Jesus Christ may be 
understood as indeed fully human and fully divine within the Akan context – which may also 
be significant to the wider African and ecumenical contexts.  
6.2 The person of Christ as mediator in Christian (Nicene) tradition 
My intention here is not to engage in any comprehensive review of Nicene Christology. An 
exhaustive account of the person of Christ in Christian theology would need work on a vastly 
larger scale than what can be offered here. All that I shall attempt in this section is to sketch 
the (Nicene) Orthodox Christian beliefs concerning the person of Christ as defined by the 
creedal statements of the ecumenical councils from the 4th and 5th centuries. I will focus on the 
first four general councils of the Church (held at Nicea, 325; Constantinople, 381; Ephesus, 
431; Chalcedon, 451) at which the basic outlines of Christian teaching about God and the 
person of Christ were established. 
6.2.1 The Council of Nicea (325): The question of Jesus as truly God  
My sources for this discussion are Pelikan and Hotchkiss 
(2003) and McGrath (1994). They also include the somewhat older works of Bettenson 
(1863), Lohse (1966), Pelikan (1971), Kelly (1977), Stevenson (1981) and Chadwick (1982) 
that I had access to. 
The main agenda of the Council of Nicea (325) was to discuss Jesus’ divinity. The theological 
issue at stake, or seemed to be, was the status of the “Logos” and His relation to the Godhead 
(Kelly 1978:224). The controversy arose from the difficulty of combining the divinity of 
Christ, the incarnate Logos, with the unity in God. Particularly, the Arian view of Christ as 
creature collided with the tradition of describing Jesus as true God. At the beginning of the 
problem statement, the Trinity as such was apparently not directly at stake. But, in the course 
of the controversy, it became clear that one cannot discuss Christology without entering into 
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debates on the concept of God (Kelly 1978:223). 
Prior to the Council, there were some notable sects which had already denied the full divinity 
of Christ. The Ebionites taught that Jesus was not God, but a human prophet promised in the 
Old Testament.7
The most immediate issue that led to the Council of Nicea was the controversy of Arius, an 
Alexandrian monk. The issue at stake was the status of the “Son” and his relation to God the 
Father (Pelikan 1971:200, Chadwick 1982:129). Arius accused Bishop Alexander of deviant 
teaching. That is, proclaiming the Son and the Father to be co-eternal. 
 In the third century, Sabellius also stressed monotheism to the extent of 
declaring that Logos was a function of God the Father rather than a separate Person, but his 
view had comparatively few adherents. Another group, called the Adoptionists, taught that 
Jesus was an ordinary human being by nature but was adopted as God’s Son because of the 
exemplary and dedicated life that he lived (Kelly 1974: 40). Origen also explicitly taught that 
the Son is subordinate to the Father (Pelikan 1971:198).  
Arius contended that Jesus was divine, but that he was less divine than God the Father. For 
Arius, because the Son is “Son”, he is “begotten”, therefore he is gen(n)etos, but God is by 
definition agen(n)etos. The Son is therefore not, in any strict or proper sense, God. Thus the 
Son cannot be co-eternal with the Father (see Gunton 2001:39-41).  
Arius also contended that “the Son had a beginning, but God is without beginning.” He 
therefore explicitly rejected the idea that the Son is homoousios with the Father and insisted 
that the Father is “different in ousia” from the Son.
Alexander (the Bishop of Alexandria) challenged Arius over this view, and this led to some 
controversy. The precise details of Alexander’s position are somewhat obscure in the account 
which Arius gave in his accusation letter concerning Alexander (see Stead 1978). However, 
the broad shape of Alexander’s position is clear enough. He held that the Father and the Son 
are co-eternal. The Son, though “begotten” (gennetos), in no way came into existence later 
than the “unbegotten” (agennetos) Father. The Son co-exists with the Father and emanates 
from the Father. 
  
After the death of Alexander, Athanasius became Bishop of Alexandria. Nonetheless, Arius’ 
controversy led to the first ecumenical Council held at Nicea in AD 325. It was moderated by 
Emperor Constantine himself (Kelly 1978:230- 232, Pelikan 1971:193).  
                                                 
7  The Ebionites represented a Jewish form of Christianity which acted as a potent force in the apostolic age 
(Kelly 1978:139).  
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In his response to Arius’ views, Athanasius argues as follows: Firstly, Arianism undermined 
the Christian doctrine of God by presupposing that Jesus is not eternal and thereby virtually 
reintroducing polytheism. Secondly, Arius’ view made nonsense of the established liturgical 
customs of baptising in the Son’s name as well as the Father’s, and addressing prayers to the 
Son. Thirdly, and most importantly, it undermined the Christian idea of redemption in Christ, 
since only if the Mediator was Himself divine could humankind hope to re-establish 
fellowship with God. Kelly (1978:233) contends that considerations like these may well have 
carried weight with the Council. After some deliberations, the Council arrived at a decision 
which affirmed the full divinity of Christ. The views which directly affected the full divinity 
of Jesus were therefore declared as heresies by the Council.  
The Council declared the Son to be co-essential with the Father (Stevenson 1981:22). The key 
concept used to maintain the full divinity of Jesus was the Greek term homoousios. The 
characteristic Nicene emphases are: “true God from true God, begotten, not made, homo-
ousios with the Father”. The term does not stand alone, nor can it be adequately understood if 
it is isolated from its background and treated simply by itself. 
Together, ousia and homoousios stress that the Son of God is himself authentically God, that 
is, genuinely Son rather than a created being. He is, not “made” but “begotten”; his being 
derives from the being of the Father himself. He therefore shared the same essence with the 
Father (Kelly 1978:236). The phrase co-essential with the Father or “homoousios with the 
Father” recapitulates and focuses all the positive and negative affirmations in the Council of 
Nicea (Kelly 1978:236, Pelikan 1971:201).  
The Council of Nicea formulated its teaching by drafting a new Creed which was to become 
the standard for orthodox faith. What we now know as the Nicene Creed is a later compilation 
which most likely dates from the Council of Constantinople of 380/1. However, this includes 
material from the earlier creed of Nicea. This earlier creed includes the following clauses: 
We believe in one God … and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the 
Father as unique (monogenes), that is from the ousia of the Father, God from God, light 
from light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, homoousios with the Father, 
through whom all things were made …  
The rejection of Arius’ Christology is then to be found in the canon which immediately 
followed the Creed: 
And those who say, “There was once when he was not,” and, “Before being begotten, he 
was not,” and that he came into being from nothing (ex ouk onton); or who declare that the 
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Son of God is from some other hypostasis or ousia (sc. than the Father’s), or that he is a 
creature or changeable or alterable: the catholic Church anathematizes8
Arius was finally condemned and excommunicated. However, in the later years in the East, 
Arianism came to prevail.
 (Bettenson 1963). 
9 Nonetheless, the Western church in general was more loyal to the 
definition of Nicea and regarded Athanasius as a defender of true doctrine (Kelly 1978:238).10
6.2.2 The Council of Constantinople
  
 
Alongside the question of Jesus’ divinity, a diametrically opposite Christological view known 
as docetism emerged which denied Jesus’ humanity. Docetism has its roots in the Greco-
Oriental assumptions about divine impassability and the inherent impurity of matter (Kelly 
1978:141).  
(381): The question of Jesus as truly human 
However, the main controversy that led to the Council of Constantinople was the 
Appollinarian controversy. The agenda of the Council of Constantinople (A.D.381) was to 
assert Christ’s humanity without denying his divinity. The theological issue at stake was the 
status of the “Logos” and His relations to the Christ’s humanity (Kelly 1978:224). The 
controversy arose from the difficulty of combining the intellect and will of Logos with that of 
Christ’s human intellect and will.  
On the one hand, we have the notion of the Logos which is fully divine in nature; on the other 
hand, Christ’s human nature which is fully human in nature. If one assumes, as the Council of 
Nicea did, that the Logos has become flesh, then, it logically follows that either there are two 
                                                 
8  The Council rejected Arius’ position most categorically, and left no loophole which would permit him and 
his allies to subscribe to the creed while maintaining their former position. As Arius had already rejected 
the notion of homoousios, the creed offered itself as a suitable instrument for this purpose. This at least he 
could not accept without genuinely shifting his ground. This suggests amongst other things that the use of 
homoousios at the Council of Nicea was primarily negative: it was a means of excluding Arian theology. Its 
positive meaning was never really explored clearly. 
9  Constantine’s son, Constantius who became the emperor embraced the views of the excommunicated 
presbyter Arius. Desiring unity above all else, Constantius accepted the views of Arius as evidence of 
orthodoxy. From 350 to 361 Constantius controlled the whole of the Empire and set about vigorously 
opposing Nicene orthodoxy. Arius was readmitted to communion two years after the Council of Nicaea and 
was elected bishop of Constantinople. Athanasius, who succeeded Alexander as bishop of Alexandrian in 
328, was sent into exile for refusing to readmit Arius to the Alexandrian church (Stevenson 1966:1). As 
emperors of various persuasions succeeded one another, Athanasius was forced to flee his diocese no fewer 
than five times. The thoroughgoing Arians surfaced and succeeded in gaining wide approval for their 
beliefs at a series of councils. At the Second Council of Sirmium, in 357, the Arians had the terms removed 
that were offensive to them. At the same time, however, as a result of the very triumph of extremism, there 
emerged a moderate party under the leadership of Ancyra rallied around a compromise formula 
homoiousians “of like substance”.  
10  The council of Nicea was widely regarded as a watershed in the development of Christian teaching 
concerning Christ. It connected many of the previous discussions about Christ’s nature, some irreconcilable. 
Before long, it had become a standard of what was acceptable as “orthodox” in the greatest part of the 
Church in East and West (Kelly 1978). 
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natures (in the person of Christ) or one nature absorbs the rest of the other nature.  
Followiing the latter view, we may then have a kind of “hybrid” in the person of Jesus. 
Apollinarius who was Bishop of Laodicea (ca.310-ca.390) and a strong supporter of 
homoousion theology held such a view. Apollinarius maintained that the Logos occupied the 
place of Christ’s human spirit – performing the functions of intellect and will.  
Such a view was not quite as new; Origen held a similar belief. According to Origen, it was 
the nature of the Logos which predominated in Christ. His conception occured from the 
Logos’s indwelling, and his whole life was under the direction of the Logos. The human soul 
was, in Origen’s view, totally suffused with and caught up in the divine wisdom, goodness, 
truth and life. As Origen saw the matter, the Logos had in effect taken over the role of the 
governing principle of the Christ (Kelly 1978). 
However, a group of three theologians known as the Cappadocian Fathers (Basil the Great, 
Gregory of Nyssa and the Gregory of Nazianzus) and also Athanasius rejected the proposed 
view of Apollinarius. Athanasius contended that rejection of a normal human psychology in 
Christ clashed with the biblical picture of a saviour who was limited in knowledge, and who 
suffered and underwent every kind of human experience. It was thus held that in Apollinarius’ 
view, Jesus was not truly human, for his will was absorbed by the Logos.11
Uppermost in the concern of Apollinarius’ opponents was the advocacy of Christ as Saviour – 
his mediating role between God and humankind. In this regard, Gregory Nazianzus wrote: “If 
anyone has put his [sic – or her] trust in him without a human mind, he is really bereft of 
mind and quite unworthy of salvation. For that which he has not assumed he has not healed; 
but that which is united to his Godhead is also saved” (Stevenson 1981:98). 
 
In 378 Apollinarianism was condemned at a council held in Rome – during the pontificate of 
Damasus (and with the support of the powerful Emperor Theodosius I). Synods in the 
theological centres of the East also followed with condemnation; at Alexandria in 378 and 
Antioch in 379.12
                                                 
11  Apollinarius’ suggestion did not entail a new idea. With the widespread reaction against Origen’s most 
distinctive thesis (viz that Christ’s human soul was the point of union between the eternal Word and 
humanity) in the East, the prevailing idea was a conception of the absolute unity of the Word with the man 
Jesus. Malchion and other key bishops in the East advanced the idea that Christ’s humanity did not include 
a human soul, but that all the functions of soul in his constitution were performed by the Word incarnate 
(Kelly 1978:158).  
  
12  In A.D. 380, Emperor Theodosius issued an edict requiring his subjects to profess the orthodox faith of 
Nicea. He also raised Gregory Nazianzen to the patriarchal throne of Constantinople. 
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In May 381, Theodosius I called for a second ecumenical council to address the various 
Christological questions in a more formal way. The council was held in Constantinople. Some 
of the questions addressed by the Council can be posed as follows: Could Christ be said to be 
truly human without less being implied about his divinity than Nicea had already stated? How 
does the Spirit relate to the Father and to the Son (Kelly 1978:223)? 
After much deliberation, the Council formulated a revised creed and the formula known today 
as the Nicene Creed emerged: 
We believe in one God, the father almighty, maker of heaven and earth of all things 
visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ the only –begotten Son of God 
begotten from the father before all ages, light from light true God from true God begotten 
not made, of one substance , with the father through Whom all things came into existence, 
who because of us men and because of our salvation came down from heaven, and was 
incarnate from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary and became man, and was crucified 
for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried, and rose again on the third day 
according to the Scriptures and ascended to heaven, and sits on the right hand of the father 
and will come again with glory to judge the living and the dead, of Whose kingdom there 
will be no end .  
And in the Spirit the Lord life –giver, who proceeds from the father who with the father 
and the Son is together worshipped and together glorified, who spoke through the prophets 
in one holy Catholic and apostolic Church. We confess one baptism to the remission of 
sins, we look forward to the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. 
Amen.  
At the Council of Constantinople (381) the Nicene faith was reaffirmed, and the various 
“Arianising” deviations were placed under a ban. Undoubtedly, the condemnation of 
Apollinarius’ view first and foremost emphasised the true humanity of Christ. Nonetheless, 
the Council also promulgated what came to be known as the doctrine of Trinity (Stevenson 
1981).13
Together, the Council of Nicea and Constantinople taught that Jesus was fully divine and also 
fully human. These Councils however did not clarify how one person could be both divine 
and human, and how the divine and human were related within that one person.  
  
6.2.3 The Council of Ephesus 
The Councils of Nicea (325) and Constantinople (381) legislated on the questions of Jesus 
Christ’s deity and humanity. However, the debates about the precise nature of Christ’s 
divinity and humanity began to surface.  
(431): The question of Christ’s two natures in one person  
The first major controversy on Christ’s two natures combined in one person, concerened 
                                                 
13 Also see Bettenson (1956). 
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Apollinarianism, started by Apollinarius.14
Nestorius was concerned with the thought that God might be seen to have had a new 
beginning of some sort or that God suffered or died. To Nestorius, none of these could befall 
the infinite God. Therefore, instead of the God-man unity, he taught that there was the Logos, 
and the man, whom the logos assumed. He favoured the term Christ-bearer (Christotokos) as 
a summary of Mary’s role. Or perhaps, Mary should be named both God-bearer and Man-
bearer to emphasise Christ’s dual natures. Nestorius was accused of teaching a double 
personality pertaining to Christ: two natures and two distinct persons.
 The second major controversy and also the 
immediate event that led to the Ecumenical Council of Ephesus concerned Nestorianism. 
Nestorius was Bishop of Constantinople from 428. He emerged from the Antioch school. He 
opposed a theological and devotional slogan theotokos – St Mary as the God bearer or 
“Mother of God”.  
15
This controversy led to the third ecumenical Council which was convened at Ephesus in 
431).
 Nestorius’ main 
antagonist was Bishop Cyril of Alexandria.  
16
At the Council of Ephesus, the Fathers wanted to maintain Cyril’s basic Christological idea as 
expressed in his second letter to Nestorius.
 So violent was the controversy that the Council of Ephesus could not reach a doctrinal 
formula. It took two further years before the two sides struggled their way through to a 
common formula.  
17
                                                 
14  The major historical controversies on the notion of Christ’s two natures in one person are: Apollinarianism, 
Nestorianism, Eutycheanism, Monophysitism and Monothelitism (see Cameron 1978).  
 According to the Council Fathers, this means 
that Jesus Christ is one and the same who is eternally begotten of the Father and was born of 
Mary, in time, as a man. The Council’s concern here was exactly the same as had already 
been decisive in Nicea: God himself meets us in Jesus Christ. 
15  Nestorius denied the charge but the term Nestroianism had always been linked with his teaching. Nestorius 
was condemned and finally sent into exile at the Council of Ephesus in 431. Yet he lived long enough to see 
the substantial triumph of his beliefs at Chalcedon, but the Nestorian heresy had started. Many Eastern 
churches remained Nestorian, notably the Persian church. Nestorians never fully reunited with the Orthodox 
Church and there remain Nestorian Christians to this day.  
16  Two main orthodox views were held concering Christ’s person; the views of Alexandria and Antioch. A 
conflict between these two different views ensued for 200 years in the eastern Empire. However, in the 
western part of the Empire, Tertullian had already formulated a basic doctrine of Christ’s person stating that 
Christ has two natures in a single person; His divine nature and his human nature were both resident in a 
single person. This old idea became the basis for a compromise between the Antioch and Alexandria 
schools, but only after the church had split a couple of times and some bishops were exiled and died.  
17  The Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed speaks first of the eternal Son of God consubstantial with the Father, 
and then goes on: “For us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven. He was made flesh and 
was made man.”  
 
 
 
 
 151 
Nonetheless, a new item were added by the Ephesus decision pertaining to the identity of the 
one subject who from eternity resides with the Father and who in time has become human. 
Therefore both what is divine and what is human must be predicated to Jesus Christ.  
Thus we can and must say that Mary is the mother of God (Theotokos). In this respect, the 
Council of Ephesus formulated that Christ has two natures in one person as against the 
assumed view of Nestorius, that, Christ has a double personality: Two natures and two 
persons. 
Another issue that came up was the question whether Jesus’ humanity is to be worshipped. 
The Council maintained that Jesus’ humanity is not to be worshipped as if it were a different 
subject – only together with the Logos but both are glorified in single worship. The 
Christological orthodoxy formulated at Ephesus was therefore less theoretical or doctrinal. 
Correct prayer and correct liturgical worship became the yardsticks and criteria for correct 
belief (Kasper 1976). 
6.2.4 The Council of Chalcedon (451): The limits of the doctrine of the Person of Christ  
The most important event in all the controversies concerning the person of Christ was the 
Council of Chalcedon, held in 451. The Council promulgated a Christological doctrine known 
as “hypostatic union”. In short, this doctrine states that two natures, one human and one 
divine, are united in the one person of Christ (unio personales). 
The Council of Chalcedon was the largest council and was the last one acknowledged as 
“Ecumenical” by all branches of the church (excluding the Nestorian and Monophysitism 
churches). This Council re-condemned Eutyches, condemned Diocorus, declared Flavian a 
martyr, and supported the Tome of Leo and Cyril of Alexandria’s second letter to Nestorius. 
The Council also (for reasons that had more to do with asserting their authority) wrote up a 
new creed.  
The Council further taught 
that each of these natures, the human and the divine, was distinct and complete.  
The immediate event that led to the Council of Chalcedon was the controversy over 
Eutycheanism. Eutyches (375-454), an archimandrite (monastic superior) from Constanti-
nople was not satisfied with the prevailing climate after the condemnation of Nestorius. He 
began to teach a form of what would later be called monophysitism, namely that Christ has 
one nature rather than two after the incarnation – therefore the God-man was to be seen as a 
single being (where the superiority of the divine over the human nature is emphasised).  
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Eutyches would not acknowledge the human nature of Christ but only that “his body is 
consubstantial with ours”. He believed that the humanity of Jesus was absorbed by the 
divinity in the same person. Based on such a contention, Flavian (449) bishop of 
Constantinople, summoned Eutyches to a synod in November 448. At the synod, Eutyches 
was questioned on his contentions. He neither denied nor retreated from his claims. Instead, 
he maintained that his doctrine was orthodox and expressed the faith of Cyril, Athanasius and 
Nicea.  
However, the inquirers believed that his doctrine led to a different kind of humanity for Christ 
than our humanity. The Fathers therefore maintained that such a view will lead to the 
conclusion that Christ could not save us because he was not fully human. Eutyches was 
therefore condemned.18
Therefore following the holy fathers we all with one accord teach men to acknowledge 
one and the same son, our lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in Godhead and complete in 
manhood , truly God and truly man consisting also of a reasonable soul and body of one 
substance (homousious) with the father as regards his Godhead, and at the same time of 
one substance with us as regards his manhood; like us in all respects apart from sin: as 
regards his Godhead, begotten of the father before the ages, but yet as regards his 
manhood begotten, for us men and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin the God bearer 
(Theotokos); one and the same Christ, son Lord, Only begotten, recognized in two natures 
without confusion, without change without division, without separation; the distinction of 
natures being in no way annulled by the union but rather the characteristics of each nature 
being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or 
separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only begotten God the Word 
lord Jesus Christ; even as the prophets from earliest times spoke of him, And our lord 
Jesus Christ himself taught us and the creed of the fathers was handed down to us 
(Bettenson 1963:51-52).  
 Afterwards, the Council framed a new creed known as the formula of 
Chalcedon. The core of that statement reads as follows: 
The Chalcedonian Creed is regarded as orthodox by the mainstream church. It became a point 
of reference for all other Christologies. However, there were again some controversies. The 
first major controversy after Chalcedon was around monophysitism. This controversy came 
about because several sectors of the church, especially the Egyptian churches, never accepted 
the decisions of Chalcedon. They maintained that Christ has “one nature” after the 
incarnation, hence the name monophysite. These groups eventually moulded into separate 
churches that did not recognise the formula of the Council of Chalcedon (451). 
While the controversy with monophysitism was still pending, another controversy referred to 
                                                 
18  Flavian sent the news to Pope Leo of Rome so that he could comment. Leo wrote back a sophisticated and 
orthodox reply condemning Eutyches and expounding on the doctrine of Christ. This document became 
known as the Tome of Leo. However, the rule of this council was later reversed against Flavian and Leo. It 
was nevertheless later adopted at Chalcedon as an orthodox statement.  
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as monothelitism also came up. Monothelitism refers to the doctrine that Christ had only one 
will. This is contrary to Chalcedon’s confession that Christ posessed both a human and a 
divine will. The supporters of monothelitism accepted the doctrine of two natures, 
nevertheless, and tried to help bridge the gap between orthodox and monophysite views – by 
proposing that Christ had only one will. Thus, their position became akin to that of 
monophysites: “one nature” after the incarnation in one person. However, this view was also 
condemned by the Third Council of Constantinople (the Sixth Ecumenical Council, 680-
681).19
6.2.5 Conclusion  
 
The Chalcedonian Creed which states that Christ was true God and true human in two natures 
but was one person (also called the hypostatic union) did not put an end to Christological 
debates. Nevertheless, it did clarify the terms used and became a point of reference for those 
who adhered to the Chalcedonian formula.  
6.3 The person of intermediaries in the traditional Akan context  
6.3.1 Introduction 
Amongst the Akan, both spirit and human beings serve as intermediaries in their various 
capacities. In the relationship between God and humankind, it is assumed by the Akan that 
God may occasionally use ordinary human beings or a spirit being to provide care, support 
and protection for other human beings. However, no human institution or priest or spirit being 
exists who particularly mediates, at least in a formal way, between God and humankind. Thus, 
from within the Akan context, there is no mediator between God and humankind; except in 
the general sense of applying the term “mediator”. Nevertheless, there are resources available 
                                                 
19  Kasper (1976) notes that the immediate sense of the Chalcedon definition is that, it makes a distinction of 
the two natures, without which Jesus’ mediatorship would be illusory. At the same time, the intention is to 
go beyond Ephesus and not merely maintain the unity of the one subject in Jesus Christ but to give it 
conceptual expression as a unity in one person and hypostasis. He notes that despite this aim, the dogmatic 
formula of Chalcedon has met with not less, but even more criticism than the Nicene Creed. He particularly 
points to the two most important objections: (a) the charge that Chalcedon has replaced the biblical and 
early church Christology which started from Jesus Christ. Instead they regarded Christ from a double point 
of view, namely, according to the flesh (sarx) and according to the spirit (pneuma) – an abstract formula 
entailing the unity and distinction of divine and human nature; (b) to speak of two natures is in any case 
problematic, because, on the one hand, the term “nature” cannot be applied equally to God and humanity, 
and on the other, an ethical or personal relation is thereby misinterpreted in a physical sense. While 
conceding to the legitimacy of the issues raised against Chalcedon, Kasper however contends that the 
Council’s confessional definition does not express any metaphysical theory about Christ, but contents itself 
with Christological negatives which safeguard the mystery.  
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in the traditional Akan view of humanity that may be employed to reinterpret the status of 
God’s unique priest as one who mediates between God and humankind.  
6.3.2 Okra in human beings: The only mediator between Onyame and human beings 
In Akan anthropology, an entity called okra provides the immediate link between God and 
human beings. Okra may be regarded as an entity seeing that okra, in the Akan thought-form, 
is believed to be a rational, relational and self-aware being. The Akan believe that okra 
pertains to the nature of God in human beings; and it is only human beings who are endowed 
with okra (Wiredu 1992).  
An Akan will rarely, if ever, make contact with Onyame through a traditional priest or any 
lesser divinity or ancestor. It is not within the practices and the operations of the priests of 
lesser divinities to present themselves as representers of Onyame. Within such a context I 
argued in previous chapters that the role of the lesser divinities and the ancestors should not 
be understood as one of mediating between human beings and the Supreme Being.  
When a traditional Akan wants to offer thanksgiving and worship to Onyame (God), he/she 
would usually offer it directly to Onyame – by setting up Onyamedua (literally, God’s tree) 
and offer the sacrifice on it to God. Moreover, an Akan may also occasionally worship his/her 
okra – which is believed to be the nature of God in human beings. This is done through a 
ritual called akradware (soul washing). From this, it is already evident that the most important 
and maybe the only mediators between God and humankind within the traditional Akan 
context, are human beings themselves through okra. Thus, I will in this section focus on a 
human being as the only possible mediator between Onyame and human beings. 
6.3.3 The Akan concept of being human  
In this section, I will offer a description of the four entities that constitute being human, 
namely okra (soul), sunsum (spirit/personality), ntoro (fatherhood-deity) and mogya (blood). 
The purpose here is to lay a foundation to help reinterpret the status and position of God’s 
unique priest as truly human as well as truly God.  
a) Okra (soul) 
Of the four components that constitute a human being, the okra (soul) is of fundamental 
importance. It is believed to be the core part of every human being. According to traditional 
Akan belief, this part is provided directly by the Creator before any human being comes into 
the world (Christaller 1933:254, Opoku 1978:95, Gyekye 1987:85, Wiredu 2001:299, 
 
 
 
 
 155 
Sarpong 2002:91, Pobee 1979:88). It is believed to be the part of God residing in every 
human being which makes one a living human (being). It is thus described as a spark of 
divinity and sharing an antemundane existence with Onyame (Opoku 1978:95, Gyekye 
1987:85, Wiredu 2001:299).
The Akan believe that okra obtains leave from Onyame before it comes into the material 
world as a human being. When okra becomes “flesh” through the normal human birth 
process, it is said that okra has become teasefo (human being). The term teasefo is unique to 
human beings.
  
20
According to the traditional Akan belief, before okra becomes teasefo (a human being), okra 
would stand before Onyame to narrate the course of life it may want to take as a human being. 
Onyame may affirm what an individual okra opted for as its proposed human life after posing 
some questions to the okra. Thus, the Akan refer to human destiny as nkrabea, literally, a 
place where one said farewell to Onyame. The Akan myth of “the dialogue between Onyame 
and okra”, as composed in “high life music” by Nana Kwame Ampadu, illustrates this 
belief.
  
21
Okra is thus the bearer of one’s destiny, and the realisation of this destiny on earth is referred 
to as obra or abrabo (life) (Pobee 1979:88, Gyekye 1987:85).
  
 Such a destiny is unalterable at 
least in theory (Opoku 1978:95). Thus Akan also refer to human destiny as hyebea, literally, a 
place where one’s destiny is affirmed by Onyame.22
The bearer of human destiny, individual okra – as a rational, relational and self-aware being, 
 It is believed that, after Onyame’s 
affirmation, one’s destiny becomes unalterable. Thus, the saying goes: nkrabea or hyebea nni 
kwatibea (destiny is unalterable). 
                                                 
20  One may draw a distinction between okra which is believed to be a self-aware, relational and a rational 
entity, yet not teasefo (human being), and okra which has become teasefo. The Akan world thus comprises 
of human beings, the ancestors and those who exist (as okra) but are yet to become human beings. 
21  In the myth, there was a woman named Yaa Manua who always complained against God that the latter had 
made her infertile. To show the woman that it was rather the children in the form of okra who decided by 
themselves what their destiny on earth should be (that includes where and to whom they want to be born), 
God one day opened the “spiritual eyes” of the woman. Yaa Manua then had an opportunity to listen to the 
dialogue between Onyame and okra who was about to become a living human being – okrateasefo (through 
normal birth process). In this particular case the okra to arrive was to be born by Yaa Manua. Through the 
dialogue, the woman saw that the birth, the life and the death of someone are antecedent to the discussions 
one had with God as okra, before one became a human being. A Ghanaian musician, Kwame Ampadu has 
put this myth into music. The Yoruba have a similar belief – as described by Idowu (1962:170). 
22  Some Akan scholars identify two interpretations of the Akan concept of destiny. One view of destiny 
pertains to that which one opted for by oneself. The second view is that of a destiny that God Himself 
assigned to individual okra. Notably, the burden of the argument rests on the different interpretations of the 
two key terms nkrabea and hyebea.  
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with a specific course of life, may be regarded as a constituent agent of reason governing the 
world.23 Interestingly, Idowu has also expressed a similar view of what being human 
comprises of amongst the Yoruba in Nigeria.24
By virtue of possessing okra, a divine element, every person has an intrinsic value, the same 
in each, which one does not owe to any earthly circumstance. Thus, okra relates an individual 
human being to God uniquely and also relates individual human beings to one another. 
Associated with this value is the concept of human dignity and of kinfolk. These imply that 
every human being is entitled in equal measure to a certain basic respect, as well as nearest 
and dearest relations. Thus follows the Akan saying: Everyone is the offspring of God; no one 
the offspring of the earth (Wiredu 2001:301). 
  
For the Akan, okra is a guardian spirit or protector which guards the person and gives him or 
her advice. In this role, okra is a separate entity from the “person” and it may fail to guide and 
protect him or her; hence the expression, Ne kra apa n’akyi (his or her okra has failed to 
guide him or her; his or her okra has neglected him or her). In another expression, an Akan 
will say: someone’s okra has taken flight from him or her, leaving that person pale with fear 
(Opoku 1978, Sarpong 2002:91).  
When a person’s okra protects him or her (Ne kra di n’akyi) and gives good advice, causing 
his/her undertaking to prosper, it may become an object of worship. Okra then may be given 
thanks and offerings, just like a deity or spirit, in a ritual called akraguare (washing of the 
                                                 
23  A belief in predestination, expressed in terms of the concept of okra, seems to suggest that the Akan 
experience some anxiety about human helplessness in certain situations. However, it also expresses the 
Akan conviction that human existence has meaning. It suggests, for instance, that human beings are not set 
on a purposeless mission in this world, rather that they have a mission to fulfill, a message to deliver – 
which is the meaning of their existence – and that this mission has been fully endorsed by the Creator. 
Nonetheless, the problem remains of the apparent contradiction between the belief in predestination and the 
attribution of responsibility to human beings for their actions. If destiny, as understood in the Akan context, 
is what one (okra) opted for and is only affirmed by Onyame, then one is logically responsible for his/her 
human actions. The concept of nkrabea expresses the Akan conviction that human life must be freed as 
much as possible. One may thus infer the idea of “supremacy of human freedom” against any form of 
tyranny and despotism. The idea is that, if Onyame would allow one to determine the life one wants to live 
as a human being, amidst human despondency towards evil, then a strong lesson follows that human 
freedom must not be curtailed, so long as it does not infringe on another’s freedom. Thus, from the 
traditional Akan perspective, one may infer that, ethics must have its foundation on issues which only 
infringe on another person’s freedom. Of course there is a connected question of why God allows evil 
destiny to be part of human life. The traditional Akan do not have a myth or belief about “paradise lost” 
whereby only good exists. The Akan beliefs only point to the time when Onyame was much closer to 
human beings. The concept of nkrabea, which expresses human freedom, entails good and evil 
simultaneously.  
24  For a discussion of Akan, Mende and Yoruba concepts concerning human beings, see Opoku (1978). 
Sawyerr (1986) has also offered a discussion and comparison of the three views.  
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okra25
One Akan maxim, expressed as an epigram, is that, onipa wu a, na onwui (when a human 
being dies, he is not really dead). What is implied by this is that something resides in a human 
being – okra that is eternal, indestructible, and that continues to exist in the world of spirits 
(asamando). The okra is an element unique in a human being; animals do not possess okra 
(Opoku 1978:95). Animals and some plants, however, have a kind of spirit which the Akan 
call sasa and which they believe the power of human beings can control.
) (Rattray 1923:153, Opoku 1978:96). 
26
The okra (soul) of a human being according to the notions of the traditional Akan already 
existed and perhaps one’s okra (soul) is that of another family member or other person who is 
already dead (Rattray 1959:153). This accounts for the Akan belief in reincarnation (Sarpong 
1974:39).  
  
The final departure of okra from the body signifies death. At death, as the Akan believe, the 
okra leaves the body gradually until the person expells his last breath; but okra can be called 
back just before death, to be communicated with. After its final exit from the body, okra is 
believed to return to God to give an account of its earthly existence (Opoku 1978:96). It may 
then be allowed to return to the world through re-incarnation, or made to remain with God.27 
To the Akan, okra continues to live even after its departure from the body28
Besides the belief of okra in human beings which is the spark of Onyame’s nature, there is 
also an indication that Onyame has Okra. This is the case because it is believed that one can 
occasionally become possessed by the Okra of Onyame. Amongst the traditional Akan, as 
noted by Meyerowitz (1958:27), particular religious experiences in some years back were 
explained in terms of possession by the Okra of Onyame. From this, we may infer that it is 
possible for the Okra of Onyame to dwell in human beings.
 (Opoku 1978:95).  
29
                                                 
25  This is normally done on the day that person is born.  
 Nevertheless, the Akan do not 
26   Human beings too posess sasa. The Akan will explain the remorse that might drive the murderer to 
confession or to suicide as an operation of the sasa of the murdered person upon the murderer. To avoid the 
vengeance of the sasa, one would have to perform certain rituals called sasa duro (antidote to the vengeful 
spirit).  
27  The phrase “remain with God” may refer to either the abode of God or asamando (the dwelling of the 
ancestors) or the same place if the abode of God is the same as the dwelling of the ancestors.  
28  Every okra obtains a kradin, a name which is given to a child according to the day of the week on which the 
child is born. For example Kwaku is the name given to a child born on Wednesday, Yaa – Thursday, and 
Kofi – Friday. In addition to the kradin, each child receives a characteristic spirit corresponding to the 
spirit-deity which is believed to preside over that particular day. For example, a child born on Thursday is 
believed to be eager for battle: one born on Friday may be called Okyini (wanderer). 
29  The suggestion here is that, there is a possibility for two okra, okra in human and Okra of Onyame, to dwell 
together without confusion. We will return to this later in the discussion of the two natures in one person of 
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regard a human being as a divine being. The okra, which forms part of human nature, is but a 
spark of God’s nature. God is the Okra, and the human being posesses the spark of God’s 
nature. Analysing the role and function of okra, it is already evident that okra as a divine 
element, yet also a distinct entity, is regarded as the intermediary between a human being and 
Onyame. 
b) Sunsum (spirit/personality)  
The second component of a human being is that of sunsum. 
It is only individuals who possess sunsum. In symbolic terms, a family, a community or tribe, 
or a nation may also posess its sunsum. The Asante nation, for example, has a sunsum which 
is taken to be enshrined in the Sika Dwa, (Golden Stool), believed to be brought down from 
the skies by Okomfo Anokye – during the reign of King Osei Tutu, founder of the Asante 
nation. The Golden Stool is therefore greatly revered and tightly guarded, for what befalls it, 
good or bad, affects the Asante nation. However, such corperate sunsum entails nothing more 
than a collective sunsum of the leaders in that community, believed to be symbolically joined 
together to constitute the corporate sunsum.  
It is an intangible element in each 
human being which accounts for his/her character (suban), disposition and intelligence 
(Rattray 1923: 154, Opoku 1978). It is the sunsum which individualises a child.  
In contrast to the okra which is always constant and unchangeable, the sunsum is subject to 
change, for it is capable of being trained from the state of being “light” (ne sunsum ye hare) to 
a heavier weight (ne sunsum ye duru [literally, his sunsum is heavy]), or in other words, he is 
courageous, spirited or brave.  
The sunsum is believed to be able to leave the body while a person is asleep, and may not 
return for some time. However, the final departure of sunsum signifies the death of the person. 
It is also supposed to be the “dramatis personae” in dreams, and the part of human being 
which is open to attack by witchcraft. The sunsum of a witch for instance is believed to leave 
the body to perform misdeeds which are associated with witches. In this regard, a “heavy” or 
strong sunsum is believed to be an effective antidote against witchcraft. This belief is 
conveyed by the Akan saying: “Wo sunsum ye duru a, obayifo ntumi wo” (if you have a 
heavy sunsum, the witch cannot overcome or attack you). 
                                                                                                                                                        
Christ in section 6.4. 
The sunsum is the entity that 
protects and gives guidance, thus the saying: Me sunsum edu (sunsum is heavy); my sunsum is 
strong; my sunsum stands at my back. Such expressions are constantly heard within 
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contemporary Akan society.  
Another difference between okra and sunsum is that the former remains within a person and is 
not apparent, whereas the latter is clearly reflected in the appearance of the person and in the 
qualities peculiar to that person’s individuality, especially to his or her moral qualities.  
After death, sunsum may return to Onyame. The suggestion, particularly by Opoku, that 
sunsum died with the person may not be sustained in terms of traditional Akan thinking. As 
rightly argued by Gyekye (1987:91), if sunsum entails a spirit entity, then it is an element 
which does not die.
Again, as one views the role and functions of the sunsum in human beings, it would not be 
wrong to regard sunsum as an entity. To the Akan, sunsum is more than an active force. It is 
regarded as a rational, relational, self-aware and distinct being in itself.
  
c) Ntoro (fatherhood-deity) 
  
The third component of the human being according to Akan belief is the ntoro 
Actually, some of the functions of sunsum and ntoro overlap, yet the Akan recognise the 
distinction between the two as Opoku (1978: 98) rightly maintains (see Pobee 1978:88). The 
distinction between sunsum and ntoro, gains weight on the basis of the Akan belief that the 
three, okra, sunsum and ntoro, share information and interact in distinct ways (Gyekye 1987). 
(Rattray 
1923:155). The Akan believe that each child possesses a similar ntoro as that of the father 
(Opoku 1978: 98). The general belief is that the child inherited it from his/her father. It is 
transmitted from a father to his children and helps to account for the inherited characteristics 
of each person. It is the ntoro which moulds the child, making him/her what he/she is: kind, 
stupid, eloquent, clever, and fluent in speech, lazy or hardworking. This aspect may perhaps 
be partly compared with the role played by a person’s genetic predispositions. 
To the Akan, before a child attains puberty, his/her father’s ntoro acts on behalf of him or her, 
but after puberty, the child’s own ntoro takes over and assumes greater control (Opoku 1978). 
The belief with regard to the concept of ntoro helps to build a spiritual bond between a father 
and his child which balances the relationship between the child and its mother. 
The ntoro is considered to be instrumental in the conception of the embryo in the womb. 
However, ntoro is more spiritual in nature, a being which originates from God himself. A 
This is very 
important in a matrilineal society such as amongst the Akan, where the father does not form 
part of the family comprising the mother and children. 
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proof that this is the traditional belief given in the myth of the origin of the first ntoro ever 
bestowed upon the Akan – the Bosommuru ntoro. 
Very long ago one man and one woman came down from the sky and one man and one 
woman came up from the earth. From the Sky God (Onyame) also came onin (a python), 
and it made its home in the river now called Bosommuru. At first these men and women 
did not bear children, they had no desire to, and conception and birth were not known at 
that time. One day the python asked them if they had no offspring, and being told they had 
not, he said he would cause the woman to conceive. He bade the couples stand face to 
face, and then he plunged into the river, and rising up, sprayed water upon their bellies 
with the words kus kus, and then ordered them to return home and lie together. The 
woman conceived and brought forth the first children in the world, who took Bosommuru 
as their ntoro, each male passing this ntoro on to his children. If a Bosommuru ntoro man 
or woman sees a dead python (they would never kill one) they sprinkle white clay upon it 
and bury it (see Busia 1954:206). 
The following myth illustrates this:  
From the myth above, it could be deduced that ntoro, though associated with human 
fatherhood, is a spiritual entity that originated from God. It was God who sent the python that 
caused humans to produce offspring. However, it is noted that the pregnancy did not take 
place without a human male contributing sperms.  
Further, the Akan believe that ntoro is associated with water deities, thus all the ntoro have 
bosom (water deity) as a prefix to the ntoro (Opoku 1978:78). From this, we may infer that 
ntoro is a facet associated with God, which both human beings and the water deities share 
with God. In this respect, to translate ntoro as physical being, obscures its true identity. It is a 
component God provided for procreation. To the Akan, ntoro symbolises fatherhood. We may 
infer from this that human beings have only a spark of this nature seeing that they are created 
in the image of Onyame.
(d) Mogya (Blood) 
  
Mogya makes up the fourth component of a human being. It is translated as the blood which 
the mother gives to the child. This mother-child bond is a biological one. Every Akan belongs 
to a clan, and is bound to the clan by a blood relationship called abusua. This mogya received 
from the mother procures a child its status and membership in the mother’s abusua (a clan), 
also referred to as nton. At the same time, it spells out every member’s obligations as a citizen 
in the Akan matrilineal society (Opoku 1978:99).30 Thus one becomes an Akan and fully 
human being irrespective of anything else. Of course one must reside in a human body.
                                                 
30  All members of the same abusua consider themselves to belong to the same blood group (mogya kro - one 
blood). One who belongs to the mother’s lineage, has the right to inherit the property of the lineage 
because all the members of the lineage share a common blood. They are therefore forbidden to marry 
each other. 
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Amongst the Akan, it is believed that blood is thicker than the ntoro. Consequently, people 
who belong to the same blood – one mother – are believed to enjoy greater affinity, than those 
only from the same father. Also, as the Akan proverb has it, the chick followed the hen, and 
not the cockerel. In such an arrangement, the father is seen as a “stranger” amongst his wife 
and children. Thus, to the Akan, all that is required to show your identity as an Akan is that 
your mother is an Akan, irrespective of where the father comes from and even the nature of 
the father. 
According to the Akan, a human being is formed when the ntoro of the father co-operates 
with the mogya of the mother at the moment of conception. When the baby is born, it 
becomes okrateasefo (human being). I will return to this in more detail in section 6.4. 
The Akan believe that mogya descends to Mother Earth at death.  
6.3.4 The relations between the four entities of human being: okra, sunsum, ntoro and 
Mogya 
Firstly, we will consider the relations between okra, sunsum and ntoro. Deducing from the 
attributed interaction of okra, sunsum and ntoro in human beings, one may infer that the three 
are inseparable yet distinct entities.  
The assuming working relationship between okra, sunsum and ntoro is clearly set out in the 
case when a woman commits adultery. According to the traditional Akan belief, if a man’s 
wife commits adultery, the husband’s okra will inform his ntoro which will then let the 
sunsum know and this last entity will nag the woman; thus the expression: Me kunu sunsum 
akyere me (my husband’s sunsum has caught me). It is believed that if a woman fails to 
confess such unfaithfulness to the husband, she may fall ill and die.  
Logically speaking, this classic example may be taken as a strong indicator of three spiritual 
entities which are added to mogya to yield four components in human beings. Any contraction 
of the three entities to be reduced to less than three, betrays the interactions between them. 
Moreover, adding other entities to increase to more than three, in addition to mogya, may also 
somehow introduce non-core additional entities.
From this belief we may infer that the three (okra, sunsum and ntoro) are inseparable yet 
distinct entities. We may also infer a harmony between the three entities. They relate and 
work together in perfect harmony. Moreover, there is no sense of subordination – in terms 
hierarchical – between them.
  
31
                                                 
31  I will return to this notion in my proposal of the two natures of Jesus and also the doctrine of Trinity in 
section 6.4. 
 Added to this, the Akan also believe that one’s okra or sunsum 
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may temporarily leave the body and return later. Nevertheless, it is held that the three entities 
are inseparable.  
Secondly, we also consider the relationship between okra, sunsum, ntoro as they relate to 
mogya (blood). In Akan anthropology, a person is made up of two principal entities or 
substances: one spiritual (non-material: okra is inseparable from sunsum and ntoro) and the 
other material (mogya or body) (Wiredu 2001:299, Meyerowitz 1949:86, 115). Mogya (blood 
or body), though depending on the okra (soul), is also an entity in its own right. This is the 
case since the okra can leave the body, (temporarily though), while the body can act in the full 
capacity of a person. The blood or body (mogya) is the part which perishes when one dies, but 
okra, sunsum and ntoro (soul, spirit and one’s personality) are believed to survive death. 
There is a fundamental assumption amongst the Akan concerning the unity of the human 
personality. The Akan sometimes speak as if the relation between the immaterial (that is, okra 
plus sunsum and ntoro) and the material (mogya), are so close that they comprise an 
indissoluble or indivisible unity – though they are distinct entities. The condition of the okra, 
sunsum and ntoro depend upon the condition of the body. When the okra, sunsum and ntoro 
are enfeebled or the sunsum injured by evil spirits, ill health results. Poor conditions of the 
body affect the condition of the three components of human life as well.
Based on this description and analysis, one may infer that, to the Akan, okra, sunsum and 
ntoro are distinct entities yet inseparable ones. The three together with mogya (blood) form a 
fully fledged human being. It is believed that the permanent absence of any one of these 
connotes the death of such a person. To the Akan, one is a human being only when one 
possesses all these three components together with mogya.  
  
6.3.5 Conclusion  
Within the context of traditional Akan anthropology, human beings may be conceived to be 
located in space as well as in time. In terms of the concept of okrateasefo, there is a 
suggestion of the self-differentiation of the divine omni-spatiality. The relations between the 
okra (eternal) and teasefo (time) – thus okrateasefo (human being) suggest not juxtaposition 
but interpenetration. This is not a matter of descent but of co-presence in time and in space. 
There is then a suggestion of a simultaneous interaction of the temporal and eternal. It 
represents a way of expressing an understanding of humanity, which avoids the suggestion 
that human beings cannot relate to God.  
From the Akan anthropological perspective, then, one can understand human nature as 
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necessarily open to a dimension of transcendence. Thus the view of an entirely closed off, 
self-contained material order, which forms the presupposition of much post-Kantian Western 
theology, becomes questionable within the Akan context. In this respect, we are, at least, 
beginning to see cracks in the view that holds the spatial co-presence of two different entities 
to be inconceivable.  
If African theologians are to remain true to the Nicene definition of the person and work of 
Christ, we must seek for an interpretative framework which suggests that this life is both fully 
temporal and yet is the space wherein the eternal is present. This is what the traditional Akan 
worldview, without falling prey to pantheism,32
6.4 The Mediator between God and humankind: The incarnation of God’s 
unique priest (Nyamesofopreko) 
 offers us. In this way, we can come to 
understand Jesus as a unique instance of humanity open to God. However, this is not a 
suitable basis for our understanding of the divine status of Jesus. Such a view alone cannot 
express the Chalcedonian Christology adequately. The reason is that the ultimate end of such 
an approach may be similar to degree Christology, for human anthropology will be made 
basis of Christ’s divinity. The significance of Jesus then consists in him possessing a 
significant, even unique, number of human qualities. Nevertheless, this may provide a clue to 
work with.  
6.4.1 Introduction  
In this section, I want to draw on an Akan understanding of okra in order to explain that Jesus 
Christ is truly divine as well as truly human. The traditional Akan refer to the Okra of 
Onyame and the okra of human beings. The latter is viewed as the sparks of the former. One 
may point to the spark and the fire as the qualitative difference between okra of human being 
and the Okra (of Onyame). However, whereas the Akan regard the okra of Onyame as divine, 
human beings are not regarded as such (not even as semi-divine), only as embodying sparks 
of the divine. The idea of the okra of Onyame is not an inference from the notion of okra in 
human beings – the latter serving as basis for speculation about the former. Rather, it is a 
distinct traditional Akan belief by itself.  
In this respect, the Akan concept of okra may be understood in terms of the relationship 
                                                 
32  In the context of the traditional Akan worldview, the rationale of the eternal is in some way distinct from 
that of the temporal context – we can understand neither the one nor the other on their own terms. In this 
respect, the charge of pantheism or near-pantheism cannot be sustained. 
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between a fire and the sparks, or a mother and her children. On the other hand, when okra 
becomes flesh (human), the relationship is then seen by the Akan in terms of the relationship 
between Creator and creation and the contrast between the universal and the particular. The 
traditional Akan does not only refer to okra in human beings as a distinct yet integral part of 
being human; but similarly of the Okra of Onyame. Thus in the Akan thought-form, there is 
the Okra of Onyame (similar to the Greek concept of Logos) which is distinct yet inseparable 
from Onyame.  
Based on the above discussion, one may infer that okra entails an eternal absolute Being 
which unfolds its nature in individual human beings. On the one hand, okra may be regarded 
as Being itself. On the other hand, okra (in human beings) may also be regarded as the sparks 
emanating from Being itself. 
On this basis, and also with respect to the status attributed to Jesus as “truly human” and 
“truly God”, I propose that the status of God’s unique priest (Nyamesofopreko) may be 
interpreted as the incarnation of the Okra of Onyame (Being itself).
The Akan concept of okra thus suggests the possibility of a 
union of the concrete with the universal. The concept of okra may therefore enable one to 
speak of Jesus and his relation both to God and to humanity.  
33 This proposal may also 
enable one to understand Christ’s incarnation, his true divinity and true humanity, and his two 
natures combining in one person.34
Okra as an anthropological concept will help our understanding of the Okra of Onyame (the 
dynamic equivalent of Logos). The reason is that the Akan speculate less about the Okra of 
Onyame than about okra in human beings. Nonetheless, the Akan usually infer the nature and 
operations of the Okra of Onyame from the okra in human beings, and this may be used as a 
mode of interpretation. As the traditional Akan have already established such a mode of 
interpretation – usually inferring the nature and activities of the Okra of Onyame from the 
okra of human beings, I will in this thesis follow the same mode of interpretation. Thus, 
where original speculations about the nature and the activities of Okra of Onyame are not 
clear enough to articulate any meaningful proposal, I will indicate such a lack of originality 
  
                                                 
33  From the point of view of Nicene Christianity, every statement about Jesus taken independently from his 
relationship with God, only results in a gross distortion of the person of Christ; for the economy of Jesus 
Christ reveals the triune God. Thus, any viable Christological concept must both distinguish Jesus Christ 
from God and identify him with God and humanity at the same time.  
34  Okra links individuals to one another and to God. Okra in human beings may then, on the one hand, be 
regarded as a mediator between oneself and Being itself. On the other hand, it may also be regarded as the 
objective foundation of morality from which a theory of human solidarity can be built within the Akan 
context.  
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and make inferences from the belief about okra in human beings. In keeping with this, the 
argument of this section will be structured in two main parts. In section 6.4.2, I will offer a 
brief characterisation of okra as a Christian theological concept. Then in section 6.4.3, this 
will be placed in juxtaposition with (Nicene) Christian views on the person of Christ. This 
will be followed by a brief conclusion in section 6.4.5.  
6.4.2 The characterisation of okra as a Christian theological concept  
The Akan concept of okra expresses how the “one” (Onyame) and the “many” (human 
beings) are related. The concept is embodied with principles defining human solidarity and 
freedom. However, I do not intend to offer a coherent and systematic exposition of the Akan 
concept of okra here. Although such an undertaking would be very interesting, it would go far 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
In this section I only intend to outline some characteristics of okra – as far as this may be 
relevant for the argument of this chapter. Such perspectives are primarily my own 
reconstruction and adaptation within a Christian context, derived from the traditional Akan 
thinking on how okra may be understood. These characteristics would provide a basis for 
reinterpreting the person and the work of Christ within the contemporary Akan context.35
Such a metaphysical approach is not alien to the Judeo-Christian tradition; Christian theology 
is greatly enriched through the Greek concept of Logos and Jewish personification of 
Wisdom.
  
36
a) Okra: An absolute Being which unfolds its nature in individual human beings 
 Logos is also a common term used by Philo of Alexandria. The work of Philo 
gives evidence of his attempt to unite Jewish religion and Greek philosophy. A similar 
observation may be made with regard to Western Christological discourses. Obviously, both 
the New Testament writers and the church fathers who contributed to the ecumenical councils 
relied on the non-Jewish concepts to communicate the Christian message. Thus the 
introduction of okra as an African (even an ecumenical) Christological concept would be in 
line with methodological practices in Christian theology.  
In the Akan thought-form, Onyame stands as a rational, eternal and absolute Being. The Akan 
do not regard, and never have regarded Onyame as their tribal god. Rather, Onyame is seen as 
                                                 
35  Pobee (1979:88-91) interprets the person of Christ on the basis of Akan anthropology; however, he applied 
it only to Jesus’ humanity. As an advocate of functional Christology, one would not expect Pobee to 
express the divinity of Christ in ontological terms. 
36  In the last centuries before Christ, Wisdom was hypostasised as personified intelligence and this became a 
dominating tenet in Jewish theology.  
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the Supreme Being whose benevolence extends to all people. Onyame is regarded as an 
invisible rational life. The creation of the universe is attributed to Onyame and He/She is 
regarded as the governing principle of the universe. According to the Akan belief, Onyame 
has okra and so do human beings; the latter’s okra emanates as sparks from the former’s.37
The okra which forms the core component of an individual human being is regarded as 
rational, self-aware and relational. It is also believed that okra accounts for the nature of God 
which God imparts on every human being. Alongside with this belief, one may further infer 
that okra is an eternal absolute Being which unfolds its nature in individual human beings.  
  
The Akan concept of okra shows some similarities with the Greek concept of Logos which 
underpins much of Christian theology, particularly Western Christian theology. On the one 
hand, there is the concept of the universal Logos which may be regarded as the dynamic 
equivalent of the Okra of Onyame. On the other hand, the notion of the human soul was 
regarded as a particular manifestation of the universal Logos. This is similar to the Akan 
notion of okra in human beings. 
Platonists believe that the individual human soul participates in the divine Logos. Both the 
universal Logos and the human soul, in the Greek thought-form, maintain mutual awareness 
of one another, thus combining God and humanity. The Akan notions of the okra in human 
beings and the Okra of Onyame also point to such mutual awareness – on the basis of the 
analogy of sparks and fire.  
Nonetheless, the later Greek concept of the “impassability of God”, particularly that of 
Aristotle, expresses complete separation of the concrete and universal. However, it is with 
respect to such a Greek concept of the “impassability” of God that Christian theologians 
introduced the concept of incarnation. This has been maintained ever since, despite the many 
conceptual confusions and subsequent conflicts which have followed Christianity since then. 
Akan Christians need not accept the Greek doctrine of impassability of God. Nevertheless 
their concept of okra provides a coherent framework to interpret the Christian doctrines of 
God and humanity in a way that allows their interpenetration.  
                                                 
37  The Akan believe that Onyame has Okra. Such an assertion gains ground in the Akan interpretation of 
certain phenomena as being “possessed by the Okra of Onyame” (Meyerowitz 1958:27).  
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b) Okra: An invisible rational vitality (IRV) which expresses how the “one” (Onyame) 
and the “many” (human beings) are related 
The variegated world with its multiplicity poses the problem of how the one and the many are 
related. From the theistic point of view, this problem may be addressed with reference to the 
Creator and creation. Thus this complex world with its multiplicity of features is the product 
of one single cause. With respect to human beings, the concept of okra does not only account 
for the idea of such a single cause, but also explains how the one source and the many 
products are related.  
In Christian theology, the concept of okra may be explained within the context of the 
doctrines of God, humanity and creation. Specifically, the Christian concept of imago Dei 
expresses this idea; God relates to the individual human beings through His/Her nature (or 
okra) the imago Dei (humans representing God’s image in the world).  
c) Okra: The embodiment of ultimate reality (Onyame) and the governing Reason of  
the world  
Within the context of the Akan traditional religion, Onyame – the governing Being – has 
revealed itself in individual human beings in the form of okra. In terms of the Akan belief, 
okra is the bearer of each individual’s human destiny as already explained in 6.3. From this 
point of view, one may infer that okra, as the nature of God which unfolds its nature in the 
phenomena of individual human beings, constitutes the governing reason of the world.  
In Stoicism, the concept of Logos expresses the ordered and teleological oriented nature of the 
cosmos. It can thus be equated with God and with the cosmic power of reason, of which the 
material world is a vast unfolding unit. 
In the mystery religious sects, Logos takes on a special sense as sacred history, or holy 
doctrine, or revelation. Logos denotes a creative potency, the guide and agent of knowledge, 
increasingly represented as a doctrine of revelation. It is God’s creative power, and as such it 
orders and governs the visible world. It is distinctive inasmuch as the Logos is specifically the 
logos tou theou. 
Logos is also personal, and its origin and mode of operation are described in images taken 
from the sphere of procreation. In the Hermes-Logos theology, Logos is personified as 
Hermes (also Pan, Isis, etc.). Hermes serves as a mediator or herald of the divine will and also 
as the great force of conception.  
Nonetheless, in the Greek thought-form, there is no suggestion that Logos may be understood 
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as a locus of incarnation. Instead, Logos was interpreted in terms of an equation of the 
revelatory and cosmogenic principle with a deity, i.e., its hypostatising as a god.  
In Christian theology the Logos becomes flesh in Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus Christ is thus 
regarded as a person functioning within the conceptual framework of Logos. On this basis, if 
Jesus would be regarded in terms of the Okra of Onyame, one may also expect that he would 
manifest all the attributes of the Okra of Onyame. In this particular case, Jesus may be 
regarded as the embodiment of ultimate reality (Onyame) and thereby the governing reason of 
the world.  
d) Okra: The bearer of individual destiny and universal history 
On the basis of the traditional Akan culture and worldview, one may see world history as a 
drama in which individual human beings participate in a unique way. This drama is ultimately 
being controlled by Onyame. No individual human being is a mere spectator in the world but 
an actor, playing a part in the drama of Onyame. In this drama, the Akan believe that the okra 
obtains permission from Onyame before it arrives into the material world to play its part. In 
this regard, okra is regarded as the bearer of one’s destiny. To establish the Akan idea of 
universal history, one may refer to the total sum of such human destinies, embodied in the 
individual okra and managed by Onyame – all of which constitute world history.38
Expressing it differently, the traditional Akan believe that okra in the human being is the 
bearer of a person’s destiny. Based on this belief, one may infer that, if there is the ultimate 
Okra (Okra of Onyame) from which the okra in human beings derives its existence, such 
Okra of Onyame may be regarded as the bearer of the universal destiny.  
 
In Christian theology, particularly within the context of the doctrine of atonement, Christ is 
regarded as the bearer of universal destinies and history. Thus, if Christ is regarded as the 
Okra of Onyame, there would be an adequate conceptual framework to interpret not only the 
person but the work of Christ as well within the African Christian context.  
                                                 
38  If the universal history is being controlled by Onyame, as is assumed within the Akan context, would the 
Akan affirm with G.W. Leibniz that “This is the best possible world”? Or affirm with F.H. Bradley that 
“This is the best possible world and everything in it is a necessary evil”? Indeed any application of the 
theistic paradigm requires an explanation of evil in the world. Another connected question is: Does history, 
which is assumed to be under God’s control, steer towards a purpose? For Hegel it does, for Christianity it 
does, and of course for the Akan as well. But what is the Akan view of the purpose of universal history? 
These questions may be interesting to pursue but reach beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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e) Okra: The essential link between God and oneself  
Amongst the traditional Akan, the first role that okra fulfills as a link between God and 
humankind is that okra serves as the bearer of one’s destiny. Secondly, it is through okra, as 
the Akan believe, that human beings have access to God. Thirdly, after death, it is believed 
that the human okra returns to God to give an account of one’s existence on earth. Therefore, 
okra is an invisible rational vitality (IRV) which serves as an essential link between the 
Supreme Being and human beings as well as between individual human beings. Okra thus 
links each individual human being to God, to one another and all human beings together in 
one universal family. On this basis, okra may not only be regarded as the link between God 
and humanity but also the locus of human solidarity under the motherhood of God.39
A similar connotation is also evident from the Greek concept of Logos. We see this in the 
speculations of hermeticism on creation and revelation, in which the Logos is portrayed as the 
son of God, the demiurge, who plays the role of an intermediary, as an image of the deity of 
which humanity itself is an image. For Philo, the divine Logos is also a mediating figure 
which comes from God, forms a link between the transcendent God and the world, and 
represents humanity as a high priest and advocate before God (Kleinknecht 1986:507). 
  
The concept of the imago Dei in Christian theology is similar to the Akan concept of okra. 
Also, the analogy of “stem and branches of a tree” that Jesus applied according to the Gospel 
of John (15:1-8) illustrates the relationship between the Okra of Onyame and that of human 
beings. If Jesus would be seen as Okra of Onyame, there would be adequate grounds to 
explain the Christian spirituality within the Akan Christian context. This is especially 
pertinent in terms of the need to abide in Christ through the spiritual nourishment of prayer. 
f) Okra: An object of worship 
Another interesting characteristic of okra is that, although it is an invisible rational vitality 
(IRV) which is regarded as an intrinsic part of one’s being, okra is nevertheless regarded as 
an object of human worship. Okra is projected to be outside of and something greater than 
oneself; something that may be venerated and worshipped. 
One may pray to one’s okra for further life, strength and protection for oneself and one’s 
people.40
                                                 
39  Such a notion illustrates the Akan attribute to Onyame as Onyame baatanpa (God the excellent mother). 
 This is not just a matter of self-talk or murmuring to oneself. Rather, such act of 
40 The usual occasion for such worship is when one comes to believe that his or her okra has protected him or 
her and has rendered good advice, causing one’s undertaking to prosper. In such rites, one may give thanks 
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prayer is envisaged as a subject praying to an object. Usually, one will set a simple “temple” 
for one’s okra to make such subject-object worship meaningful.41 Note that one would not 
worship someone else’s okra but one’s own okra.42
If the individual okra is believed to be an object of individual worship, one may logically 
infer that the Okra of Onyame should be an object of universal worship. From this, one may 
further infer that, if Jesus is regarded as the Okra of Onyame, there would then be a basis, 
within the Akan context, to accord him universal worship. Furthermore, the concept of okra 
may give one a conceptual framework to express the Christian notion of Jesus being God, yet 
offer prayers to God. If one can offer prayers to one’s okra, then Jesus being the Okra of 
Onyame incarnate may also be able to offer prayers to Onyame. Indeed, the Western 
worldview lacks such subtle intricacies hence the difficulty of accepting that Jesus being God 
can pray to God in a subject-object manner. Obviously, there is a limit to the knowledge one 
can acquire in this way. This is largely dependant on one’s conceptual apparatus acting as a 
filter and organiser of the received data. Although the Enlightenment worldview suggests that 
such a notion is implausible, this does not necessarily mean that it cannot be retrieved. 
  
g) Okra: The nature of Onyame (God) 
In the Akan thought-form, okra is an IRV from God that relates individual human beings to 
God. As sparks from the Okra of Onyame, okra in the individual human being shares in the 
nature of God and thus relates individuals to Onyame and also to one another. Based on these 
beliefs, one may suggest that okra may form the constituent nature of Onyame or constitute 
the essence of Onyame. 
From the Akan anthropological perspective, we can then understand through okra why all 
human nature is regarded as necessarily open to a dimension of transcendence.43
                                                                                                                                                        
and offerings to his or her okra, just as one would offer a deity or spirit thanks and offerings. The Akan 
refer to this ritual as akradware – washing of the okra (Rattray 1923:153, Opoku 1978:96).  
 It is indeed 
an interesting way of perceiving humanity, avoiding suggestions that humanity is a closed-off 
41  For details of akradware (soul worship) see section 6.3. 
42  However, when one dehumanises another human being, an Akan will rebuke that person with a statement: 
wobra Onyame (literally, you have grossly oppressed God). Here the suggestion is that one cannot oppress 
another human being without offending God. 
43  Nonetheless, there is an indication in the myth of God’s self-withdrawal that such access has been marred 
due to humankind’s sin against God. To what extent such a relationship is damaged is not clear and may be 
subject to debate; yet there is no discussion on this issue in Akan literature. Perhaps, one might argue that 
the myth of God’s self-withdrawal may have the single focus of explaining why the sky, which is regarded 
as God’s abode (not identified with God) is so far removed from the earth, the abode of the human beings. 
However, on the basis of the myth, the fact still remains that the Akan have a sense of the marred relation 
between God and humankind. 
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reality, in no way capable of a relationship with God.44
Nonetheless in terms of Akan beliefs, there are clear-cut structural differences between 
Onyame, who is regarded as the Creator, and human beings who are regarded as creatures. 
Just as the Christian concept of imago Dei does not necessarily turn human beings into divine 
beings, in the Akan thought-form, the analogy of “substance and sparks” i.e. fire and sparks 
does not prefix divinity to human beings. The concept of okra (in a human being) only 
suggests that some divine entity is in human beings but this is entirely different from the 
suggestion that human beings are divine or semi-divine in themselves.  
 
It is to be noted that the Father Origen proposed a theory in which he viewed humanity as 
basis for Christ’s divinity. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  
It is indeed questionable whether the Nicene notion of Jesus’ divinity could be based on such 
grounds. If all that Jesus had was okra – a divine spark like any other human being – then 
Jesus’ uniqueness would consist in him being a unique and perfect human being. In this 
respect, okra (spark of God’s nature) forms the basis of Christ’s divinity.  
When Jesus is seen as an ideal type of such humanity, he then becomes some kind of divine 
fulfilment of imago Dei to represent the rest of humankind. With such an approach, one may 
argue strictly “from below”. Jesus may then be regarded as being of one substance with us as 
touching humanity. He would then be like us in all things apart from sin. However, such a 
view is hardly equivalent to the Nicene formula “of one substance with the Father” (Gunton 
1997:126). Thus such a view only safeguards the humanity of Christ.  
Moreover, within the context of this view, the temporal order may be regarded as absolute; by 
itself divine. Thus, it may become impossible to distinguish the order of salvation from that of 
creation. Jesus then becomes the saviour only in terms of a divinised evolution.  
To overcome this problem, and to reformulate the Nicene formula of the divinity of Jesus 
adequately in the Akan context, I will draw from the Akan concept of the Okra of Onyame, 
which all other okra originate from. That is to say, the Okra of Onyame may have become 
incarnate in Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique priest).  
                                                 
44  In this way, the proponents of “degree” and “functional” Christologies proposed that we can conceive of 
Jesus as a unique instance of humanity open to God. This is indeed how far Rahner’s (1978) 
anthropological basis for Christology could reach (see Gunton 1977). Rahner might have been influenced 
by Origen’s incarnation theory in this regard. Several Christologies have been built along this line of 
thinking – whereby humans could ascend to become divine. Someone might also wish to apply the Akan 
concept of okra to follow suit. 
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h) Okra: The nature of being human/of human beings/humanity 
In the Akan thought-form, the concept of okrateasefo simply denotes that the divine spark 
(okra) has become a human being (teasefo). Thus, okra as a divine spark has the capacity to 
become a human being without any confusion with human nature. However, in this proposal I 
suggest that not only the divine spark should be seen as the embodiment of human flesh, but 
also the Okra of Onyame. Such an idea may be expressed as the Okra of Onyame, being the 
incarnation of God’s unique priest (Nyamesofopreko).  
The Greeks speculated that the sacred Logos had union with a deity in whom the initiate is 
also logos tou theou. Thus, gods like Osiris and Hermes are personifications of the Logos or 
the sons of God. Nonetheless, historically Logos was not regarded as a unique being; not as 
the only-begotten One who became one unique human person (Kleinknecht 1986:507).  
It is only in the New Testament, particularly in the prologue of the Gospel of John, where we 
find ho logos in the absolute. In 1 John and the Gospel of John, Logos is the historical Christ 
in a dynamic equation. The identity of Jesus and Logos emerges here as the kernel of all New 
Testament sayings that apply Logos in a specific sense; the new aspect is the pre-existence of 
the Logos and its emergence in history. Pre-existence as the distinctive theme in John 1:1ff. is 
now placed thematically at the head and expressed through the term Logos. In John 1 the 
basic idea is explained in terms of the eternal glory in flesh, that exists in the historical Jesus. 
There is also an interesting development of the concept of Logos in Origen’s thoughts. He 
expounds a theory that there is a world of spiritual beings, including human souls, that pre-
existed from all eternity (see Kelly 1978:155; Chadwick 1982:105). He used this as a key to 
expose the incarnation of Christ. 
According to Origen, one of these souls, the one destined to be the soul of the man Jesus, in 
every respect a human soul like the rest, was from the beginning attached to the Logos with 
mystical devotion; with love and desire for justice.  
He postulated that all the other souls, by the misguided exercise of their free will, fell away 
from the Logos, to whom they ought to have adhered. But this unique soul, according to 
Origen, as a result of its adoring contemplation, became inseparably united with the Logos. 
He noted that this is to be conceived of as union, and not mere association, and that such 
union was a complete one.  
Origen explains that since this soul, while cleaving to the Logos, properly belonged to a body, 
it formed the ideal meeting point between the infinite Word and finite human nature. So when 
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it was born from the blessed virgin with pure flesh created by the action of the Spirit, God-
head and humanity were inextricably united. Origen then contends that it was natural for this 
special soul to be designated God’s Son, in union with the flesh with which it was conjoined. 
With this theory of the mediating role of Christ’s human soul, Origen expounds his doctrine 
of the incarnation.  
On the other hand, he also insists on the duality of Christ’s natures, referring to Christ’s 
manhood and even to his hypostasis as man and his hypostasis as only-begotten Son. With the 
traditional teaching as his starting -point, Origen was thus able to explain the rationale for the 
incarnation in terms of his philosophy. However, such an insight is not adequate to express 
the divine status of Jesus as defined at the Council of Chalcedon.  
The Father Clement also contends that the Logos “has come to us from heaven” and “entered 
into” or “attached” Himself to human flesh. Clement explains that in becoming incarnate and 
making himself visible, the Logos has begotten Himself, that is, He created His own 
humanity. From this, Clement argues that Christ is both human and divine – alone both God 
and man. He has “clothed Himself with a man”, so that he is God in the form of a man 
unsullied (Kelly 1978:154). Justin in his discussions of Logos in the Christian context also 
questions why one should shy away from believing that the Logos could be born of a virgin if 
the Logos has been active in all human beings, imparting to them whatever goodness and 
knowledge they possessed.  
From within the Akan context, one may also question why the Okra of Onyame cannot 
become teasefo (a human being), seeing that the sparks of Okra Onyame have been active in 
all human beings, imparting to them whatever goodness and knowledge they possessed. In the 
Akan thought-form, okra is indeed destined to become a human person – nothing human is 
alien to okra. 
The crucial difference between the proposals of Origen, on the one hand, and Clement and 
Justin, on the other hand, is the meeting point for Christ’s incarnation. For Origen, Christ’s 
soul (while cleaving to the Logos) formed the ideal interface between the infinite Word and 
finite human nature. For Clement and Justin, the Logos itself serves as interface between the 
infinite Word and finite human nature. In my proposal here, it is not any form of okra (which 
emanates as spark) that serves as meeting point of incarnation. Instead, it is the Okra of 
Onyame that becomes teasefo (a human being).45
                                                 
45  Nonetheless, while Origen’s view runs the risk of degree Christology, Clement and Justin’ views are also 
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i) Okra as co-presence of time and eternity  
According to Gunton (1997:158), the dynamic interrelationship between the temporal and the 
eternal realm is less sustained in contemporary Western theological discussions. However, for 
the traditional Akan, the very beginning of theology lies in conceiving of human nature as 
being necessarily open to a dimension of transcendence. In this way, one can come to view 
humanity as being open to God.46
In the Akan belief, the okra which originates from the Okra of Onyame, is destined to become 
human and when it does, the okra then becomes okra-teasefo (a human being). However, 
when there is any suggestion that the Okra of Onyame has become okra teasefo (human 
being), or became a historic person in particular, then there is indeed an instance of the co-
presence of time and eternity. This may be similar to what Nicene Christianity
 But the Akan do not regard such a transcendent dimension 
as a means whereby a human being could ascend to become divine.  
47
Thus we may draw from the Akan concept of Nyame-kra-teasefo as the basis of Christ’s 
incarnation. On the one hand, the term teasefo when used to refer to Jesus, guarantees his co-
humanity with the rest of humankind. On the other hand, the phrase Okra of Onyame also 
adequately expresses Jesus’ divinity. The proposal is based on the Akan concept of being 
human, with a counterbalancing emphasis on the (divine) Okra of Onyame. 
 would term 
“incarnation”. In the Nicene tradition, incarnation is regarded as the event in which the two 
orders are brought together in the historical realm. The outcome represents the movement of 
the love of God into time. Such an experience is uniquely found in the person of Jesus Christ. 
In the Akan context, such an idea can be adequately expressed by the notions of the Okra of 
Onyame (eternal) and teasefo (time). This is in fact a crucial aspect of the proposal offered in 
this thesis, namely that the Okra of Onyame – from which all human okra originates – has 
become a historic agent in the person of Jesus Christ as the Nyamesofopreko. In the person of 
the Nyamesofopreko, one can speak of the co-presence of time (teasefo-human being) and 
eternity (Okra of Onyame). 
                                                                                                                                                        
prone to the heresy of docetism. There is therefore a need to demonstrate how a Nyamesofopreko 
Christology could avoid these two extremes and their associate heresies.  
46  This is exactly what a number of Western theologians– for example Rahner and Pannenberg– would 
contend. 
47  The Council of Chalcedon (451) fomulated that Jesus was fully divine and fully human in two natures 
without confusion, without change (contra monophysites), without separation, without division. Both 
natures are united in one person and one hypostasis. 
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j) Okra in relationship: Distinct yet inseparable from Onyame 
Amongst the Akan, it is believed that okra is of the very same substance of Onyame yet 
distinct by itself – as the Akan do not use the terms okra and Onyame interchangeably. In the 
Akan belief, okra, particularly in reference directly to Onyame, denotes Onyame, yet okra 
does not exhaust the content of Onyame. In the Akan thought-form, such intricacies exist both 
to distinguish okra from Onyame as well as to identify it with Onyame. This proposition 
correlates with the notion of okra residing in human being. To the Akan, okra is believed to 
be inseparable from being human, yet okra is distinct enough to be approached in prayers and 
even accorded worship.  
In addition to okra, there are also two invisible rational vitalities (IRV’s) namely, ntoro and 
sunsum which may be regarded as the constituents of Onyame. Although these three IRV’s 
okra, ntoro and sunsum, are inseparable, each may be regarded as distinct in itself. Thus, in 
terms of the traditional Akan thought-form, one must distinguish okra from Onyame as well 
as identify it with Onyame. 
By comparison, the doctrine of Trinity was prompted by the need both to distinguish Jesus 
Christ from God and to identify him with God. This was deemed crucial in order to avoid the 
heresies of modalism and tritheism. One may argue that the Akan concept of okra expresses 
such a necessary distinction and identification adequately. It may therefore provide the 
categories required for a reconstruction of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in an 
African/ecumenical context.  
k) Okra as an invisible rational vitality in a relationship: Distinct yet inseparable from 
sunsum and Ntoro  
Amongst the Akan, it is believed that okra is distinct, self-aware and relational. In addition, 
okra, sunsum and ntoro may be regarded as IRV’s, since these three are believed to be 
invisible and also acting on one another in a rational and harmonious manner. Thus, of the 
four vitalities that constitute a human being, with the exception of mogya (blood) which the 
Akan view as purely physical, I contend here that the three namely okra, ntoro and sunsum 
are indeed IRV’s.  
In Akan thought (affirmed amongst Akan scholars), the suggestion that okra originates from 
Onyame is unanimously accepted. Nonetheless, there is an ongoing debate between Gyekye 
and Wiredu on whether okra can be translated adequately as “soul” or not. Wiredu maintained 
that amongst the Akan, it is believed that a person can spiritually “observe” and communicate 
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with okra. On this basis, okra would entail a quasi-physical entity. Gyekye, by contrast, 
argued that, within the Akan context, the connotations attached to such a spiritual 
“observance” of okra if any, do not necessarily entail observing something of a physical or a 
quasi-physical nature. Amongst the Akan, rarely, if ever, has anyone made an attempt to 
describe what okra in the material form looks like. With Gyekye (1987), I therefore maintain 
that okra is an invisible rational vitality (IRV).  
Similar debates are raging about the contention that sunsum is an invisible vitality. The 
debates centre on the question of whether sunsum is derived from one’s father or from 
Onyame. Gyekye (1987) and Opoku (1975) may be right to affirm that sunsum is also derived 
from Onyame. Since Akan scholars generally maintain that sunsum does not die, it may be 
regarded as an invisible being. As Opoku maintains, and as is succinctly argued by Gyekye, 
Busia and Danquah might have mistakenly identified ntoro with sunsum. In the Akan belief, 
the two entities are not identical. As Opoku and Gyekye rightly maintain, it is generally 
believed amongst the Akan that okra and sunsum originate from Onyame and ntoro and 
mogya come from the father and the mother respectively.  
However, having argued that okra and sunsum are invisible beings, the issue that has to be 
addressed here is the claim that ntoro is an invisible being. The important question in this 
regard may be posed as follows: If mogya comes from the mother and ntoro from the father, 
and the two are held to be the determining factors of human conception, why could mogya be 
regarded as physical and ntoro as invisible? 
In response to this question, I first concede that amongst the Akan, ntoro has been generally 
associated with the human father. It is believed that ntoro is what the father contributes 
towards the conception of a human being. Thus ntoro is considered to be instrumental in the 
conception of the embryo in the womb. However, I argue here that although ntoro is 
associated with the human father, this does not necessarily preclude one from viewing ntoro 
as both a physical and a spiritual vitality. In the Akan thought-form, when one moves beyond 
the surface, ntoro is more than physical; it entails an invisible rational vitality that has a 
physiological dimension in a form of DNA via spermatozoa.  
The first reason is that, according to the Akan, ntoro does not die. After someone dies, that 
person’s ntoro will go into his/her sons. When one does not have sons, it will go into one’s 
brother’s sons (anyone of them if there are more than one). Obviously, a living creature that 
does not die, would belong to the realm of spirits.  
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Secondly, as already indicated, amongst the Akan, if one’s wife commits adultery, it is 
believed that the three – okra, ntoro and sunsum work together to punish that unfaithful 
wife.48
Thirdly, from the “myth of ntoro”, as explained in 6.3, it could be deduced that ntoro, though 
associated with human fatherhood, is an invisible vitality that originated from God. 
Furthermore, the Akan believe that ntoro is associated with water deities, thus all the ntoro 
have bosom (water deity) as a prefix to the ntoro (Opoku 1978:78).  
 It is believed that the man’s okra will inform his ntoro and the ntoro will inform his 
sunsum to nag the woman; the woman might then die if she refuses to confess her infidelity. 
Obviously, this belief places ntoro in the category of the other two (okra and sunsum) as an 
invisible vitality.  
From this, we may infer that Ntoro is a component associated with God, which both human 
beings and the water deities have in common with God. In this respect, to translate ntoro as 
physical entity would obscure its true identity.  
For the Akan, the three dimensions, okra, sunsum and ntoro, stand at par with each other. 
Thus their order of arrangement is arbitrary; the arrangement does not connote any sense of 
superiority of one over the others. The Akan do not assign any superiority to any of the three 
invisible vitalities or interpret them in terms of ontological subordination.   
These three invisible rational vitalities provide us with terminology that may be applied to 
reformulate the Christian doctrine of Trinity within an African context. This would provide 
the necessary foundation for any sound Christology. Pannenberg (1977:36) rightly notes that 
while Christology must begin with the man Jesus, its first question must relate to his unity 
with God.  
Nonetheless, as Mugambi (1998:158) has noted, the notion of Trinity is not clearly articulated 
in African Christianity. This poses a major challenge for African Christian theologians. He 
points out that many African Christians identify Jesus with the Holy Spirit and draw no 
distinction between God, Jesus and the third Person of the Trinity.  
As it is necessary to explain the divinity of Jesus within the framework of a triune God, I 
suggest, with respect to the discussions of 6.3, that the notion of God the Father may be 
interpreted witin the Akan context as Onyame Ntoro, God the Son as Onyame Okra and God 
the Holy Spirit as Onyame Sunsum. 
                                                 
48  Interestingly, there is no internal “watchdog”-system for the unfaithful husbands. 
I will return to this proposal in chapter 8. 
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l) Conclusion 
Based on the above characteristics of okra, one may infer that the Akan concept of okra may 
be regarded as the dynamic equivalent of the Greek concept of Logos. Thus the purpose of 
this comparison is to explore the similarities as well as differences between the two.49 Such a 
comparison may help to assess the applicability of okra as a Christological concept.50
There appear to be more similarities than differences between the two concepts. Both Logos 
and Okra may be regarded as metaphysical realities.
  
 
Both Logos and Okra suggest how the “one” the (ultimate reality) and the “many” (human 
beings) are related. Thus both the conceptions of Logos and okra suggest the notion of 
“Being-itself”. Moreover, both Logos and okra may be regarded as the governing Reason of 
the world. 
Logos expresses the ordered and 
teleologically oriented nature of the cosmos. In Akan thought Okra entails the embodiment of 
the ultimate reality (Onyame). 
Further, both Logos and okra are regarded as the presence of transcendence within the 
immanence reality. Logos is regarded as indicating the presence, that is, the immanence of 
God. Amongst the Akan, okra (which characterises the nature of God) forms the core 
component or inner essence of an individual human being. Thus, each individual human being 
uniquely represents the presence of God in time. In this respect the Akan believer would state 
that everyone is a child of God. 
Furthermore, both Logos and okra are regarded as mediating invisible vitalities between 
ultimate reality and humanity. For Philo the divine Logos is a mediating vitality which 
originates from God. Logos thus forms a link between the transcendent God and the world, 
and represents humanity as a high priest and advocate. Okra may also be regarded as the link 
between oneself and Onyame (God). Both Logos and okra are regarded as being of the same 
nature as God yet distinct in person from God. Both Logos and okra are objects of worship. 
Both okra and Logos are believed to be pre-existent and eternal.  
There are some differences between the two as well. According to the traditional Akan belief, 
                                                 
49  As okra has been rendered as soul and equated with nefesh, it is necessary to explain okra against the 
background of these two terms.  
50  It will be rather interesting if a similar and more detailed comparison could be undertaken within Yoruba 
context. Gbadegesin’s (1998:148-168) analysis of the Yoruba concept of human being will be an invaluable 
aid in such a project. One may also consult Idowu’s analysis of the Yoruba concept of a human being. For 
the similarities and differences between the Akan and Yoruba concepts of human being, see Gbadegesin 
1998:158-159. Gbadegesin has also indicated some major differences between Wiredu and Gyekye (see 
Wiredu and Gyekye 1992). 
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okra entails an invisible vitality which is rational, self-aware and relational. However there 
are no such attributions to Logos, at least not in pre-Christian references to the Logos. 
Another difference is that, whereas the concept of okra contains divine and human 
connotations – in the analogy of substance and spark – the same cannot be said about the 
concept of Logos, at least not its pre-Christian usage. 
By comparison, the Akan concept of okra shares the New Testament idea of the pre-existence 
of the Logos. On this basis, and also with respect to the status attributed to Jesus as “truly 
human” and “truly God”, I propose that the status of God’s unique priest (Nyamesofopreko) 
may be interpreted as the incarnation of the Okra of Onyame.51 This proposal may also enable 
one to understand Christ’s incarnation, his true divinity and true humanity, and his two 
natures in one person. On the basis of this assumption, I have, and will continue, in this thesis, 
to use upper case for the first letters of the three terms, namely Ntoro, Okra, and Sunsum 
when I refer to the nature of God. I will use lower case; ntoro, okra and sunsum when 
referring to human beings (except for a heading or at the beginning of a sentence).52
6.4.3  A Christological application of the concept of Okra  
  
In this section, I want to draw on an Akan understanding of okra, as characterised above, in 
order to explain that Jesus Christ is truly divine and truly human and that he possesses two 
natures in one person, as formulated by the Council of Chalcedon (451). My intention is to 
protect this proposal, as much as possible, from the heresies condemned by the four 
ecumenical councils. I have intentionally left some key questions unanswered from the main 
argument; I will address these questions in section 6.4.4.  
a) Okra of Onyame: The basis for a proposal of Jesus’ divinity  
I have previously made a distinction between the Okra of Onyame and the okra of human 
beings. Such a distinction is based on the traditional Akan thought-form. It is highly important 
and crucial to the proposed understanding of Jesus’ divinity. For each of the two categories of 
the concept okra, namely Okra of Onyame and okra of human beings, suggests a different 
understanding of Christ’s divinity. On the one hand, when the interface between eternity and 
                                                 
51  From the point of view of Nicene Christianity, every statement about Jesus taken independently from his 
relationship with God, only results in a crass distortion of the person of Christ; for the economy of Jesus 
Christ reveals the triune God. Thus, any viable Christological concept must both distinguish Jesus Christ 
from God and identify him with God and humanity at the same time.  
52  It would also be interesting to compare the Akan concept of okra and the Christian doctrine of the imago 
Dei. 
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time is taken as the okra of human beings, similar to what Origen proposed, the end product 
of one’s proposed Christology would be functional or degree Christology. On the other hand, 
when the Okra of Onyame becomes this interface, one could move closer to the Nicene view 
of the person of Christ. My key point here is that the divinity of Jesus is defended in this 
thesis on the basis of it being the Okra of Onyame.
In terms of the traditional Akan beliefs, particularly the concept of okra as discussed in 
sections 6.3 and 6.4.2, the Okra of Onyame must be regarded in terms of its oneness with 
Onyame: therefore of the same nature as Onyame, but also as a distinct entity by itself.
  
 
In this respect, if Jesus is regarded as the Okra of Onyame, he may be seen as an invisible 
rational vitality (IRV) which pre-existed with Onyame before he became teasefo (a human 
being). Thus the Okra of Onyame as the incarnation in the person of Nyamesofopreko may be 
regarded as one who is eternal and pre-existed with God from the very beginning. Moreover, 
the person of Nyamesofopreko may be regarded as one who is homoousios with Onyame 
(God), yet a distinct rational vitality by itself.  
Okra 
is also regarded as pre-existent vitality that is eternal, rational, relational, and self-aware. 
There is no myth, maxim or story that claims that Okra had a beginning, will ever cease to 
exist or be annihilated.  
On this basis, if we may regard the person of Nyamesofopreko as the incarnation of the Okra 
of Onyame, the necessary conclusion would be that Nyamesofopreko is of “one substance 
with Onyame”. 
Such a proposal avoids running the risk of the “heresy” of modalism, for, as already indicated, 
Okra is one of the three IRVs, namely Ntoro, Okra and Sunsum which form the nature of 
God.
In this sense, the Akan concept of the Okra of Onyame is similar to the usage 
of the word Logos as a Christological concept.  
 
One advantage of this proposal is that Okra, Sunsum and Ntoro are rational, relational and 
self-aware vitalities. Another advantage is that these three IRV’s are believed to cooperate 
harmoniously for a common good as already noted in section 6.3. In this proposal, the concept 
of Onyame is not one “substance” which can be observed in three or more different forms, nor 
an abstract noun such as love. Moreover, the three are not inanimate objects. Rather, they are 
three distinct IVR’s that stand in permanent relations with each other. This guarantees a 
Of course this raises a pertinent question that needs to be addressed in this regard. It may 
be posed as follows: What happens to Onyame in the case of Jesus’ death; does it imply that 
God Himself is dead? I will return to this in section 6.4.4.  
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Christology that is directly based on the notion of triune God. 
Furthermore, such a construction also avoids the heresy of tritheism. For, in the traditional 
Akan thought-form the three invisible rational vitalities – Ntoro, Okra and Sunsum – are 
inseparable though each remains a distinct entity, especially pertaining to human beings. The 
proposal, therefore, does not succumb to the conceptual flaw of divine assembly.  
b) Okra of Onyame became “teasefo” (human being): A proposal for Jesus’ humanity 
As I have already discussed the divinity of Jesus on the basis of the Okra of Onyame, I will 
focus in this section on the Okra of Onyame becoming teasefo. In terms of Akan belief, when 
the okra of human beings become teasefo (flesh), the designated term for that is okra-teasefo. 
In order to reinterpret the person of Christ in the Akan context, I have also in this thesis 
proposed the idea that the Okra of Onyame (the dynamic equivalent of Logos) becomes 
teasefo (human being). In this regard, Jesus becomes: Okra of Onyame (in human flesh) 
teasefo; simply Nyamekra-teasefo. The difference lies with the qualification Nyame. Thus we 
have Jesus as (Nyame) okra-teasefo and other human beings as okra-teasefo.53
When an Akan uses the term teasefo, she/he refers to all the constituents of a human being, 
namely mogya, okra, sunsum and ntoro. The term teasefo therefore means “human being” in 
the Akan language. This may be similar to the Greek concept of flesh (sarx), which denotes 
the total human being- body, soul and spirit. The Akan, however, use the term teasefo and its 
cognate term okra-teasefo interchangeably.
 
54
The Akan term okrateasefo is a combination of two words: okra and teasefo. With its formal 
use, the terms okra and teasefo denote divine spark and human being respectively. Okra is 
regarded as a living being. Likewise the Akan term teasefo describes a living being. However, 
okra is not regarded as human until it is embodied within human flesh and thus becomes 
teasefo or okrateasefo. 
  
In the Akan thought-form the Okra of Onyame is regarded as divine, yet it has to become 
teasefo (human being) before it can express adequately the Nicene/Chalcedonian view of 
Christ as truly divine as well as truly human. Nonetheless, Jesus becomes Onyame okra 
                                                 
53  I have purposely hyphenated the terms in order to help the non-Akan readers to understand their 
composition. 
54  The term okrateasefo is only meant to emphasise the idea that okra is the core component of a human 
being. Both terms okrateasefo and teasefo are exclusively used for human beings, and it connotes okra that 
has become human being – teasefo. Commenting on the term okrateasefo, Gyekye (1987:86) notes that the 
combination of the terms okra and teasefo appear to be tautologous yet signifies concrete expression.  
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teasefo (truly God and truly human), distinguished from other human beings who become 
okrateasefo (truly human with a spark of God’s nature). Jesus therefore would be regarded as 
Nyamekrateasefo (God the Okra [son] incarnate).  
Such a distinction becomes necessary as the traditional Akan do not regard human beings as 
divine. In a way every human being receives okra from God – but that does not imply that 
human beings are divine in the same way that Jesus may be regarded as the bearer of the Okra 
of Onyame – particularly in his attributed status. 
The Akan saying: Akoko kra ne Abubro de nnse (literally, the okra of the fowl and that of the 
dove are not the same) may throw some light on such a distinction. In the Akan belief, only 
Onyame (God) and human beings possess okra; animals are not endowed with okra. The 
Akan however, in a proverbial sense, attributed okra to such birds to illustrate the uniqueness 
of individual okra in terms of the mission a human being is to pursue on earth. The context of 
this proverb does not specifically delineate one person’s okra as unique. However, it does 
suggest a broad context in which the uniqueness of Jesus as the bearer of the Okra of Onyame 
may be affirmed. If Jesus, therefore, was to become the bearer of universal salvation, indeed, 
the okra of fowl (other human beings) and that of the dove (Jesus) may not be the same.  
Nonetheless, a connected question that needs to be addressed can be posed as follows: If the 
okra of Jesus and that of other human beings differ – in what way would Jesus then be fully 
human in all respects except regarding sin? In other words, if my okra is somehow of a lesser 
status than that of Jesus, is he not then elevated above me also as a human being? An 
associated crucial ethical question is: Would this Akan saying, by making a provision for 
Jesus’ uniqueness, not also serve as basis for personal discrimination in terms of “heavy” and 
“light” okra of human beings?  
The Akan saying as quoted above connotes the uniqueness of individual okra depending on 
someone’s mission in the world. A traditional Akan may find it not too difficult to accept the 
true humanity of Christ, even if one maintains that Christ is also truly divine (the incarnation 
of the Okra of Onyame). To the Akan the determining qualification for being human is to be 
born of a woman. I will discuss this issue in detail in section 6.4.4. 
The concept of the Okra of Onyame, that is Nyamekrateasefo, therefore expresses Jesus’ full 
divinity adequately while at the same time guarantees his humanity with the rest of 
humankind.55
                                                 
55  It is necessary to pose a Christology that does justice to the two aspects of the biblical picture of Jesus. 
 In this proposal, one may say, the Okra of Onyame enters the human realm; 
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indeed he was already in human beings in the form of okra (sparks emanating from the Okra 
of Onyame). 
In his discussion of the true divinity and true humanity of Christ, Justin questions why one 
should shy away from believing that the Logos could be born of a virgin. If the Logos has 
been active in all human beings, he indeed imparted to them whatever goodness and 
knowledge they possessed (Kelly 1978). Similarly, one may also ask: Why can the Okra of 
Onyame not become teasefo (human), seeing that the sparks of okra have been active in all 
human beings?56
Seeing that Jesus is truly human, his humanity may be meaningfully expressed through his 
finitude, particularly his death.
 To the Akan the determining qualification for being human is to be born 
from a woman. 
 The Akan in many ways affirm that, death is the lot of every 
human being. The Akan sayings and proverbs eloquently express this fact: Obiara be wu 
(every person will die); Onipa ba, obra twa wuo (for a person that is born of a woman, life 
should end in death). 57
In Akan society, a person also indicates that he/she is a human by showing a dependence on 
some power beyond oneself. Prayers usually symbolise such dependence, seeing that prayers 
within the Akan society are addressed to the spirit beings – God, ancestors and lesser 
divinities.
 
 
Moreover, amongst the Akan, as in the biblical world, Jesus’ finitude was demonstrated by 
his finite knowledge. An Akan is conscious of his/her finitude, as is clearly articulated in the 
maxim obi nnyim adekyee mu asem (one does not know what the next day has in store for 
him/her). Consequently the claims that Jesus lacked knowledge about the “parousia” would 
impress the Akan, as it did the biblical writers, that Jesus was finite and therefore a genuine 
human being (Pobee 1978). 
Thus Jesus’ prayers would, within the Akan society, as professed in the biblical 
writings, be the concrete expressions of his total dependence on God and therefore of his true 
humanity.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Thus, the second aspect of Jesus’ nature that we will consider is what might be termed his true ordinariness, 
at least in terms of the impression that many of his contemporaries had of him (“Is not this Joseph’s son?”). 
If Jesus’ human excellence is stressed in the wrong way, one forfeits the sense of solidarity: that Jesus was 
a human like ourselves.  
56  The possibility of such an idea could be seen in the Akan conceptuality for at least two reasons. Firstly, the 
idea that okra can become human is not an exception but a norm in Akan anthropology. Okra is not just 
active but has been intrinsically part of all human beings. Thus the idea that either okra-spark or the Okra 
of Onyame has become a human being, raises no unusual enquiries within a traditional Akan context.  
57  Pobee (1979) contends that, in traditional Akan belief, the doctrine of Jesus’ omniscience is not only false, 
but also obscures the humanity of Jesus. 
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c) Onyamekra-teasefo as the two-fold natures of Nyamesofopreko: A proposal for Jesus’ 
two natures in one person 
My proposal for Jesus’ two natures in one person is based on the concepts of the Okra of 
Onyame (Nyamekra) and okra of human being. In the previous proposals for the divinity and 
humanity of Christ I have postulated that God’s unique priest (Nyamesofopreko) possesses 
two natures, namely being truly divine as well as truly human. In this section, I make a further 
claim that these two natures exist in one person, without confusion between the two or 
subjugation of one to another. With such a proposal, a epistemological question needs to be 
addressed: Is there any conceptual link between a historical event and an eternal reality within 
the Akan context?58
Within the context of the Akan thought-form, okra (spark of the eternal) and teasefo (time) 
connote the possibility that the concrete forms a unity with the universal realm. Thus, when 
Okra of Onyame is assumed to become human, then, there is a suggestion of a meeting of two 
orders: eternal and temporal. Such a framework provides the necessary grounds for a proposal 
of Christ’s two natures in one person. For on the one hand, the Okra of Onyame, unlike the 
okra of human beings (sparks), is assumed to be fully divine. Thus the Okra of Onyame may 
constitute the full divine nature of Christ. 
  
On the other hand, the term teasefo embodies mogya, okra, sunsum and ntoro – the full 
constituents of a human being. Thus, we may assume that teasefo also constitutes the full 
humanity of Christ.59
Faced with a similar question Origen, following Socrates and Plato, proposed a theory that the 
 Nonetheless, taking this approach, we may be confronted with a heresy 
similar to that of Apollinarianism. A connected question can be posed as follows: How does 
one account for the human okra of Jesus if the Okra of Onyame entails the incarnation of the 
person of Jesus?  
                                                 
58  The success of this proposal largely depends on how I will be able to express the affirmation of Chalcedon 
against the various heresies that the Council condemned. The major historical controversies on the notion 
of Christ’s two natures in one person are: Apollinarianism, Nestorianism, Eutycheanism, monophysitism 
and monothelitism.  
59  In his argument on the scriptural basis for the two natures in one person, Kasper (1976) first concedes that it 
would be historically wrong to seek the fully-developed two nature doctrine in the Scriptures, not even 
from the Johannine writings – which come close to the ecumenical dogma. However, he insists that if one 
considers the fact that the flesh in the context of John 1:14 denotes soul and spirit as constituents of a fully 
human being in the Hellenistic worldview, then, we have flesh, together with soul and spirit on the one 
hand. On the other hand, if we take our departure from Logos, then we consider two natures in the person 
of Christ. Kasper contends that it then logically follows that either there are two natures or one nature 
absorbed the rest of the other nature. He argues that, following the latter view, we may then have a kind of 
“higher breed” of Jesus’ person. However, the Council of Chalcedon condemned the former view and 
affirmed the latter.  
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human soul permanently attaches itself to the Logos (akin to the Okra of Onyame). With this 
theory, Origen could account for both a human will and a divine will in the person of Jesus.  
As Origen views it, Christ’s human soul acted as the point of union between the Logos and 
humanity (Kelly 1978:158). In his attempt to express both the divinity and the humanity of 
Christ in one person, Rahner also opted for the notion of the human soul as the point of 
meeting between the Logos and humanity. However, it is doubtful if such an approach can 
express the Chalcedonian notion of the person of Christ adequately (Gunton 1997:126).60
On the other hand, had Origen proposed that the Logos with the “attached soul” (which he 
proposed to be Christ’s human soul) became flesh in the person of Jesus, it would have made 
a difference. The Logos (the dynamic equivalent of the Okra of Onyame), not the human soul 
(okra), would then have become the point of union between God and humanity. Thus in the 
person of Christ, there would be a co-presence of the Logos and the human soul.  
 
The proposal in this thesis relies on the analogy of the relationship between fire and spark. 
The analogy distinguishes between the Okra of Onyame and the okra of human beings. It 
illustrates the relationship between God and human beings in terms of how “the one and the 
many” are related in the Akan thought-form. 
The analogy thus naturally presupposes the co-presence of the Okra of Onyame (fire) and the 
okra of a human being (spark) in the person of Jesus. The idea that the okra (soul) of a human 
being is totally subdued by the Okra of Onyame at the meeting point, i.e. in the event of the 
incarnation, would render such an analogy inconsistent.  
The traditional Akan believe that okra is by nature destined to become human, to die and 
return to Onyame as a distinct being. Even at death, and its subsequent return to Onyame, 
okra does not forfeit its distinctiveness. The context of the analogy of fire and the spark in 
reference to the Okra of Onyame and the okra of human beings therefore connotes that the 
two co-existed at any point of meeting. Otherwise, one would not interpret the analogy 
consistently. That is to say, at any given point of meeting, for that matter in the person of the 
historic Jesus, there was co-presence of the Okra of Onyame and the okra of a human being.  
One may point to a spark of a fire that is removed from its substance. Thus human beings 
                                                 
60  The notion of self-transcendence does not assist us much either with regard to another central area. That is 
where the significance of Jesus is linked from the beginning with the fact that it is through this particular 
human life that God’s salvation becomes actual on earth. Here, too, the accent is often placed on the fact 
that Jesus functions as Saviour by means of his lowliness. Notions of self-transcendence actually obscure 
the heart of Christology.  
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could be endowed with the sparks of the Okra of Onyame without necessarily being endowed 
with the substance (fire) itself. However, where there is a substance that sparks, a spark co-
exists with that substance. If there is a fire and its spark, the presence of the former may not 
necessarily put out the latter. 
On this basis, between the two, namely the fire and the spark (Christ’s human okra and the 
Okra of Onyame), there is “distinctiveness in oneness”. That is, the Okra of Onyame – in 
Jesus – did not subjugate the okra of human – in Jesus. The human okra (spark) rather co-
existed with the Okra of Onyame in the person of Christ. The analogy thus expresses the co-
existence of the human soul (okra) and the divine being (Okra of Onyame) 
Amongst the Akan (as well as many other African societies) there is a belief that a lesser 
divinity can become human through the normal human birth process. With reference to such a 
belief, although such a person is a lesser divinity, it is not assumed that the nature of the lesser 
divinity in such a person would absorb the human faculties of that person. Such a person, 
assumed to be exercising his/her “supernatural powers”, may be regarded as one who acts as 
an agent of the lesser divinity; yet at the same time as being truly human – as he/she was 
indeed born of a woman.  
in the one person 
of Jesus Christ. 
In keeping with my suggestion that the status of Jesus may be regarded as the incarnation of 
the Okra of Onyame, the term Nyamekrateasefo will therefore imply that the Okra of Onyame 
has become a human being in the person of Jesus. The phrase “Okra became teasefo” is 
therefore similar to the phrase “the Word became flesh”. According to Christian theology, it 
was the Word (Logos) which “became flesh” in Jesus Christ (1:14). 
6.4.4 Some key debates on Jesus’ divinity and humanity in the Western theological 
discourse: Reflections from within the Akan context 
Similarly, within a 
traditional Akan context, it is the Okra of Onyame that became teasefo (a human being).  
My intention here is to reflect further on some questions which my proposal raises but which I 
could not discuss in detail in the main argument. The pertinent questions are as follows: 
a) What happens to Onyame in the instance of Jesus’ death: does this imply that God is 
dead? 
In terms of the Akan belief, becoming a human (birth) and the cessation of a human’s 
functions (death), only signify the termination of one’s activities in one mode of life. Humans 
can only surmise what happens beyond death. Thus, the question of what happened to God 
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when Jesus died – if Jesus is regarded as God, betrays a materialistic view of a human being. 
It presupposes that death terminates all activities and that if Jesus is God and has died, then 
God’s activities in the universe ceased. However, the Akan need not accept such a view of 
being human to the detriment of theirs. For, all worldviews are self-imposed conceptual 
frameworks to explain the universe in a coherent manner.  
For the Akan death does not entail or necessarily constitute annihilation. Rather, it is believed 
that death brings a change of one’s material being to one’s non-material being. Thus, at death, 
there is in a sense a “continuing self” and it is believed that okra is the agent of that 
“continuing self” which links a person’s past, present and future.  
In the Akan thought-form, okra is one of the three vitalities okra, sunsum and ntoro that may 
be regarded as the nature of Onyame – the ultimate reality. In terms of the Akan belief, there 
exist some forms of okra that are of a human nature and some that are not (non-material). 
Nonetheless, it is believed that okra is destined to become human, and to return to Onyame as 
a distinct being after the death of the human being concerned. 
The Akan believe that okra in the form of a human being can temporarily leave the human 
body. Yet, such an occurrence would not necessarily spell one’s death. It is believed that in 
the event of the temporary exit of okra, one only becomes anxious and sorrowful until the 
okra returns. It is only when the okra finally leaves the human body that someone would be 
dead.  
The proposed exit of the Okra of Onyame from Onyame to become human flesh (incarnation) 
may be interpreted as a temporary exit of okra. It was a matter of time before the Okra of 
Onyame (likened to the temporary exits and returns of the okra of a human being) returned to 
Onyame after accomplishing its task in the world.  
On the basis of this explanation, one may infer that, within the Akan context, the incarnation 
of Jesus as the Okra of Onyame only expresses the temporary exit of okra from its host – 
Onyame. Thus, the birth of Jesus or Jesus becoming human, does not necessarily entail the 
death of Onyame or the descent of Onyame to become human being. 
With regard to the death of Jesus, one may suggest that his human okra returned to Onyame – 
that spelled his death. That is to say, it was certain that Jesus actually died like any other 
person. One may further speculate that when the human okra returned to Onyame, it was 
quickened back to human life,  
In this respect, in the case of other human beings, one may talk about the final exit of okra to 
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Onyame that signifies death. In the case of Jesus, as he was the Okra of Onyame, Jesus might 
have rather surrendered his body to death in terms of a permanent cessation of its functions; 
as a human body is destined to death. However, since the Okra of Onyame did not finally 
leave the body of Jesus, there was the need that his body should be changed to another form 
of human body. This is what one may term as the resurrection of Jesus; thus the body of Jesus 
did not decompose.  
Within the traditional Akan context, the death and the resurrection of Jesus may then be 
understood in the context of the Akan maxim: Nyame boo owuo na owou kum Nyame; na 
Nyame na ote nanka oduro nti odii owou so nkonim (God created death and death killed God; 
yet God who is all powerful – had an antidote for death). This maxim provides the sense of 
“God’s death and resurrection.” Thus, it provides the basis for the Akan to accept that Jesus 
may be regarded as truly God even though he died and was resurrected.
I have proposed that the incarnation took place by the direct action of the Okra of Onyame.I 
might add that it was done in conjunction with the Ntoro and Sunsum. One may also propose 
here that the resurrection took place through the direct action of the Okra of Onyame in 
corroboration with his Ntoro and Sunsum; thus the Father, through the power of the Holy 
Spirit, changed Jesus’ body into another form which is incorruptible.  
  
Here, I use the term “changed the body” to signify the idea that it was the same body of Jesus 
which did not decompose but was transformed into another form of human body. By contrast 
to the ancestors whose bodies obviously decay, the body of Jesus did not decompose, but was 
transformed. In this respect, if one contends that Jesus is an ancestor, one may be doing more 
harm to Christian theology by blurring the key distinctive difference between Jesus and other 
human beings.  
This is a subtle element that Western notions of the incarnation and resurrection lack. Even 
the concept of Logos and its relations to God fails to answer the question: What happened to 
God at Jesus’ birth and death, if Jesus is indeed regarded as God? It was the Christian 
emphasis that “the Logos was God” that brought the concept of Logos closer to the Akan 
concept of Okra. Nonetheless, unlike Okra and Onyame, the status of Logos in its relation to 
God is indecisive and created a point of dispute in theological discourse until the decisions of 
the Council of Nicea. 
Moreover, I have already indicated that in addition to Okra, two other IRV’s, namely Ntoro 
and Sunsum, constitute the being of Onyame. Such a belief obviously implies that the 
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incarnation of the Okra of Onyame and the death of Nyamekrateasefo (the Okra of Onyame 
incarnate) does not exhaust the being of Onyame, seeing that all three constitute the being of 
Onyame.  
These three entities are assumed to be inseparable. Therefore one might ask: Did these three, 
namely Onyame Ntoro (God the Father) Onyame Okra (God the Son) and Onyame Sunsum 
(God the Holy Spirit) become flesh and die? It certainly seems that way. However, it is 
assumed that it was rather a distinct act of the Okra of Onyame – that became flesh and died 
but in corroboration with Onyame Ntoro (God the Father) and Onyame Sunsum (God the Holy 
Spirit).  
Again my worn out example of “the adulterous wife and the husband’s nagging sunsum” may 
throw some light on this. When an adulterous wife is being condemned by her conscience for 
her infidelity, an Akan may say that obaa no kunu sunsum akye no (her husband’s sunsum has 
apprehended her). However, according to the belief, the three work together but the sunsum 
exercise a distinctive act to apprehend the adulterous wife. Applying this to the context of 
incarnation and the death of Jesus, one may say that incarnation and death were distinct acts 
of the Okra of Onyame; yet it was fulfilled with the corroboration of the Father (Ntoro) and 
the Holy Spirit (Sunsum). This explanation somehow also answers the question of whether 
Nyamekrateasefo suffered and died for humankind with the Ntoro (Father) and the Sunsum 
(Holy Ghost).  
In this respect, I may conclude that the incarnation and the death of Christ is not a case of the 
God descending to take on human flesh and to die. Instead, this is a case where the Okra of 
Onyame, in corroboration with Sunsum and Ntoro, acted to ensure the conception of a 
mediator who had the task of redeeming humankind. Thus God himself in the form of his 
Okra accomplished a special task as God’s unique priest (mediator) – Nyamesofopreko for 
humankind. Based on this analysis, I may therefore say that neither the birth nor the death of 
Jesus denotes the death of Onyame.  
b) Was Jesus conscious of his being as Okra of Onyame (his divinity) as a human being? 
The question of whether or not Jesus was self-conscious as God incarnate leads to one of the 
most important debates in Christology. To some scholars, within the earlier strata of the Jesus 
tradition, there is substantive evidence that Jesus laid claim to speak with divine inspiration 
and authorisation as, in some sense, God’s representative. But there is nothing of consequence 
to support the thesis that Jesus saw himself in some sense as God, or as the divine incarnation. 
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Nonetheless, some scholars object to this notion. They contend that while Jesus did not make 
an explicit claim to the status of divinity, ample references affirm implicitly that Jesus was 
self-conscious of his divine status.  
The pivotal point of the argument is: If Jesus himself was not aware that he was divine, then, 
the divine status was attributed to him by his disciples after his death. If so, it then follows 
that Jesus is “divine” only in the judgement of his disciples; thus the claim of the uniqueness 
of Jesus’ divinity is not based on a solid foundation. Of course, one may also accept the 
judgement of the disciples on the basis of an affirmation of God’s revelation – whatever that 
may mean.  
In terms of a post-Enlightenment framework, this would be a valid argument. However, the 
traditional Akan would see it differently. The Akan believe that the okra pre-existed with 
Onyame, and is eternal, not a mere idea in the mind of Onyame (God). To the Akan, okra 
entails an invisible rational vitality, conscious of its existence and the course of life it wants to 
take. Yet, when okra becomes teasefo (a human being) it forgets its previous existence. As the 
Akan say, obi nim awie gye Onyame (no one knows the end of a course of life, except God). 
Thus, to the Akan all human beings pre-existed before becoming human, yet no one knows 
exactly the course of his/her life. The Yoruba of Nigeria share a similar contention. According 
to the Yoruba belief, after “emi” bids farewell to God, it crosses a river, then forgets 
everything about its missions.  
Similarly, Jesus also made a statement to the effect that no one except God knows when the 
world will come to an end. Thus to the Akan and also the Yoruba, whether Jesus was aware of 
his divine status (when he became teasefo) or not, does not necessarily rule out the notion that 
he was indeed the Okra of Onyame incarnate. To the Akan it is important that Jesus was 
aware that he shares the limitation of human beings, yet this does not subtract from his 
divinity.  
c) How does one account within the Akan context for the virgin birth and sinless life of 
Jesus? 
As is the case in several social institutions, the Akan matrilineage has an ideology that serves 
as its operational charter for procreation. Theory propounds that during mating, the mother 
provides the blood (biologists term this the egg), whilst the father provides the ntoro or spirit 
(that is to say, the biological sperm). The Akan distinguish between the ntoro and the mogya 
(blood) with regard to the nature of the born person (Assimeng 1989). The Akan believe that 
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both ntoro and mogya (blood which is believed to be transmitted by the mother as well as the 
father) are genetic factors responsible for inherited characteristics of a human being. 
According to this belief the child has the same ntoro as the father though.  
With reference to the virgin birth of Jesus,61 it can be said that a human (represented by the 
Virgin Mary) provided the mogya (blood) and Onyame provided the ntoro. In the usual 
procreation, the father provides the ntoro.62 However, for a deity to provide the ntoro 
(personality) in the case of Jesus may not be something difficult to accept within the Akan 
context. The concept of the ntoro is often associated with water bodies. Every Akan ntoro is 
linked up with a water deity. Interestingly Onyame is also in some sense associated with the 
rain water that falls from the sky.63
For the Akan, a father would derive his ntoro (personality) from Onyame.
 Thus when it is cloudy, an Akan would say Onyame ani 
wofem (literally, God’s eye is down) or when it rains, the Akan will express it as Onyame agu 
fem (literally God has come down). Ntoro is also directly associated with Onyame as already 
indicated in 6.3. 
64
Thus for God to provide ntoro to Mary for the conception of Jesus does not necessarily imply 
the mating of a spiritual being and a human being in the form of a hieros gamos: where Mary 
as the female element were to produce the human Son of God.
 The association 
of ntoro with Onyame and the water-deities cautions one from rendering ntoro as just 
biological sperm. Though the Akan may think that ntoro can take shape as biological sperm, 
ntoro is also regarded as non-material (see 6.4.2).  
 
On this basis the virgin conception of Jesus may be explained on the grounds that, because he 
is Nyamekrateasefo (Okra of Onyame incarnate), his okra is inseparable from the Ntoro and 
Sunsum of Onyame. Thus, Jesus did not need any human ntoro or sunsum to become teasefo 
In this regard, I may postulate 
that while all other human beings have their ntoro linked to one of the water deities, only 
Jesus possesses Onyame as his ntoro because he is Nyamekrateasefo.  
                                                 
61  The virgin birth of Jesus is one of the more disputed areas in both Gospel studies and Christian theology. 
For further discussions see Brown (1974: 44-45) and Houssiau (1981). 
62  Notably, ntoro is linked up with water deities. 
63  Nevertheless, the Akan do not identify Onyame with the sky. 
64  It is also commonly assumed that some lesser divinities can incarnate themselves to be born into a certain 
family either to bless them or to punish them. In such instances, their personality would be that of the said 
lesser divinity. Such common stories of this nature abound in many Akan towns and villages. The Akan do 
not entertain any story of alleged birth taking place without the contribution of a man or woman. This is 
similar to the Eleventh Council of Toledo in AD 675, (DBS 533) which rejected the contention that, since 
Mary conceived by the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit was the father of Jesus. 
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(human). This presupposes that Jesus also has the Ntoro –personality of Onyame.  
Amongst the Akan, the ntoro helps to establish a spiritual bond between a father and his child 
(Busia 1954:197). 
In this respect, while the Ntoro from Onyame to Jesus may account for Jesus’ sinlessness, the 
“heavy” Sumsum which he derived from Onyame accounts for miracles and his resurrection. 
While the Ntoro of Onyame enables Jesus to lead a sinless life, his Sunsum helps Jesus at the 
same time to “charge” his Sunsum to become powerful all the time.  
In this respect, we can contend that Jesus (only) having the Ntoro of 
Onyame could develop an intimate relationship with God which passes any human’s 
relationship with God. Such an intimate relationship also helps Jesus to maintain a high sense 
of devotion to God. This may also account for the sinless life he lived. Thus, in terms of the 
Akan thought-form, if Jesus is assumed to possess the Ntoro of Onyame, it may be expected 
that he would lead a kind of life that reflects the nature of Onyame. The reason is that, to the 
Akan, one’s life reflects the attributes which are traditionally attached to one’s ntoro. The 
Akan regard Onyame as a perfect being, thus the saying: Onyame nnpe bone (God hates sin). 
The Akan believe that, when one indulges in sinful activities,65
In this regard, one may say that a sinless life empowers one in the spiritual realm. This 
explains the reason why from time to time an Akan will offer a sacrifice as a sin offering to 
purify him- /herself and to strengthen his/her spirit. In Jesus’ case, he does not need to offer 
such a sacrifice to purify himself in order to empower himself spiritually, the ntoro helps him 
to overcome sin. As a result, Jesus’ sunsum are constantly being empowered, thus he always 
has “heavy” sunsum. The implication of one having a “heavy” sumsum is that one can 
overcome all forces. This may account for Jesus’ numerous miracles and his widespread 
healing ministry. 
 it is said that ne sumsum aye 
ha (literally, his spirit has become light). In other words he/she has become restless. This is 
usually the case when one is being pursued by his foe, “sasa” (a vengefully spirit). 
More importantly, Jesus’ virgin birth and his sinless life, which he derives from the Ntoro and 
the Sumsum of Onyame, might have accounted for his resurrection. Sin weakens one’s 
sumsum, but Jesus received his Ntoro from Onyame. He could therefore overcome sin. Light 
sumsum is easily overcome by spiritual forces, but Jesus has the very Sumsum of Onyame 
thus, he overcame every force, including death.  
                                                 
65  It also pertains to some cases when one becomes a victim of sinful activities. 
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The miracles and the resurrection of Jesus Christ may be understood in terms of his “heavy” 
sunsum (strong spirit) which enables him to overcome evil forces, including death. Probably, 
being the Okra of Onyame and also fulfilling the mission as bearer of humankind’s salvation 
might also have contributed to Jesus’ sinlessness. Nonetheless, Kudadjie (see Pobee 1979:90-
93) has raised a concern about the claim of Jesus’ sinless life as it relates to his humanity. 
Pobee (1979:90-93) has responded extensively to these concerns. 
d) Does the attribution of sinlessness to Jesus render him not truly human in the  
Akan context?  
If every human being, with the exception of Jesus, is a sinner (Romans 3:23), this evokes the 
question whether Jesus may be regarded as a full human being. This debate engaged John 
Pobee and Joshua Kudadjie within the context of Akan anthropology. It is unfortunate that 
Kudajie’s views have to be derived from Pobee’s response to him. This dialogue took place in 
the form of verbal communication and was later narrated in Pobee’s book Towards an African 
Christian theology (1979).  
Pobee notes that Kudadjie has suggested that, in the Akan view of humanity, unreliability, 
wickedness and evil, are important characteristics of human beings. Kudadjie cites the Akan 
saying: Suro onipa (fear human being), as an illustration of how the Akan conceives of the 
wickedness of a human being.  
Pobee admits that such statements are uttered when someone does something wrong, and 
others do not only express their disapproval of the act but also of the view that it is but the lot 
of human beings to behave as such. Kudadjie argues that, if this is so, Jesus would then 
(granted that he did not sin), to the Akan, lack an important attribute of humanhood, namely 
wickedness, unreliability. In this sense one could therefore, not take Jesus to be truly man. 
Pobee concedes that he is not sure about the phrases cited above, but suggests that it may 
express no more than the tendency of human beings toward unreliability and wickedness. He 
notes, “If so, then Akan man’s [human] version of the biblical claim would be that Jesus, 
being flesh, was potentially capable of sinning but did not sin only because he consciously 
resisted sin” Pobee (1979:90-93). However, to Kudadjie, Jesus can be nothing more than a 
“sinner”, seeing that all humans by nature are “sinners”.  
From the concession that Pobee makes – “as one would expect a mortal man to behave” the 
question that one can pose to Pobee is: Was Jesus a mortal man? If what is expected of every 
mortal would not apply to Jesus, is it not clear that Jesus lacks what it takes to be a full human 
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within the Akan context?  
In the first place, Kudadjie reads more into the statement by concluding that Jesus could then 
not be regarded as true man. Such an assumption presupposes that the Akan believe that 
humans are sinners by nature; a kind of Adamic sin or original sin. Thus, every human cannot 
do otherwise but sin. Such a conclusion extends Akan thought beyond the content of the 
original thought-form.  
Secondly, Pobee is right in maintaining Jesus had the potential to sin. However, his 
explanation that “as one would expect a mortal man to behave” without any qualification 
makes sin the lot of all human beings without exception. In this respect, Pobee’s concession 
supports Kudadjie’s assumption that Jesus fails to meet the standard of what (any) “mortal 
man is expected to behave”. Therefore, Jesus could not be fully human as viewed from within 
the Akan context. 
My response to Kudadjie is that the above statement meant to say that it is expected that 
“some or more or so many” will behave unreliably, wickedly, with evil intent to fail another. 
Thus the saying: Suro onipa (fear human being) from the Akan context is not open and closed 
but allows at least an exception. Jesus may be regarded as that exception. Of course this also 
raises another question as to why such an exemption should be limited to Jesus only.  
In another discussion, Pobee contends that Jesus is fully human, yet he is more truly human 
than the rest of humankind. Pobee’s posits that the rest of humankind has sinned whereas 
Jesus did not sin and this has marred the imago Dei in other human beings. In other words, 
whereas Jesus is truly human, the rest of humankind is not.  
The pertinent question here is: By what criteria does one assess who is human? Before Jesus’ 
time on earth there were human beings, and after Jesus there were human beings as well. How 
do we know that Jesus was human? Of course one has to compare Jesus to the community 
that accepted him. Thus, for Pobee to maintain that Jesus was more human than the rest of 
humankind, becomes logically incoherent; he dismisses the very criteria he uses to judge 
Jesus’ humanity. In effect, the Jesus that Pobee proposes, is not truly human because he does 
not fit the description of a human being.  
From my point of view, Jesus’ sinlessness may be accounted for on the basis that he had his 
Ntoro (characteristic that determines one’s behaviour) directly from a superior source, 
Onyame. In terms of Akan belief, the source of one’s ntoro largely determines one’s 
behaviour. Of course this also raises a question whether Jesus enjoyed a special advantage 
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over and above all other human beings – and whether his temptation was genuine? 
My response is that, if it is assumed that one has the Ntoro of Onyame, it is not conclusive 
that that person cannot sin. Jesus came to a social world which constitutes both good and evil. 
Thus Jesus as a human could have sinned, but on the basis of the biblical evidence, we can 
assert that he did not.  
In this regard, one may say that only Jesus, having the Ntoro of Onyame, could have 
developed an intimate relationship with God which surpasses anyone’s relationship with God. 
Such an intimate relationship might have been the decisive factor that accounted for Jesus’ 
elevated sense of devotion to God.  
Nevertheless, this does not, to the Akan, render Jesus more human than the rest of 
humankind. Amongst the Akan no one is more human than others; yet the Akan recognise 
that some people have “heavy” sunsum while others have “lighter” sunsum. It is such 
differences with regard to human’s inner constitution, that may denote the uniqueness of an 
individual person. Therefore, Jesus is unique not because he was a truer human than others, 
but his uniqueness was based on his inner constitution i.e. being the Okra of Onyame 
incarnate.  
e) Is the difference between Jesus and the other human beings explained in terms of 
kind or degree?  
In this chapter the divinity of Jesus is proposed on the basis of the notion of the Okra of 
Onyame. Jesus’ humanity was described in terms of the Okra of Onyame becoming teasefo 
(human). His two natures in one person was also conceptualised as Nyamekrateasefo (Okra of 
Onyame incarnate). Thus, the Akan concept of Okra-teasefo or Nyamekrateasefo provide the 
basis to understand both Jesus’ divinity and his humanity and also his two natures in one 
person. However, on the basis of such claims, one may pose a connected methodological 
question: Is the difference between Jesus and the other human beings explained in terms of 
kind or degree? Stressing the difference of degree to the exclusion of kind, runs the risk of a 
degree Christology. Stressing the difference of kind to the exclusion of degree, runs the risk 
of docetism.  
On the one hand, if one regards Jesus as okrateasefo, then we may only view Jesus as one 
who is fully human. Thus, the difference between Jesus and other human beings should be 
conceived of in terms of degree; like us in all things – apart from sin.  Jesus’ significance then 
consists in the fact that he possesses a significant, even unique, number of human qualities.  
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On the other hand, if Jesus is assumed to have the okra of a human being and he himself is 
also the Okra of Onyame, the difference between him and any other human being may also be 
expressed as one of kind. The reason is that the Okra of Onyame and the okra of human 
beings are of the same substance, yet, in the traditional Akan belief, the latter is not afforded 
the capacity to grow in order to become like the former.  
Thus, in the Akan thought-form the difference between Jesus and other human beings may 
paradoxically be expressed as both that of degree (being one substance) and of kind (lack of 
inherent capacity to become like the other). 
One may contend that the analogy of fire and spark then fails to convey the Akan idea of the 
Okra of Onyame and the okra of human beings. The reason may be that a spark has the 
capacity to become a fire. However, the idea of such a capacity only emerges in the context of 
the existence of other things which the spark might come into contact with. Thus, a spark by 
itself does not have the capacity to become a fire.  
f) The humanity of Jesus and that of other human beings: Do they differ? 
 Again, the Akan saying: Akoko kra ne Abubro de nnse (literally, the okra of a fowl and that 
of a dove are not the same) may cast some light on the distinction between the person of 
Christ and that of other human beings.  
This raises an important question: If the okra of Jesus and of other human beings differ – in 
what way would Jesus then be fully human in all respects except sin? In other words, if my 
okra is somehow of a lesser status than that of Jesus, would he not then be elevated above me 
as a human being? An associated crucial ethical question is: Would this Akan saying, making 
a provision for Jesus’ uniqueness, not also serve as a basis for personal discrimination in 
terms of the “heavier” or “lighter” okra of human beings? 
The Akan saying quoted above, denotes the distinctiveness and uniqueness of an individual’s 
okra. While the Akan rate the importance of individual okra on the same level; no one is more 
fully human than another. In essence, there is an affirmation of the distinctiveness of an 
individual’s okra in terms of one’s mission in the world. In this respect the Akan would say: 
Obi kra ne Nyame no na obi nyina ho (literally, when one was discussing one’s destiny with 
God, no one else was there); in other words, each one discusses his/her destiny with God on 
his or her own.  
This maxim implies that each person distinctly stands before God to discuss the part he or she 
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is to play in the drama of life. This is not imposed by Onyame but is born out of free will 
chosen by humans themselves. Thus when a traditional Akan finds life “tough”, one would 
remark that: Me nkrabea nye me meko na maba (the part I am playing in the drama of life is 
tough for me; I wish I can come back). It is also meant to convey the message that each 
human being is distinctive and precious to Onyame. Thus no one has the right to exploit 
another human being as a means for his or her personal ends, irrespective of the 
circumstances.  
On this basis, the answer to the associated ethical question is that there is no basis for one to 
discriminate in terms of the “heavier” or “lighter” okra of human beings. There is no hint of 
such a notion in the Akan thought-form. Instead, there is an emphasis on the uniqueness of a 
individual’s okra. 
In the Akan thought-form, a baby’s mind (or brain) is not a passive tabula rasa; it has an 
inner, as yet undeveloped nature – which must largely determine that child’s future and 
individuality. What does this inner nature comprise of? In modern terms one may refer to this 
with reference to DNA-strings. For the Akan, this inner nature is okra – an invisible rational 
vitality (IRV).  
No one has any basis to claiming superiority as a person in terms of DNA while he or she is 
still alive. Since one does not know how one’s life would end, this does not warrant any claim 
of having a superior DNA. What if the supposedly superior DNA carries a rare disease that 
will only surface during midlife or when life ends? One does not know what one’s destiny 
entails; as the Akan would say: Obi nim awieye (no one knows the future).  
On the basis of this analysis, a traditional Akan might not find it too difficult to accept 
Christ’s true humanity, though his mission as the bearer of universal salvation warrants that 
he might have been endowed with inner vitality adequate to carry out his mission. Of course, 
this rests on the affirmation that Jesus alone and once and for all, was the bearer of Okra of 
Onyame. He is thus Nyamekrateasefo while other human beings are okrateasefo.  
Could Jesus be regarded as more fully human than other human beings? In terms of Akan 
belief, the answer is an unequivocal “No!”. To the Akan, the qualification for being human 
and thereby at par with other human beings is to be born of a woman irrespective of the 
composition of one’s inner nature. The bottom-line of being human is to be born of a woman 
and to be endowed with a human body.  
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g) How does one delineate the person of Christ from other human beings? 
How does one delineate the “two natures in one person of Jesus” as opposed to the “one 
nature of other human beings”? In other words, how could one differentiate Jesus from other 
human beings and at the same time guarantee his co-humanity with the rest of humankind?  
Here, I draw on the Akan idea that all human beings have the spark derived from the Okra of 
Onyame. Therefore the okra in human beings cannot constitute a divine nature, seeing that the 
traditional Akan do not regard it as such. Neither can the inseparable three – okra, ntoro and 
sunsum – in a human being, constitute a divine nature; they just act as sparks that originated 
from the nature of Onyame.  
The difference between the two can then be expressed as follows: “Fully human with a spark 
of divine nature” (Okra, Ntoro and Sunsum) against “fully human and fully God.” To 
distinguish between the two, a capital letter and a small letter are used (in this thesis) to 
differentiate between the spark and the original invisible vitality. Thus, whereas other human 
beings are okrateasefo, Jesus is Okrateasefo or Nyamekrateasefo.  
6.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter the person of Christ is approached by means of two indispensable constituent 
foci, namely the Akan concept of being human and the nature of Onyame (God). Onyame is 
conceived of in terms of three constituent vitalities namely, Ntoro, Okra and Sunsum. This 
serves as the basis for my proposal for understanding, within the Akan context, the doctrine of 
Trinity. Needless to say, the doctrine of Trinity is pivotal to a Christology; one cannot give an 
adequate account of the divine saviour without it.  
Correlatively, a human being is described as a being created in the image of Onyame. Thus, 
human beings are regarded as endowed with the sparks – ntoro, okra and sunsum – of 
Onyame’s nature. Yet, they are not regarded as being divine, not even as a divine being. One 
of the tenets of the Akan belief is that okra, which is regarded as a core constituent of being 
human, is a spark of Onyame’s nature. 
In this chapter, the divinity of Jesus is proposed on the basis of the Okra of Onyame. His 
humanity was described in terms of the Okra of Onyame becoming teasefo (being human). 
Thus, the Akan concept of Okra-teasefo or Nyamekrateasefo, provides the basis to understand 
both Jesus’ divinity and his humanity. This notion was further explained in terms of two 
natures in one person, without confusion or subjugation. 
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To sum up the proposal of this chapter: The person of Jesus is presented as being God’s 
unique priest (Nyamesofopreko); he is the incarnation of the Okra of Onyame. The purpose of 
this incarnation is that the Okra of Onyame through the person of God’s unique priest 
becomes the Afomusuyideε (sin and curse bearer) for humankind. This theme will be 
expounded in the next chapter, particularly section 7.4. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Mediation as the work of Christ 
7. 1 Introduction 
Mediation is a prominent soteriological concept sprouting from the biblical roots and 
expounded during the subsequent history of the Christian tradition. Jesus Christ is portrayed 
in the Christian tradition as the Mediator of the broken covenant between God and humanity. 
As a mediator acceptable to both God and humanity, the work of Christ is altogether human 
and divine concurrently. The role of Christ as Mediator is mainly perceived through his death, 
resurrection, ascension, intercession and the parousia.  
In this chapter I will focus on the death of Christ as a core Christological motif in order to 
explore a reinterpretation of Christ’s mediatory work between God and humankind within the 
Akan context. 
7.2 The work of Christ as mediator in the Christian tradition  
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part (section 7.2-3) deals 
with the work of Christ in the Christian tradition. The second part (section 7.4-7) focuses on 
the notions of mediation within the Akan context. The third, constructive, part attempts to re-
appropriate the Christian views of mediation within the Akan context. This will be followed 
by a brief conclusion in section 7.5. 
7.2.1 Introduction 
The work of Christ is traditionally discussed with reference to the doctrine of atonement. The 
atonement of Christ, however, has been understood in very different ways throughout the 
history of Christianity. In Christologies developed duirng the twentieth century, Gustaf 
Aulén’s analysis of three main views (or “types”) of atonement has become highly influential, 
although the details of his argument have also been severely criticised. In reviewing Aulén’s 
analysis, I do not intend to engage in a thorough critique or comparison of the three theories 
he identified and discussed. Instead, the review is primarily intended as a model to engage 
with the Akan culture in order to make a constructive proposal with respect to the Christian 
doctrine of atonement in the Akan context. I will also briefly sketch the history of this 
Christian doctrine as background to the three main views of atonement that Aulén analysed. 
My sources for this discussion include the works of Kelly (1977), Lohse (1966), Berkhof 
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(1937) Mozley (1953) McGrath (1994) and Pelikan & Hotchkiss (2003). 
7.2.2 A brief background to the three main views of atonement 
This section entails a brief survey of the notions of atonement from the Patristic to the post 
Reformation period. All that I shall attempt to do is to describe the views of some key 
theologians on atonement briefly. Individual theologians are chosen for their representative 
character in connection to one of the three main views of atonement.  
a) The Fathers 
According to Justin, Christ redeems us by his own blood. Irenaeus (c. 130-200C.E) also 
postulates that all human beings are enslaved by the powers of darkness and that redemption 
implies freedom from these powers. Irenaeus moves a step further by introducing the notion 
of Christ’s total identification with humankind through his life, death and resurrection. What 
we lost in Adam, namely, being in the image and likeness of God, we might regain in Christ 
(Kelly 1977). The view of Irenaeus anticipates the ransom theory of atonement.
Clement argues that if, indeed, Christ laid down his life for the sake of each of us, a life worth 
no less than the universe, then Christ demands of us in return that we offer our lives on behalf 
of each other (Mozley 1953: 95). Clement may be said to pre-empt the later Abelardian theory 
concerning “moral influence”. 
  
For Tertullian, 
On another development, Hilary of Poitiers (315-367 C.E) regards the death of Christ as a 
classic example of an innocent sufferer, paying the penalty of sins he had not committed. 
Hilary thereby introduced the thought of penal substitution which was later to occupy the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century reformers. 
Christ was “sent to die” and only by his death could our death as humans be 
destroyed. Tertullian is known for his use of the term satisfaction, though not with reference 
to the atonement itself, but to humankind’s penitential effort to satisfy God through good 
works. The term “satisfaction” later on became a key word in Anselm’s position on 
atonement dubbed the satisfaction theory. 
Origen (185-254 C.E) is identified in church history as the first Christian theologian to 
advance explicitly the “ransom theory” of atonement. He views the death of Christ as a 
ransom paid to the devil in exchange for human souls; forfeited on account of sin. Origen 
argues that when Christ offered his soul as a ransom for human souls, the devil could not 
withstand its perfect purity – having found it hazardous to enslave Christ’s soul. Origen 
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asserts that the devil was deceived into believing that he could overcome Christ. However, the 
devil later realised he could not bear the torment of holding Christ (Kelly 1977). Gregory of 
Nyasa echoes Origen’s view of atonement (Mozley 1953:109). From the Fathers theological 
discussions, different views of atonement emerged. The dominant one was the ransom view 
of atonement.  
b) Mediaeval period 
Anselm of Canterbury articulated the satisfaction view within this period in his Cur Deus 
Homo (Why did God become human?). The then current ransom theory of the atonement held 
that Jesus died and thereby paid a ransom to Satan allowing God to rescue those under Satan’s 
bondage. 
Anselm did not state specifically whether Jesus’ payment of debt was for all of humankind or 
for individuals, but his language points to the former direction. Thomas Aquinas later on 
specifically attributes the scope of the atonement to be universal in nature. Aquinas also 
argues that Christ’s death satisfies the penalty owed by sin
For Anselm this solution was inadequate. Instead, Anselm suggested that we owe 
God a debt of honour. This debt came about as a result of humankind’s sin against God. As 
Anselm sees it, this debt creates an imbalance in the moral universe; it could not be satisfied 
by God simply ignoring it. For Anselm the only possible way of repaying the debt was if a 
being of infinite greatness, could act as a human being on behalf of humankind, to repay the 
debt of honour owed to God. Therefore, when Jesus died he did not pay a debt to Satan but to 
God, His father.  
 
The work of Faustus Socinus is of classic importance. It attacks every point in the conception 
of the death of Christ as a satisfaction to God. Socinus’ arguments and conclusions are widely 
adopted; though debatable.
and that Christ’s Passion was 
specifically needed to pay the debt of human sin. 
In the line of Socinus, Abelard offers a criticism against the Anselmian view.
  
 
The work of Grotius was largely a response to Abelard’s criticisms on Anselmian view. 
Grotius saw the death of Christ as a substitute for the penalty of sin. Thus, what Christ did 
Abelard rejected 
both the ransom theory contending that Christ had come to pay a debt to the devil, and 
Anselm’s theory that Christ had come to pay a debt to God. For Abelard, it is rather the 
plenitude of God’s love that Jesus exhibited, and this love was ultimately expressed in Jesus’ 
death. Thus, Jesus sets an example for us through his death. Abelard’s position was later 
labeled as the “moral influence view”.  
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through his death was to demonstrate that God’s justice will require from us to suffer should 
we continue on the path of sin. This view has come to be known as the “governmental theory” 
of atonement (see Erickson 1985).
c) The Reformation Period
  
The Reformers, though following the tradition of the Anselmian satisfaction theory, went 
beyond that. Examples can be seen from the works of Martin Luther and John Calvin. The 
classical statement of Luther on the atonement is found in his commentary on Galatians 3:13. 
There he insists that Christ was the most cursed of all sinners, seeing that he assumed in his 
body the sins we had committed, to render satisfaction for them by his own blood.
  
 
Calvin wrote on atonement in two important chapters of the Institutes. He begins by 
addressing himself to the question of the compatibility of God’s love for sinful humankind. 
From this flowed the work of redemption, wherein hatred cannot be denied a place in God’s 
just vengeance upon sinners.  
Such an 
expression by Luther clearly indicates the idea of penal substitution. However, Luther was not 
comfortable with the word “satisfaction” pertaining to the death of Christ. Zwingli paid 
attention to the exemplary side of Christ’s work but was nonetheless substantially in 
agreement with Luther. 
Calvin postulates that Christ through his death on the cross did not pay a general penalty for 
humanity’s sins but suffered a specific penalty for the sins of individuals. One obvious feature 
of Calvin’s atonement theory is that Christ’s atonement is limited in its effect only to those 
whom God has chosen to be saved. The reason is that the debt for sins was paid at a particular 
point in time (at the crucifixion). Calvin draws on St Augustine’s earlier theory of 
predestination to construct his theory. 
Calvin understood the atonement and satisfaction in terms of penal substitution, that is, Christ 
has borne our punishment through his death. For Calvin Christ has satisfied the demands of 
justice and appeasing God’s wrath in order for God to justly show grace. Calvin employs the 
language of sacrifice to explain the “how” behind the punishment. Calvin’s theory of 
atonement was affirmed at the ecumenical Synod of Dordt.  
Calvin shifted from the idea of Aquinas that satisfaction 
was penance (which focused on satisfaction) to the idea of satisfying God’s wrath, which is 
propitiated through Christ’s death. 
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d) The Post-Reformation 
The debates on atonement in the post Reformation period was mainly in response to the 
satisfaction (Anselm) and punishment (Calvin) theories which represented the two widely 
accepted notions in Western Christianity. The advocates of these theories maintained that 
Christ died on the cross as a substitute for sinners. He did it in full payment for sins, which 
satisfied the righteousness of God so that He could forgive sinners without compromising His 
own righteousness. Thus the sacrifice of Christ satisfies the divine justice. 
period 
The key difference between Anselm and Calvin is that, for Anselm, satisfaction implies an 
alternative to punishment. The honour that was obviated must be repaid or punishment should 
follow. Through Christ satisfying our debt of honour to God, we avoid punishment. For 
Calvin it is the punishment which satisfies the demands of justice; thus he offers a specific 
explanation for the death of Christ.1
While the idea of substitutionary atonement is prevalent in nearly all atonement theories, the 
specific idea of penal substitution became dominant only within the Latin Church. 
Nevertheless, the Reformers’ view of penal substitution soon gave rise to opposition. They 
experienced the first but less important opposition in Germany.  
  
The most significant opposition occurred during the Enlightenment period. With the advent of 
the modernist worldview, critical approaches were adopted towards theories of the atonement 
which included transcendent elements. Some of these transcendent elements that were 
rejected include: the idea of a sacrifice that had some impact upon God, Christ dying in order 
to pay some penalty or of satisfaction required due to sin. The facets of the Enlightenment’s 
notion of atonement can be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, the cross has no transcendent reference or value; its value relates directly to its impact 
upon humanity. Thus the cross represents a “sacrifice” only in as far as that it represents 
Christ offering his life. Secondly, the person who died on the cross was a human being, and 
the impact of that death is exerted upon other human beings alone. That impact takes on the 
form of inspiration and encouragement to model ourselves upon the moral example Jesus 
Christ set for us. Thirdly, the most important aspect of the cross is that it demonstrates the 
love of God towards us. Such views follow a consistent pattern that can be seen from the 
                                                 
1  Nearly all of the Church fathers, including Justin Martyr, Athanasius and St Augustine taught 
substitutionary atonement. However their specific interpretations of the meaning of the death of Christ 
differ. Athanasius and St Augustine taught that through Christ’s suffering in humanity’s place, he overcame 
and liberated us from death and the devil.  
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eighteenth century writings of G.S. Steinbart, I.G. Tollner, G.F.Seiler, and K. G. 
Bretschneider (see McGrath 1994:409).  
This approach became enormously influential in rationalist circles throughout nineteenth 
century Europe. The model of a martyr, rather than a saviour, describes the attitude 
increasingly adopted towards Jesus within such circles.  
The most significant challenge to this rationalist approach to the crucifixion was expressed by 
F.D.E. Schleiermacher. He insisted upon a religious as opposed to a purely moral approach to 
Christ’s death. For Schleiermacher, Christ did not die to create or endorse a moral system; he 
came in order that the supremacy of the consciousness of God could be established in 
humanity. However, Schleiermacher’s distinctive ideas ultimately proved to be capable of 
being assimilated within a purely exemplarist understanding rather than posing a coherent 
challenge to that reductionist moralistic notion. In England, the most significant contribution 
to the exemplarist approach came from Hastings Rashdall in his 1915 Bampton Lectures 
(McGrath 1994:409). Stevens, Clarke, and Tymms are also exponents of the exemplarist view 
of atonement. 
From the above discussions it is clear that there are several views on the doctrine of 
atonement. However, I will discuss only the three main views as identified by Aulén in his 
1931 monograph Christus Victor. 2
7.2.3 The three main views of atonement: A brief review of Gustaf Aulén’s work  
  
In this section, I will review the three main views on the work of Christ as analysed by Aulén. 
The discussion will follow the structure of Aulén’s analysis. 
a) Background  
Gustaf Emmanuel Hildebrand Aulén was born in May 15, 1879. He died on December 16, 
1977 at the age of 98. Aulén served as the Bishop of Strängnäs in the Church of Sweden since 
1933. He studied Philosophy and Theology at Uppsala University from 1889 to 1915 and 
received the degree of Doctor of Theology in 1915. He became a lecturer of Dogmatics at 
Uppsala University in 1910 and a professor of Systematic Theology at Lund University in 
1913. Aulén was an avid music composer contributing profusely to the Swedish hymnbook. 
He was the president of the Royal Swedish Academy of Music 1944-1950. Aulén was the 
                                                 
2  Unlike the person of Christ in terms of which the ecumenical councils formally stated their position, the 
questions on the work of Christ do not have any ecumenical reference point. This somehow makes it 
difficult to single out one of these theories as the traditional (Nicene) Orthodox reference point.  
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author of several books and articles including the acclaimed Christus Victor: A Historical 
Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement in 1931.  
In this book, Aulén distinguishes between three main types of atonement. He identifies the 
“classic” type (drawing especially on Irenaeus) in which Christ’s victory over the powers of 
evil is emphasised, the “Latin” or Anselmian type in which Christ’s satisfaction for guilt 
incurred by humanity is the focal point, and the “modern” type which draws on Abelard and 
bases its design on the subjective appropriation of Christ’s atonement. Aulén compares and 
contrasts the three main atonement theories around four key areas namely sin, salvation God 
and reconciliation.  
b) Christus Victor (the ransom theory) 
The central theme of the Christus Victor type is the notion of divine conflict and victory; 
Christ the Victor fights against and triumphs over the powers of the world, the “tyrants” under 
which humankind is in bondage and suffering. These hostile powers that hold humanity in 
bondage (and which Christ conquers) serve as the executants of God’s will. The redeeming 
work of Christ for humankind is, however, not found in any sort of rational settlement, but in 
a drama in which a decisive event occurs to change the relations between God and 
humankind.  
Aulén contends that according to the classic approach, sin is depicted as an objective power 
lurking behind humankind. He argues that the atonement of Christ entails God’s triumph over 
sin, death, and the devil. 
For Aulén salvation is a comprehensive term which describes humanity’s new relation to 
God. The classic idea of salvation entails that Christ gained victory once for all, yet this 
victory is continuing in the work of the Holy Spirit. The victory of Christ is therefore present 
as well as past. Aulén contends that justification and atonement then became one. God’s love 
prevails over the curse of sin and death. Justification is simply the atonement brought into the 
present, thus there is a close and inseparable connection between the incarnation and the 
atonement. He argues that because salvation is understood in terms of a divine victory, the 
incarnation is the necessary presupposition of the atonement, and the atonement completes the 
incarnation. 
Aulén notes that Patristic theology is dualistic, but he also argues that such dualism is not 
absolute. In the classic approach, God is depicted as intervening in conflict with evil on the 
stage of history. Yet, at the same time, God is also the all-ruler, the Sovereign.  
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The hostile powers which hold humanity in bondage also serve as the executants of God’s 
will; thus within divine control. The deliverance of humankind from the power of death and 
evil does at the same time imply humankind’s deliverance from God’s judgment. Through the 
incarnation and death of Christ, God has taken away the evil forces’ powers to harm 
humankind. Thus God through Christ has overcome sin, evil and death and has reconciled 
humankind to himself (Aulén 1931:145-158). 
c) Latin theory (Anselmian and penal substitutionary theories) 
Secondly, Aulén analyses critically what he terms the Latin view of atonement. He notes that 
Anselm’s work of Cur Deus homo? is the first systematic exposition of this view of 
atonement. As Aulén sees it, Anselm intended to replace what appeared to him to be the old 
mythological account of Christ’s work as victory over the devil.  
For Aulén, the major limitation of the Latin view is that images and analogies are taken 
largely from the law-courts. Legal order dominates the reconciliation between God and 
humankind. He conceded that such analogies can also be seen in the classic approach. 
However he insists that, in the Latin type, legal order dominates the whole conception, and 
any violation of justice becomes unthinkable. It entails the payment of the required 
satisfaction. For Aulén, the continuity of divine operation is therefore forfeited. The 
satisfaction is offered by Christ as human, the sinless human on behalf of the sinners. 
Comparing the classic and the Latin types on their conceptions of sin, Aulén contends that the 
classic type has a wider scope while the Latin type concentrates only on sin and its 
accompanying guilt. In the classic type, sin entails a whole series of evil powers – death, the 
devil, law and curse; most constant is the grouping together of sin and death.  
As Aulén sees it, sin according to the Latin type has been degraded into a merely moralistic 
idea. Salvation becomes a mere remission of punishment. However, for Aulén, salvation 
should instead entail deliverance from both sin and death, as well as an entrance into life; 
such an understanding portrays salvation as positive rather than negative.  
Aulén notes that the Latin type appears to suggest a direct and personal relationship between 
God and humankind, and at the same time a deeper sense of guilt. Yet he insists that this does 
not extend beyond theoretical discourse since the threatened penalty is in the same breath 
borne by a substitute. Obviously, this makes one wonder if the guilt that the Latin view 
intends to deal with is indeed pressing enough. Moreover, some if not many, can scarcely 
stand to see an innocent person being punished instead of the real offender.  
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Another point that Aulén raised against the Latin type, relates to its materialised view of sin. 
The merits of the satisfaction delivered by Christ for humankind, are treated by default as 
transferred or imputed onto humankind. Aulén argues that such a view obscures the direct 
personal relationship between God and the sinner. Then, too, the very idea of a satisfaction 
shows that the justice of God on humankind has not been fully met. So, in the payment of a 
compensation for sin, or the endurance of punishment for sin, God’s personal demand on 
humankind is not adequately expressed, nor is the idea of sin itself seen in its full personal 
significance.  
Aulén argues that sin is always positive, wherever the classic idea is dominant, whether the 
actual terms used be the forgiveness of sins, union with God, the deifying of human nature, or 
some other. Thus, when Christ overcomes the tyrants which hold humankind in bondage, 
Christ’s victory is accompanied by the divine blessing, justification, grace and salvation. In 
respect to the Latin doctrine, the natural tendency is for forgiveness to be regarded negatively; 
for it is the fruit of the satisfaction made by Christ that remits the punishment humankind has 
fully deserved.  
To Aulén, the fundamental mistake that Anselm made with regard to forgiveness is that he 
expounded a negative conception of forgiveness. Aulén claims that Luther is always 
vigorously positive when it comes to sin. Luther largely describes salvation in terms which 
are more or less synonyms, even to the old patristic language of the “deification” of human 
nature. While one may follow Aulén in this respect, one may equally doubt whether Luther is 
not picked selectively to back only the classic view.  
An important point that Aulén rightly notes is that the penitential system on which the Latin 
doctrine has its basis, is essentially moralistic: How a perfect God should deal with individual 
sinners. Such an approach removes the atoning death of Christ from its primary context. 
Christ’s atoning work basically meant to restore the broken relationship between God and 
humankind. The individual human being has sinned against God, against one another and 
against nature as a whole. However, to dwell on this as point of departure for the 
interpretation of the atoning work of Christ, distorts the whole picture.  
On salvation, Aulén contends that the Latin doctrine provides a series of acts which are 
relatively loosely interrelated. The actual atonement consists of Christ’s offering of 
satisfaction and God’s acceptance of it. With this act humanity has no input, except in so far 
as Christ stands as their substitute or representative. Justification is a second act, in which 
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God transfers or imputes to humanity the merits of Christ. Here again, Aulén argues, no direct 
relation seems to exists between Christ and humanity. Next, we have sanctification, a third 
act, as he sees it, with no organic connection with the preceding two acts.  
Aulén accused the Latin type that it fails to explain the relation between the incarnation and 
the atonement adequately. For God is no longer viewed as the direct agent in the atoning 
work. Christ, as a human being, delivers atonement on behalf of human beings. Aulén notes 
that, “the classic idea of the atonement, as it is set forth in the writings of the Fathers, is both 
clear and monumental. It sets forth God’s coming to human, to accomplish His redemptive 
work”. He contends that incarnation and redemption belong indissolubly together; God in 
Christ overcomes the hostile powers which hold humanity in bondage. Incarnation is defined 
by Aulén as “the manifestation of God’s goodness and the fulfillment of His saving work in 
flesh, under the conditions of human nature.” 
Aulén contends that the Latin approach to the atonement always regards the sacrifice as 
offered by a human being to God, and expands this into a logical theory. But the classic idea 
of the atonement, whether from East or West, is always marked by a double-side-ness. For 
Aulén the sacrifice of Christ is the means whereby the tyrants are overcome; yet there is a 
close connection between the tyrants and God’s own judgment against sin.  
Aulén argues that the idea of God receiving a sacrifice, based on a theoretical calculation of 
what God must demand from the human side for the satisfaction of His justice before 
atonement can be effected, is odd. He contends that sacrifice stands in the divine economy as 
a means whereby the divine will to reconciliation realises itself. It also shows how much it 
costs God to effect the atonement.  
Aulén contends that the incarnation is no longer a vibrant doctrine in the Western theological 
discourses as it had been in the days of Athanasius. As he sees it, it has become a venerable 
inheritance from the past, which must be guarded carefully, but which is not altogether easy 
to comprehend fully. Surprisingly, Aulén accuses Anselm of not taking the incarnation 
seriously. However, Anselm’s atonement theory pivots around the question of incarnation.  
On the concept of God, Aulén notes that the Latin type depicts God as more remote. The idea 
of some opposition to God as portrayed in the classic approach, is less evident in the Latin 
type. He attributes this to what he terms “abstract retributive justice” that substitutes the 
personal wrath of God. The solution of the antinomy, as Aulén argues, can fairly be termed a 
rational compromise. The justice of God receives a compensation for human’s default, so that 
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God’s mercy may now be set free to act (Aulén 1931:81-98). 
d) Subjective type (Moral influence view) 
Thirdly, Aulén analyses the subjective type of atonement. This approach is generally known 
as the “moral influence”-theory and is associated especially with Peter Abelard. According to 
Abelard, Christ is set forth as the perfect example, the Ideal Man, and the realisation of 
human perfection.  
Aulén notes that the consequence of such a view is that God’s share in the process of 
salvation becomes secondary. He contends that the “subjective” type must be seen against the 
background of the Latin doctrine, as a reaction against it. According to Aulén, the moral 
influence theory does not regard the atonement as in any true sense carried out by God. 
Rather, reconciliation is the result of a process that takes place in human beings, such as 
conversion and amendment. Aulén points out that, if mention of Christ is made in the 
connection of atonement, Christ’s efforts are not thought of as God’s work for humankind’s 
salvation. He is rather the perfect Example, the Ideal Man, and the Head of the race. Aulén, 
further notes that, in so far as Christ’s work can affect the relation between God and 
humankind, it is a matter of “from below upwards”, and not of God’s approach to humans. 
Aulén further argues that the idea of sin has become altogether weakened in the subjective 
approach. He discerns this weakness in the larger context of the enlightenment theology 
which regarded sin as little more than infirmity. He also notes that liberal Protestantism, 
which, he contends serves as the context for this type, generally has a truncated sense of sin. 
Aulén contends that this humanistic interpretation of atonement fails to maintain the radical 
hostility of God to evil, and His judgment on sin. 
On salvation, Aulén notes that Abelard stressed the accomplishment of the atoning work 
through the human nature of Christ. The emphasis on the human nature becomes exclusive, 
and Christ is treated eventually simply as an ideal Man.  
For Aulén, the Christ presented in the subjective approach, was a peculiarly abstract and 
unreal Christ. He is portrayed as an ideal human being, and actually became in effect a sort of 
“intermediary being” between God and humankind. On a very important note, Aulén also 
pointed out that the incarnation ceases to take a primary place in terms of the moral influence 
theory. 
Aulén further observes that the English theologians who subscribe to the moral influence 
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theory, interpret incarnation in a semi-Arian rather than a Nicene sense. He notes that 
amongst continental liberal theologians, God is at most regarded as the ultimate cause of 
Christ’s atoning acts. Through Christ God sees humankind in a new light. In either case the 
atonement is not in any true sense to be assumed the work of God. 
On the concept of God as relating to sin, Aulén notes that the moral influence type does not 
view any opposition against God. Aulén attributes this to the intention to set forth a “purified” 
and “simple” conception of God, whose character is that of unchanging Love. However, 
Aulén surmises that this simplicity is won at the cost of obscuring the hostility of the divine 
love to evil. Thus, for the advocates of the moral influence, atonement is no longer regarded 
as in any true sense carried out by God. Rather, the reconciliation is the result of some process 
that takes place in humans, such as conversion and amendment.  
Aulén points out that, although Abelard did not pay attention to the seriousness of sin which 
occasioned the atonement, one would still appreciate his renewed emphasis on love as the 
underlying motive of the atonement. He contends that it may be fallacious to argue that 
Abelard was a lone voice on this subjective view. In fact, this approach had been anticipated 
by Gregory the Great and Anselm himself (Aulén 1931:133-142). 
e) Conclusion 
To sum-up, Aulén contends that the classic view poses atonement as a movement of God 
towards humankind. God is closely and personally engaged in the work of humankind’s 
deliverance. With the Latin view, God seems to be more distant, for the satisfaction is paid by 
a human, in the person of Christ, to God. In the moral influence theory God acts even more 
distant. As far as God is concerned, no atonement is needed, and all the emphasis is on 
human’s movement to God, and this is accomplished in the human world. That is to say, the 
essential Christian idea of God reaching out to humans, which dominates the classic type, is 
weakened in the Latin type, and lost in the subjective type of atonement envisaged.  
7.2.5 Colin Gunton’s analysis of the three main atonement theories 
Colin E. Gunton was Professor of Christian Doctrine at Kings College, London, and associate 
minister of the United Reformed Church in Brentwood. Gunton was also the editor of the 
Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine. He is the author of many influential 
publications and articles including: The Actuality of Atonement: A study of Metaphor, 
Rationality and the Christian Tradition. This book was published in 1988. Gunton’s 
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immediate focus was Aulén’s analysis of the three main views of atonement, particularly the 
Christus Victor view, which he sought to respond to. In this section, I will review The 
Actuality of Atonement as a response to Aulén’s book Christus Victor. In what follows, I will 
review the three main views which Gunton analyses. He tags these theories as: Christus 
Victor, the forensic or Anselmian and the Exemplarist (Moral influence) theory. 
a) Gunton’s response to Aulén on the Christus Victor view of atonement 
In its earliest forms, the ransom theory was embedded with freighted accounts of devils and 
demons which were vanquished by various divine stratagems. Aulén recaptured the old theory 
in a new mode by employing the phrase Christus Victor to draw together interpretations of the 
cross as God’s triumph over evil. 
Of course, from the biblical perspective, one may justifiably speak of the victory of Christ 
over evil spirits. However, it appears that Aulén largely and almost exclusively based his 
analysis on Colossians 2:15. This is where Gunton particularly disagrees with Aulén.  
For Gunton, the language of victory should rather come from a broader New Testament 
passage and also an Old Testament background to make it more convincing. From the New 
Testament, particularly Gospels and Revelation, Gunton cites several passages of Christ’s 
victory over evil spirits to buttress his point. 
He also contends that the demons vanquished by Christ are not mythological creatures to be 
set aside but apt metaphors for both personal and extra-personal aspects of sin. He argues that, 
from both the Old Testament and the New Testament the texts about demons “present us not 
with superhuman hypostases trotting about the world, but with the metaphorical 
characterisation of moral and cosmic realities which would otherwise defy expression”.  
Gunton moreover argues that a recent study has cast doubt upon Colossians 2:15 as it is been 
interpreted that Christ met and defeated a host of cosmic enemies. Gunton (1988:55) cited 
Carr (1981:188-71, 178) to stress his point that such an interpretation does not come from the 
New Testament, but rather from Origen, a major advocate of the ransom theory. Nonetheless, 
Dunn (1996:166-170) has reviewed the recent literature on various interpretations of 
Colossians 2:15 and has taken a position similar to Aulén’s view. One may thus question 
Gunton’s argument of the recent study that has cast doubt on Aulén’s position. 
He further contends that Aulén emphasises the divine initiative. But this emphasis on the 
divine victory only, entails a one sided truth. He argues that the victory charted in the New 
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Testament is as much human as divine. From some selected biblical passages such as Luke 4; 
Luke 22:40-46 and 23:7 and also Romans 1:25, 18, 28- 41, Gunton argues that, the victory 
over evil forces was won by Christ acting as truly God and truly human. 
Furthermore, Gunton contends that the victory of Christ is rather a passive and not a positive 
action. He explains that the authors of the synoptic Gospels do not describe explicitly the 
ministry of Jesus as a victory as such. They rather clearly depict it as in part, a conflict 
between the authority of God represented by Jesus, and those that deny it. He further explains 
that Jesus’ victory over temptation was passive, and its outcome was in both the “spiritual” 
and “physical” worlds. Furthermore, in the New Testament no absolute distinction is drawn 
between what can be termed the cosmic and moral dimensions of the world. 
b) Gunton’s analysis of Anselmian theory 
Gunton labeled Anselmian theory as forensic because it explains the substitutionary sacrifice 
of the God-man as satisfying the requirements of justice. For the advocates of this theory, on 
the one hand, only a divine being could pay the enormous debt of human sin. On the other 
hand, only a human being should do so.  
The trouble with Anselm’s theory, according to Gunton, is that it is dipolar rather than 
trinitarian. It presents the atonement as a transaction between God, the Father and the Son, 
whose humanity must suffer the penalty of sin on behalf of humankind. Thus Anselm’s 
approach, as Aulén also points out, overlooks the suffering of trinitarian God and views 
atonement as merely a removal of guilt rather than a renewal of life.  
Gunton argues that a trinitarian interpretation of atonement will not depict sacrifice as 
something that befalls the creature in the name of a vengeful, angry, or demanding deity. It 
will also not portray it as action of Christ on the cross exerted once for all. To Gunton, too 
much weight is thrown on the action of Jesus Christ towards the Father, whilst too little is 
afforded the notion of salvation being realised through the involvement of the triune God in 
history. 
Gunton contends that atoning sacrifice entails an eternal activity within the divine life in 
which the Father and the Son reciprocally offer themselves to each other and to the world. 
Here, Gunton employs the thoughts of P.T. Forsyth and Edward Irving for his discussions.  
For Gunton, “substitutionary atonement” means far more than Christ’s taking our punishment 
upon himself. He argues that humankind, in a sense, is substitute for Christ – in that the true 
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humanity that belongs properly to Christ (according to the doctrine of enhypostasis) now 
applied to us3
Gunton also notes that advocates of the doctrine of penal substitution, often elide the juridical 
with the sacrificial. For Gunton it is a mistake. It is court of law, not the temple that provides 
the metaphorical setting for the substitutional model. He argues that sacrifice in the Bible is 
never punitive; rather, it is a divine gift which, as human offering, becomes an expression of 
praise and gratitude. It is also a demonstration that reconciliation is a costly matter.  
 (see Forsyth 1938). 
On the ongoing debates on whether Jesus died as our representative or substitute, Gunton 
contends that the debate is barren, in that both cases are true. He contends that these terms in 
the context of Jesus’ atoning work are correlative, not opposing concepts. Because Jesus is 
our substitute, it is also right to call him our representative. However, Gunton notes that it is 
rather in the cult, not the court, that substitution receives its metaphorical purchase. 
Moreover, Gunton contends, justice too, in the Bible, is not essentially punitive or retributive; 
it entails restoration. He suggests that if one continues to conceive of the atonement in 
forensic terms, it is essential to view it not always as a legal transaction but as the 
transformation of a relationship. He however notes that this is a connection not always 
convincingly made by advocates of the doctrine of penal substitution. 
Gunton contends that in the Western theological discourse, sin is often conceived as 
transgression of the law of God. Therefore, correlatively, salvation is understood as freedom 
from the consequences of penalties of that transgression. To Gunton, this is not exactly the 
case in the context of atonement. There are a number of complicating factors – biblical, 
historical and systematic. He argues that both Old and New Testament writers show no 
interest in law abstractly as such. 
Gunton explains that in the law books of the Old Testament, there is a certain degree of 
variety in the way the law is conceived to function in Israel’s life. However, the law largely 
belongs in the context of God’s covenant with Israel. The laws and instructions are a gift of 
God, the framework of the communal life of those whom God set free from Egypt.  
Gunton also points out that Anselm believes that unless there is some objective balance, there 
can be no restoration of human life, even to the state it enjoyed before sin interposed. There is 
                                                 
3  In this way Gunton moves from Anselm’s theory to that of Barth, from substitutionary punishment to 
substitutionary grace (see Runia 1982).  
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to be sure, a quantitative, almost transactional component to the gift: something that the 
incarnate Son offered to the father to compensate for what human creation has itself failed to 
offer. However, this is too speculative on Anselm’s part. 
Furthermore, Anselm is faulted for making the whole affair of atonement appear to be an 
exercise of power rather than love: the Son, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, had 
determined to show the loftiness of his omnipotence by no other means than death. Added to 
this, is the fact that God appears to be not as much concerned to achieve a correct balance of 
numbers in heaven as to realise his love towards the creation. 
For Gunton Anselm also seems to equate salvation with the remission of penalty. A relatively 
little emphasis is given to the atonement as the sphere where reconciliation in the sense of a 
renewed personal walk with God is realised. Gunton further expresses his concern on how far 
the theology of satisfaction is viable in a world which has so different a conception of human 
freedom. 
Gunton notes that the problem with the imagery of the forensic notion of justification is that 
God is portrayed as a stern judge who demands punishment for human sin, and not so much 
as a loving father. Nevertheless, the penal substitution position would in fact be a travesty of 
justice. Penal Substitution theory is based on the concept of a criminal justice system which 
demands punishment for transgression. But no criminal justice in the world (except possibly 
tyrannical states) would ever claim that it is just to punish the innocent in place of the guilty.4
c) Gunton’s critique of the exemplarist theory of atonement 
  
Gunton notes that the exemplarist view of atonement is theologically associated with Abelard, 
and philosophically with Kant. He contends that this view characterises the attempts of 
rationalism to reduce Jesus to a perfect role model. It also depicts redemption as an 
achievement that human beings can reach themselves.  
For Gunton the doctrine of atonement receives little attention these days because of its 
                                                 
4  It has been noted that penal substitutional theory is based on vengeance and violence. The concern here is 
that a strategy which depends on violence and on vengeance, cannot be termed reconciliation. Girard has 
raised a concern that penal substitution entails an inherently violent model of atonement; moreover, this 
underwrites a culture of brutality and vengeance, ethically, socially and politically. Radical feminist 
theologians Joan Carson Brown and Rebecca Parker have gone so far as to speak of “divine child abuse” 
and to argue that the image of Jesus as voluntarily submitting to brutality contributes to the victimisation of 
women. Black liberation theologian James Cone links the model to the defense of slavery and colonialism. 
Michael Northcott suggests that it is no coincidence that leaders of the Religious right, for whom the model 
stands so central, are such staunch advocates of lex talionis, capital punishment and the war of terror. 
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controlling concepts such as substitutionary suffering, the blood sacrifice, and the victory over 
Satan. It appears to the modern and post-modern mind as both immoral and fantastical. 
Gunton, however, contends that the language of atonement is metaphoric. It is, nevertheless, 
useful in demonstrating the real evil of the real world which was faced and healed 
ontologically in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ (Gunton 1988:27-52). 
7.2.6 Conclusion  
To sum up, all three theories of atonement carry strengths and weaknesses. As I have already 
noted, it is neither my intention to critique nor to offer my evaluation of these theories. My 
aim is to give a brief overview of the analysis of these three main atonement theories as Aulén 
and Gunton understand them. The overview of this analysis will serve as a guide for the 
construction of my atonement hypothesis in section 7.4. Before that, in the next section, I will 
describe the basis of my hypothesis, which entails the Akan understanding of reconciliation.  
7.3 Means of mediation in the traditional Akan context 
7.3.1 Introduction 
Amongst the Akan an intermediary and mpatadeε sacrifice are the two key elements to effect 
reconciliation. When a broken relationship appears between human beings or between 
humans and lesser divinities or the ancestors, an intermediary and compensation or sacrifices 
are not optional but crucial elements. On the one hand, mpatadeε are means to affect 
reconciliation between human beings. On the other hand, afoddeε are means to affect 
reconciliation between humans and spirit beings. It is expected of the offender to search for 
someone to mediate between him/her and the offended party. However, if the wrongdoing at 
stake affects the whole family or community, it then becomes the responsibility of the 
community elders to initiate the mediation. This is usually officiated by the family head who 
acts as the okyeame (linguist) when the problem lies between human beings. But if the 
problem lies between human and spirit beings, usually, the officiating agent is the osofo 
(priest).  
7.3.2 Akan terms for mediation 
The Akan have at least seven terms for mediation. Terms such as nntemgyinafo, opatafo and 
dwantoafo, are abstract intermediary terms. Terms such as okyeame and osofo serve as agents 
of the intermediary. Mpatadeε and afodeε are also terms which serve as means of mediation. 
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In this section, I will explain briefly the first five terms and leave the means of mediation for a 
more detailed analysis.  
a) Ntemgyinafo 
The term ntemgyinafo was coined by the Akan Twi Bible translators from two Akan words; 
ntem (between), gyina (stand) and fo (suffix: one). 
b) Dwantoafo 
Ntemgyinafo literally means (one who 
stands in between). In English language, it implies a mediator. The coinage of ntemgyinafo 
became necessary as there is no original Akan term to capture the biblical term mediator. The 
original Akan terms for mediation, as we will see below, only approximate the biblical 
meaning of a mediator. 
The Akan term dwantoafo in a broader sense of the word means intermediary or mediator. 
Precisely, dwantoafo denotes a person who pleads on another’s behalf. The break down of the 
term is as follows: dwan (flee); toa- (unto) and fo (one). Dwantoafo means “a person that one 
can flee unto” to plead one’s case with him or her. This presupposes that dwantoafo unlike 
ntemgyinafo is only called to a scene in case of a problem. Whereas ntemgyinafo functions as 
a “standing-order”, the nature of the work of dwantoafo is more that of a task-force. The task 
of dwantoafo is primarily to plead for a forgiveness of sin or for a favour. Of course 
dwantoafo may also have to deal with the root cause of that particular sin to avoid its 
recurrence. But this is more embedded in the personality of dwantoafo, as a recurrence of the 
problem entails disrespect to the dwantoafo. Thus not just anybody can function as 
dwantoafo. The nature of the task of a dwantoafo demands a person whom both parties accord 
respect. The bottom line of the work of dwantoafo is that, it is limited to a situation whereby 
one pleads on behalf of an offender for forgiveness or favour. 
It lies outside the task description of a dwantoafo to plead on one’s behalf by his or her own 
accord. Technically, it is offensive for a dwantoafo to do that. The reason is that, to “plead” 
for forgiveness on behalf of someone when that one is not present to admit his/her 
wrongdoing, logically entails judgment. That is to say, the person one is pleading for is the 
offender. Indeed, it is a declaration that the person in question is guilty and the assumed guilty 
party is expected to repent and mend his/her ways. Thus the dwantoafo only has a task to 
fulfill when he/she is called to act. 
Nonetheless, in some cases, dwantoafo may take it upon him/herself to plead for forgiveness 
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without the person’s accused consent – provided that the one involved is a minor or there is a 
sense of corporate responsibility. Primarily, dwantoafo has a task only when sin is admitted, 
and such an admission therefore may serve as a precursor to reconciliation.  
7.3.3 The means of reconciliation in the Akan context 
In what follows, I will discuss two Akan mediatory terms namely, mpatadeε (compensation) 
and afodeε (sin sacrifice).  
a) Mpatadeε as a means of reconciliation between human beings 
Amongst the Akan, it is the responsibility of an intermediary to render an apology on behalf 
of the offender (in a case where that person has already acceded to his/her fault). In many 
cases, a mere verbal apology is not regarded as adequate to bring out the desired 
reconciliation. Thus, for the sake of reconciliation, and also in some cases to avoid a possible 
retaliation, the Akan elders deem it appropriate that, in addition to the verbal apology, 
mpatadeε should almost always be given to the offended party as a precursor to 
reconciliation. This is the case even between extended family members or husband and wife. 
One can choose anybody that one deems respectable enough to render the apology and also to 
present the mpatadeε.  
Mpatadeε may be akin to the English term compensation/reparation but there are some subtle 
differences. Amongst the traditional Akan, mpatadeε as a means of mediation in a conflict 
situation serves at least six purposes:  
Firstly, for the offender to give mpatadeε willingly, indicates that the person has accepted 
his/her wrong or evil doing and thereby renders an appropriate apology to the victim. 
Amongst the Akan, in most cases, a verbal apology, “I am sorry”, is deemed not enough. The 
formal way of accepting oneself as the guilty party in a case is to present a token – mpatadeε 
– as a concrete expression of the outcome of the arbitration of the case. 
Secondly, mpatadeε serves as the historical record of an outcome of arbitration. One 
important focus of mpatadeε is to compensate the victim. However, since in former days 
arbitration of cases was not recorded, mpatadeε was used as the concrete affirmation of the 
outcome of arbitration.  
Thirdly, mpatadeε is a key reference point in the recollection of a case. It is typical of an 
Akan, who is making a reference to an old case to say: “At such and such a time, I had a case 
with so and so, and he/she was at fault, but he/she acceded to that wrongdoing and gave me an 
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mpatadeε of so much. Here the referent is resting his or her case on the mpatadeε as the 
concrete evidence of the outcome of an arbitrated case between the parties. 
Fourthly, mpatadeε also assures the victim that the offender has admitted that he /she has 
wronged the victim – with the logical implication that the offender will ensure that a similar 
case will not occur in future.  
The traditional Akan concept of mpatadeε, unlike the Western notion of compensation or 
reparation, only follows one’s own admittance of evil or wrong doing. Amongst the 
traditional Akan, if one offers mpatadeε to a victim without any sense of acceptance of one’s 
sins, in most cases the victim will refuse the mpatadeε. A well noted case will throw more 
light on this notion. 
In the midst of misunderstanding between family members, a nephew slaps his uncle. The 
family elders call the case for arbitration and reach a decision that the nephew should 
apologise and offer a sheep to the uncle as mpatadeε. No sooner than the spokesperson for the 
elders has finished speaking, the nephew in his usual arrogant mood immediately accepts the 
verdict of the elders to offer the sheep. 
The uncle observes the nephew’s crass attitude in his acceptance to give him the sheep. It is 
therefore clear to the uncle and those standing around that, to the nephew, the whole 
arbitration entailed a business deal of paying for the slapping. And to the nephew, the cost of 
a sheep was but a small amount.  
Interestingly, before the nephew gets ready to go fetch the sheep, the uncle retorts: “Kofi” – 
calling the nephew by his name, “even though I have not eaten your sheep, you have given 
me such a dirty slap. How many more dirty slaps will you give me when I enjoy your sheep?” 
With such remarks, the uncle thanks the elders and refuses the sheep.  
Had the uncle received the sheep and continued to bear ill-feelings against the nephew, the 
uncle would have been regarded as a bad person. For the Akan, if one does that, it would be 
said that one has put water in his/her mouth to speak to the elders – meaning that she/he has 
deceived the elders.  
Amongst the Akan, there is no compensation or reparation without reconciliation. If the 
victim has any cause to believe that the offender has no sense of guilt for her/his evil acts, 
there is no point for the victim to accept the mpatadeε – for its essence is to demonstrate that 
the offender has acknowledged his or her wrongdoing. On the other hand, if the offended one 
called for compensation instead and the offender unwillingly or willingly pays the 
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compensation demanded, it may still be regarded as mpatadeε but will be devoid of its 
essence as a means of reconciliation.  
Fifthly, mpatadeε functions as a way of removing the ill-feelings that the victim had against 
the offender. After the acceptance of mpatadeε, the victim is expected to amend all his/her ill-
feelings towards the offender. An Akan maxim illustrates this view: Efie akyi ne abofono 
(literally: if one vomits fully one will not vomit again). Mpatadeε therefore assures the 
offender that his/her fault or evil acts have actually been forgiven by the victim.  
Sixth, amongst the Akan, it is not the victim who fixes what he/she will accept as the 
mpatadeε. Rather, the offer on what will constitute the mpatadeε, has to come from the 
offender, guided by the arbitrators of the case. Interestingly this rule helps to maintain the 
appropriate balance, seeing that any demand from the offended person will endanger the 
intended reconciliation.  
Seventh, mpatadeε functions as a means of reconciliation. The modern legal compensation in 
the court of law setting, which has the aim of merely “replacement”, is quite different from 
the traditional Akan concept of mpatadeε. Whereas the legal compensation has the primary 
aim of a possible adequate replacement, the traditional Akan mpatadeε has true reconciliation 
as its primary aim.  
Amongst the Akan someone cannot carry mpatadeε by him-/herself to the offended party. It is 
deemed an insult for one to do even that. Mpatadeε should be given through a respected 
person whom the victim recognises as such. In matters of human relations, the okyeame 
(linguist) of the case usually takes care of the mpatadeε (compensation). Okyeame may act as 
ntemgyinafo or dwantoafo. Ntemgyinafo and dwantoafo are terms for reconciliation. The 
mpatadeε (compensation) is linked to the role of intermediaries. It is not the case that if 
mpatadeε or afodeε does not work, then you need an intermediary. Rather, the intermediary is 
required to demand mpatadeε on behalf of the offending party. Mpatadeε functions as a 
means of reconciliation; a way of shaping the behaviour of a citizen, a device to avoid 
retaliation and family feud, a method of keeping historical records and a strategy to deal with 
conflicts.  
b) Afodeε as a means of reconciliation between human and spirit beings  
The Akan term afodeε in the English language denotes guilt or sin sacrifice. Such sacrifices 
will require an intermediary, who is a specialist in such matters acting as the officiating 
person. In the case of a lesser divinity, it is usually the priest of the lesser divinity who then 
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becomes the intermediary. In the case of one’s ancestors, it is usually the family elder (abusua 
panin) or the traditional priest who mediates.  
However, for reasons unknown, the Akan do not offer afodeε sacrifices to Onyame (the 
Supreme Being). Probably, this may have to with the fact that the Akan do not have priests 
for Onyame who are duly qualified to officiate such sacrifices.  
(i) Afodeε (sin sacrifice) as an admission of sin and evil 
Offences against the ancestors and the lesser divinities are not taken lightly. It is believed 
amongst the Akan that offences and curses run concurrently within the system of the spirit 
beings. Thus, when someone offends a spirit being, that person is automatically cursed.5
In this regard, the first reaction of an Akan when he or she offends a spirit being is to accept 
his/her sins. This admission is expressed concretely in the form of afodeε (literally sin/guilt 
something).  
  
The purpose of the presentation of an animal as afodeε (sin sacrifice), is to accept publicly 
that the offender has acknowledged his/her sin and has therefore surrendered him-/herself to 
the offended spirit being. Such a sacrifice is offered to establish the fact that one has 
personally and publicly accepted his/her guilt before a spirit being, i.e. a lesser divinity or an 
ancestor. Such a sacrifice also serves to enforce the notion that the society does not take sin 
lightly at, least before God, the ancestors and the lesser divinities who are regarded as the 
custodians of public morality. 
The basic rationale behind the sin offering within the Akan context, is the public 
acknowledgement of guilt and acceptance of it. The admission of one’s sin before the spirit 
beings serves as a basis to plead for forgiveness of sin and the removal of the curse. In this 
respect, the death of the animal represents a concrete form of acceptance of guilt and its 
consequences, namely death. At the same time, it is a means of asking for unmerited 
forgiveness. Nonetheless, the animal is never meant to be the bearer of the offender’s penalty. 
Indeed it would be odd, particularly in the context of African traditional sacrifices, to view the 
presented animal as a substitute to bear the punishment in stead of the offender so that the 
offender may go free. It would also be odd to view such an animal as a bribe to the lesser 
divinities or the ancestors – the custodians of public morality. 
                                                 
5  Usually one gets cognisance of this either through sickness and calamities or this is revealed to him or her 
by a diviner. 
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(ii) Afodeε as cleansing of sin 
In Akan traditional religion, sin is believed to lead to the severing of relationships between 
human beings and the lesser divinities and it may result in a crisis such as an epidemic, 
famine, drought or serious illness. Thus, when someone commits what amounts to a sin 
against the ancestors and the lesser divinities, a number of measures are taken by the 
community. Usually, “cleansing” ceremonies or rituals are performed by elders, medicine 
men/women, priests, or diviners.  
In the event of asking for forgiveness from a spirit being, one does not approach a lesser 
divinity, ancestor and even a living chief, empty handed. If one recognises that he/she has 
offended a spirit being, 
Interestingly, there may be a possibility whereby a priest may become a victim of sacrifice. 
This is the case whereby the priest has recommended an item for sacrifice which becomes 
almost impossible to obtain. Yet, it is necessary that the sacrifice should be offered for the 
benefit of the whole community. In such cases, the elders of the community may confer to 
offer the priest himself as the necessary sacrifice. Thus, the Akan saying: Se okomfo kyere 
musuyi na nakadeε ni ho yede no na eyi (if priest recommended that something should be 
used as sacrifice and it is almost impossible to get, the priest himself must be killed as 
sacrifice).  
the procedure is to approach the shrine of the offended spirit being 
with an offering, in most cases a live animal. In the context of the Akan sacrificial system, 
afodeε (guilt/sin sacrifice) is the offering presented when a human being offends a spirit 
being. These usually involve the slaughtering of animals (like sheep, goats or chickens,) and 
the use of blood. Thereby, the offender is reconciled to the other party and to the wider 
community and re-accepted within the society. 
Such an animal or victim would be slaughtered, and the blood would be sprinkled on the 
shrine of the offended lesser divinity or on the black stool of the ancestors. This is regarded as 
a means of cleansing the spirit beings from desecration. Perhaps the primary reason for 
slaughtering an animal for a sin sacrifice, is to use the blood of the animal to disinfect the 
uncleanness that has resulted because of the offender’s wrongdoing. The need for a blood 
sacrifice as a sin offering dates back to antiquity and cuts across many ancient societies.  
However, the animal is not offered so that the gods get blood to quench their blood thirst. The 
blood is not meant for the gods and the ancestors to drink so that their anger will be averted. 
This is a demonstration to all the people that, what had happened is abhorrent to the society at 
large. The spirit being’s anger will be averted because the society has not condoned sin but is 
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taking the matter seriously.  
In some instances the blood of the sheep will be poured on the head of the offender as an 
expression of the gravity of the sin committed. In this sense, the custodians of public morality 
would be satisfied, for evil has been confronted and acknowledged as such. This is entirely 
different from the notion that the animal has been severely punished as a substitute for the ill-
doing of the offender. A classic example of the rite of cleansing communal sin within Akan 
societies is the Odwera festival.  
(iii) An example of a sin cleansing ceremony: The Odwera festival 
The whole Odwera ceremony derives its name from the Akan idea of soul-cleansing, a 
purification ceremony. Dwera means to cleanse. Cleansing therefore is in effect the central 
focal point of the whole Odwera ceremony. According to Busia (1976:2003-2004), the 
Odwera ceremony is an annual festival which lasts a week or two. Sheep, drinks and first 
fruits of the year are offered to ancestors and the lesser divinities (and also to the Supreme 
Being; particularly the libation drink). Odwera is also a time for the cleansing of the tribe of 
defilement, and for the purification of the shrines of ancestral spirits and tribal lesser 
divinities. 
Here I will only address the core rite of the cleansing and omit the other details. The three 
main rites related to the cleansing of national sin are as follows. Firstly, the Asantehene’s 
ritual bath (soul washing). During this rite, cleansing and purification usually take place in a 
stream where the chief takes a ritual bath. Such an act symbolises cleansing of the whole 
nation as the Asantehene represents the whole Asante nation.  
The second rite is the sprinkling of water on the major shrines of the lesser divinities and on 
the stools of the ancestors. The shrines of the lesser divinities and also the stool of the 
ancestors represent the spirit beings. Therefore to sprinkle water on these objects is a sign of 
cleansing the nation from defilement that may obstruct the relationship between them and the 
spirit beings  
Thirdly, the people present at the ceremony will be sprinkled with water. Within Akan 
understanding, such sprinkling of water symbolises the cleansing of the whole Asante nation. 
The fourth rite entails the climax point of the festival. In this rite, a black hen is sacrificed on 
the state ancestors’ stools. The sacrifice of a black hen symbolises the removal of all that has 
defiled the tribe in the year. It is an offering to the ancestors on behalf of the people for the 
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sins of the past years. Busia explains that a black hen is usually sacrificed because a spotless 
white hen was what the traditional priests usually demanded as sacrifice to the lesser 
divinities.6
(iv) Afodeε (sin sacrifice): Precursor to the ritual of musuyi (curse removal)  
 
Another remarkable issue in the traditional Akan’s relation with the spirit beings is a common 
belief that as soon as someone sins against a spirit being, that person concurrently places him-
/ herself under a curse; thus disaster awaits such a person. Therefore, as one approaches the 
spirit being with afodeε (guilt something), it is a concrete expression of an admission of one’s 
guilt. It then becomes the responsibility of the said spirit being to remove the impending 
disaster or the curse from the offender. 
In the process of removing the curse or the impending danger, the offender will be asked to 
provide another animal to act as a bearer for the curse or disaster. Notably, it is also the 
responsibility of the offender to provide the animal for the removal of the curse or the 
impending disaster. Thus, the spirit acts to remove the sin as well as the curse from the guilty 
party. Remarkably, the act of cleansing of sin and removal of a curse can take place at 
individual as well as community level. 
c) The ritual of musuyi (curse removal) is based on the concept of substitution / 
representation 
The substitutional and representational sacrifices are amongst several kinds of sacrifices 
offered by the Akan. These kinds are normally offered as an exchange for the safety of a 
community or an individual who would have otherwise suffered some kind of misfortune. 
These misfortunes are normally seen or detected by a diviner or by the individuals themselves 
by means of dreams. Rituals are subsequently offered to prevent the looming danger. Thus, 
substitutional and representational sacrifices are offered to avert danger or misfortune that, it 
is believed, might befall the one offering the sacrifice. Amongst the Akan, musuyi takes on 
two forms: Either the substitution/representative will be allowed to escape with a curse upon 
its head or be killed; usually the former in the case. 
                                                 
6  This sacrifice is followed by a ritual feast which the living and the dead are believed to share. All who 
partake of this feast are believed to receive strength, health and blessings. According to Busia, the cycle of 
rites observed during the Odwera portrays all the elements of Asante religious faith: the Supreme Being, 
the lesser divinities and the ancestors are all propitiated. 
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(i) Substitutional curse removal within the Akan context: An example 
In most cases, a sheep is presented as a substitute for the human being. The sheep is rubbed 
against the body of the offerer and it is believed that the offerer transfers his/her illness or 
misfortune to the sheep. In other cases, the offerer lays his/her hands on the sheep or touches 
the forehead of the animal with his/her hands. It is believed that the ill-fate of the offerer is 
exchanged with the animal. Afterwards, the animal is led into the wild and allowed to escape.  
When a ritual is performed to transfer a curse or impending disaster on the animal, the animal 
then becomes accursed. It then follows that, it would be allowed to escape with the curse upon 
its head. The associated belief in this regard is that the curse or the impending danger is 
automatically transferred to any person or animal that kills the accursed one. 
(ii) Substitutional sacrifice within the Akan context: Some examples7
The sacrificial death of four Akan chiefs may serve as examples of 
substitutional/representative curse removal. In the Akan history, four Akan Chiefs 
intentionally gave themselves up, at different occasions, to be killed on behalf of the Asante 
nation (the dominant group of the Akan people). They offered themselves for ritual purposes 
to gain victory in war against their enemies. Thus, substitutional/representative death is not 
unknown in Asante.  
 
At the end of the 16th century, war raged between the Asante and Dankyira. Nana Osei Tutu 
was then the chief and founder of the Asante kingdom. He had a priest and a shrewd politician 
who was called Okomfo Anokye, a co-founder of the Asante kingdom.
One of the things Anokye asked from the Asante chiefs was that three of them should 
sacrifice themselves for medicinal purposes which would help the Asante win the war against 
their enemies. In response to the request, Nana Asenso Kofo, (chief of Adwumakase), Nana 
Dikopim I, (Chief of Edweso), and Nana Tweneboa Kodua, (paramount chief of Kumawu) 
offered themselves.  
  
Nana Dikopim I offered himself to be butchered to death and his body distributed to the 
vultures. His only request was that nobody from his clan, Asona, should be sacrificed in any 
form. 
In this free will response to the priest’s request, Nana Asenso Kofo was buried alive. His only 
request was that after his death, nobody from his town, Adwumakase, should ever be killed 
                                                 
7  I am indebted to Bishop Sarpong for this story (Sarpong 1998:149). 
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for sacrifice in any form.  
Nana Tweneboa Kodua, volunteered himself, and was also asked to lead the marching 
soldiers. Though he was armed, he was forbidden to shoot, therefore he was killed. He also 
requested that nobody from his state should be ever be sacrificed in any form. Again, 
whenever a drummer from any of the Asante states started drumming on Atumpan drums, his 
name and appellations should be sounded to remind future generations that they too should 
sacrifice themselves for the Asante nation.
Another person sacrificed himself, however, in a different way. Okomfo Anokye asked Nana 
Osei Tutu to stay at home and another chief to lead the war against the Dankyira. His 
explanation was that, although the Asante nation would win the war, whoever led as War 
General would not survive beyond seven days after the war.  
  
Nana Boahen Anantu, Chief of Mampong, at once volunteered to lead the soldiers to the war. 
He requested that, since he was taking the place of the King of Asante as War General, his 
stool should be stood next to that of the Asantehene. The Asantehene was occupying the 
Golden Stool; therefore his state should occupy a Silver Stool.
In the true spirit of sacrifice, none of the four chiefs asked for any personal benefits. However, 
each one requested that after his death, nobody from their home town should be killed for 
sacrifice in any form. This may serve as an example of substitutional/sacrifice within Akan 
history (Sarpong 1998:149). 
  
These incidences are well-known to many Ashantis, particularly that of Nana Tweneboah 
Kodua, (one of the two paramount chiefs amongst them). This offering usually goes with the 
Akan colloquial saying: Na obi nakum Antwi, namum Tweneboa Kodua na onoa de neho 
kogye akyerema (no one forces Tweneboa Kodua to die a sacrificial death, seeing that he 
intentionally offered himself to do so).
7.3.4 Osofo: The officiating agent of afodie (sin sacrifice) and curse removal  
  
In matters of relations between the lesser divinities and human beings, the asofo (priests) 
serve as the intermediaries. All the recognised and established lesser divinities that have 
shrines have asofo (priests) as their intermediaries. The priests serve as intermediaries 
between, the lesser divinities, ancestors (and other spirit beings) and human beings. In both 
afodeε (sin sacrifice) and curse removal, it is the prerogative of the priest of the offended 
lesser divinity to officiate the rite. 
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Nonetheless, while recognising that there is marred relationship between God and humankind, 
there is no indication within the Akan context of a human attempt to make amends for the 
broken relationship. The problem may be due to the fact that there is no priesthood for 
Onyame.  
As the rule of such an relationship between the lesser divinities and their priests, it is the 
prerogative of the lesser divinity to choose or provide its own priest. There has never been a 
case where someone chose a priest for a lesser divinity. As experience has shown, any attempt 
to choose a priest for a lesser divinity or impose oneself as a priest, met with a strong 
reprimand from the lesser divinity. In this respect, the burden lies now with Onyame to bring 
in his/her own priest. Someone that would be designated as God’s priest must be necessarily a 
sinless person.  
7.3.5 Conclusion 
 The Akan terms mpatadeε and afodeε serve as the principal means and precursors to 
reconciliation. The difference between afodeε and mpatadeε is that the latter is usually offered 
to a human being, while the former is largely offered to spirit beings. Nonetheless, mpatadeε 
as well as afodeε can also be offered to the chiefs in their capacity as the ancestors’ 
representatives. Thus, if one offends a chief, the tradition demands that the offender should 
give afodeε in the form of a sacrifice to the chief (who sits on the ancestors’ stool). Such 
afodeε can also be seen as mpatadeε to the chief. The only difference is that in the case of 
afodeε (sin sacrifice), an offering of blood is necessary for the cleansing. This is not required 
for mpatadeε. 
7.4 Christ our afomusuyideε: A Christian view of atonement in the  
Akan context 
7.4.1 Introduction  
In critical dialogue with the three main theories of atonement and the Akan ideas of the means 
of mediation, particularly the notions of afodeε and musuyideε (as discussed in the sections 
7.2 and 7.3 respectively), in this section I will propose an African Christian view of 
atonement. This proposal is conceptualised in terms of afomusiyideε, that is, that Christ 
through his death, acknowledged humankind’s sins before God and also became our curse 
bearer. The crucial issue to be addressed in this regard is how Jesus’ death and our sins are 
related. In Christian theology, it is not the statement “Jesus died” that can be described as the 
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good news. Rather, the belief that “Jesus died for our sins”. The problem lies in the word 
“for” as it relates to the death of Christ and our sins.8
In the history of Christian discourse, several proposals have been put forward to relate the 
death of Jesus to the sins of humankind. The major approaches as pointed out and analysed by 
Aulén are: the ransom type, the anselmian type and the subjective type. Whereas each of these 
theories throws some light on the significance of Christ’s death, it is doubtful if one of them 
expresses the significance of Christ’s death adequately. 
  
I do not claim to offer a working theory or a final solution to this problem. Rather, I aim to 
offer a proposal from the African (Akan) perspective on the significance of Christ’s death as 
sacrifice. I must also note that this proposal is only intended to illlustrate how a traditional 
African could possibly understand the death of Jesus as a sacrifice. Thus the proposal is 
somehow limited as it seeks to interpret the death of Christ only through the metaphor of 
sacrifice. I hope some insights from the African animal sacrificial practices may correct the 
erroneous view of animal sacrifice which serves as the basis of the penal subtitutionary 
theory. In this proposal I will seek to relate the death of Jesus to the sins of humankind 
directly within the context of the Akan sacrificial system. This proposal is also illustrated by 
referring to sacrifice practices from the Old Testament. 
Several proposals have been set forward in respect to the significance of Christ’s death. The 
idea however that “Jesus died to acknowledge humankind’s sin (guilty status) before God” 
may be a novel suggestion. In order to discuss my proposal in relation to the three major 
views of atonement,9
7.4.2 The three main atonement theories within the Akan context 
 I will first discuss the three main theories within the Akan context, and 
then develop my own proposal.  
These dialogues – between the three main views of atonement and the Akan culture – are not 
meant to offer an exhaustive review, critique or comparative study. My intention is to 
compare the key ideas of each of these three theories with some similar ideas within the Akan 
culture. The focus here is on how an Akan will view each of these theories within his/her 
context. 
                                                 
8  See Hooker (1994:7). 
9  These dialogues may also serve as an impetus for further studies of Christian atonement theories within an 
Akan context.  
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a) The ransom metaphor for atonement in the traditional Akan context 
The earliest articulation of the ransom theory connotes that Jesus’ death was meant to pay a 
ransom to Satan; allowing God to rescue those under Satan’s bondage. This view of 
atonement would be meaningful to the Akan if it is interpreted in the context of the Akan 
maxim: Nyame boo owuo na owou kum Nyame; na Nyame na ote nanka oduro nti odii owou 
so nkonim (God created death and death killed God; yet God, who is all-powerful, had an 
antidote for death, and overcame death).  
With reference to the maxim, there is a notion of an insurrection against Onyame by “Death” 
who was a creature of God. Onyame succumbed to death. 
Obviously, spirit beings do not die, and the Akan believe that Onyame is a Spirit being. In the 
framework of the Akan thought-form, one may speculate here that it was rather the Okra of 
Onyame incarnate i.e. Nyamekrateasefo that temporarily yielded to death. As death is the lot 
of only living material beings, the notion of the death of God in the Akan becomes clearer 
within the context of a proposal that the Okra of Onyame became teasefo (human), that is, 
Nyamekrateasefo (see section 6.4). 
But within the “domain” of death, 
Onyame, who is all-powerful, had an antidote for death, overcame death and subsequently 
rose from the dead.  
Moreover, it is the professed lot of okra to assume a human bodily form and, at one time or 
another, to appear on earth. Therefore one may not be wrong to suggest that the Okra of 
Onyame might have taken its turn as okra becoming human being for the purpose to 
overcome Death for the benefit of humankind. In order to demonstrate total supremacy, the 
Okra of Onyame finally overcame death. Thus Onyame has tasted death, yet death could not 
overcome Onyame.  
In this regard one may pose a speculative question: Why did God succumb to death and then 
later overcame it? Within the context of the traditional Akan conception of Onyame, Onyame 
may not need to demonstrate his power over the creatures. Onyame created everything 
including all the lesser divinities, and there is no myth, maxim or story that depicts Onyame as 
struggling with any of His creatures except “death”.10
Within the framework of the ransom theory, we can focus on the maxim that Onyame 
  
                                                 
10  This maxim depicts Onyame as a passable Being. This is in contrast with the Greek conception of God that 
underpinned Western theological formulations; that God is impassable. Whether it was the Greek or the 
Akan that have the correct conception of God, is an issue which reaches beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, Akan Christians do not need to subscribe to the notion that God is an impassable Being. 
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succumbed to and later overcame death in order to assure humankind that He/She is the 
sovereign. From this we can infer that death, sin and evil spirits do not have the final say on 
human life. Onyame has demonstrated that He/She is not an aloof Being to whom all powers 
are merely attributed. Instead, Onyame is aware of the fears and the worries of humankind, 
and that the most feared of those, “death”, is also under Onyame’s control. Onyame did not 
need to do battle with every “major power”, it sufficed to overcome the most feared power, 
namely Death. The importance of this maxim becomes clearer when one interprets it in 
accordance with other related myths, namely those depicting the struggles of lesser divinities 
with Death, and of human beings’ attempts to overcome Death.  
The myth of the struggles of lesser divinities with Death focuses on the river Tano, the 
earliest and one of the greatest of the lesser divinities amongst the Akan. According to the 
myth, there was a struggle between “river Tano” and “Death” with regard to a sick person. 
Struggles ensued between the two to determine whether Tano could secure life-without-death 
on behalf of humankind, or whether death will be the lot of humankind. Neither “river Tano” 
nor “Death” was victorious. A compromise was reached to the effect that, when someone is 
sick, either Death or Tano will have its way, depending on who makes the first contact. Thus, 
if a person becomes sick and recovers, it implies that Tano has outrun Death to reach that 
patient. On the other hand, if one falls sick and dies, this implies that Death has outrun Tano. 
Of course, this is an attempt from within the priesthood tradition to account for why not all 
sick people are healed. This myth, however, also illustrates that the lesser divinities are not 
powerful enough in their attempts to save humankind from the power of Death.  
The Akan regard Okomfo Anokye as the most powerful and respected priest that ever lived. 
Legend has it that Okomfo Anokye, after achieving so much for the Akan, including helping 
to establish the Asante nation through commanding the Golden stool from the heavens, set out 
to overcome the strongest “force”, namely Death. Yet, the greatest priest was eventually over-
powered by death; he died and could not rise again. Thus, the common saying goes: Okomfo 
Anokye se okogye owuo adoru aba nanso woko a woamba bio (The priest Anokye set out to 
bring the antidote for death but he did not return). This account about Okomfo Anokye 
represents human beings’ failed attempt to overcome their eventual death. 
Within the framework of the ransom theory, the maxim illustrates the necessity of God 
suffering on behalf of humans. It nonetheless resulted in God’s power over death. To the 
Akan, to overcome death connotes that one may be more than human or a lesser divinity. One 
must be God himself / herself. Thus Jesus as the Okra of God incarnate, i.e. Nyamekrateasefo, 
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qualifies to serve as the saviour of humankind in this regard. This is evident in the Akan 
context seeing that neither human beings nor lesser divinities could overcome death, as 
several stories portray. To overcome death demands a saviour who can deliver humankind 
from their strongest, “enemy”. As we affirm that Jesus is truly human as well as truly God, 
this maxim illustrates the death and resurrection of Jesus and the subsequent victory over 
“death”.  
The ransom theory clearly depicts the prevailing Christology pertaining to divine conquering 
within the African context. Salvation is described in terms of warfare and conquering with no 
sense of reconciliatory mediations.  
The ransom theory of atonement has some merits. However, it becomes questionable if 
Christ’s death could be interpreted only in terms of warfare and the conquering of foes. The 
necessary question that the adherents to the ransom theory need to address is: If indeed, God 
has conquered sin, death and Satan in order to deliver humankind, how can humankind be 
reconciled with God given their guilty conscience? 
The Akan carving symbol Owou kum nyame (death killed God) is derived from this maxim. 
This maxim articulates a sense of “God’s death”. Thus, it provides the basis for the Akan to 
accept that Jesus may be regarded as truly God even though he died. This is because he was 
resurrected with the purpose of overcoming death, sin and evil. 
b) The satisfaction metaphor for atonement within the Akan context  
The advocates of the satisfaction and penal substitution theories maintain that Christ died on 
the cross as a substitute for sinners. This was in full payment for sins, which satisfied the 
righteousness of God so that God could forgive sinners without compromising God’s own 
standards. Thus, the sacrifice of Christ satisfies the divine justice.11
Nearly all of the church fathers, including Justin Martyr, Athanasius and St Augustine 
affirmed the vicarious nature of the atonement. The key term in this regard is “substitution”. 
However, the penal substitution theory offers a specific explanation as to the reason for 
Christ’s suffering: Christ accepted the punishment that was meant for humankind.  
  
Traditional Akan culture and religion provide rough equivalents for many of these 
soteriological images. As already indicated, in Akan history four Akan Chiefs intentionally 
                                                 
11  Indeed the death of Jesus entailed a judicial act in human terms, but this does not necessarily mean to say 
that it was “divine” punishment. 
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gave themselves up, at different occasions, to be killed on behalf of the Asante nation. This 
may serve as an example of vicarious representation within the Akan history. One may also 
point to the Odwera festival as a rich illustration of the cleansing of communal sin. The 
climax of the festival entails the offering of a black hen as atonement for the people’s sin. 
This may well serve as an example of substitutional sacrifice (see section 7.3). 
Nonetheless, the Protestant Reformers’ idea of penal substitution differs starkly from what a 
traditional Akan (I might as well say an African) would rarely, if ever, imagine about sin and 
guilt sacrifices. Interpreting the concept of “penal substitution” within the Akan sacrificial 
system, this concept would be concretised as follows: An Akan has breached a rule of a lesser 
divinity. He/she has approached the lesser divinity (through the priest) with a sheep as the 
custom demands. The animal will be slaughtered (as usual) and the blood will be poured over 
the shrine of the lesser divinity as a means of disinfecting the lesser divinity from 
uncleanliness.  
The question that this raises is: Would the Akan understand the “role” of the sacrificial animal 
in terms of “penal substitution”? Amongst the Akan, as well as many other African traditional 
societies, the sacrificial animal is never meant to be a bearer of the offender’s sin. Instead, it is 
a way of acknowledging one’s offence and to disinfect the shrines of the offended lesser 
divinity or the black Stool of the ancestors from uncleanliness. To buttress this contention, I 
may point to the custom whereby the flesh of the sacrificial animal is eaten by the priest and 
the attendees at the shrine.  
Amongst the traditional Akan, no sane person will ever think of eating an accursed animal. As 
already stated, when someone offends a spirit being, the offender simultaneously falls under 
curse. That is to say, sin and curse run concurrently in the realm of the spirit beings. Thus an 
animal which may be designated as bearer of sin is accursed at the same time. Let us presume 
the animal that an offender of a lesser divinity presents to the spirit being is a substitutional 
sacrifice, thus an accursed animal. In that case the priest and his attendees will never eat the 
animal. However, it is the norm for the priests and their attendees to eat the carcass of a sin 
sacrifice. That indicates that sacrifice animals are not “bearers of sin” on behalf of the 
offender. 
Within the traditional Akan context, it would rule out any idea of penal substitution if the 
animal sacrifice is meant to be a sin sacrifice. Otherwise, it may be odd for traditional priests 
and the attendees of the shrine to eat the flesh of an accursed animal. The idea of penal 
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substitution conflicts with any known practices pertaining to a sin sacrifice. 
The traditional African notion of sin sacrifice correlates with the sin and guilt sacrifices in the 
Old Testament – whereby the priest also gets to dine on the flesh or the carcass of the 
sacrificed animal. In respect to the concept of penal substitution, Dunn (1991) suggests that 
the blood of the animal is drained from it before it can be eaten by the priests. However, such 
a suggestion would seem odd for any traditional African – as only a social outcast would eat 
the accursed animal, even when its blood is drained. As such, this cannot be associated with 
the priest and their attendees who understand the implications of eating an accursed animal. 
A related question needs to be posed in this regard: Could an animal that is sacrificed to a 
lesser divinity be interpreted within the traditional Akan context as “satisfaction”, that is, as 
an alternative to the offender’s punishment? In a broader sense, it may indeed be regarded as 
“satisfaction”. The reason is that the offender has acknowledged his/her sin, thereby offering 
the animal as a concrete affirmation, and the blood of the animal is to be used to disinfect the 
shrine of the lesser divinity. The honour of the lesser divinity or ancestor which was 
compromised due to sin, is “repaid” by acknowledging one’s sins, followed by the ritual of 
disinfection from uncleanliness. Such an action obviously avoids the punishment (curse) 
associated with such sin, as understood in the traditional Akan context, particularly in the case 
of the lesser divinities and the ancestors. 
Nonetheless, the term “satisfaction” and “repayment of a debt of honour” may not be 
appropriate within the Akan context. The reason is that the presentation of the sacrificial 
animal – afodeε (literally, guilty entity), is neither meant to repay a debt of honour nor 
something to be regarded as satisfactory. It could be appropriately regarded as a sober 
admission of one’s guilty position that anticipates the offended lesser divinity’s clemency. In 
this regard, the traditional Akan do not regard mpatadeε (compensation/reparation) or afodeε 
(sin sacrifice) as a repayment of a debt of honour, nor as something to be regarded as 
satisfactory. What an offender owes to the spirit beings as the custodians of public morality, 
indeed cannot be repaid. Thus it would not be appropriate to talk about satisfactory repayment 
for sins committed against the spirit beings, which also entails a crime against the community. 
Perhaps a similar idea may be inferred from the Old Testament sin/guilt sacrifices. The rite of 
sacrifice in relation to sin may be regarded appropriately only as “something adequate”, but 
not satisfactory, to warrant mercy from God or the offended spirit being. 
Thomas Aquinas’ idea of penance may also have some similarities with African sacrifice 
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practices, particularly within the Akan context. Amongst the Akan, when one commits what 
may be regarded as a taboo – musuo (beastly behaviour), one would sometimes be made to 
undergo what may be regarded as similar to penance. This may include the following: shaving 
the offender’s head drearily; killing sheep on the head of the offender – draining the blood 
over the head and the whole body; and the offender will be compelled to carry an empty pot 
followed by children, hooting the offender. In some cases, such a person would be banished 
temporarily or permanently from the community.  
Nonetheless, the purpose of such penance is to demonstrate to the members that the 
community disapproves of such behaviour; thus the ritual of musuyi (removing of beastly 
behaviour). In this respect, to regard penance as the basis of God’s forgiveness of 
humankind’s sins does not express adequately the Akan notion of a sin sacrifice which must 
precede forgiveness. Within the Akan context, mercy and forgiveness is only based on the 
acknowledgment of sin, not on any form of penance. 
Another issue that has become a bone of contention in the atonement debate is the ransom 
price that Jesus paid. Whereas the advocates of ransom theory are of the view that Jesus paid 
this price to Satan, Anselm taught that the price was paid to God. Without doubt, the usage of 
the term “ransom” should be understood here in a metaphorical sense. To press such 
metaphorical language by asking to whom the ransom was paid: Satan or God, is to 
overstretch the metaphor. In the traditional Akan context, the payment of the price may refer 
to the humiliation that the offender has to undergo publicly accepting the evil he/she has 
committed to be “animal behaviour”. The question arises: Can the same connotation not be 
applied in the case of Jesus as well?12
c) Abelard’s view of atonement within the Akan context  
  
For Abelard, Christ can be seen as the ideal person. This obviously draws some analogues 
with Akan ancestors. In the Akan context, ancestors are regarded as the principal role models. 
One main qualification to become an ancestor is that one must have led an exemplary life, 
that is, a life worthy of emulation. A would be ancestor must not be a selfish person but must 
be ready to offer him-/herself even unto death for the benefit of his/her community. The four 
Asante kings who died for the Ashanti nation illustrate this ideal.  
This is what Aberlard would have us believe about the death of Jesus Christ. Similar to the 
                                                 
12  Adam (representing humankind) only shifted the blame onto God – “the woman you gave me,” but never 
accepted his own sin. Likewise, in the myth of God’s withdrawal there was no acceptance of sin or guilt. 
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moral influence theory, the strength of the ancestor Christology lies with Christ as a role 
model – the most prominent view of the ancestor image. Indeed, some lessons can be learnt 
from the loyalty demonstrated by Christ’s death. However, it expresses nothing about 
reconciliation which is the focus of Jesus’ mediatory work. 
d) Some other atonement theories within the Akan context 
Grotius saw the death of Christ as a “substitute for a penalty” of sin. Remarkably, this view 
may also be off-track within the African sin sacrifice. In terms of the Akan belief, sacrifice 
animals are not regarded as substitutes for a deserved punishment, but serve as a concrete 
expression of one’s acceptance of guilt – afodeε (sin sacrifice).  
For Campbell and Moberly, the self-offering of Jesus was the expression of His perfect 
penitence for the sins of humankind.13 For Campbell, Christ’s vicarious contrition for 
humankind constitutes his atoning work.14 For Moberly, Christ offered the sacrifice of 
supreme penitence.15
e) Conclusion 
 Interestingly this view comes close to the concept of afomusuyideε. 
Somehow, an Akan may see a sacrifice animal as an expression of penitence for his/her sins. 
However, Campbell and Moberly’s views share some resemblance only with the aspect of sin 
sacrifice; it does not shed light on Christ as our curse bearer (Campbell 1949, Moberly 1901). 
The ransom theory of atonement obviously has a connection with the prevailing African 
divine conquering Christology. Salvation is described in terms of warfare and conquering of 
foes, with no sense of reconciliatory mediations. Here the concept of afomusuyideε differs 
                                                 
13  Such an idea appears to come very close to what I have been depicting as meaning of sin sacrifice within 
the Akan context. Remarkably, the argument against this view that one does not repent or confess one’s sin 
on behalf of someone else, misses the basis of a communal sacrificial system. The Odwera festival of the 
Akan as explained in section 7.3 relays a sense of communal repentance and confession of sin led by the 
Asante king. Similarly, the Old Testament Day of Atonement also provides a sense of communal 
repentance and confession of sin led by the high priest. Nonetheless, there are some subtle differences here. 
Whereas Campbell and Moberly rest only with what I term as afoddeε (sin sacrifice), I combine the two 
aspects, sin sacrifice and the notion of the scapegoat, together in the concept of afomusuyideε. 
14  Jonathan Edwards thought that an adequate repentance for sin would render punishment unnecessary. God’s 
outraged majesty must be vindicated by punishment, unless the offender could demonstrate repentance, 
humiliation, and sorrow, proportionate to the greatness of the majesty despised. Edwards denies the 
possibility: There can be no infinite sorrow for sin in finite creatures. But Campbell and Moberly conceived 
such sorrow or penitence on the part of Christ – who was not a “finite creature”. Following a path which 
Edwards had seen but left untrodden, Campbell and Moberly contend that the cross pictures Christ as the 
perfect penitent confessing the sins of mankind.  
15  This conception made a huge appeal to those who would prefer to retain the language of substitution and 
sin-offering but do not agree with the penal aspect of the substitutionary theory. Over the years, this view 
has gained support from other theologians such as Robert Mackintosh (Mackintosh 1920).  
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from the divine conquering Christology as the former draws its core from the traditional mode 
of reconciliation. While the concept of Afomusuyideε, expresses the notion of conquering 
indirectly, it also adequately addresses the mode of reconciliation between God and 
humankind.  
 7.4.3 Afomusuyideε: A conceptualisation of the atoning work of Christ within the  
Akan context 
a) Introduction 
The term afomusuyideε is coined from the two Akan terms afodeε (sin sacrifice) and 
musuyideε (curse bearer).This is my proposal in order to conceptualise the significance of the 
death of Jesus as a sin sacrifice and curse bearer i.e. “scapegoat”. In this thesis, I understand 
the person and the work of Christ in such a way that the Okra of Onyame (dynamic equivalent 
of Logos) is the incarnation of Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique priest) for the purpose of 
becoming afomusuyideε (sin sacrifice and curse bearer in one) for humankind. Thus Christ as 
God-man died for the salvation of humankind. The concept of afomusuyideε is based on the 
metaphor of sacrifice. On the one hand, afomusuyideε (afodeε – sin sacrifice) denotes an 
“admission” of one’s sin before the offended lesser divinity. Thus in the Akan Christian 
thought-form, Christ died to “admit” the sin of humankind before God. On the other hand, the 
concept of afomusuyideε (musuyideε – curse bearer) also denotes removal of the curse and of 
sin. In the Akan Christian thought-form, Christ thus also becomes the bearer of humankind’s 
curse and sin.  
In the context of sin sacrifice in both the Old Testament and in the Akan society, Christ 
becomes humankind’s representative. However, in the context of the “curse bearer” 
(scapegoat) 
b) The basis and the point of reference of the afomusuyideε proposal 
in both the Old Testament and in terms of traditional Akan sacrifices, Christ 
becomes humankind’s substitute. Within this context of being a “curse bearer” i.e. scapegoat 
(akin to musuyideε) and not a “sin sacrifice” (afodeε), substitution receives its metaphorical 
purchase. Moreover, it is in the cult, not the court, that substitution receives its metaphorical 
purchase. One may then agree with Gunton (1988) when he contends that the terms 
“representative” and “substitute” pertaining to Jesus’ atoning work are correlative, not 
opposing concepts. Jesus is our representative and substitute concurrently.  
The afomusuyideε proposal has two bases. Firstly, the significance of the death of Jesus could 
be interpreted adequately as a ritual sacrifice. In this sense the Old Testament sacrificial 
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system serves largely (however not solely) as a prototype for Christ’s death. The Roman 
sacrificial system could be regarded as one of the most dominant systems to have influenced 
the New Testament writers in their interpretation of the death of Jesus as sacrifice. 
Nonetheless, the Jewish sacrificial system, particularly that of the Jewish Day of Atonement, 
serves as metaphor for this sacrifice. This is clearly depicted in the book of Hebrews (Dunn 
1991:41).16
Secondly, sin sacrifices in the Old Testament show similarities with the sin sacrifices which 
are still practiced in various African societies. In this regard, Sawyerr consistently argues that 
the sacrificial practices of African peoples provide important illustrations of the Christian 
message. For Sawyerr (1969:58), the Christian theologian studying the practice of sacrifices 
in West Africa, has the task of finding out in which areas placation occurs. He argues that this 
will help one to place the biblical concept of hilasterion in its related context.  
 
What one may term a “primitive” sacrifice, is still practiced amongst the Akan. It may be 
helpful to get a clue as to what actual sacrifices look like. Indeed, it is my first hand 
knowledge of the practice of sacrifices – the killing of animals and pouring their blood on the 
shrines and the black stools – that prompted me to question the reformers’ idea of penal 
substitution as the significance of the death of Jesus as sacrifice. My main contention is that 
the notion of “penal substitution” seems odd within the context of traditional African sin/guilt 
sacrifices. It also appears to conflict with the Old Testament notion of sin/guilt sacrifices. 
The proposal of afomusuyideε takes its point of departure from the African context but uses 
the framework of the Nicene/Chalcedon formular as its point of reference. 17
c) An explanation of the term afomusuyideε 
 
In this proposal, the significance of the death of Jesus is expressed by the Akan term 
afomusuyideε. The term is made up of two religious terms, namely afodeε and mosuyideε. 
These two terms have a common suffix dei which is consistently interpreted as “something”. 
Actually, the coined term afomusuyideε is derived from two terms afodeε (guilt something) 
and musuyideε (curse bearer). As each of the terms has the same suffix: dei (something) one is 
dropped to make the coined term meaningful. Combining the three: afo-musuyi-deε, professes 
                                                 
16       Also see Hengel (1981). 
17       My proposal is based on the following assumption: Even though there were other influential backgrounds, 
one of the primary notions which influenced the New Testament writers to interpret Jesus’ death that “he 
died for our sins”, is the Jewish Day of Atonement. In keeping with this view, I also assumed that there 
are similarities between the sin/guilt sacrifices relayed in the Old Testament and those sin / guilt sacrifices 
of the African – which are still practiced in various African societies. 
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Jesus as “our sin bearer and curse remover”. 
(i) The term afodeε (sin sacrifice) 
A more detailed explanation of these two terms 
will provide more clarity in this regard. 
The term afodeε is constituted by a prefix “a”, the stem “fo” and a suffix “deε”. The word 
“deε” has a consistent meaning as “something”. The key word is the stem “fo” which carries 
two related meanings: “fo” (guilt) and “fo” (soak with liquid). It is very important to note here 
that the Akan term “fo” is also regularly used as a suffix, and in that usage carries a different 
meaning. In most cases, “fo” as suffix connotes the plural. Thus obroni (whiteman) and 
abrofo (whitemen), or okuani (a farmer) and akuafo (farmers).  
However, when the term “fo” is a stem in an Akan (particularly Asante) word, it may rarely 
connote any meaning far removed from guilt. In this respect, the word afodei which may be 
literally rendered as “guilt something” within the context of traditional Akan sacrifices, may 
be rightly interpreted as guilt/sin sacrifice rather than a general term “sacrifice” as the Akan 
Twi Bible translators have done. Oddly enough, the Akan Twi Bible renders “thanksgiving 
offering” as naase-afodeε, which may literally be translated as “thanksgiving guilt offering”.  
(ii) The term musuyi (removal of curse, taboo or abomination)  
In its technical and current usage, the term musuo means “taboo”, “abomination” or “curse”. 
The prefix “bo” and suffix “yi” usually accompanies the term musuo. An Akan will say wa 
“bomusuo” (she/he has committed an abomination) or ye ko yi musuo, which literally means: 
“We are going to remove (yi) something that is an abomination to the society.” It is a taboo, 
abomination or curse in that it offends the ancestors, the lesser divinities, Mother Earth and 
even God. Amongst the traditional Akan, the ritual of mosuyi is usually preceded by a 
sacrifice termed afodeε (sin sacrifice).  
d) An application of the concept of afomusuyideε within a Christian context 
The term afomusuyideε was coined to express the significance of the death of Christ. In this 
section, I will dissect the term in order to relate its Christian meaning within an Akan context. 
(i) Jesus as Afodeε (sin offering) for humankind  
In ancient Judaism the sin sacrifice or hatta’t was an important ritual for cleansing of certain, 
unwittingly committed defilements. The guilty laid their hands on the head of the sacrificial 
animal. Whatever that entails within the Old Testament narrative is not clear and has become 
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a bone of contention amongst scholars; whether this refers to a “representative” or a 
“substitute” (Lasor 1982:153). After the beast was killed, the blood was sprinkled on the altar 
and elsewhere in the sacred precincts. The purpose of the ritual was to purify the guilty and to 
re-establish the holy bond with God through the blood of the consecrated victim. Similarly, 
amongst the Akan, and also many traditional African societies, the point of a sin sacrifice is to 
disinfect the priest, the shrine, or the people from various forms of defilement, be it moral or 
ritual. 
Within the context of such sacrifices early Christianity regarded the death of Christ as 
atonement for the sins of humankind. By shedding Christ’s blood, the sin of humankind was 
wiped out. Like the innocent and “spotless” animal Christ died “on behalf of” all people.  
The death of Christ may be appropriately explained as “on behalf of” rather than as a 
substitute. The reason is that in the Old Testament, hatta’t does not refer to the appeasement 
of divine wrath but the shedding of the blood of the victim to wipe out sin. The key 
differences between the sacrifice of Christ and that of the hatta’t animal are that a) Christ’s 
was regarded as a voluntary and effective sacrifice for all humankind and b) his was 
considered the perfect sacrifice, delivered once in time and space but perpetuated in eternity 
by the risen Lord. 
Interpreting the death of Jesus as atonement in light of the Jewish Day of Atonement, the first 
goat which was killed may represent the death of Jesus as sin sacrifice.18
He shall slaughter the goat of the sin offering that is for the people and bring its blood 
inside the curtain, and do with its blood as he did with the blood of the bull, sprinkling it 
upon the mercy seat and before the mercy seat. Thus he shall make atonement for the 
sanctuary, because of the uncleanness of the people of Israel, and because of their 
transgressions, all their sins; and so he shall do for the tent of meeting, which remains with 
them in the midst of their uncleanness.  
 In this regard the 
author of Leviticus 16:15-16 states: 
Looking at the passage as it stands, there is no notion whatsoever that the sacrificial animal 
was made to undergo any form of punishment as penalty in place of the people. The idea that 
the blood of the animal is used to sprinkle the mercy seat may denote that the whole act 
entails a purification of all contamination and asking for forgiveness. Dodd commenting on 
the related passage of Romans 3:25 said:  
The idea underlying it is characteristic of primitive religion. The ancient felt that if a taboo 
was infringed, the person or thing involved became unclean, defiled or profane. The 
condition of defilement might be removed by the performance of the appropriate act: it 
                                                 
18  However, that is not the whole picture. I will return to the significance of the second goat later. 
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might be washing with water, or sprinkling with blood, or simply the forfeiture of some 
valuable object to the deity concerned with taboo. Such acts were felt to have the value, so 
to speak, of a disinfectant. Thus in the Old Testament a whole range of ritual actions are 
prescribed for disinfecting the priest, the altar, or the people from various forms of 
defilement, ritual or moral (Dodd 1959:78). 
Dodd’s idea is similar to the notion of sin sacrifice in West African traditional religion. 
Amongst the Akan, the blood of the animal offered as a sin sacrifice is used to disinfect the 
sacred places. On this basis I propose that, Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique priest) as fully 
human and human’s representative, admitted humankind’s sin in order to avert God’s anger 
over their sin. However, the animal was not meant to appease God. Rather it is the offender’s 
acceptance of his/her sin which the animal represents, that averts God’s anger.19
Jesus voluntarily and publicly acknowldged human sin; that act denotes genuine acceptance 
of humankind’s sin. The purpose of a sin sacrifice cannot be merely to satisfy the honour of 
the offended party or to serve as penalty for the offender. The purpose has to be reconciliation 
between the victim and the offender. The first step towards such reconciliation is the 
offender’s acceptance of his/her wrongdoing.  
 
The concept of afomusuyideε is based on the recognition that genuine reconciliation cannot 
take place without the offender admitting his/her wrongdoing and showing signs of remorse 
and repentance. The one who has done wrong must recognise the gravity of the ill in order to 
seek reconciliation between the conflicting parties.  
Within the context of the traditional Akan, it is normal to presume that the Supreme Being, 
the lesser divinities and the ancestors – who are regarded as the custodians of public morality 
– are vexed when human beings flout the public moral rules.  
Moreover, it is in accordance with the Akan tradition that such sins when committed must be 
properly and duly recognised, and disposed of before any form of reconciliation can take 
place. The purpose of the animal is to acknowledge publicly that the offender has admitted 
his/her sin and has therefore surrendered him-/herself to the offended spirit being. Such an 
animal would be slaughtered, and the blood would be sprinkled on the shrine of the offended 
lesser divinity or the black Stool of the ancestors as a means of cleansing the spirit beings 
from desecration.  
                                                 
19   Conradie, a professor in the Department of Religion and Theology at the University of the Western Cape 
South Africa, normally explains this in terms of the notion of a “deficit”. For him, in any wrongdoing 
something can be paid back, but some aspects cannot be compensated. Forgiveness is asked and offered for 
that which cannot be paid back – the deficit. The animal which is sacrificed is merely a small symbol of the 
deficit that remains. 
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In this sense, evil has been confronted and acknowledged as evil and ritually disposed of and 
ousted from the community. This view captures both the ideas of propitiation and expiation in 
the context of Romans 3:24. It is not the suffering or the death of the animal that causes the 
anger or wrath of a god to be averted – as the penal substitution theory would want us to 
believe. It is rather what the death of the animal stands for: admission of sin.  
Of course one might consider adequate punishment or compensation/reparation as a basis for 
reconciliation. Indeed, either of the two could avert anger. But the question remains: Will 
such an approach offer a genuine reconciliation that will ensure mutual love? Obviously, 
whereas the approach of afodeε (sin sacrifice) is aimed at restoring the former relationship to 
a certain degree, the punishment approach either meted out to the offender or his/her 
substitute, portrays vengeance – which is far removed from the purpose of a sacrifice. 
As already indicated, in the case of the relationship between a human being and the ancestor 
or lesser divinity, the offender offers not mpatadeε,20 but rather afodeε.21
 Afodeε as understood within the traditional Akan context is necessarily devoid of any sense 
of compensation. The reason is that, if God, the lesser divinities and the ancestors serve as the 
custodians of public morality, it may be logically inconsistent to mention rendering them 
compensation when they are offended. If one offends them, one has inevitably offended the 
community as well. It may also not be right to presume that the ancestors and the lesser 
divinities in their capacity as custodians of public morality would accept bribes or 
compensation. As it would be a misnomer for a judge to take compensation from a citizen for 
the state. Therefore it would be logically inconsistent to presume that the ancestors and the 
lesser divinities in their capacity as the custodians of public morality would accept a bribe or 
compensation. The belief is rather that the admission of one’s sin before the spirit beings 
provides a basis to plead for forgiveness of sin and the removal of the curse associated with it. 
This is expressed in the concrete form of afodeε (a sin admission sacrifice).  
 The concept of 
mpatadeε somehow differs from the English term “compensation” (see 7.3). 
                                                 
20  Ekem (2005:63) rejects the term mpatadeε as inadequate to capture the nuances of hilasterion. He suggests 
ahyenanmuadze (replacement something) as an adequate word to carry the meaning of hilasterion in the 
context of Romans 3:25a. Ekem maintains that the passage propounds “the idea that it is God who takes the 
initiative to put Jesus forward as a means of ‘hilasterion’ through his blood …” In the context of Akan 
belief, the offending party presents mpatadeε, not the victim or the offended party. Thus, if God is the One 
who presents the mpatadeε, then within the Akan context, the impression is that it is God who has offended 
humankind.  
21  It is rather unfortunate that the translators of the Akan-Twi Bible failed to observe the subtle difference 
between the two terms by referring to Jesus as mpatadeε. 
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Thus, the basic rationale behind the sin offering within the Akan context is the public 
admission and acceptance of the status of being guilty. In this respect, the death of the animal 
represents a concrete form of admission of guilt as well as its consequence: death. At the 
same time, it is a means of pleading for an unmerited forgiveness. 
Nyamesofopreko as truly human as well as truly God, represented humankind by surrendering 
his life as “sin/guilt admission” to avert or propitiate the anger of the triune God over 
humankind’s sin (as committed and represented by one person Adam). Within the traditional 
Akan context, afodeε (sin sacrifice) signifies an unconditional acceptance of one’s sin. This is 
common practice of sin sacrifice in many African societies where sacrifices are still practiced. 
In order to effect such cleansing, the Okra of Onyame became truly human – 
Nyamekrateasefo, that is: God in Christ became human. 
(ii) Jesus as Musuyideε (Curse/sin bearer) for humankind  
On the other hand one might profess the following with regard to Christ’s work within the 
Akan context: Without ceasing to be human, the Okra of Onyame, inseparable from Sunsum 
and Ntoro, responded to Christ’s admission of humankind’s sin and forgave, cleansed and 
restored the relationship between God and humankind. Therefore, Nyamesofopreko offered 
the forgiveness and cleansing of sins to humankind by acting as a “scapegoat”.  
Thus, in the person of Jesus as fully God and fully human, we discover humankind’s 
representative acting to acknowledge humankind’s sin and as God’s representative forgive 
humankind. Leviticus 16: 20 relays the narrative about the second goat – the removal of sin 
and misfortune on the Jewish Day of Atonement.  
When he has finished atoning for the holy place and the tent of meeting and the altar, he 
shall present the live goat. Then Aaron shall lay both his hands on the head of the live 
goat, and confess over it all the iniquities of the people of Israel, and all transgressions, all 
their sins, putting them on the head of the goat, and sending it away into the wilderness by 
means of someone designated for the task. The goat shall bear on itself all the iniquities to 
a barren region; and the goat shall be set free in the wilderness (Leviticus 16:20- 22; 
italics-RA). 
In the Old Testament, the laying of hands on the second goat (the scapegoat) may be 
understood as God’s response to the Jewish community, who had admitted their sins (guilty 
status).  
The phrase “sending it away into the wilderness” may presuppose that the animal is to carry 
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the community’s curses and sins into a place beyond remembrance.22
In light of this ritual, I may suggest that Jesus representing humankind acknowledged 
humankind’s guilty status before God. He did that by offering his life as afodeε – a guilt 
something (to avert God’s wrath over human sin). At the same time, Jesus represented God in 
responding to the human reconciliatory act by forgiving and cleansing human sin. That he 
accomplished by offering his body as musuyideε – accursed something. The Akan 
understanding of vicarious sin sacrifice and the removal of curses, as noted in Odwera festival 
and the death of four Asante chiefs, underpins this proposal. 
 The ritual of curse 
removal (second goat) opens up another chapter, God’s response, which is to carry the 
impending curses away.  
In the person of Christ, humankind has placed itself under the mercy of the triune God (as the 
Three are inseparable even while the son was presented as a human).23
7.5 Conclusion  
 At the same time, the 
triune God in the person of Christ has forgiven humankind and removed their sins beyond 
remembrance. Nonetheless, such a task becomes possible only through the act of incarnation 
– Nyamesofopreko as the incarnation of the Okra of Onyame. It thus takes One who is truly 
human as well as truly God to effect such reconciliation.  
The relevance of this hypothesis to contemporary society lies in the area of conflict and 
reconciliation. Whether the conflict is between nations, tribes or individuals, the most 
important key to peace is a willingness to publicly admit one’s sin/guilt as well as a 
willingness from the offended party to forgive and remove the pain and retribution. For 
Africans, the concept of afomusuyideε has an added advantage in that it is well grounded in 
the African sacrificial system. It is also generally accepted as a mode of reconciliation, that is, 
a genuine admission of sin and the resulting symbolic forgiveness  
My objection to the “penal substitutionary” theory is based on the grounds that it does not 
tally with what we learn from Christ’s death in light of the nature of Old Testament sacrifices. 
It is widely recognised, particularly amongst Western theologians, that the precise meaning of 
the Old Testament sacrifices cannot be easily recollected because the ritual is far removed 
                                                 
22  There is an interesting ongoing debate with regard to the meaning of azusa, but it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
23  It must be noted here that, as the okra, sunsum and ntoro in human beings are inseparable, it is also logically 
inferred that if God’s unique priest is the personification of the Okra of Onyame, so Nyamesofopreko does 
necessarily express the triune God. 
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from Western civilization. Moreover, the biblical data on sacrifice is not self-explanatory 
seeing that the authors assumed the prior understanding of their target audience.  
However, the idea that the sacrificed animal would suffer for the penalty of an offender, 
seems odd within any conceivably sacrificial system. Likewise, the notion of “penal 
substitution” does not fit well with any known sacrificial system.  
In the primal sacrificial system, the sacrificed animals are not regarded as the bearers of the 
curse or as punishment. This accounted for the reason why the priest and their attendees could 
dine on the meat of the animal. The animals that are regarded as the bearers of the curse and 
impending disaster, are usually not killed, but are left deserted somewhere in the wild instead. 
Only the outcast of the society and wild animals dine on such animals.  
Dunn has suggested that the blood of such accursed animals is drained before the animals’ 
meat is eaten. But such a view fails to explain why the animals are bearers of sin – thus 
accursed yet the priests eat their meat (Dunn 1991). No traditional African will ever consider 
such a possibility within the context of sacrifices. Within the wider African context, where 
rituals of animal sacrifice are still widely practiced not much different from the past, sin 
sacrifice can at best be interpreted as an admission of sin. In this respect, the concept of 
afomusuyideε might throw some light on our understanding of the significance of the death of 
Christ for us. 
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CHAPTER 8  
The ecumenical significance of a Nyamesofopreko Christology 
8.1 Introduction 
This study seeks to make a contribution from within the Akan context to the understanding of 
the person and work of Jesus Christ. It is also an attempt to appeal to a wider ecumenical 
Christianity. Specifically, I endeavour to reinterpret aspects of the Christian confession of 
faith as formulated by the Council of Chalcedon (451) that Jesus Christ is “truly God” (vere 
Deus) as well as “truly human” (vere homo). In accordance to that, the relationship between 
these two claims may be understood in terms of the one “person” and the two “natures” of 
Jesus Christ. In this regard, this chapter addresses two important items: a) Can a Nyame-
sofopreko Christology be recognised as authentic by other Africans and also by Christians 
worldwide? b) Can a Nyamesofopreko Christology be of value to other Christians within their 
own context?  
Before these questions are addressed, a brief summary of the argument of this study is 
presented in section 8.2. The strengths and weaknesses of Nyamesofopreko Christology are 
then presented in section 8.3. A discussion of the significance of a Nyamesofopreko 
Christology in wider Christian circles, under which the above questions are discussed, is 
offered in section 8.4. This will be followed by a brief conclusion in section 8.5. 
8.2 A summary of the argument  
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part, which covers the first four chapters, 
entails reviews of some of the dominant African Christologies – with particular reference to 
Christologies building on the notion of divine conqueror and ancestor Christologies. In these 
chapters, the adequacy of these Christologies is assessed with reference to the 
Nicene/Chalcedonian confessional definition concerning the person of Christ. The conclusion 
is that these Christologies do not adequately express the person of Christ as truly divine and 
truly human as defined by the first four ecumenical councils. As a result, these Christologies 
also express the work of Christ, particularly his atonement, in a less adequate way.  
I noted that the methodological problem of discerning the middle way between a Christology 
“from below” and “from above” is directly associated with the affirmation of the person of 
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Christ as “truly God and truly human”.1
In critical dialogue with some African Christologies, particularly the divine conqueror and 
ancestor Christologies, I proposed a Christology based on the concept of “God’s unique 
priest” (Nyamesofopreko) in the second part of the thesis (chapters 5-7). 
 The two notions must meet at a certain point 
otherwise the content and the method of the Christology will not be correlated with each 
other. In other words, any image that expresses the affirmation adequately that Jesus is truly 
God as well as truly human, intrinsically requires a synthesis of a Christology “from above” 
and “from below”. In this respect, I argued that there is a need for an approach that expresses 
both the humanity and the divinity of Christ adequately. 
According to this Christology, three themes were developed. The need for a mediator between 
God and humanity was discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 then focused on the person of Christ 
as Mediator between God and humanity. This was followed by a discussion on mediation as 
the unique work of Christ in Chapter 7. In each case, the core tenets of the Christian faith 
were related to themes in the traditional Akan culture, worldview, and belief system in an 
attempt to offer a constructive reinterpretation of such themes.  
The core of my proposal is captured in the Akan concept of okra. This concept is loosely 
translated in English as “soul”. It could however be better rendered by the concept of “logos” 
as its dynamic equivalent. This concept pertains the quality of a co-presence of time and 
eternity – it holds together time and eternity, immanence and transcendence.   
In Chapter 5, before introducing the concept of okra, I offered an exposition of the term 
Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique priest) as a Christological designation which suggests the 
need for a mediator between God and humankind. This is patterned along other Christological 
designations such as “Messiah”, “Son of Man”, and “Son of God”.2
I then developed a constructive proposal on the need for such a mediator. My proposal is that 
the term Nyamesofopreko may be employed to portray Jesus Christ as God’s unique priest. In 
 I built on the basis of the 
traditional Akan myth of Onyame’s self-withdrawal and the absence of a priesthood for 
Onyame. In this regard I offered the observation that, in traditional Akan religion and culture, 
no suitable mediator has been identified that could restore the relationship between God and 
humanity.  
                                                 
1  There are ongoing debates with respect to the meaning of the terms Christology “from above” and “from 
below”. It is not my intention to enter into these debates. See also Gunton 1997:10 -55.  
2  In Chapter 5, I suggested how Jesus who is not Akan, may be accepted amongst the Akan people.  
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other words, that Jesus is the One who, for the first time, could fulfill this mediating role since 
he is professed to be a person without sin. As God’s unique priest, Jesus mediates between 
God and humankind, following the alienation between these two (interpreted in the traditional 
Akan context in terms of the myth of God’s withdrawal).  
In Chapter 6 I then employed this Akan concept of okra, which contains both the properties of 
that which is divine and human, to suggest that the Okra of Onyame is incarnated in the 
person of the Nyamesofopreko.  
In Chapter 7, the concept of afomusuyideε was developed to explain the death of Christ as 
atonement for humankind’s sin. The term afomusuyideε is coined from the two Akan terms 
afodeε (sin sacrifice) and musuyideε (curse bearer) to express the Christian notion of the death 
of Jesus as a sin sacrifice and acting as “scapegoat”. My main contention was that, the death 
of Jesus as sacrifice may be better interpreted as “one who acknowledged the sin” of 
humankind before God as a representative. In this respect, for Akan Christians, 
Nyamesofopreko (God’s unique priest) becomes our afomusuyideε (sin sacrifice and curse 
bearer).  
8.3 The strengths and weaknesses of a Nyamesofopreko Christology 
8.3.1 Strengths  
Methodologically, a Nyamesofopreko Christology suggests a synthesis of Christology “from 
above” and “from below”. The proposal also interprets the notion of the “triune God” from 
within the African context. This suggests a direct relationship between Christology and the 
Trinity. On the significance of theology to practical life, a Nyamesofopreko Christology 
connotes a direct relation between Christology and social ethics and also a direct relationship 
between atonement and social ethics. Thus a Nyamesofopreko Christology may be regarded 
both as a form of inculturation and of liberation Christology. However, the former takes 
precedence over the latter.  
a) A synthesis of Christology “from above” and “from below” 
One of the features of Christology from above is that the Kerygma – the proclamation of 
Christ by the church, forms the basis for understanding Christ. By contrast, a Christology 
“from below” aims to ground what it has to say about Jesus primarily in the anthropological 
realm/sphere or, more generally, in that which has to do with time rather than with eternity.  
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In a Christology “from above”, Jesus is usually presented as one who pre-existed as God 
himself in a non-material world before he also became human in the material world. Thus 
Christologies from above are usually formulated in the context of a dualistic worldview. With 
a Christology “from below”, the eternal features of Jesus’ existence are largely explained as 
functions, epiphenomena or projections of his humanity. In recent times, stress is placed on 
the Christology “from below” as the most viable method for Christological discourse. 
Nonetheless, for those who seek to maintain both the humanity and the divinity of Christ, the 
need arises for a Christological method that allows for a double movement, corresponding 
with the human and divine content of the Christological language in this regard.  
The reason is that one’s approach to the person of Christ inevitably influences the content of 
one’s Christology and soteriology. Notwithstanding this, there is the tendency amongst some 
scholars to reduce Christology to soteriology. Nonetheless, unless a position on the work of 
Christ is based upon a belief or statement about who Christ is, a purely subjective theology is 
likely to result from this (Pannenberg 1968:48). It must also be noted that without any form of 
synthesis between a Christology “from above” and “from below”, reinterpreting of the person 
of Christ as truly human as well as truly God, remains a pipedream.  
Methodologically, the problem of finding the middle way between a Christology “from 
below” and “from above”, is directly associated with the faith affirmation of the person of 
Christ as “truly God and truly human”. 
Nonetheless, the riddle follows that if one starts “from below”, one can rarely avoid a heresy 
that is similar to degree Christology – professing in Jesus a divinised man. Likewise, the 
method of Christology “from above” may also run the risk of docetism. Christology “from 
below” and “from above” are approaches which are likely to absolutise either “time” or 
“eternity”. While “from below” is likely to render time absolute, “from above” is also likely 
to consider eternity in the same vein. The content of the proposed Christology will inevitably 
be influenced by such methodology.
In other words, any image that can express the 
affirmation adequately that Jesus is truly God and truly human, intrinsically requires a 
synthesis of a Christology “from above” and “from below”.  
In response to this dilemma, the core of my proposal is summed up in the Akan concept of 
okra. This concept is loosely translated in English as “soul” but could be better rendered as 
Logos in its dynamic equivalency. This concept provides the notion of a co-presence of time 
and eternity – in a design that holds together time and eternity, immanence and transcendence. 
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That is to say, the Akan idea of okra may embody the synthesis of the notion of time and 
eternity.  
According to Akan belief, okra implies a spark of God’s nature that pre-existed with Onyame. 
At one point of its life, okra should become teasefo (human being) through the normal birth 
process. At the end of its course of life in the material world, okra returns to God. Thus, an 
Akan mentions okrateasefo as the point where sparks of God’s nature and human flesh meet 
(see chapter 6.3).  
The traditional Akan speak of the Okra of Onyame and the okra of human beings. The latter 
is viewed as the sparks of the former. However, whereas the Akan regard the Okra of Onyame 
as divine, human beings are not regarded as such (not even as semi-divine). Humans are taken 
to be embodying sparks of the divine. This may be similar to the church father Origen’s 
concept of a pre-existent soul. As already noted in section 6.4, if one based Christ’s divinity 
on okra of human being as both Origen and Karl Rahner have done, the end result would 
amount to degree Christology.  
However, the alternative is to re-appropriate the person of Christ from the essence of divine 
being as well as from the essence of a human being, as I have done in this thesis. In that case 
one avoids the situation whereby a human is reconfigured to become God.  
Remarkably, the idea of the Okra of Onyame is not an inference from the notion of okra in 
human beings in terms of the latter serving as the basis for speculation about the former. 
Rather, it is a distinct traditional Akan belief by itself. The traditional Akan speaks not only of 
okra in human beings as a distinct, yet integral part of being human, but similarly of the Okra 
of Onyame. Thus within the Akan thought-form, there is mention of the Okra of Onyame 
(similar to the Greek concept of Logos) which is distinct yet inseparable from Onyame.  
Of course, in some sense, this thesis’ proposal may appear to depict a movement from the 
infinite to the finite. The reason is that okra first existed in eternity before becoming human 
being. This, however, does not strictly make my proposal a Christology “from above”.  
I argued that okra is an eternal absolute Being which unfolds its nature in individual human 
beings. On the one hand, I perceive okra in terms of Being itself. On the other hand, I regard 
the okra (in human beings) as sparks that emanate from Being itself. 
Moreover, in Akan thought-form, there always exists a form of okra which is yet to become 
The Akan concept of 
okra thus suggests the possibility of a union of the concrete with the universal realm. 
Therefore, okra may be said to exist in eternity and time simultaneously. 
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human and also a form of okra which is already a human being. While some forms of okra 
become human, some other forms of okra have also finished the course of their lives as 
human beings and have become a non-material embodiment of okra.  
On this basis, if one proposes that the Okra of Onyame (God) has at the same time become 
teasefo (human being), it may not look strange to the Akan – as “God trotting on earth”. This 
is because such a movement implies a normal route for okra. Jesus as the Okra of Onyame 
incarnate may not be regarded as an isolated incursion or intervention into a world totally 
foreign to him – the Okra of Onyame. 
Thus my proposal may be more appropriately interpreted as based on the notion of a double 
movement rather than a movement from eternity to time. A Nyamesofopreko Christology 
therefore suggests a synthesis of a Christology “from above” and “from below”.  
b) A Nyamesofopreko Christology and the notion of the triune God from within an  
African context 
African theologians have produced more treatises on Christology than on any other subject. 
However, the doctrine of the Trinity has received relatively less attention in African 
theological discourse. The reason given is that the mystery of the Trinity cannot be translated 
because the African context does not share the metaphysical concern that pretends to be able 
to separate the nature of Christ from his functions (Pobee 1979:82; Sarpong, 1998:32 and 
Vähäkangas 2000:35). However, if the doctrine of the Trinity is inherited from the West 
without original African reflection, then one can hardly maintain that there is a genuine 
African Christology. African Christology would then be dependent on western conceptions of 
the Trinity. This will endanger the originality of an African Christology. It will then become 
only a western Christology decorated with African ideas. Thus, the emergence of genuine 
African reflection on the doctrine of the Trinity is not only needed; it is a logical outcome of 
the designs of African Christologies (Vähäkangas 2000:34-35). This section focuses on the 
necessity and the problem of reinterpreting the doctrine of the Trinity within the African 
context, and what a Nyamesofopreko Christology may offer in this regard.  
If Christ is truly God as well as truly human, the theological inquiry naturally has to proceed 
to the doctrine of the Trinity. Notwithstanding the necessity of holding Christology and 
Trinity together, a trinitarian based Christology is yet to be articulated in African theological 
discourses.  
For Mugambi (1998:158), the notion of the Trinity is not clearly expressed in African 
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Christianity. He notes that, at least in practice, many African Christians identify Jesus with 
the Holy Spirit and make no distinction between God, Jesus and the third Person of the 
Trinity. Both Mbiti and Bediako affirmed incidences of such a theological blunder in 
contemporary African Christian theology.  
In African Christological discourse, the socio-economic concerns take precedence over the 
theological affirmations. Thus, Jesus is presented to the Africans more on the basis of what he 
can do and is doing, without taking any due regard to the nature of his person. In this respect, 
the need for an articulation of the doctrine of the Trinity as the basis of Christology holds a 
major challenge for African Christian theologians.  
Remarkably, some African theologians, particularly Sarpong (1998:32), appear to have 
abandoned the possibility of appropriating the Christian confession of the triune God within 
the African context. His contention is that, the doctrine of the Trinity is “simply beyond the 
comprehension of any culture”. Nonetheless, several attempts have been made to articulate 
the doctrine of the Trinity from within the African context. Here the review of the 
Vähäkangas (2000:34) on African trinitarian discourse may be the best available guide.  
Firstly, there is an attempt to relate the African family system to the concept of the Trinity. 
Most often when the theme of the family is discussed in African theology, the doctrinal topic 
connected to it is the communion within the church. Nonetheless an attempt has also been 
made to extend this to the subject of the Trinity. For Africans, family in the traditional sense, 
pertains to the extended family, or clan.  
An example of the African family and trinitarian discourse is the African concept of Ujamaa. 
According to this proposal, African concepts of family are not used as the standard criterion 
of a proper understanding of the Trinity. Rather, the trinitarian model is used to influence 
African models of family as well as be interpreted through them. The relationship between the 
Trinity and the African family model is not based on the number of persons but rather on the 
Holy Spirit as the bond of trinitarian unity. The primary view is that the African family should 
reflect the trinitarian communion (Vähäkangas (2000:34-37).  
The Swahili word jamaa means (extended) “family” and belongs to the basic vocabulary of 
the language, whereas its derivative ujamaa (familyhood) belongs predominantly to political 
rhetoric.  
Secondly, there is an attempt to construct a trinitarian theology on the basis of an ancestral 
model. Nyamiti is an African theologian who has penetrated this notion the deepest in relating 
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the idea of ancestors to the doctrine of the Trinity. According to Nyamiti (1999:34-39), all the 
ancestral characteristics, except mediation, can be found in the notion of God even if only in 
an analogical sense. Nyamiti (1984) contends that “no human term or category can apply 
univocally to God and His creatures”. Personally, I would wish to disagree with his 
contention. My reason is that the Akan concept of okra denotes both divine and human 
characteristics (see Vähäkangas 2000:39). 
Nyamiti (1999:35) maintains that ancestral relations exist within the triune God. Thus, in 
reference to the notion of the Trinity, Nyamiti, implements the following ancestral 
terminology: The Father is the Ancestor of the Son who is the Descendant. The Holy Spirit is 
the mutual Oblation of the two. In this regard the influence of Augustine’s model of love to 
understand the triune God is evident.  
Thirdly, the African understanding of reality has been compared with the notion of the 
Trinity. According to Nyamiti (1999:34-39), African understandings of reality always imply 
being-with-the-others; purely individual non-relational existence is out of the question. The 
quality or strength of a being is defined by his or her relations to the others. The deeper and 
more harmonious the union someone enjoys with others, the stronger he or she will be.  
By comparison, the notion of the Trinity represents the deepest possible communion of 
persons. Viewing the African concept of being human in the context of the trinitarian 
relationships would obviously cohere well. This has become one basis for further theological 
reflection on the doctrine of the Trinity within the African context. 
Unlike the traditional models which attribute the distinctions between the divine persons to 
their relative opposition, Nyamiti maintains that the personality of each is derived from 
communion. The deeper one’s communion becomes with others, the more fully he or she will 
exist as a person. Mulago, Penouku and Egbulefu also have attempted to explain the Trinity in 
this regard (Vähäkangas 2000:33-51). 
From this discussion, it should be obvious that the majority of African reflections on the 
Trinity are based on social analogies or familial relations. The possibility of re-appropriating 
into the African context the notion of triune God in ontological form, i.e. in terms of rational 
and relational entities, has also been achieved, albeit to a lesser extent.  
Many western theologians, following ecumenical contact with Eastern Orthodox theologians, 
have been attracted towards the “social analogy” to comprehend the relationship between the 
unity and the tri-unity of the divine persons. 
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In the midst of such a discourse I offered a trinitarian proposal. This is a logical outcome of a 
Nyamesofopreko Christology. 
My proposal is based on the concept of Nyamebaasafua.3
I suggest that the composition of Ntoro, Okra and Sunsum may be regarded as the triune 
Onyame (God). This idea is based on three distinct vitalities which are inseparable. As the 
diagrams 1-A and 1-B indicates (see the Apendix I), Jesus’ divine nature is viewed from the 
perspective of the triune God. This guarantees a Christology that is directly based on the 
notion of the triune God. 
 It literally means: God-three-one. 
The term might, linguistically, express the notion of the Trinity adequately.. However, within 
the Ghanaian context, the term presently still entails a literal translation of the Father (Agya), 
Son (Oba) and Holy Spirit (Sunsum Kronkron).  
The advantage this hypothesis has over the other proposals is that, the three dimensions, okra, 
sunsum and ntoro, stand at par with each other. Thus their order of arrangement is arbitrary; 
the arrangement does not connote any sense of superiority of one over the others. The Akan 
do not assign any superiority to any of the three invisible vitalities or interpret them in terms 
of ontological subordination. Moreover, in terms of gender, okra and sunsum are described as 
neuter.  
On this basis, a Nyamesofopreko Christology suggests a direct relation between Christology 
and Trinity. For the details of this discussion, see chapter 6.4.  
c) A Nyamesofopreko Christology suggests a direct relation between Christology and  
social ethics 
Firstly, a Nyamesofopreko Christology pertains to an intrinsic correlation between 
Christology and social ethics. The Akan concept of okra does not only relate human beings to 
God but also serves as common denominator that unites all human beings. This suggests 
organic relations between Christology and social ethics within the framework of a 
Nyamesofopreko Christology. 
The concept of okra and nkrabea (see 6.3) expresses the Akan conviction that human life 
must be freed as far as possible. It suggests, for instance, that human beings are not 
embarking on a purposeless mission in this world. It affirms that humans have a mission to 
                                                 
3  This term was originally coined by the Akan Roman Catholic Church, probably by Bishop Kwasi Sarpong. 
I first got acquainted with it when I was learning the Apostle’s creed. It is part of catechism in the Roman 
Catholic Church.  
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fulfil, a message to deliver – which is the meaning of their existence – and that this mission 
has been fully endorsed by the creator.  
The idea embedded in these concepts is as follows: Onyame allows one to determine the life 
one wants to lead as a human being, amidst human despondency towards evil. In light of this 
follows a strong lesson that human freedom must not be curtailed, so long as it does not 
infringe on another person’s freedom. One may thus infer the idea of the “supremacy of 
human freedom” as against any form of tyranny and despotism. From the traditional Akan 
perspective, one may then hold that ethics must have its foundation only on issues which 
infringe on another person’s freedom.  
Secondly, a Nyamesofopreko proposal suggests a direct relation between atonement and social 
ethics. An adequate expression of the work of Christ must have a direct cash purchase in our 
contemporary ethical “market”. Otherwise, Christ’s work remains an outmoded ritual which 
is irrelevant to the contemporary society. In this regard, Hebblethwaite (1997:77) rightly 
noted: “It is quite impossible, in the context of personal theism, still less in that of Christian 
trinitarian faith, to treat the goodness of God as an attribute to metaphysical perfection, 
unrelated to our human notions of moral goodness.” 
Both my proposal and the penal substitutionary theory are grounded in the notion of Jesus’ 
death as sacrifice. Yet the former may have an advantage over the latter in terms of the moral 
lessons one may discern from the work of Christ. Here the relevance of my hypothesis to 
contemporary society lies in the insistence that God forgives sins on the basis of one’s 
acknowledgement of one’s sins. This is what Jesus did for humankind. On that basis God 
showed His mercies and thereby made provisions for the forgiveness of humankind’s sins. 
This obviously serves as a much more improved moral lesson than the ideas embedded within 
the substitutionary theories. True reconciliation cannot be effected without a genuine 
“acknowledgment of sins”. This is a universal and timely basic principle of reconciliation 
which the ritual of sin/guilt sacrifices in Africa symbolises.  
In this regard, one may conclude that a Nyamesofopreko Christology suggests a synthesis of 
inculturation and liberation Christologies – this serves as the third point. On the one hand, a 
Nyamesofopreko Christology is deeply embedded in the religious and cultural realities of 
Africa. It draws on various aspects of the Akan mythology, history, culture and worldview. 
An example drawn from the myth of God’s withdrawal and the need for a mediator between 
the Supreme Being and human beings is used in chapter 5. The traditional Akan conceptions 
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of God and of person are offered in chapter 6 as an affirmation of both the divinity and the 
humanity of Jesus Christ. African (particularly Akan) traditional sacrificial practices were 
used in chapter 7 to illustrate the meaning of the death of Christ. 
On the other hand, a Nyamesofopreko Christology responds to political and socio-economic 
realities in present day Africa. The socio-ethical implications of the concept of okra are drawn 
to suggest that we owe socio-economic duties to one another. This assertion is based on the 
traditional Akan belief that indicates that Okra (the nature of God) is the common 
denominator between individual human beings and God on the one hand, and between 
individual human beings on the other hand. In this respect, a Nyamesofopreko Christology 
combines both the ideals of inculturation and liberation Christologies. 
8.3.2 Weaknesses  
Notwithstanding the strengths of a Nyamesofopreko Christology, there are a number of 
theological criticisms which may be raised against this proposal. 
a) Less justice to parousia, the final judgment of Jesus Christ and the notion of hell? 
These include the following: 
a) It has done less justice to the parousia and the final judgment of Jesus Christ, b) It runs the 
risks of obscuring the significance of biblical revelation by juxtaposing biblical and African 
accounts and c) Interpreting the atoning death of Jesus solely from a sacrificial perspective 
remains an inadequate Christology.  
A Nyamesofopreko Christology may be able to offer an account of the incarnation, 
sinlessness, resurrection, ascension, and the sitting at the right hand of the Father. However it 
is less evident that such a approach may do justice to the traditional Christological theme of 
the parousia, the final judgment of Jesus Christ and the Christian notion of hell. There are no 
analogies to these themes within the Akan worldview. The problem lies with the differences 
between the respective concepts of time and history.  
In a sense one might refer to the “final judgment” of individuals within the Akan context. To 
the traditional Akan, Onyame’s abode is in the sky, while the human abode is on earth. There 
is a belief amongst the Akan that each individual human being through his or her okra will 
return to give an account before God of his or her life. Such a belief entails judgment, but it is 
strictly an individual judgment, not a corperate one. 
This differs from the Christian notion of judgment that entails the expectation that this 
universe will one time change radically or come to an end. Jesus will return – parousia – hold 
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corperate judgment and the righteous will go to heaven and the sinners will go to hell.  
However, according to the Akan belief, no one is eternally damned. The Akan believe that 
those who could not qualify to become ancestors will not get entry into bliss (the place of rest 
for the ancestors). Nonetheless, the spirit of those who could not qualify as ancestors will 
roam about as ghosts until they are reborn. One may suggest that this type of return into the 
world implies a kind of re-incarnation. Thus, the Christian concept of hell has no analogy 
within the Akan worldview and is therefore foreign to the Akan traditional thinking. 
In this regard, a Nyamesofopreko Christology focusing on the Akan context as the recipient of 
Christian ideas, may not be able to express the Christian notion of the parousia, the “final 
universal Judgment” at one time and the Christian notion of hell (Sarpong 2002:99). 
b) Inadequacy of interpreting the atoning death of Jesus solely from sacrificial 
perspective 
A Nyamesofopreko Christology interprets the atoning death of Jesus solely from a sacrificial 
perspective. To understand the mediation of Christ as priesthood, presupposes the atoning 
death of Jesus as vicarious sacrifice. Indeed, it is by means of Christ’s death as sacrifice that 
other atonement views were discussed. However, one may contend that the soteriological 
significance of Christ’s atoning death cannot be reduced to one line of interpretation, namely 
sacrifice. It may be argued that it will be at best a too narrow and one sided approach to 
salvation and at worst, a misrepresentation or failure to capture the richness of Christ’s work. 
Christ’s death amounts to more than sacrifice. Sacrifice is essential, but it offers only one line 
of understanding the significance of Christ’s death for humankind.  
c) The risks of obscuring the significance of biblical revelation  
A Nyamesofopreko Christology also runs the risk of obscuring the significance of biblical 
revelation by simply juxtaposing biblical and African accounts. The approach of studying the 
biblical account together with similar accounts from approximately a similar background, has 
several disadvantages. Perhaps, the most notable of these is that, comparing the similarities 
between the Christian story and the related African one would tend to obscure the significant 
differences. This is particularly the case when one compares the biblical story of the fall with 
the African version of the myth of God’s withdrawal. It somehow becomes difficult for Akan 
Christians to argue with the traditional Akan as to why the story of God’s withdrawal is a 
myth and why the account of the fall in Genesis could be regarded as more. Of course, some 
Christians regard the biblical account of the fall in Genesis as a myth as well. 
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Moreover, following the approach of a Nyamesofopreko Christology, a traditional Akan might 
argue: If it is possible to view Onyame as the triune God within the Akan context, why would 
one then restrict the notion of God’s revelation to one particular culture and history only? A 
Nyamesofopreko Christology may therefore be used as a instrument to defend the African 
traditional religion as an embodiment of God’s revelation which is on par with the biblical 
revelation. There would thus be no need to portray the Christian faith as African traditional 
religion’s final fulfillment. 
It has already been indicated that the myths, stories and the history of the Akan may be 
regarded as the shadow of better things to come, which are fulfilled in Christ. It was further 
argued that, even if it can be proved that African traditional religion is capable to absorb the 
mystery of God, it does so from within a Christian framework of understanding. While an 
attempt has been made to delineate my position from possible misinterpretations, it is 
nonetheless evident that such arguments concern Christians more than non-Christians. 
8.4 The significance of a Nyamesofopreko Christology within in wider 
Christian circles  
This study is a contribution from within the Akan context. It is also an attempt to contribute to 
a a wider ecumenical Christianity. In this regard, this section has to address two important 
themes: a) Can a Nyamesofopreko Christology be recognised as authentic by other Africans 
and also Christians worldwide? b) May a Nyamesofopreko Christology be of value to other 
Christians within their own context?  
8.4.1 Would Nyamesofopreko Christology be recognised as authentic by other Africans 
and also Christians worldwide? 
This thesis is primarily associated with the Nicene/Chalcedon confessional definition of the 
person of Christ. During the course of searching for materials for this study, the question was 
usually posed to me: Why do you seek to “import” the 5th century Chalcedonian fomulation 
into 21st
Indeed, in this age, it seems that creeds are regarded more often than not as outmoded 
restrictions on the free play of thought and imagination. In light of this a thesis that re-
appropriates Nicene/Chalcedonian Christianity, and in particular the creed associated with 
these councils, is to say the least, out of the ordinary. For some theologians, the Chalcedon 
definition about the person of Christ is outmoded in character, therefore need not be followed 
as reference point for 21
 century African Christianity? 
st century Christianity.  
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At the Council of Chalcedon, almost all the Eastern Churches refused to ratify the 
formulation. Later on, some strong reactions also came from some members of Western 
traditional Churches which adopted the Chalcedon definition of the person of Christ as its 
confessional point of reference (see Lane 1982 and Need 1995).  
Such reactions come from both Catholic and Protestant perspectives. Some major publications 
from Roman Catholic theologians who have abandoned Chalcedon are those by 
Schoonenberg (1977) Schillebeeckx (1982) and Küng (1980). Some major publications from 
Protestant theologians who also abandoned Chalcedon include those by Flesseman (1972) and 
Robinson (1973). Amongst the contemporary theologians, Pannenberg has also registered his 
protest against Chalcedon. For him Chalcedon is unavoidably dualistic. Dunn (1977) and 
Bauer (1972) have also expressed dissatisfaction about applying Chalcedon as point of 
reference for Christological assessment. 
Some African theologians, particularly Pobee (also an Akan), have also registered protest 
against the Chalcedonian Creed. 
According to Pobee (1979:82), “the process of philosophical abstraction from the concrete 
biblical texts which has been the chief trend of Western theology is not … effective in Africa, 
at least if theology is to engage the church as a whole and not just the initiates.” 
Since the primary focus of this thesis is on Akan Christianity, 
it is necessary to analyse Pobee’s concern against Chalcedon in more detail. This is especially 
crucial in the light of Pobee’s claims that functional Christology fits better within the Akan 
context than my proposal of ontological Christology would.  
Pobee notes that in any discussion of Christology, one sooner or later has to make some 
reference to the Nicene/Chalcedon definition as the reference point of orthodox Christianity. 
However, for Pobee, the definition was an attempt of a predominantly Hellenistic society to 
articulate its belief in Jesus in terms of the language and concepts of that time. Thus, as he 
views it, some of the terms and concepts of the formula are alien to our current and modern 
language and thought-forms – whether in Europe or Africa, America or Asia. He particularly 
questions the contemporary relevance of the key terms in the Chalcedon definition such as 
substance, person and hypostasis in their technical Chalcedonian sense (Pobee 1979:82-83). 
For Pobee, Chalcedonian Christology is at best based on one of the Christological 
assumptions in the New Testament. He contends that the Creed was an attempt to “translate” 
the biblical faith into the then contemporary language and thought-forms. However, the 
worldview and language assumed at Chalcedon do not allow the definition to become 
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serviceable within any modern context. For Pobee, this makes it necessary to get behind the 
formula towards the biblical faith. Thus the Christological point of reference is the biblical 
texts and not the Chalcedonian definition. Having taken such a stance, Pobee has obviously 
undermined the legitimacy of Nicene/Chalcedonian Christianity as reference point for 
Christological discourse. This goes a long way to say that, any Christological proposal which 
uses the Chalcedonian Creed as a point of departure, would tend to forfeit its authenticity – 
whether in Africa or elsewhere in the Christian world.  
Pobee contends that our intellectual indebtedness to Greco-Roman culture has predisposed us 
to keep on discussing Christology in metaphysical terms. He argues that the biblical approach 
is different. With reference to the Trinity, Pobee contends that the ontological relations within 
the Godhead are absent in the biblical faith [piety]. For him, this amounts to mere 
metaphysical speculations about Christ. Such an assertion inevitably undermines the 
importance of the concepts of the triune God and the hypostatic union of the person of Christ 
which the Council of Chalcedon promulgated (Pobee 1979:82). 
Nonetheless, as Pobee views it, Christology in the context of the “biblical faith” was present 
in hugely functional terms of Jesus concerning his actions. Having taken the approach of 
degree Christology, Pobee has truncated the Chalcedonian definition of the person of Christ in 
terms of Christ confessed as truly God as well as truly human. 
From this discussion, it is already evident that Pobee has rejected a Nicene/Chalcedon 
Christology, particularly, insofar as it is proposed as reference point. He would probably also 
object to any other Christological proposal that employs a Chalcedonian definition of the 
person of Christ as a point of departure.4
Here my reaction and intention is not to defend the Nicene/Chalcedon notions per se, but 
instead to explain the necessity and the relevance of a re-appropriation of the Councils of 
Nicea and Chalcedon’s design into 21st
  
 
                                                 
4  Pobee has noted that his colleague J. Christopher Thomas had already expressed his dissatisfaction about 
his opposition between the Creed and the New Testament. However, he explained that this is not exactly 
the case. Instead, he is of the view that “both the New Testament and the Creed agree on the essentials of 
Christology, namely humanity and Divinity of Jesus Christ.” Pobee also noted that he is not claiming that 
“we can go back to a simple gospel which is conceptually neutral” (Pobee 1979:165). However, if one 
reads Pobee’s book Towards an African Theology (1979: 81-83), one may still agree with Pobee’s 
colleague J. Christopher Thomas in this regard. 
century Akan, African and ecumenical Christianity. 
In this manner one may also explicate the essence and relevance of the ecumenical councils 
with regard to contemporary Christianity. The crux of the matter is that, if the Council of 
Chalcedon’s design is not relevant for contemporary ecumenical Christianity, its authenticity 
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for Akan Christians would also be questionable.  
Pobee has noted rightly that the New Testament presents several Christological assumptions. 
Dunn has also argued that there are several Christological assumptions in the New Testament 
and that the Chalcedonian view just happened to have become the dominant one. In this 
regard a question needs to be raised: If one, from the Bible, can view different Christological 
assumptions to construct Christology, and the Chalcedon definition “faithfully” represents 
one such assumption, what then, is the concern, if one re-appropriates the content of 
Chalcedonian definition of the person of Christ within the Akan context? That is, considering 
the fact that African, particularly the Ghanaian Christianity, is largely pro-Chalcedon 
inclined? Let us return to the question: Why does one make use of the Chalcedonian formula 
as a basis for contextualization?  Obviously, this contestation betrays the bias of the anti-
Chalcedon sentiment. 
The language of the Chalcedon formula has been described as static in character by 
Pannenberg, Pobee and others (Pannenberg 1968:29-33; Pobee 1979:82). Again it is 
contended that Chalcedon’s design is a by-product, and does not represent the biblical 
narratives. For this reason, it might or might not accurately represent the biblical faith.  
However, a response to these contentions is: If one is to construct contextualized Christology 
on the basis of one of several so called Christological assumptions in the Bible, would the 
end-product not also entail a “by-product” of the biblical faith, and for that matter also be 
liable for misconception concerning the person of Christ – the same misappropriation 
Nicene/Chalcedon is accused of? Interestingly, whether or not Pobee’s degree (functional) 
Christology faithfully represents the totality of the person of Christ, as being portrayed in the 
Scripture, is another issue worth considering; but this would go beyond the scope of this 
thesis (see Pobee 1979:82).  
Obviously, the church in African would gain much by standing with Nicene/Chalcedon which 
is duly represented in the tradition of mainline Christianity rather than an individual Christian 
Christological proposal which is in conflict with the ecumenical councils.  
The importance of ecumenical councils lies with the Church Fathers’ efforts to protect the 
essentials of the Christian theology from degenerating into relativism whereby each Christian 
holds a belief as he or she understands it. This would have been the case if an individual 
Christian would have to select any of the several so called New Testament Christological 
assumptions to fit their situations. This is not to say that individual Christians are not at 
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liberty to exegete the content of biblical passages and arrive at what they each deem to be the 
right meaning of the text. The aim of the ecumenical councils was to guide Christians with 
regard to the essentials of Christian doctrines.  
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the decisions of the Councils of Nicea and 
Chalcedon were arrived at amidst conflicts. This leads us to the second major charge against 
the authenticity of Nicene/Chalcedon as reference point for ecumenical Christianity. There is 
a contention against the ecumenical councils that their decisions have previously served as a 
spring board for disunity and that this continues up to this day. For this reason, it would be 
illegitimate for one to promote Nicene/Chalcedon as basis for contextualized Christology or 
as postulate for a new ecumenism.  
Again, if such an indictment on Nicene/Chalcedon, which serves as its negative outcome, has 
more weight than the Councils’ positive outcomes, then, the authenticity of a Nyamesofopreko 
Christology, which is primarily based on Nicea/Chalcedonian Christology, becomes 
irrelevant. 
It must be noted, however, that in the world of human beings, no ideological position could be 
maintained without conflict. Christian doctrines could therefore be no exception. These 
disunities, though not desirable, ensued from the Church Fathers’ bona fides – to maintain the 
church unity in Christ and its identity as Christian. For this reason such disunity could be 
regarded as a necessary evil.  
Besides, one will overstate one’s case if disunity could only be associated with the 
ecumenical councils. These Councils’ aim was Unity in Christ and the church identity as 
being Christian. For that matter, such a noble aim has been largely achieved if one would 
compare the Church today with the ecumenical creeds to what it would have looked like had 
there not been any ecumenical Council.  
Of course, comparing an existing situation with a non-existence alternate one, and declaring 
the existing situation as a better option is based on the fallacy – argument from silence. 
Usually such arguments are not regarded as strong ones. Nonetheless, if one is to compare a 
community with communal point of references (i.e., laws), with a community without any 
such point of reference, it is more probable that the former would have an advantage over the 
latter. 
Without any form of theological unity, theological discourse could degenerate into confusion. 
For this reason, from the early days of the church, the decisions of the ecumenical councils 
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have been taken as adequate summaries of both the biblical witness and the preaching and 
teaching of the church. The decisions of the councils served both as a means of identification 
and the basis for unity. These decisions provided and continue to provide a norm both for 
reading the scriptures and for evangelism and instruction (Turner 2001:9 also see Geddes 
1980). 
These ecumenical decisions have anchored the church in beliefs and practices without which 
the church in Ghana, Africa and the rest of the world can preserve neither its unity in Christ 
nor its identity as being Christian. In keeping with this view, I hold that theology as a practice 
of the church is responsible to the doctrines of the church as derived from Holy Scripture and 
expressed in the ecumenical decisions. 
Thus, for any Christological proposal to be relevant and authentic, it has to be based on the 
following: biblical narratives, a thorough inhabiting of the traditions of the church, and a 
critical engagement with the age in which we live. This conviction provides a necessary basis 
for the renewal and reunion of the divided Church not only amongst the Akan but also 
worldwide between Christians. This is what I have attempted through a Nyamesofopreko 
Christology.  
African Christianity is largely pro Nicene/Chalcedon. As noted in chapter 1, the missionaries 
who introduced Christianity to West Africa were largely affiliated to the churches who, at 
least, officially adhered to Nicene/Chalcedonian decisions. The church in West Africa has 
subsequently remained largely pro-Nicene/Chalcedonian. For this very reason, would it not be 
more appropriate, if one wants to engage in responsible theological reflection, to set the 
Nicene/Chalcedon confessional definition of the person of Christ as the appropriate point of 
reference for a contextualised Christology?  
Only when the African church anchors its faith within the tradition of the church that the 
church can assess proposals which do not cohere well with the doctrines of the ecumenical 
church.  
8.4.2 Can a Nyamesofopreko Christology be of value to other Christians within their  
own contexts? 
I have captured the argument of this study with three Akan terms, namely the conglomerates 
Nyamesofopreko and Afomusuyideε as well as the concept of Okra. Such characterisations 
may appear to be a major stumbling block for the ecumenical significance of a 
Nyamesofopreko Christology. One might dismiss the whole thesis as an inculturated edition 
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of local theology – which does not have any wider theological appeal. The pertinent question 
in this regard would be: What if one does not share the Akan view that human beings are 
composed of okra, sunsum, ntoro and mogya? Although these concepts are drawn largely 
from the Akan context and are partly applicable to the general African context, they may in 
my view be recognised ecumenically and they could have ecumenical significance.  
a) The core meaning of the myth of God’s withdrawal could have ecumenical Christian 
significance  
 A Nyamesofopreko Christology draws on African mythology, with reference to the myth of 
God’s withdrawal. The core meaning of this myth concerns a broken relationship between 
God and humankind. 
This thesis builds on the traditional Akan myth of Onyame’s self-withdrawal and the absence 
of a priesthood for Onyame. The observation was offered that, in traditional Akan religion and 
culture, no suitable mediator has been identified that could restore the relationship between 
Onyame and humanity. This observation is followed by a constructive proposal on providing 
such a mediator.  
The proposal is that the term Nyamesofopreko may be employed to portray Jesus Christ as 
God’s unique priest, i.e. as the One who, for the first time, could fulfill this mediating role 
since he is professed to be a person without sin. As God’s unique priest, Jesus mediates 
between God and humankind, following the alienation between them (interpreted within the 
traditional Akan context in terms of the myth of God’s withdrawal).  
This myth is not unique to the Akan. With some slight differences it is a shared by many 
different societies in Africa. Africans do not consider this myth as a historical fact, but draw 
on the core message which the myth entails. 
Given that it is not the story itself that matters to the African, but rather its embedded 
message, the core meaning of the myth of God’s withdrawal could also be recognised as 
having ecumenical significance for other Christians worldwide. 
b) The proposal of okra as Christian concept could be recognised ecumenically and 
might have ecumenical significance  
The characterisation of okra as a Christological concept, may also appear to be the major 
question for the ecumenical significance of such a Nyamesofopreko Christology. However, 
this argument is not so strong. The reason is that the Akan conception of being human, like 
those of the Greeks, Hebrews or any other, is not a structure that one can allude to as being 
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factual. Even, the theological dichotomy of human body and mind cannot be taken at its face 
value as factual.  
The different conceptions of humanity are assumptions of being human, based on the 
expressions of diverse cultures. That is to say, any anthropological notion is necessarily posed 
from a particular perspective. Even the materialist view of a human being as constituted by 
material components only, cannot be taken as a statement of facts. This enables one to 
communicate and expand the moment, to remember the past and to anticipate the future.  
Besides, one might pose the question: If Greek Christians can apply the concept of Logos as 
an analogy to express the Christian faith, why can the Akan concept of okra not be used in 
similar vein, especially if the concept of okra may be used to express Christian beliefs?  
On this basis, a Nyamesofopreko Christology, although it takes its point of departure from the 
Akan anthropology and culture, could be recognised ecumenically and might have ecumenical 
significance for other Christian theological discourses.  
c) The core meaning of Akan “sin sacrifice” could have ecumenical Christian 
significance 
I suggested that Jesus did not die to pay the penalty of our sins. Rather, he died as afodeε and 
musoyideε (afomusuyideε), that is, to acknowledge our sins and remove our sins and the curse 
that accompany them. 
This hypothesis is based on the traditional Akan understanding of sin sacrifice and curse 
removal. These traditional practices are also found in many African, particularly West 
African, societies. I argued that these practices have close similarities with the practices of 
sacrifice relayed by the Old Testament teaching and in Judaism as well as that of the ancient 
Greeks and Romans.  
The concept of afomusuyideε pivots on “reconciliation” as the most probable aim of the 
ancient sacrifices. It also entails that a genuine “acknowledgement of sin” is symbolised by 
the ritual of sacrificing the animal to serve as precursor to forgiveness and reconciliation. One 
could agree with Conradie that such sacrifices can never ensure full remuneration. It is offered 
as a symbol of the whole and accepted on that basis. Even though the deficit can never be 
redressed, the sacrifice needs to be commensurate with the gravity of the offense – as far as 
this might be possible. Conradie describes this in terms of the notion of a “deficit”5
                                                 
5      This is derives from oral discussions with Prof. Conradie of  the Department of Religion and Theology, 
. 
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Such a view expresses adequately the timely and universally well accepted principle of 
reconciliation. On this basis, the concept of afomusuyideε based on the Akan sacrificial 
practices, could also have ecumenical significance for other expressions of the Christian faith.  
8.5 Conclusion 
To sum up the proposal of this thesis: The person of Jesus is presented as God’s unique priest 
(Nyamesofopreko): he is the incarnation of the Okra of Onyame (Nyamekrateasefo). The 
purpose of this incarnation was that the Okra of Onyame through the person of God’s unique 
priest became the Afomusuyi (sin sacrifice and curse bearer) for humankind.  
Logically, any complete Christology serves as a prolegomena for reflection on the doctrine of 
the Trinity. This is the case when Jesus’ divinity is not denied; denial leads to the rejection of 
the doctrine of the Trinity as well. Thus my proposal rests on the foundation of faith in the 
triune God. This was conceptualised as Nyamebaasafua, that is, Onyame Ntoro (God the 
Father) Onyame Okra (God the Son) and Onyame Sunsum Kronkron (God the Holy Spirit). 
The characterisation of okra and also Nyamesofopreko, Afomusuyideε and Nyamebaasafua as 
Christological concepts, might also appear to be the major problem for my proposal to be 
regarded as ecumenically significant. However, this argument does not hold. The reason is 
that, for example, the Akan conception of being human, like those of the Greeks, Hebrews or 
any other, does not entail a structure or entity that one can allude to as being factual. The 
different conceptions of humanity are assumptions to explain what it means to be human. 
That is to say, any anthropological assumptions are necessarily derived from a particular 
perspective. Nonetheless, they could serve as operational concepts.  
On this basis, the relevant question remains: If Greek Christians can apply the concept of 
Logos as a core concept to express the Christian faith, and if that can indeed become a viable 
ecumenical concept, why can the Akan concept of okra not be used in similar vein to express 
core Christian beliefs?  
Thus, a Nyamesofopreko Christology, although it takes its point of departure from the Akan 
anthropology and culture, may be recognised ecumenically and may have ecumenical 
significance for wider Christian theological discourses.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
University of the Western Cape South Africa, on 17th September 2007. 
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Trinity: Three persons in Godhead( )Nyamebaasafoa
Incarnation / Two natures in one person
Illustrative Diagrams: Incarnation, two natures in one person and Trinity
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